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The mission of the journal is to create a modern platform of full value for discussion, exchange of international and national experience and specific knowledge among professionals in the field of Public Administration; for working out and further correcting the development strategy of public and municipal administration.

The editorial policy is to provide a very clear emphasis on the specific subject along with the focusing on the interconnection of the properly public administration problems with the relative economic, legal, political science and managerial problems, including interaction of the state and civil society.

The following key issues are addressed:
- The theory and practices of the public administration;
- Legal aspects of the state and municipal administration;
- The analyses of experts;
- Discussions;
- Case Studies;
- The training and the improvement of specialists in public administration.

The journal is meant for analysts and researchers, workers in the public and municipal administration, for academic purposes and for a wider readership interested in current status and development of the system of public and municipal administration in the Russian Federation and abroad.

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GUEST EDITOR'S PREFACE

The Special English language Issue of the PAI is the third in the history of the journal. The policy of the PAI is to cooperate in preparing special issues with outstanding international research and expert institutions, and to promote international comparative research in the field of public administration.

This Special Issue of the PAI is prepared jointly with the Kennan Institute – a division of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (Washington DC, USA). Most of the articles in the Special Issue (seven out of a total of nine) are dedicated to subjects that were either based on or related to the research projects that were completed by scholars during their stay at the Kennan Institute. The interest for participation in our Special Issue was so great that it was not an easy task for the Editorial Board to choose the articles for publication from more than twenty which applied for publication.

We would like to express our huge appreciation to the Kennan Institute for their valuable support of this scientific initiative, as well as for the distribution of the *call for papers* among the Kennan alumni, which had a favorable response, and for providing constant and fruitful communication with the authors during the process of improving the draft articles.

The content of the Special Issue covers areas of research connected with contemporary theory and practice of public administration and public policy, of which scholars in Russia and in the USA continue to have enthusiastic discussions. There are several topics of paramount significance among them: how to shape better public administration reforms by means of the existing administrative paradigms; how to improve the quality of public leadership using new technologies for transforming leaders' mindsets; how to evaluate macroeconomic consequences of the national debt's influence on the development of national economy (debt as a managerial instrument for the development of the national economy); how to struggle against corruption in transitional countries; what kind of migrant policy is suitable for shaping labor migration; how constructing city-agglomerations can restore the growth and development of the national economy; how to improve the quality of federal-regional "vertical" cooperation in modern federative countries; and, how regional authorities can better shape the administrative practice of communication with the local mass media.

The publication of the Special Issue, I believe, will improve interrelations between the researchers and think-tanks of both countries and promote the restoration of the heavily damaged Russian–US cooperation in social sciences and humanities, especially in such a palpable area as the analytics of public administration and policy.

Guest Editor, Alexey G. Barabashev

ARE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE PARADIGMS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE TOOLS TO RESOLVE THE CONTEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE CRISIS?

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Abstract

The hypothesis of the article is that the basic administrative paradigms (Weberian and neo-Weberian; NPM; New Public Governance) are not capable of providing tools and procedures (sets of administrative mechanisms, attributed to the basic administrative paradigms) for governance which are suitable for overcoming the global administrative crisis. The arguments in support of this hypothesis are outlined according to an analysis of scenarios of using such administrative mechanisms under the conditions of administrative crisis: (a) to use each set of administrative mechanism (or to limit their usage through some "good mechanisms") in the practice of governance despite their attribution to different basic administrative paradigms; (b) to select the "best" basic administrative paradigm and to only follow this particular vision with recommendations on how to shape the administration and its work.

In the final part of the article the possible principles of a new administrative paradigm that could be relevant to the fast-changing contemporary situation and current instability are discussed.

Keywords: administrative crisis; public administration reform; administrative paradigm; administrative mechanisms; effective state.

General Introduction into the Subject
(administrative crisis and administrative paradigms)

As this article is the second in a series of research papers dedicated to the author's discovery of a new Effective State paradigm (see the first article: Baraba-

shev, 2016), I would like to start with a brief introductory description, mainly for English speaking readers, of the approach and ideas described in the first article that are used as the foundation for the present research.

Recently, we have witnessed, worldwide, the escalating appearance of different local complexes of innovations which combine scientific, technological, economic, and social entities. Such complexes are increasingly influencing countries' development. States all over the contemporary world need the creation of new approaches to management in the new, rapidly changing conditions of innovative turmoil. This means that instead of the globalization of governance based on multinational agreements and on the coordination of hierarchical stability, a new governance reality affects every country, without exclusion, in terms of conditions of instability and uncertainty. The last decade has clearly shown that administrative tools and procedures of governance (so-called administrative mechanisms) should be heavily and repeatedly re-shaped and modernized.

The administrative crisis that is a consequence of misbalances produced by innovative development highlights the incapability of national governments to react properly to new kinds of challenges. Mistrust in governments, a lack of many globalist initiatives, economic volatility, the appearance of numerous international conflicts, and the attempts of many countries "to find their own way" are all based on governments losing their grip through their resistance to address administrative crisis.

On the level of public administration theory, as described in the first article, all three basic administrative paradigms, namely, Weberian and neo-Weberian (the latter is consistent with the Weberian approach, because both are interpreting state and bureaucracy as a subject), the New Public Management paradigm (with its interpretation of state and bureaucracy as a set of administrative service functions), and the New Public Governance paradigm (which describes the state and civil service as a network of relations with civil society), produce chains of theories and models that purport to elaborate the administrative mechanisms capable of overcoming the recent administrative crisis in the best way. Again, such theories and models respond differently to the modern administrative crisis, which consists of a sequence of rapid and uneven innovative challenges that are impossible to reject and quite difficult to accept.

In order to briefly describe the essence of the basic administrative paradigm approaches to solving the contemporary administrative crisis, it is important to note that these approaches are rather different. The Weberian paradigm proposes administrative mechanisms to reconstruct the system of government bodies based on the explication and division of their responsibilities, and to increase the professional competences of public servants according to their specifics. The Neo-Weberian approach stresses the idea that the ethical essence of professional behavior and the motivation to serve people should be placed at the center of efforts to make governance better. NPM reacts to the crisis with two sorts of proposals: first, from an external perspective, how to specify the functions of government bodies, paying attention mainly to the regulation

(improvement of services delivery), and to control the strengthening of functions, including relations with civil society, and how to outsource functions from the public sector to the private sector. Secondly, from an internal point of view, for public service, NPM proposed mechanisms on how to downsize staff on the basis of its KPI, to reduce the transaction costs of state management. Finally, Good Governance, or New Public Governance, as it is sometimes called, is a paradigm which made advances in increasing the openness and transparency of governments, and on the co-productive relations between the government and its citizens (Bingham, Nabatchi & O'Leary, 2005; Hinţea, Profiroiu & Tţiclău, 2015).

The introduction to the research questions
(The divergence of the best governance practices
are far beyond the existing basic administrative paradigms)

The potential of the existing administrative paradigms is evident in its reaction to the current administrative crisis. Recently, as an expert group member of the Russian Labor and Social Protection Ministry (ML), I had the chance to see the public authorities' work. Due to the need for the elaboration of administrative mechanisms that are suitable for the rapidly changing conditions of governance in our country, in circumstances of full-scale economic (and not only economic) turbulence, the ML, which is responsible for civil service management, announced a national competition among the government and municipal bodies. The call for an annual competition, now entering its third year (ML of Russia, competitions, 2016), solicits best practices in governance from state entities in the areas of human resource management, including the search for and selection of personnel, qualification requirements, professional adaptation, professional development, motivation and remuneration, professional culture, anti-corruption techniques, rotation and transfer to other positions, attestation and qualified exams, personnel reserves, information technology for HR management, and other topics formulated by the applicants (entities) themselves. Two cycles of the competition were resulted through the decisions of the expert group regarding which practices are best, and whether they can be replicated by other bodies.

At the time of the evaluations it was impossible to recognize any anomalies in the results, especially at the second competition cycle (2015) when over 200 applications from governmental bodies were received. Over time, however, I have recognized that almost all of the selected best practices have some remarkable features. In the 2015 competition we found several unusual aspects (the best practices are presented in their entirety at the: ML of Russia, best practices, 2016):

(1) All of the best practices are connected with dramatic cuts in financing;

(2) Most applications were dedicated to non-standard procedures involving how to find (select) the appropriate personnel capable of finding flexible solutions to problems. Such practices were much appreciated. They are not

intended to improve the legislation, but rather to find mechanisms for the implementation of norms;

(3) Second in number were those best practices showing how to develop the abilities of personnel in order to adapt to rapidly changing conditions of governance, including the ability to undertake continuous education and self-development;

(4) Third in number were best practices on how to evaluate the final outcomes (not outputs) of civil servant activity beyond the existing KPIs;

(5) At the core of almost all the best practices was a strategy of working with personnel, along with the evaluation of the quality of personnel based on the results of the strateg implementation;

(6) To sum up, the administrative mechanisms proposed by government bodies were heterogeneous and in some significant ways went far beyond the tools and procedures proposed by the basic administrative paradigms. Great dissatisfaction with governmental and municipal bodies about "standard" mechanisms is clearly evident.

Remarkably, almost the same situation regarding the variety of practices beyond the NPM framework is mentioned in the workings of other EU countries' governments (De Vries, Nemec, 2013). Heterogeneity of contexts and tools for strategic planning strongly requires flexibility and a willingness to learn throughout the process (Bryson, 2004) is seen at the local departmental level in the USA (Edvards, 2012). We can conclude that the present practices of governance should be understood from the position of existing basic administrative paradigms: if these paradigms are capable of providing practices of governance with "one-size-fits-all" tools or not.

The research questions (about which administrative mechanisms are better for governance in the current administrative crisis)

Due to the difference in the basic paradigms' "recipes for practitioners" it is necessary to answer the questions: "Which administrative mechanisms are better to select for the elimination of the governance shortcomings at the time of an administrative crisis, and why?". Some questions on the usage of the administrative mechanism should be asked, starting with the simplest and then proceeding to the more complicated and theoretically stronger:

Question 1. Is it possible to follow the easiest managerial decision for the contemporary practice of governance: to accept all the administrative mechanisms from different administrative paradigms simultaneously, without paying attention to the theoretical heterogeneity of the proposed instruments? Actually, governments are mostly used to this way of acting (Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2011). However, the problem of accepting the results of such a "theoretically omnivorous" approach is vital: an eclectic application of the mechanisms from different theories in practice, despite their controversial background and disagreements, could entail negative consequences. My hypothesis is that this can't be a proper decision, because

theoretical unscrupulousness makes the practice of governance weaker, especially under conditions of crisis, when the cost of administrative mistakes is much higher.

Question 2. A more advanced question: is it possible to select the *best* mechanisms elaborated in different paradigms and to only use the good procedures and tools despite the differences in their theoretical roots? For NPM and Good Governance, as an example, M. De Vries and J. Nemec outlined, that "Nonetheless, many NMP based tools and instruments are still being used and optimized in order to support the process of improvement. Internally, governments are still trying to optimize their internal work. Externally, a shift from emphasizing minimal government (NPM) into trends toward good governance is indeed visible" (De Vries, Nemec, 2013, p. 13). To generalize and re-formulate the question of selective usage: what are the comparative shortcomings of the theories and approaches developed within the framework of the main administrative paradigms of public administration? Which administrative mechanisms should be neglected, and which are better kept in the managerial arsenal? To answer these questions it is necessary to take into account both the theoretical arguments (requirements for completeness, and the theoretical justification of administrative mechanisms), and the disadvantages associated with the practical solutions proposed by such administrative mechanisms. The hypothesis of selecting and simultaneously using essentially the best administrative mechanisms from different paradigms is impossible here because of the strict contradictions in the organizational implementation of such heterogeneous mechanisms.

Question 3. The last and "strongest question" is about the possibility of selecting only those mechanisms that belong to an exclusively administrative paradigm. For example, the neo-Weberian paradigm as the best option was strongly supported by (Drechsler, 2005a). The question is, which paradigm is best (or most suitable) in a practical sense, to choose for the purposes to overcome the present administrative crisis? My thesis here is also negative: to select the best paradigm from the existing list is impossible. All of the basic administrative paradigms at present fail principally because they can't lead to success toward eliminating the administrative crisis. Moreover, if one pretends to find solutions using only the limited, existing basic administrative paradigms' approaches, it will lead toward the multiplication of the contemporary problems of governance.

Question 4. Finally, as the last variant of the research question, I would like to ask whether it is possible to find a new administrative paradigm, which will be relevant in its administrative mechanisms to a proper reaction to the crisis of contemporary governance. The thesis (hypothesis) of the article is that this is the only way out of the present administrative crisis. Hence, future research should be committed to the discovery of principles and administrative mechanisms for this hypothetical new paradigm.

Review of approaches (literature)

Discussions on which kind of governance is needed to overcome the current crisis are mainly concentrated around the external context of governance, its public nature. The reasons for paying so much attention to the external context

of governance are simple: governments first of all are inefficient in their relations with citizens. As G. Peters wrote, "the most fundamental paradox has been that while along many dimensions public administration has improved much of its internal performance, it is currently regarded publicity as even more inefficient and ineffective than ever" (Peters, 2013, p. 315). In addition, it is a deep conviction of many researchers that to improve governance, one must change the political and cultural context, not the internal administrative mechanisms, which are secondary and dependent of the context. The significance of the external context for the improvement of governance is expressed clearly by V. Junjan and R. Torenvleid (Junjan & Torenvleid, 2016). They stressed that "Public management reforms (but also public management research on reforms) have put too much emphasis on government control and not enough emphasis on democratic responsiveness. In Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), these imbalances have led to unsustainable reforms, harming the quality of public service delivery and also political stability" (Ibid, p. 321).

In the EU case, the problems of migration, of political authoritarianism, of Brexit, of the concentration of decision-making at the level of the European Commission, and of the rising indebtedness, have been the most significant issues for governance in recent years[1]. For China, the one-partisan (in essence) political system and existing (to this day) ideology of communism are estimated both as the foundation of social stability, and as the blocking of the route to administrative reform.

The neo-institutional approach gives a good insight into a better understanding of the external approach toward changes in public administration (Kuhlmann, Wollmann, 2014, p. 44–47). In Russia, several researchers also trace the fundamental problems of governance toward neo-institutional peculiarities of a political system. Neopatrimonialism and cynical behavior of the Russian elite is the main barrier to administrative reform (Gelman, 2015, p. 7). Transitional state crisis related to the indefiniteness of all social processes in the country, which is completely applicable to Russia, is embodied in malfunctions of governance, in tensions within the Russian power institutional design (weak legitimacy of governance, and, as result the orientation of governance not to effectiveness, but to social fairness and to justification; and weak coordination and accountability of bureaucracy (Kupriashin, 2015, p. 5).

However, despite the extrinsic (external) approach toward governance reshaping in the conditions of crisis prevailing, the intrinsic (internal) approach to overcoming administrative crisis also exists. Its position is that no progress in governance is possible unless appropriate administrative mechanisms are elaborated. Moreover, small technical steps in providing progress in administrative mechanisms of governance (the so-called, "theory of small deeds") are more fruitful than any institutional transformations. This position clearly contradicts to already cited thesis that the administrative mechanisms elaboration is secondary in overcoming a governance crisis.

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[1]   This was M. Potucek's recent discussant thesis at the Annual Meeting of the International Network for Social Policy Research and Teaching, Milano, October 23–25, 2016.

Internal (intrinsic) re-shaping of governance connects progress in governance with the possibility of existing administrative paradigms to be functional and deliver results. The internal position is embodied in three different variants that are discussed in the course of administrative reform implementation:

1) The transition from NPM paradigm ("audeau, consumers epoch"). The idea is to dismiss NPM tools as outdated at the time of crisis, or to use them together with other tools beyond NPM (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). A review of this position and related sources, traced by researchers (De Vries, Nemec, 2013) back to 1988, and which have become the "motto" today, is resumed by them in the words about present changes in the usage of NPM administrative mechanisms: "Common paradigm (NPM – A.B.) shifts are also visible from emphasizing a short term goal achievement to stressing the need to address long term effectiveness; from an emphasis on efficiency to stressing effectiveness; from emphasizing outputs to outcomes; from input (what is put in) to thinking process (how to do it), et cetera" (ibid., p. 8).

2) The transition toward a neo-Weberian paradigm ("vivat, ethical state"). The roots of this position are embedded in understanding that administrative technique without reflexive behavior has become a kitsch which "can be pre-digested, prepackaged, and sold as a largely unproblematic activity with a barely disguised "how-to" training guide intends" (Samier, 2005, p. 39). Of course, the reflexive position means that we recognize critical thinking and behavior as ethical categories that give soul to the administrative procedure. As Samier wrote "what does it mean to BE an administrator, beyond and underlying the professional duties and technical skills formally prescribed"? (ibid, p. 18). It gives a new birth to the Weberian paradigm as reincarnated into a neo-Weberian ethical shape.

3) The transition toward Good Governance (New Public Governance) paradigm ("welcome, shared governance"). The administrative mechanisms guided by bureaucracy should be replaced by mechanisms, where decision-making is attributed to the participation of civil society. "This model emphasizes relationships between the population, public servants, and other actors (for example nonprofit organizations), and the organizational landscape is characterized by networks, inter-organizational relationships, and multi-actor policy-making" (cited from: Sicilia, Guarini, Sancino, Andreani, Ruffini, 2016, p. 11), The co-production of public services as voluntary efforts by individuals and groups to enhance the quality of services they use has become the focal point of new public governance (Brandsen, Pestoff, Verschuere, 2012), with the outsourcing of some administrative functions (Obolonsky, Barabashev, 2014). The idea of NPM, that the government should be oriented towards market and business, is replaced by the idea that the population should be a co-producer of a new public value.

Study of the research questions

To answer the research questions raised in the previous section of the article, I would point out that it is not proof in a strong (G.W. Leibniz) sense. Rather,

it is a reasonable argumentation in support of my position, because the subject of research lies in the field of the theory of public administration, and all rationale here is also theoretic: it is reasoning, not calculations.

Reasoning on question 1 (to accept all administrative mechanisms from different administrative paradigms simultaneously)

Let us consider higher administrative personnel management. What might the consequences of simultaneous usage of managerial mechanisms produced by different administrative paradigms be? This has already been done in Russia, and the results can be evaluated as a negative experience.

To describe the sets of different mechanisms, the management of higher personnel can be founded on:

(1) A meritocratic approach toward selection and promotions to higher positions (not for political nominees). It is the Weberian paradigm tool kit, based on the evaluation of the level of professional competencies, on resume analysis (professional education and experience), on the testing of professional skills and abilities to solve the problems, on participation in educational and training programs. Such an approach is most effective in the case of establishing a unified government structure that has the authority to guide the selection and nomination of cadres to positions, the promotion of higher administrative personnel. It should be more or less similar to the functions of Office of Personnel Management in the USA (Wyen, Beeck, Hondeghem, 2013; Mann, 2009; Lobanov, 2006). As for Russia, we can see some elements of such an approach in the merit procedures of recruitment and promotion, of cadres' reserves, that are fixed in Russian civil service legislation and currently supported by ML.

(2) Another approach toward working with higher administrative personnel can be seen in the NPM paradigm that proposes other kinds of administrative tools. Here the accent is fixed on the evaluation of services effectiveness. It is the mechanisms of processes effectiveness evaluation (via administrative regulation of services, so-called "administrative reglaments", and job descriptions scrupulous implementation). Citizens, as consumers of public services, are given evaluations priority. Higher administrative personnel should possess full responsibility for the quality of services, and weak indicators should lead toward administrative penalties for state managers. The ML of Russia has elaborated some methodic recommendations for governmental bodies on how to evaluate administrative personnel this way (ML of Russia, evaluation procedures, 2016). Recent transformation of the NPM administrative mechanisms for higher administrative personnel performance measurement have led toward new accents on the evaluation of the strategic activity and the achievement of objectives (Bozhya-Volya, 2009; Rato, Baptista, Ferraz, Rodrigues, 2008); toward the evaluation of flexibility in goals and task setting, and in the achievement of targeted results (Bouckaert, Halligan, 2007). As a consequence, in the context of NPM administrative mechanisms, higher administrative personnel should be in disposal of relevant administrative bodies, and there is no need in a unified center (as OPM in the USA), because neither

professional competencies, nor continuous educational programs are critical for promotions based on specific services delivery, its strategy elaboration and implementation.

(3) The "Open Government" approach that is referred to in New Public Governance administrative mechanisms is the willingness of top civil servants to work in close contact with NGOs and citizens, to share decision-making responsibilities, to accept volunteer assistance, and to become moderators and executors (directors) of publicly produced decisions (Sicilia, Guarini, Sancino, Andreani, Ruffini, 2016), and bearers of a new type of administrative culture of co-production (Alford, 2009). The "mediagenic", public credibility and charisma, ability to listen to people, to change one's position and to lead – these are the remarkable features of higher administrative personnel. Such features either exist "naturally", or are originally absent. It is possible to improve or to weaken them due to inappropriate actions, but not to create them "from zero". Which is why entering the "administrative elite" outside is possible, and procedures such as standard education training, selection by merit, or by the effectiveness of services delivery are not sufficient here. Also, such charismatic leaders are quite difficult to fire from their positions because of their publicity and peoples' support. Any personnel managerial structure, or structures, is not capable of growing such leaders, it is a phenomenon of appearance, that they come and become those who they are.

Is it wise to blend all three sets of administrative mechanisms described above, to work with higher administrative personnel? In Russia, such an eclectic attempt is under implementation right now. Hence, we receive such unpleasant results as:

– The programs of training and continuous education for higher personnel that are made "for show", formally, and their results are not considered to be a reason for promotion;

– Personnel management bodies are not unified, and their responsibilities are intersects (Russia has at least three competing structures- inside the ML of Russia, in the Administration of the President of Russia, and in the Apparatus of the Government of Russia), plus the HR unit also has such responsibilities in each governmental body;

– Cadres' priorities are unclearly articulated.

The crucial questions here are: How to work with top administrative personnel? Who should be promoted, and why? Which structure will be responsible for top administrative officials, their selection, training, and promotion? Different paradigms answer those questions controversially, and it shows that, at least in Russia, in this particular case, the eclectic consumption of tools from all of the basic administrative paradigms fails. It is remarkable that we can find the same conclusion following on from other arguments. To argue the transition from NPM to neo-Weberian paradigm in Central and Eastern European countries, W. Drechsler writes "Yet, with systems as heterogeneous as NPM and "Weberian" PA, most elements are not functional outside of their context, and might even destroy the mechanics of another system. Too much flexibility in a merit system, for instance, ruins its advantages" (Drechsler, 2005 b, p. 102).

The results of the analysis can be presented as a diagram (Diagram):

Competencies   **Motivation**

Effectiveness

The diagram express the contradictions in administrative mechanisms proposed by the basic administrative paradigms. Actually, the difference of 3 types of selection and promotion shows that to combine them is impossible.

Reasoning on question 2 (to select practically best mechanisms elaborated in different paradigms)
To select some optional ("best") administrative tools and procedures from basic administrative paradigms, and to combine them, we need to compare theoretical and practical disadvantages of the administrative mechanisms. The idea is to reject the administrative mechanisms that show significant obstacles for their usage in the administrative crisis conditions. It is better to demonstrate such disadvantages in the form of a table (Table).

Table

Disadvantages of administrative mechanisms proposed
by basic administrative paradigms

Paradigm	Basic theoretical principles	Theoretical disadvantages	Practical disadvantages
Ideal Weberian state / Meritocracy *Neo-Weberian state / Ethical meritocracy*			
Structural ideal state	Formation of responsible state as procedures for specification of the structure and responsibilities of governmental bodies	The structure of governmental bodies cannot be fixed forever, it is flexible	Structural reforms of government are not relevant to the administrative crisis; they become outdated too fast. Additionally, the structural reforms lead toward temporary disorganization of governance (for up to a one year period, as it was in Russia in 2004)

Paradigm	Basic theoretical principles	Theoretical disadvantages	Practical disadvantages
Ethical meritocracy	Formation of professional ethics of civil service – creation of the ethical infrastructure of governance	Professional ethics is not separate from general ethics, it is culturally and socially dependent	Unimpeachable professional ethical behavior cannot, by itself, replace the correct and fast reaction on innovative changes (phenomena of ethical, but not effective actions)
Motivational meritocracy	Improving motivation of civil servants toward PSM	Public interests are impossible to determine without contradictions	Motivation is oriented to the stable system of values, but due to innovative processes, the goals and conditions of governance are changing, and it is followed by rapid changing of priorities and of values
Competencies based meritocracy	Improvement of professional competencies of civil servants and elaboration of the qualification requirements for job positions	Professional competencies is hard to determine, the professional qualifications requirements are too general and conditional	At contemporary administrative crisis, all professional competencies are dynamic, and they became outdated rapidly
NPM / effective bureaucracy			
State of services	Regulation of the functionality of governmental bodies and elaboration of regulatory acts for services delivery	Administrative regulation of services delivery does not embrace all functions of governmental bodies. Also, the complete detailed, taking into account all cases of administrative regulation of services is impossible	The process of administrative regulation slows decision-making. Otherwise, the crisis requires fast and flexible mechanisms of responsiveness
Regulatory state (oversight) and regulatory impact assessment	Elaboration of the procedures that can improve an effective oversight, such as inspections, checklists, etc, and to prevent ? unjustified regulation	Oversight functions are growing as metastases. Additional corruption risks do exist. Also, the measures of oversight are principally incomplete	Transaction costs of oversight are increased at crisis conditions, because the oversight procedures are too awkward
Processes: Effective bureaucracy (KPI and BSC effectiveness of civil servants)	Elaboration and improvement of the tools for evaluation of processes of activity of civil servants	Outcomes evaluation is replaced by outputs and by processes effectiveness evaluation, it distorts the understanding of which professional activity is successful	Working not for real effects, but on "indicators" is dangerous. Also, the initiative of civil servants is oppressed by the introduction of such indicators

Paradigm	Basic theoretical principles	Theoretical disadvantages	Practical disadvantages
Strategic and planning effectiveness of bureaucracy	Elaboration of the instruments for evaluation of strategic effectiveness, including SMART and PEST analysis. Elaboration of the instruments for evaluation of the plans of professional activity	Strategic effectiveness cannot possibly be introduced, undoubtedly because the strategy is just an optional selection of goals. Also, the strategic effectiveness is not attributed to "line" servants, but just to managerial level servants. Executive staff should not discover their own strategies. The plans constructed "from existed" conditions, they are provisional	Strategic effectiveness of civil servants' activity at the time of administrative crisis is not sustainable: the conditions and goals of governance are changing rapidly. The planning becomes problematic due to the emergence of unpredictable new settings
New Public Governance State / bureaucracy of participation			
Participatory governance	Elaboration and decision-making in interaction with civil society (governance as the network of communications with structures of civil society and with citizens)	Network of communication is hard to formalize and to clearly find the conditions and borders of collective decision-making	In practice, the lobbying of private and of some peculiar social groups is not excluded. How are the "pseudo-structures", that are created just for material profits (distribution of public funds) eliminated? It is especially significant at the time of crisis, when the tensions between different group interests are increasing
State of stratified participation of different social actors, and of co-production	Elaboration of decisions in interaction with different social actors (business, state established organizations, NGOs, citizens)	Conditions and borders of collective decision-making processes are overcomplicated	Manipulation from the state, especially in transitional and developing countries, increase if the social contract does not exist. Also, the set of actors at the time of crisis is changing perpetually
State of outsourcing	The transfer of government bodies' responsibilities (functions) toward external (NGO, business, etc.) organizations	The criteria, which responsibilities are needed to be transferred, is difficult to find. Also, how are the bodies' responsibilities and people's rights to participate combined?	Potential corruption of the transferring of responsibilities from state to other entities

Paradigm	Basic theoretical principles	Theoretical disadvantages	Practical disadvantages
Co-productive bureaucracy (sharing responsibilities for decision-making, accepting volunteering by individuals and groups)	Network distribution of the responsibilities and duties	Unclear, how to formulate the networking (collective) responsibility for decisions	Administrative crisis is sharpening the social contradictions, and it is hard to achieve consensus in decision-making

It is clear from the list of disadvantages, that practical ones are tightly connected with theoretical disadvantages. To generalize, an administrative crisis which is an aspect of the global crisis of governance due to misbalances of innovative development, sheds the light on the weak aspects of existing administrative mechanisms. It is impossible to avoid some theoretical disadvantages and to just take the "best" practical instruments: every practical implication of the proposed procedures has in reverse, as with a coin, the side of theoretical justification (and disadvantage), and vice versa. In other words, it is not possible to just take some practically "best" tools, and to dismiss their theoretical attribution, exactly as it is impossible to cut off one side of a coin and just use the other side.

The deep reason for such a conclusion is in recognizing the fact that every administrative mechanism has its organizational structure of implementation, period of activation, and consequences of exploring. To use the "best" (practically) mechanisms of different theoretical paradigm origin, they require different organizational support, and will be not correlative in times of action.

For example, to understand the civil service as an object (an essence) according to Weberian and neo-Weberian paradigm, and to apply the standard procedures of merit toward the selection, promotion and stimulating of servants, a lot of problems appear. They are: to struggle with the instability of professional competencies; to accommodate the moral values to innovative social relations; and to introduce the initiative into traditional civil servants legalistic behavior in the dynamic World. Let's try to improve, for instance, the Weberian tools by the other "best" administrative mechanisms borrowed from NPM and from NPG. Usually, they are attempts to add such components (for improving the civil service) as effectiveness-oriented remuneration (bonuses, or other instruments of stimulation) according to services delivery results, increasing the transparency of professional activity of civil servants (more information on web sites, introduction of feedback procedures from consumers of services, etc.), and anticorruption measures (reports, whistleblowing, etc.). Unfortunately, to blend all those administrative tools and use them simultaneously would create tensions in the systems of contemporary civil service:

– For any ministry of finance, calculating the limits for funding personnel in governmental bodies is much easier if they do not take into account the amount of bonuses. To declare the total amount of funds needed for any specific governmental body's personnel bonuses is almost impossible to do: everything is changing rapidly. In the present crisis with instability and pri-

orities shifting it looks like it is the voluntaristic and situationally made decisions that are expressing some ranking of bodies' significance in the representation of political authorities. Additionally, the bonuses are given with a delay, not at the time of the effective actions of servants. Finally, bonuses have the tendency to become part of a regular salary.

– Introduce transparency to civil servants' professional activity influences heavily on the relationships among civil servants themselves. From an organizational standpoint, the system of orders from managers to the executive staff will be under pressure: all these orders can be discussed openly and evaluated negatively by the public. The unpredictability of such "approval leaks" is obvious. As a result, the hierarchical Weberian organizational system of a civil service (principal theoretical construction for Weber and neo-Weber paradigm) will be damaged.

To conclude, the state and its bureaucracy cannot be fixed by some blended system of administrative tools and procedures, borrowed as the best ones from different administrative paradigms, due to organizational and other reasons that reflect the unstable context of present governance.

Reasoning on question 3 (to only take the mechanisms that belong exclusively to one basic administrative paradigm)

I would like to divide the reasoning on "best paradigm" selection into two parts.

The first is about historical progress in paradigms. There is belief that every country should pass, in its administrative development, the stages from Weberian state to services oriented state, and only after that to the state oriented to new public governance. This belief is based on the assumption that it is not possible to wave "at once" the relics of previous systems of state management on the one hand, while, on the other hand, a smooth transition is necessary in the direction of general globalist unification of governance systems. Theoretically, this belief is traced to institutionalism and to the theory of public choice (Norgaard, Winding, 2006, p. 138, 147). However, every administrative paradigm has a set of its own theoretical deficits and practical disadvantages strongly interconnected (as shown before) that has become more and more inappropriate at the time of administrative crisis. Therefore, the transition from one set of administrative paradigm mechanisms to a set that is attributed to another, the "next" paradigm, is not progress at all. One sort of defect is just replaced by another, and the problems are replaced (or not replaced, but rather multiplied) by other problems and are not solved. The quality of governance from changing basic administrative paradigm tools is not necessarily increased: it looks more like a "chase for some theoretical fashion" and the desire to be in line with other countries that have already applied the next generation of models and theories of state and bureaucracy. Such a chase can be destructive for the country because non-critical thinking and the borrowing of new models and social theories is potentially dangerous for the existing social reality inside a country.

Every existing basic administrative paradigm itself does not fit in regards to overcoming the contemporary administrative crisis. Actually, for NPM-understanding of the state and its functions, the complete regulation of services

is theoretically impossible, but more significant is that idea that imposing strong regulations everywhere oppresses flexibility in decision-making. Moreover, the indicators of services effectiveness are not in a condition to take into account the innovative indefiniteness as they replace outcomes by outputs and by "measurement of processes" and cultivate the preparation of bulky and time-consuming formalization plans of professional activity. Besides, speaking about services, the present administrative crisis is not mainly connected with bad quality public services. It stems from the rapid, revolutionary changes of social life. As a result, good quality but outdated public services can be harmful. Just some examples: the social programs of support for workers in an ecologically dangerous industry help to fix this industry existence; for many services, it is better simply to stop it rather than improve them. Also the maxim "the consumer is always right" is not correct in the times of innovation because a lot of innovations are potentially harmful to the environment. To appease consumers in all their desires means to intensify the crisis of governance, which is already incapable of limiting rampant consumption and the extension of social divergence.

It is the same with the paradigm of New Public Governance administrative mechanisms. Such mechanisms are flawed because at the present time of mis-balanced innovative development and administrative crisis it is not possible to delimit the borders of participation. Contradictions among actors of participation broaden, their interests diverge. The lobbying risks of some social groups increase and consensus requirements start to be imitated rather than imposed, as was clearly visible in the USA election campaign.

The conclusion for the idea of historical progress in administrative paradigms unfortunately is negative. The necessity to move from instruments of a previous paradigm to the instruments of another because of their "better suitability" for contemporary administrative practice is not evident.

Now I will try to go on to explore the *second, "softer" optional variant of the "best paradigm" selection*. Instead of the historic progress in administrative paradigms usage in practice of governance, let's suppose that for different countries the "right governance" looks different (Andrews, 2010). The existence of specific social, economic, and cultural conditions and traditions of regional peculiarities produce a certain "predisposition" of the country and its system of governance toward some particular administrative paradigm.

Supposing, such a choice can be used as the basis for the selection of particular administrative mechanisms of a paradigm that is capable of overcoming an administrative crisis. For example, for those countries with a high level of governance culture, with strong ethical norms in their civil servant "community", and with a developed civil society structure, the New Public Governance paradigm can be the best choice to orient to. However, technical and social innovations can destroy the balance of interests of social groups and create a crisis of public participation in governance.

For countries with a strong system of bureaucracy and a tradition of supremacy of bureaucracy in social life (imperial tradition), without the mature institutes of civil society, the transition toward New Public Governance calls for creating just a havoc of governance institutes. At the time of innovative

turmoil it could lead toward the destruction of administrative mechanisms (a pause in decision-making procedures). In this case it is better to orient to the Weberian paradigm, and to its contemporary models. In particular, societies in a position of post-soviet transition tend to lean towards the models of ethical meritocracy and the models of public service motivation (and if their elites are not reformed, these models tend to disappear). A characteristic feature of the usage of these models is the training of new professional skills through the formation of ethical standards, by strengthening anti-corruption control and supervision. The public landmark for these countries is the widespread belief that the administrative measures of meritocratic orientation will lead to a new quality of public administration: it will help overcome the incompetence of civil servants and will contribute to a new tradition of professional ethics and motivation towards a public service establishment. However, this aspiration recalls chasing a ghost: innovative development devalues existing professional competencies, they become outdated. Simultaneously, ethical standards and motivational preferences are subject to the destructive influence of innovation, lifestyle changes. They are rapidly evolving over the course of reforms (Belle, Ongaro, 2014).

The countries in which there is significant public distrust of government institutions, and of management functions performing, tend to lean towards the formation of NMP-state oriented services. They pretend to regulate performance processes and to assess the effectiveness of civil servants on the basis of performance. But the regulation of public service functions and process-oriented evaluations of performance are useless and even counter-productive if public services and performances are rapidly changing BD new products are formed constantly.

To conclude, selection of the "best paradigm" and its administrative mechanisms as suitable for overcoming administrative crisis is not possible, neither for any individual country nor for some groups of countries (developed; developing; transitional). The "optimal solution" does not exists: all three basic administrative paradigms can mitigate the effects of an administrative crisis to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the conditions (country, region, cultural features, administrative traditions, etc.), but they are not capable of offering the tools to provide a radical elimination of the crisis "as such". For African countries, it is brilliantly evident (Andrews, 2012). The administrative paradigms can provide the ammunition (tools) to struggle with an administrative crisis triggered by contemporary innovative development misbalances, but cannot create the tools to overcome it.

The main defect of the existing administrative paradigms is that they are always "one step behind the crisis," i.e., they offer a design and procedures that respond to the crisis but with a delay. They are based on fundamental principles which, at the same time, are not the fundamental principles of the crisis, its causes and its main parameters. Existing (basic) administrative paradigms come from other epochs, they rest on the theoretical principles suitable for periods of stable development with their predictability and certainty. The contemporary crisis otherwise looks for these paradigms as the "outside call", the extraor-

dinary and temporary circumstances that make governance more complicated for just a limited period of time, which will be terminated, hopefully soon.

I argue that the administrative theory of governance at present is not able to accommodate the challenges of innovative development. Existing administrative paradigms are inadequate for overcoming the current crisis of governance.

Reasoning on question 4 (to find a new administrative paradigm): Instead of conclusion and of discussion

In a quest for a new administrative paradigm, we need to ask the questions: "What principles should be appropriate for this paradigm?; Do the roots of a new approach exist?" I believe it is possible to point to some research that is going beyond the limits of the existing administrative paradigms yet has a lot in common.

The main principles of a new hypothetic administrative paradigm should reflect the crisis problems in order to be a "translation" of crisis problems into the language of positive actions. Such actions should prevent the development of crisis phenomena at their very onset.

First of all, we need to agree that the role of the state at present has changed radically due to innovative development challenges. The state used to be recognized as a referee, which establishes the rules of fair game in social life. It was a widespread opinion that governance improvement consisted of the enhancement of the rules by the government itself. The misbalances of innovative development and the administrative crisis in its part impose other requirements on the state: we need to evaluate the state as a referee, to set rules for a fair evaluation of the referee, to know how effectively government is handling the crisis and how well it works.

However, such a strong "recipe", despite its universal applicability for all states, can be dangerous, because its use will inevitably show a complete ineffectiveness of the government systems of some countries to work at a time of crisis. Such countries will come into the situation when they will be forced to acknowledge their administrative disabilities. So the fundamental changes in the political and administrative elite, in patterns of social behavior and the national economy, should be brought in. The whole system of governance should be replaced. It is not easy to accept such a cure, perhaps almost impossible. But it is unclear, which is better to choose: to avoid elaboration and the application of a fair, objective evaluation of the government, and to lag behind, to head towards economic and social degradation, to rely on surviving through the conditions of crisis (social cohesion, patience despite the hardships), or start "to take the pills", to waive the traditional governance schemes, to move away from the sustainable existence of the elites.

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FROM SKILLSET TO MINDSET:
A NEW PARADIGM FOR LEADER
DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

I argue in this paper that a new paradigm for how leaders should be trained and developed
is needed. In the new paradigm, leader development will focus on transforming *mindsets* more
than *skillsets*. Skills are necessary but not sufficient for leadership. Drawing on the latest discoveries
in neuroscience and cognitive science, and the theory of "unlearning" of Otto Rank, I maintain that
leaders should be learning how to radically transform their current mental models when they are
out-of-date or no longer useful, thereby creating greater capacity for seeing what others cannot see
and thinking what others have not yet thought.

Keywords: Leadership, leader development, senior civil servants, mindset, adult development.

Leaders in business, government and civil society are living in a time of "permanent white water" (Vaill, 1989; Vaill, 1996) where the only constant is confusion, unpredictability and shock. In organizations all over the world, wicked social, financial and economic problems fester and go unaddressed for months

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and even years at a time. The volatility of change is swamping the cognitive and emotional capabilities of leaders to respond effectively. What's going on? Geert Bouckaert and Michel de Vries (2013) assert that, in recent years, leading is no longer about addressing clear-cut technical problems with clear-cut technical solutions. Instead, it "is about handling uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity beyond imagination, and significant disagreement about what is going on, why and what should happen" (Bouckaert & de Vries, p. 8). In my view, these developments demand not just different ways of *acting* in leadership but also different ways of *seeing* leadership.

Due to these trends, I believe that a new paradigm for how leaders should be trained and developed is needed. In the new paradigm, leader development will focus on transforming *mindsets* more than *skillsets*. I maintain that leaders should be learning how to radically transform their current mental models when they are out-of-date or no longer useful, creating greater capacity for seeing what others cannot see and thinking what others have not yet thought. Such mental maps have many synonyms – "frames", "filters", "belief systems" and "narratives" to name just a few. The quality of the judgement of leaders depends on the quality of their mental models. What, exactly, is a mental model? "Mental models are deeply held internal images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting. Very often we are not aware of our mental models or the effects they have on our behavior" (Senge, 1990, p. 8).

Therefore, how leaders think and act in moments of uncertainty – the quality of their moment-by-moment mindfulness and capacity for paying attention unfiltered through existing pre-conceptions – is more important than the behavioral competencies they have been traditionally taught in executive classrooms or training workshops. While behavioral skills, especially those involving emotional intelligence (Caruso, Mayer & Salovey, 2002), remain necessary for leaders to build trusting, mutually respectful, results-oriented relationship with others, they are not sufficient for success at the highest levels of leadership.

The Situation in the U.S., the E.U. and the Russian Federation

Today in the United States, leaders, according to Van Wart (2013, p. 555), are grappling with mind-boggling challenges such as:

Leading for results	– Difficult options to address long-term fiscal stress – Globalization, high levels of market, business and government failure
Leading followers	– Increased cynicism of experienced employees – Reduced benefits for all employees, including managers and executives
Leading organizations	– IT and social media revolutions – Reinventing organizations to meet citizen and business demands
Leading systems	– Challenges of getting results through team-based work – Lack of social consensus and cynicism of media and civil society
Leading with values	– Lack of trust in business people, in elected politicians and in senior civil servants – Confusion about which paradigm to follow (e.g., hierarchy, market, network, learning organization, etc.)

In the E.U., few leaders have coherent mental maps to make sense of and respond effectively to challenges such as large-scale migration of refugees from the Middle East; global financial instability; record levels of youth unemployment; environmental degradation; and looming terrorism and other law and order threats. Facing the stresses of running faster and faster on a 24/7 treadmill, leaders are finding themselves "in over their heads" (Kegan, 2004): the meaning-making framework of their minds – their mental acuity – is not up to the increasingly complex demands of their responsibilities. The rate of change exceeds the rate of their capacity to master the turbulence. They will need a different form of consciousness – a higher level of mental complexity – to deal with the higher level of complexity of the relentless changes swirling around them. Constantly distracted by the flow of daily crises, many suffer from a kind of leadership "attention deficit disorder": an inability to see a clear path through the blinding fog of "swamp problems". The limits of their ability to pay attention to what is important circumscribes what they can see and, consequently, what they can impact or manage. "Eurocrats have a lot to answer for", complains Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Krugman (2016). "The huge mistake of the euro, the reckless and feckless promotion of austerity, the hapless response to the refugee crisis and in general the failure to take seriously the strains of internal migration." Looking through Krugman's lens, Eurocrats are not paying attention to the right things. They are ignoring the right questions.

Paying attention to the right questions is also lacking in the Russian Federation, where scholars argue, with compelling evidence, that it is necessary to "clean out the Augean Stable of our bureaucracy" (Obolonsky & Barabashev, 2014). According to Russian scholars, "the chief prerequisite is the political will to transform the system of contracting with civil servants with a view to bringing about change in the Russian bureaucracy and turning it into an honest and professional corporate body that works for citizens" (Ibid., p. 94). Today, few leaders are paying attention to the issue of "political will," the neglect of which negatively affects all relations among business, government and civil society in the Russian Federation.

Why is *paying attention* so vital? According to Chia (2005, p. 1092), leading "is firstly and fundamentally the task of becoming aware, attending to, sorting out, and prioritizing an inherently messy, fluxing, chaotic world of competing demands that are placed on a [leader's] attention. It is creating order out of chaos. It is an art, not a science. Active perceptual organization and the astute allocation of attention is a central feature of the [leadership] task". After spending 25 years in the U.S. Government, including time on Vice President Al Gore's reinventing government team, I have concluded that "leading" has little to do with the conventional wisdom found in management or public administration (PA) textbooks and "leadership training" programs offered in classrooms by most universities. For example, most tenured faculty in U.S. schools of business or public administration know virtually nothing about research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and, therefore, are closed to new ideas widely disseminated in these fields. Typically, senior professors in business and public administration are blind to the new sciences of the brain and mind, and most don't care enough even to learn about them.

Leading, it became obvious to me while I was in public service, is about paying attention to the right problems at the right time and mobilizing stakeholders

to address them in the right way. The "leading" PA scholars themselves, with rare exceptions (Bouckaert & de Vries, 2013; Heifetz et al., 2009; Van Wart, 2013a; Van Wart, 2013b), have not been paying attention to leadership even as a general field of study, and, therefore, cannot "lead" (or teach) others, such as senior civil servants, to lead adaptively in their organizations. Typically, PA leadership scholars in the U.S. publish vague, bland generalities such as, "The role of leadership is to obtain resources and deploy those to motivate staff members to perform. It is also a leader's job to ensure that the organization's performance results in accomplishments that serve public needs" (Cohen & Eimicke, 2002, p. 284). One cannot imagine a less helpful – and more cliché-ridden – definition of the role of leading in public service during a period of worldwide "permanent white water" (Vail, 2006).

If you cannot see a problem clearly, if your attention is focused on the wrong things, you cannot take effective or timely action. You are blind. It's not what senior scholars like Cohen and Eimicke (2002) look at that matters, it's what they see. And they appear to be seeing little or nothing about what is really going on outside the cloistered walls of the U.S. academy, where linear regression analysis and linear structural equation modeling are now seen as the optimal methods of analyzing the complexities involved in leading change in organizations. It is virtually impossible to obtain a tenure-track position in any school of business or public administration in the U.S. without showing that you are an expert in linear structural equation modeling (SEM).

SEM is the "hottest" statistical methodology today in the U.S., just as t-tests, factor analysis, correlation, chi-square tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were "hot" about 50 years ago. Today, to get a PhD in management or public administration, a doctoral candidate must master every aspect of SEM. But isn't conducting research that employs SEM often an unconscious way for us to tell a highly complex, *nonlinear story* through a highly complex set of *linear equations* for the purpose of persuading our skeptical peer reviewers that we have found an objective, scientific way to generalize about highly unpredictable human beings? Here is a recent example of the misuse and abuse of SEM by West and Berman (2002), two well-known authors in the U.S. In an award-winning article published in a top-tier journal, these authors constructed a linear structural equation model of "ethics training," "moral leadership by senior managers," and "citizen trust" without understanding that classroom training on ethics is utterly different from practicing ethical behavior in real time, with real people and real ethical challenges. As someone who saw leaders practice their art (it is not a science!) at the highest levels of the U.S. government, I cannot repeat enough times: leadership is *not* linear; leadership *cannot be modeled* via linear techniques like regression and SEM; leadership deals with the irrational and the *unknown*, not the rational and the *known*. I have concluded that professors with PhDs who specialize in sophisticated statistical research methodologies know virtually nothing about the day-to-day challenges of leading change in complex times and hard places. When interviewed (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 27), many practicing organizational leaders candidly admit:

– *We are not sure we know what the problem is.* Definitions are vague or competing, and any given problem is intertwined with other messy problems.

– *We are not sure what is happening.* Information is incomplete, ambiguous, and unreliable. People disagree on how to interpret information that is available.

– *We are not sure what we want.* We all have multiple goals that are unclear or conflicting. Different people want different things. This leads to political and emotional conflict.

– *We do not have the resources we need.* Shortages of time, attention, or money make difficult situations even more chaotic.

– *We are not sure who is supposed to do what.* Roles are unclear, there is disagreement about who is responsible for what, and things keep shifting as players come and go.

– *We are not sure how to get what we want.* Even if we agree on what we want, we are not sure (or we disagree) about how to make it happen.

– *We are not sure how to determine if we have succeeded.* We are not sure what criteria to use to evaluate success. Or if we do know the criteria, we are not sure how to measure the outcome.

Adaptive Challenges

Today, all over the world, senior leaders are grappling with enormous challenges far beyond their current mental capacities and also far beyond the current knowledge base of public administration scholars and policy experts in the U.S. There are no pre-packaged or "best practice" solutions to any of the wicked problems these leaders face. Making solutions even harder to reach, the most common cause of failure in leadership, according to Heifetz et al. (2009), is treating adaptive challenges as if they were technical problems. Technical problems can be solved with the application of existing expert knowledge. However difficult they may be, and however much they tax a leader's cognitive abilities, the critical knowledge and competencies already exist to solve the problem. To be sure, technical problems are not trivial. For example, in the field of medicine, replacing a heart valve during open-heart surgery is a technical problem, even though it's an arduous, extraordinarily complex procedure. Why technical? Because it involves mastering *techniques* that expertly trained surgeons have been able, over many iterations, to test and refine successfully. Solving technical problems, although requiring great skill, involves following established knowledge, proven guidelines and procedures known to experts. These skills are, therefore, trainable.

On the other hand, adaptive challenges are those for which the necessary knowledge to respond does not yet exist, so training in "best practices" inevitably falls short (Heifetz et al., 2009). Both the problems and the solutions are unclear. Adaptive challenges require the creation of new knowledge and new capacities. These are not technical problems with agreed-upon expert solutions. The kinds of wicked challenges leaders face today are "swamp problems" of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. No one knows what to do. Unfortunately, no amount of skillset or competency training – or linear structural equation modeling – to prepare leaders to face these challenges is sufficient. Prior knowledge no longer works. Expert solutions are contradictory, inapplicable or no-

where to be found. The adaptive leader must facilitate new ways of seeing and new ways of thinking. Reframing or reconceiving *what is to be seen and thought*, the adaptive leader must learn how to pay closer attention to *what others cannot yet see, what others have not yet thought*. The knowledge to address an adaptive challenge – for example, the migration crisis in Europe – must be discovered or created on the spot, moment-by-moment, in the acts of people collaborating, under severe time pressure, intense media coverage and budgetary limits, to address it. *Technical* training programs, no matter how well-designed, cannot deliver *adaptive* learning results. While training in leadership skills and behavioral competencies remains valuable and necessary, something in addition to skillset development is now necessary.

In this paper I argue that to be effective in the current "swamp conditions", leaders will have to develop new mental capabilities – new ways of seeing – in real time, moment-by-moment, in the very process of working on the leadership challenge. To address wicked problems successfully, they must be able to *create new knowledge on the spot*, not merely apply existing knowledge or past practices. Linear regression techniques are not only useless; they are positively harmful if used to address wicked problems. When no one knows what is going on or what to do, new ways of thinking are necessary, not new statistical methods. This involves changing *how* leaders know, not changing *what* they know. The *structure* of a leader's mind is more important for executive functioning and decision making than the *content* of a leader's mind. Therefore, I believe that *mindset* not *skillset* is now the determining factor in how well leaders perform. (For a similar argument in the field of human resource development, see Kennedy, Carroll & Francoeur, 2012).

Mindset

What, exactly, is "mindset"? Although there is no consensus definition in psychology or neuroscience, our "mindset", in common parlance refers to the worldview, mental model, or set of beliefs and assumptions we hold about ourselves, our organizations and the challenges we face. The mental models that compose our mindset "govern", to use an apt metaphor from political science, how we see, think, feel and act. They direct our attention. They are the rules or neuronal programs in our mind that construct our thinking. Non-consciously, almost completely outside our awareness, they frame the world for us. Moreover, we cannot see anything not within our worldview. "At first we are subject to (or immersed within or unable to see) the rules that drive us. They are as invisible as the air we breathe, and just as necessary" (Garvey Berger & Johnston, 2015, p. 178). Without a doubt, evolutionary processes have determined that human beings "need" these invisible rules or programs in the mind. Mental models have evolved because they make us efficient so that that we do not have to expend valuable energy rethinking every routine situation (Kahnemann, Slovik & Tversky, 1982). Automatically generated mental models are necessary. We cannot live without them. These are habits of the mind. Habits are especially useful for solving technical problems, which do not require rethinking practices that worked in the past and will continue to work today. Linear regression is an excellent

tool for solving technical problems. But rethinking automatic patterns of seeing is exactly what is needed in today's world of permanent volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. By definition, meeting adaptive challenges requires that leaders examine their own mental models and rethink them – and help others do the same. Otherwise the blind will be leading the blind. And evolution is not kind to the blind.

According to neuroscience, what we perceive and how we make sense of the world – as individuals or as leaders of groups, organizations or societies – is filtered through a cognitive prism that contains what we learned as children; our taken-for-granted beliefs, assumptions and values; formal theories and systems of thought taught to us as adults; our paradigms or mental maps; and the cultural conditioning prevalent in our societies.

Figure*

The Prism

*   Copyright approval for publication has been obtained.

Our prism is the mental framework that organizes meaning-making for us. Metaphorically, it's the lens through which we look at ourselves and the world. Our prism contains the "structure" of our mind. Each "focal system" (i.e., individual, group, organizational, or societal) has its *own* prism through which it interprets what is too good to be true, what is legitimate and proper, and what is questionable, illegitimate and unacceptable:

The contents of the focal system's prism thus become a primary determinant of how things will be seen and interpreted. Whether the glass is half full or half empty depends on your prism and not on the actual quantity of water in the glass. There are also a number of belief components that exist within the prism, as seen in the accompanying illustration. Each component plays a part in defining how things will be seen and interpreted by the focal system (Marshak, 2006, p. 22–23).

A leadership mindset temporarily suspends prior professional training – including training offered by management or public administration faculty who are usually blind to new ideas from other disciplines – and prior cultural indoctrination. A leadership mindset sees and, therefore, acts freshly.

When taking a higher perspective, the seer can now "see" his or her own prism. This lets leaders change perspective on their *own* stream of thought. "Instead of being swept away by that stream we can pause and see that *these are just thoughts* – and choose whether or not to act on them" (Goleman, 2013, p. 203). Along the same lines, the neuroscientist Daniel Siegel (2012) recommends that visioning be cultivated by developing what he calls *mindsight*, the act of seeing into our own mind, not just observing our external behavior. Siegel defines mindsight as "a kind of focused attention that allows us to be aware of our mental processes rather than being swept away by them" (p. xi).

Changing "How" We Know, Not "What" We Know

The developmental psychologist Robert Kegan (2000) defines what "develops" in leader development as a radical change in the *way* leaders know, not a change in *what* they know. Their form of knowing is transformed as the mind sees more of itself. The ability to see oneself, to look back at and examine the structure of one's prism, is what we mean by "reflection" (*re-flec-tion:* Latin: stepping back). The act of reflecting means "not just to look, but to look at the act of looking itself; not just to think, but to think about thinking itself; not just to learn, but to learn about learning itself" (Koestenbaum, 1991, p. 62). The act of reflecting, as Socrates first taught over two thousand years ago, means seeing the seer.

According to Kegan (2000, p. 53), discovering increasingly sophisticated ways of knowing – which is another way of talking about seeing differently – is a gradual process by which what was "subject" or invisible in our way of knowing becomes "object" or visible:

That which is "object" we can look at, take responsibility for, reflect upon, exercise control over, integrate with some other way of knowing. That which is "subject" we are run by, identified with, fused with, at the effect of. We cannot be responsible for that to which we are subject. What is "object" in our knowing describes the thoughts and feelings we say we have; what is "subject" describes the thinking and feelings that has us. We "have" object; we "are" subject.

How well leaders pay attention to, observe and interpret the complex social, economic and political systems in their environment will determine their effectiveness. As the paradigm of leader development shifts from skillset to mindset, leaders will begin to learn to become conscious of what they usually take for granted: how they see the world and how they might learn to pay attention to what

is usually invisible to them. They will be learning "meta-awareness, [paying] attention to attention itself, as in the ability to *notice that you are not noticing* what you should and correcting your focus" (Goleman, 2013, p. 197). They will begin to learn how to surface and examine their own taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and perceptual frameworks – in other words, how they see the world through their prism, and the narratives they construct about what they see. According to Kegan and Lahey (2009, p. 222), in the new paradigm of leader development, "we must join a change in behavior with a change in the way we think and feel – and in order to change the way we think and feel, we need to change our mindsets" – i.e., change the way we see.

How leaders (and scholars who teach leadership) see or "know" leadership – and how they demonstrate effectiveness when in top roles – depends entirely on the lens or prism through which they look at and make sense of the world. A mental framework is a mental map. What leaders perceive when they look through their prisms, and how they interpret and make meaning of what they see, determines what they do. Beliefs drive action. Leaders are meaning makers, actively making sense through their mental frameworks – perceiving, sensing, categorizing – of what's happening around them. Research is showing, however, that some leaders are more capable than others in interpreting and responding, moment by moment, to the complexities of the challenges they face (Kegan, 1994). They can adapt – therefore, the term "adaptive leader" – and are agile under almost any circumstances. What makes such high-performing leaders successful?

Adaptive leaders have learned how to update their mental models on the spot – see with new eyes – and make meaning in fresh, unfiltered ways to respond effectively to challenges (Heifetz et al., 2009). When necessary, they create new mental maps, revise old ones and think anew. They have the courage and wisdom to drop or "unlearn" unproductive ways of thinking and acting. They are not locked into only one way of seeing, one interpretation, one solution, one narrative. They leverage paradoxes and polarities rather than choose one pole at the expense of the other. They are dialectical ("both-and") rather than dichotomous ("either-or") thinkers. Relentlessly curious about everything going on around them, they are unembarrassed to say, "I don't know" – not a stance manifested by leadership scholars in the U.S. concerning their own lack of knowledge about leading in organizations. (How many professors who teach leadership, I often wonder, have led *any* organization, small or large?)

Unless leaders can admit that they don't know, they cannot begin to learn anything new or see anything different from what they have always seen. In order to learn, they must shift from a condition of *unconscious* incompetence to *conscious* incompetence. They must begin to grasp that they don't know that they don't know. "Some years ago, Argyris (1991) noted that one of the biggest challenges faced in the teaching of "experts" or professionals was their tendency to make light of what was being taught them, because they presumed that they already knew what was being taught" (Harrison, Leich & Chia, 2007, p. 338).

"In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities – said a Zen master – but in the expert's there are few" (Suzuki, 1970, p. 1). Adaptive leaders demonstrate a beginner's mind. They question their own assumptions and beliefs. In order

to think afresh, they regularly step back from, and reflect on, their own mental frameworks, ideologies, habits of mind, and expectations. They take no belief system for granted as "true" or "valid" without examining it closely. When necessary, they know how to change their own minds and are skilled at helping others do the same. They have a self-transforming mind. In short, leading and learning are the *same* for adaptive leaders:

> Whatever else leaders do, their primary role is to keep learning and to facilitate the learning of those around them… Constant change requires something beyond managing to stay on a predetermined course. It requires leading, i.e., learning whether changing conditions are altering the landscape of needs and opportunities and requiring a change in existing plans or goals; learning which alternative courses might be possible or desirable; learning which direction to go; learning what it takes to get there; learning, learning, learning. In this sense, the crucial question in leadership development is not just *what* to learn, but how to *learn how to learn* (Antonacopoulou & Bento, 2004, p. 82).

Mindfulness and Mindlessness

Learning how to learn means learning how to see anew, taking nothing for granted. Adaptive leaders consistently show a capacity for what cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists call "mindfulness" (Jain et al., 2007; Shapiro & Carlson, 2009). To be mindful is to have increased ability, moment-by-moment, to discern new categories and perspectives that improve insight, problem-solving and effective actions. To be mindful is to have the capacity to "discover in the real time of the situation how to act effectively" (Vail 1996, p. 155). Curiosity and openness to self-inquiry are the foundations of mindfulness. Mindful leaders keep their whole mind awake, and continually adjust their perceptions and performance on a moment-by-moment basis to meet the unique requirements of the situation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). They have a "reflective conversation with the situation", and listen, with curiosity and close attention, to the "back-talk" coming from the environment (Schön, 1983). Embracing the need for continual learning they have the courage to ask questions of themselves, in the here-and-now, about what others take for granted. Mindful leaders are capable, in real time, of examining and – where appropriate – revising the prisms or mental frameworks they and others have been taught to apply from the past in order to interpret and act in the present. According to recent neuroscientific research (Goleman, 2013, p. 197), "mindfulness boosts the classic attention network in the brain's fronto-parietal system that works together to allocate attention. These circuits are fundamental in the basic movement of attention: disengaging your focus from one thing, moving it to another, and staying with the new object of attention".

When leaders make decisions on the basis of previously established categories, judgments and distinctions, they are liable not to see the full scope of the adaptive challenges they are facing – treating them, instead, as technical problems. The structure of their prism blinds them:

> The trouble starts when I fail to notice that I see only what confirms my categories and expectations but nothing else. The trouble deepens even

further if I kid myself that seeing is believing. That's wrong. It's the other way around. Believing is seeing. You see what you expect to see. You see what you have labels to see. You see what you have the skills to manage. Everything else is a blur (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 47).

When I see only what confirms my categories and expectations, I am not acting mindfully. I am acting mindlessly. According to Ellen Langer, the Harvard social psychologist who pioneered empirical research on mindfulness:

> When we are mindless, we are trapped in rigid mindsets, oblivious to context or perspective. When we are mindful we are actively drawing novel distinctions, rather than relying on distinctions drawn in the past. This makes us sensitive to context and perspective. When we are mindless, our behavior is rule and routine governed. Essentially we freeze our understanding and become oblivious to subtle changes that would have led us to act differently, if only we were aware of them. In contrast, when mindful, our behavior may be guided rather than governed by rules and routines, but we are sensitive to the ways the situation changes (Langer, 2008, n.p.).

Mindlessness is "like being on automatic pilot" (Langer, 1997, p. 4), when we rely on past categories, and fixate on a single perspective without seeing that things could be different.

As leaders engage with the complexities of their organizational lives, the prism or cognitive map through which they look at the world needs to transform to meet the increased demands and complexities of the challenges they face. Higher demands need higher mental capacities. Our rate of learning, as the U.K. management scholar Reg Revans famously said, must be equal to or greater than the rate of the change going on around us. To remain effective problem solvers, the minds of leaders must grow "larger" to incorporate more complexity – optimally, an increased capacity for tolerating and dealing with paradoxes, uncertainty, volatility and multiple perspectives. "While we do not often consider the growth of people's *minds* in the same way we consider the growth of their *skills*, both kinds of growth have a vital part to play in a person's success and effectiveness" (Garvey Berger, 2012, p. 9).

Mindset and Skillset: Both Are Needed

Let's pause for a moment. I have been arguing that helping leaders learn how to transform their own mental models (*"mindset"*) is a more powerful method for leader development than using traditional training techniques that focus solely on adding new skills to a leader's behavioral repertoire of competencies (*"skillset"*). Now I want to add an important qualification. Obviously, development of *both* skillset and mindset is necessary for leaders. To be sure, we want our leaders to be highly skilled in communicating, negotiating, managing conflict, building trust and many other essential skills and behaviors. These are vital skillsets for leaders and should continue to be emphasized, taught and practiced in all leader development programs. But in my opinion a focus on transforming mindsets is more critical for success at the very highest levels. Research is showing that "technical and administrative/managerial skills alone may be inadequate as leaders face many ill-defined and novel problems" (Day, Harrison & Halpin, 2009, p. 123).

The effectiveness of senior leaders can only be assessed by how well they respond *in real time* under conditions of "permanent white water" (Vail, 2006), when no one knows what to do but immediate action is essential. No single set of skill-based or behavioral competencies – e.g., planning; communicating; listening; meditating; deciding; cross-cultural awareness; managing conflict; etc. – is sufficient to make a high-performing leader (Cook-Greuter, 2004, p. 276).

According to the new paradigm, in order to be high performers, leaders must learn how to be fully present in the here-and-now, ready to adapt with agility and resolve to any challenge. They must learn how to reflect on their own mindsets, in real time, and let go of or drop assumptions and beliefs – ways of being – that may have helped them to succeed in the past but are no longer effective. This represents a profound transformation in mental capacity. Such a transformation involves learning to *unlearn* just as much as it does learning to *learn*. "As those in the lifespan development field have proposed, successful aging consists of an ongoing tension between gains and losses. The eminent lifespan developmental psychologist Paul Baltes states it bluntly in these terms: "…any process of development entails an inherent dynamic between gains and losses … no process of development consists only of growth or progression"" (cited in Day, Harrison & Halpin, 2009, p. 241). We have to learn *how* to lose or drop values, assumptions, beliefs and expectations that don't address the Now. We have to learn not only how to learn, but how to unlearn.

I have discovered that unlearning is the only way to transform existing prisms and increase the ability to see through new prisms. "Such a process of unlearning comes through a direct confrontation between the current system of sense making and expectation and the shock of an alternative plausible interpretation of reality" (Harrison, Leitch & Chia 2007, p. 338). But what, exactly, is unlearning?

Learning How to Unlearn

The first to see that transformation begins with "unlearning" rather than "learning" was the Viennese psychologist Otto Rank (1884–1939), who broke with Freud in the mid-1920s over the failure of Freud to see that training patients who were lying passively on the couch in the language of the theories (e.g., the Oedipus complex; narcissism; etc.) published in the peer-reviewed "scientific" psychoanalytic journals was indoctrination into a "prism" rather than transformation. After leaving Freud, Rank (1929) brilliantly explored new ways to release and unleash the creative life force of his patients not their sexuality, which, he believed, would naturally accompany release of the creative urge. "The creative artistic personality," wrote Rank (1932, p. 28), "is thus the first work of the productive individual, and it remains fundamentally his chief work".

In the "banking model" of training, information is deposited "into" people by breaking into their shells from the *outside* (Dewey, 1933). Comparing the process of unlearning to the "breaking out" process of birth, Otto Rank was the first psychologist to suggest that a continual capacity to separate from "internal mental objects" – from internalized institutions, beliefs and neuroses; from the restrictions of culture, social conformity and received wisdom – is the *sine qua non* for

life-long creativity (Kramer, 1989). Unlearning means separating, breaking away from, dropping, letting go of, tearing the fabric of our conventional thinking, feeling and acting.

Unlearning necessarily involves separation from one's self, as it has been culturally conditioned to conform to familial, group, occupational or organizational allegiances. According to Rank (1932, p. 375), unlearning or breaking out of our shell from the *inside* is "a separation [that] is so hard, not only because it involves persons and ideas that one reveres, but because the victory is always, at bottom, and in some form, won over a part of one's ego". You have to learn how to separate not only from *others* but from *yourself*. You have to learn how to change yourself, by separating from your own ego. This separation may be extraordinarily painful and requires deep listening and compassion from those helping managers to become adaptive leaders (Kramer, 1995a; Kramer, 1995b).

In the organizational context, learning how to unlearn is vital "because what we have learned has become embedded in various routines and may have become part of our personal and group identity" (Schein, 2004, p. 321). We refer to the identity of an individual as a "mindset". We refer to the identity of an organizational group as a "culture". Adaptive leaders learn how to question, probe and separate from, both kinds of identity – i.e., their "individual" selves and their "social" selves. By opening themselves to critical inquiry, they begin to learn how to emancipate themselves – how to unlearn. The slow process of breaking out of one's self-imposed iron cage, of separating from one's internalized objects, constitutes unlearning, which inevitably carries with it fear and emotional pain. By the mid-1920s, Otto Rank had developed a remarkably prescient theory of learning, unlearning and relearning (Kramer, 1996; Lieberman & Kramer, 2012). Rank's model, the first one ever developed in psychology, is now being confirmed by neuroscientific research.

In the process of developing adaptive leadership capacity, human beings will be *physically* changing the neural networks in their brain. According to Richard Davidson (2000, 2004), who has used Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to discover the neuroscientific correlates of mindfulness, the brain responds to focused attention by altering its neural circuitry. The science of neuroplasticity is the study of the brain's ability to re-organize itself by forming new neural connections throughout life. This is how the brain responds to unexpected challenges (Glimcher, 2003). In psychological terms, becoming a mindful or adaptive leader is the equivalent of developing a "bigger mind". In neurobiological and chemical terms, mindfulness creates new neural connections (*learning*) and prunes old ones (*unlearning*).

> When we learn something new, neurons fire together and wire together, and a chemical process occurs, called "long-term depression", or LTD (which has nothing to do with a depressed mood state). Unlearning and weakening connections between neurons is just as plastic a process, and just as important, as learning and strengthening them. If we only strengthened connections, our neural networks would get saturated. Evidence suggests that unlearning existing memories is necessary for new memories in our networks (Doidge, 2007, p. 117).

Transformative Action Learning

Transformation requires both learning new ways to see and unlearning old ways. *Transforming a leader's mindset requires transforming the leader* – changing parts of the leader's identity. One such process of identity-based leader development is called "transformative action learning" (Kramer, 2007a; Kramer, 2007b; Kramer, 2008; Kramer & Kelly, 2010), which I first introduced in the executive education program at American University, in Washington DC, in 2002.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on this method, but a few words are in order. The term "transformative action learning" refers to a group of managers working together to address a complex leadership challenge, transforming their mindsets, taking action and getting results. While they explore action steps, they are simultaneously learning from, supporting and coaching each other in a safe, non-judgmental environment. In this setting, they can relax their defenses; they do not have to pretend to know all the answers; it's OK not to know. Through dialogue and mutual inquiry, they learn how to address the seen and unseen aspects of the leadership challenge. Together, they search for the meaning of the unseen by asking each other powerful questions about the prisms or lenses through which they look at the world.

The optimal group size in transformative action learning is 5–7. Meetings usually take place (off-site) at least one day a month, but sometimes weekly or even daily, over the course of a group's life. On a rotating basis, each group member serves as a "problem holder", and shares an adaptive challenge or wicked problem with the others. (Technical problems are not suited to this process; only adaptive challenges.) Privacy is strictly maintained. Nothing confidential leaves the room without permission of the problem holder. All participants must sign a confidentiality agreement. All participants must get written approval, a kind of learning contract, from their boss to participate.

The action learning members will (a) listen to the problem holder's leadership challenge, (b) explore through questions the visible and invisible issues underlying the challenge, (c) offer questions, coaching and tentative directions for action steps, and (d) reflect, together with the problem holder, on the lessons of leading change, peer coaching and mindset transformation learned by everyone during the session.

Transformative action learning facilitates the capacity of leaders to learn how to *reflect on and transform their own mindsets* – at the same time that they are struggling to understand, change and improve the performance of their organizations, and simultaneously take action. This is not conventional classroom training, which involves lecturing or showing PowerPoint slides. Over the course of weeks, with the compassionate but challenging support of trusted colleagues and a certified action learning coach, members will experience asking deep questions of themselves and each other about what leading in their organizations means to them; what challenges they are struggling with; what they know and don't know; and what they are capable of accomplishing in the organization.

Transformative action learning is the art of making the invisible visible. In the process of unpacking a wicked problem, group members are learning how to increase their mindfulness and effectiveness in a leadership role. They are learning how to learn, unlearn and relearn Kramer and Kelly, 2010). When

practiced on a regular basis with trusted colleagues, transformative action learning accomplishes four objectives simultaneously:

– It helps group members unpack, tackle and resolve adaptive challenges.

– It helps promote deep listening, strong emotional bonds, peer coaching and team building.

– It helps group members learn how to see their own mindsets and become more mindful and compassionate as leaders toward others.

– It helps plants the seeds of a learning, unlearning and relearning culture in the organization.

The most important purpose of transformative action learning is to help re-structure leaders' prisms in a safe and non-threatening way to deal more effectively with the "mental demands of modern life" (Kegan, 1994). As an outcome, transformative action learning supports leaders in becoming more adaptive and "recognizing that ambiguity and volatility are the fabric of a complex world – eliminating them (if it were even possible) would leave us in a world less rich and wonderful than the one we inhabit" (Garvey Berger & Johnston, 2015, p. 179).

Transformative action learning allows organizations to tackle and solve "wicked" problems while, at the same time, fostering individual and group-level leadership skills, knowledge and abilities. Why did I call this process *transformative*? Because it involves *transforming* the way leaders *think*. The result is increased individual and group capacity to cope with complexity and sharply different perspectives, and produces the building blocks of a learning organization (Kramer & Kelly, 2010).

Over an approximately ten-day process, members of transformative action learning teams will:

– Identify the complexities involved in *learning to lead* their organizations, especially in untangling technical problems from adaptive challenges (based on Ronald Heifetz's model);

– Learn the three phases of adult development (based on Robert Kegan's model) along with different strategies for leading followers or subordinates at each phase;

– Use the four components of emotional intelligence (based on Daniel Goleman's model);

– Apply the process of transformative action learning (based on Robert Kramer's model) in order to surface taken-for-granted values, assumptions, beliefs, and expectations;

– Inquire about and unpack an ill-structured or "wicked" organizational problem;

– Take action steps that will benefit the mission of the organization; and

– Learn, unlearn and relearn from all their actions (based on Otto Rank's model as modified by Robert Kramer).

Usually I begin by working with the highest leaders of an organization to identify a few (1–3) complex organizational challenges along with identifying an "executive sponsor" for each challenge. Then I meet with each executive sponsor (often the highest leader himself or herself) to assess the suitability of the problem for

the action learning process; clarify my role, the role of the executive sponsor, and the roles of the team members. I provide detailed guidance for the composition of an effective action learning team. Who is needed to get the job done? What roles are essential? Who should not be invited? The executive sponsor for each organizational wicked problem then appoints about 6–7 people to each team.

Days 1–3:	The first three days are experientially-based. I focus on experiential exercises to help team members develop the leadership knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to use the transformative action learning methodology. I help participants learn such skills as active listening, asking powerful questions, reflecting, strategic thinking, and problem solving. I require each team member to select one or more personal leadership developmental goals on which to work during the transformative action learning process. I challenge team members to "let go" of taken-for-granted assumptions of leadership and problem solving – "psychic prisons" built over the years that limit our mind's ability to see and solve problems. I teach participants how to *observe themselves observing* leadership challenges. *They learn how to see the seer.* This powerful form of self-awareness focuses on how to *unlearn*; on how to discuss topics that are usually *undiscussable*; on how to ask *high-quality* questions; and on how to value *not knowing*.
Days 4–5:	I introduce team members to the structure of the transformative action learning model. By the end of day five, the teams have engaged in the necessary steps to fully implement the transformative action learning model and have developed a plan for implementation over the next 4–6 months.
Days 6–10:	After the initial week, certified action learning coaches attend up to five meetings, on site, with the teams. As the coaches meet with the teams, they work to gauge progress on unpacking the problem, review individual leadership development plans, and assess future steps. I encourage transformative action learning teams to share what's working well and what's not working well. I also encourage team members to meet on their own and to consider their transformative action learning project as a vehicle for bringing to light their capacity as a "learning leader" and a "teaching leader" (Kramer & Kelly, 2010). I challenge team members to reflect periodically on the following vital questions over the course of their transformative action learning project: – Are those on my team growing as human beings? – Are they meeting their developmental goals? – Are they more willing to ask questions about their own values, assumptions, beliefs, and expectations? – Are they increasing their "headroom"? – Are they more likely to become learning leaders in their own right? – Are they willing to experience negative capability? – Is my team taking action steps and learning from them?

In the new paradigm of leader development, where mindset becomes more of a focus than skillset, some of the key questions for researchers include: How do leaders' meaning systems – their mental frameworks – evolve over time? Are there predictable stages in which advances in adult mental development occur? If the mind has the capacity to become more complex over the lifespan, what level of mental development is optimal for leaders facing adaptive challenges? How might executive education programs promote the capacity of top leaders for higher levels of attention and more mindfulness? In my opinion, researching these questions will provide some of the most exciting possibilities for understanding the future of leader development in the coming years.

A recent article published by young scholars provides a prescription for how leadership should be studied in the future. Their prescription corresponds closely to my own views: "The state of leadership studies is rather fragmented. While varied methods, contexts and frameworks contribute to a robust body of work, the larger question is how these approaches advance the knowledge base and practice of … leadership … we specifically recommend that leadership scholars *think bigger…* At the same time, we recommend that scholars *look closer…* Our hope is that this investigation provides both a map of leadership studies over time and also a call for action to intentionally and strategically pave the road ahead" (Chapman, Getha-Taylor, Holmes, Jacobson, Morse & Sowa, 2015, p. 16).

I admire these young scholars, but I am not optimistic that minds can be changed. For decades, tenured U.S. professors, especially in a marginal field like public administration, comfortable in their ivory towers, have been *thinking smaller* and *not looking closer*. Will the newer generation of scholars be able to teach anything to the older generation, most of whom have made it a habit to reject any different perspectives in their field? Sadly, achieving tenure in universities in the U.S. is often an excuse not to learn anything new outside your "discipline" or read anything not published in your field's "top-tier" journals. As John Kenneth Galbraith (1971, p. 5) observed, "Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy working on the proof".

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MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GROWING PUBLIC DEBT ON THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

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Abstract

The paper represents a complex analysis of public debt as one of the major tools of microeconomic policy, through which a modern state can directly or indirectly affect the condition and development of the national economy.

The analysis results are given for modern concepts explaining how the amount of public debt affects microeconomic development. It is shown that a growing public debt may cause both a positive and a negative effect on microeconomic processes, which makes it possible to reach a conclusion about the contradictory character of debt funding the economy.

The essence and nature of the Russian Federation's public debt is revealed as an important component of the Russian economy's operating mechanism at the present time.

The RF public debt dynamics are presented and projected values of its growth are given for the years 2016–2018.

A brief description of the characteristics of RF debt policy is provided. It is noted that one of its objectives for the next few years is the need to adapt to the changing conditions in the external and domestic financial markets.

One hazard of growing public debt is identified given the structural misbalances and external economic shocks, since it may result in a bigger dependence of the national economy on external and internal borrowings, which, in turn, will provoke additional risks for the development of the Russian economy.

It is shown that in the countries with developing markets, growing public borrowings may cause negative macroeconomic consequences. It is proven that in order to enhance the stimulating effect of public debt on the macroeconomic processes the state needs to develop an efficient debt strategy, which would clearly define the economic boundaries of public debt use.

Keywords: public debt; microeconomic development; economic growth; budget policy; budget forecast; public budget; debt policy; debt strategy.

Analysis of the Concepts of Public Debt Influence on Macroeconomic Development

The issues concerning the optimal amount and structure of public debt and the consequences of its growth for the national economy have remained at the center of scientific discussions for many decades, and this therefore call for wise decisions during the development of debt policy in many countries. Moreover, the followers of various economic schools and trends often have quite contradictory views in respect of the consequences of public debt and budget deficit. For example, the classic approach implied that a growing public debt was an absolutely negative phenomenon, whereas the representatives of the historic school (like the founder of financial economics, A. Wagner) considered the deficit funding of the public budget as a fairly progressive process (Afanasyev & Afanasyev, 2009; Wagner, 1909). This opinion was held by J.M. Keynes, since, according to him, in the periods problematic for the economy, in order to maintain the necessary level of aggregate demand, public spending must grow to fund the budget deficit and expand the amounts of public borrowings (Keynes, 1997).

Considerable results were achieved by R.J. Barro (1997); P. Diamond (1965); N.G. Mankiw, D. Romer and D. Weil (1992); F. Modigliani (1961) in the research studies concerning the development of efficient debt policy and use of government liabilities. In later periods the most interesting papers seem to have been written by W. Moore and T. Chrystol (2008); D. Sutherland and P. Hoelle (2012); J. Hanson (2007); J. Cochrane (2011); W. Gale and P. Orszag (2003). They prove that a growing public debt may have both positive and negative consequences for the national economy. At the same time, none of the above researchers give reliable conclusions in relation to the threshold values of the amount of public debt which, if exceeded, cause change of influence vector. Linear dependence between the amount of public debt and the paces of economic growth in economically developed countries is proven by C. Patillo, H. Poirson and L. Ricci (2002), who managed to calculate the threshold values of public debt on the case of the USA. The growing interest in the identification of optimal threshold values of public debt is preconditioned by the developing debt crisis in EU countries (Misztal, 2010; Checherita & Rother, 2010). As for the countries with forming markets, the interdependence between public debt was noted by M. Caner, T. Grennes and F. Koehler-Geib (2010); C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2011); Siti N., Mohd D. and Podivinsky J. (2013), and A. Schclarek (2005).

By and large, over the past few decades two approaches have formed in relation to the effect of public debt on the paces of economic growth (Kutivadze, 2012). The first one accentuates its important role in the stimulation of economic growth. In particular, it refers to the use of debt financing tools in order to maintain a stable financial system, increase public spending on human capital development and improve infrastructure. However, positive dynamics in the paces of economic growth is observed in cases where the public debt is little, whereas growth of debt liabilities is sure to affect the GDP indicators negatively (Patillo, Poirson, & Ricci, 2004).

The second approach draws attention to the hazards of a growing public debt, since additional cash injections in the economy provoke the growth of interest rates, strengthen inflation processes and can result in the so-called "crowding out effect" of private investments and thus contribute to the worsening of the process of capital formation and of the labor productivity growth indicators. Thus, the results of the research conducted by M. Kumar and J. Woo (2010) in relation to a group of countries (both developed and developing ones) over the period from 1970 to 2007 demonstrated that there is negative dependence between an increasing public debt and GDP growth. The obtained data, in particular, provides evidence that growth in the ratio of the amount of leverage to the GDP by 10 units results in an annual fall by 0.2 units of the real GDP level per capita. Moreover, analysis carried out by A. Schclarek on the data of 25 developed and 59 developing countries has demonstrated that in the latter there is direct negative dependence between a growing leverage and growing GDP, whereas in the developed countries no substantial interdependence has been identified between these indicators.

There is no shared vision among economic researchers about interdependence of these indicators. There is an opinion (followed by W. Easterly (2001), for example), that the feedback is there. Namely, the growth rate of public debt (and the condition of the latter) depends on the GDP growth indicators. In support of this standpoint, reference is made to a situation in the global economy in 1975, when a debt crisis, which struck countries with average income per capita in the 1980s and countries with low income in 1980–1990, was provoked by growth rates of the global economy slowing down. This position is shared by P. Krugman (2012), who believes that whenever public debt grows no bad things happen to the growth, but it is exactly when there is decline in economic growth that bad things happen to public debt.

Our analysis clearly shows that according to most of the concepts which tackle the issues of how the amount of public debt affects the growth rates of the economy, countries with forming markets (including Russia) must be very careful when increasing their public debt and strive to keep its optimal structure by choosing the most efficient tools for its financing.

Macroeconomic Development Problems of the Russian Federation in the Conditions of Structural Misbalances and External Economic Shocks

Under the new economic conditions of the past few years, low growth rates have been common for the Russian economy (in comparison to previous periods). The main reasons for this have included persistent structural misbalances and considerable drops in the prices of the major Russian export goods. Thus, an average price of Urals oil in 2015 was $51.23, showing a substantial decline compared to 2014, when it was $97.6 (-47.5%).

After a shock at the end of 2014, which was marked by a fall in the ruble and considerable increase in consumer prices[1], since the beginning of 2015 and

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[1] At 2015 year end, the increase of consumer prices was 11.9% (data of the RF Ministry of Economic Development).

while the situation was stabilizing in the financial sphere, the accent of the national economic policy was transferred to neutralize the consequences of external macroeconomic challenges, which negatively affected the operation results in the real sector of the Russian economy. Thus, as early as in the beginning of 2015, a set of actions was taken which included, among other things, neutralization of the effect of the sharp growth of interest rates on some sectors of the economy. However, through a budget maneuver, the RF Government managed both to stabilize the situation in the financial market and partially improve the negative effects for the real sector. According to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, it helped to remove the negative momentum from the correction of the internal demand and thus contributed to timely structural adaptation of the national economy to external shocks.

Nevertheless, in the first five months (from January untill May) of 2015, in comparison to the same period of 2014, the GDP decreased by 3.2%. The same thing was common for other indicators: there was a fall in the sphere of investments in fixed capital (-4.8%), industrial production (-2.3%), and real disposable money incomes (-3.0%). Due to the cheapening Russian national currency and industrial embargo in the first quarter of 2015, there was a considerable growth of consumer prices (on average by 16.9%). At the same time, according to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, by the end of the year the growth level of consumer prices was 11.9%.

In January 2016 the GDP index was -0.1% of the previous month. Positive dynamics with seasonal correction was shown by industrial production as a whole. This was mainly due to production and distribution of electricity, gas and water. As for retail trade turnover, in the first month of 2016, the decline rate, given the seasonal correction, was 0.2%, the same as in December 2015, which had been the minimal value since January 2015. The dynamics of chargeable services to the public did not change in January. The level of unemployment (excluding the seasonal factor) continued its December fall into January and was 5.6% of the economically active population.

In January, according to the estimate of the Ministry of Economic Development of the RF, the fall of the GDP in comparison to January of the previous year slowed down to 2.5% against 3.5% in December respectively. At the beginning of February, Rosstat published the first evaluation of the GDP for 2015. The nominal volume of the produced gross domestic product was 80,412.5 billion rubles. In physical terms the GDP fell by 3.7%. The specific feature of the past year was the fact that the GDP dynamics were supported by external demand, whereas all the components of internal demand showed negative trends. The fall in domestic demand (by 10.3%) was compensated by a growth in exports (3.1%) and a sharp decline in imports (-25.6%), which is evidence of weak domestic demand too.

Expenses for final consumption diminished by 7.9% as a whole, including the consumer demand of households (by 10.1), and the state (by 1.8%). Investment demand lowered by 18.3%, including gross fixed capital formation (by 7.6%). At the end of 2015, the following structural shifts occurred in the GDP expenses: the share of consumer and investment demand shrank by 0.6% and 0.7% cor-

respondingly; whereas the share of net exports grew by 1.3% (goods and services exports grew by 1.1% at a time when the share of imports reduced by 0.2%).

A negative effect on the general economic growth in 2015 was produced by a decrease in financial activity, caused by a fall in the deposit and credit activity of economic agents.

The risks for the Russian economy remain. These may be provoked by growing geopolitical tension in the world, which could cause more obstacles for Russian companies preventing their access to the global capital market and, in turn, becoming a stimulus for a fall in the value of ruble. Thus, a new rise in consumer prices and a general reduction in business activity may be provoked. Moreover, there is a hazard of a further fall in oil prices, which may speed up inflation accompanied by growing tariffs of the natural monopolies, weaken the value of the Russian currency even more, cut down on investment activity and, consequently, contribute to further capital drain.

The basic scenario for 2016–2018 implies that the regime of economic sanctions in relation to the Russian Federation will continue. Thus, in this period the subjects of the Russian economy will function under conditions of limited access to the world credit market.

Vector Change in the Budget Policy of the Russian Federation in 2016–2019

The aforementioned negative effects for the Russian economy, preconditioned by the external macroeconomic challenges and the lack of structural reforms, required correction of the budget policy. In the second half of 2015, compliance with a conservative scenario in terms of indexation of budget expenses, to a point, diminished the negative cyclic impulse. Moreover, in 2015 in order to cover the federal budget deficit and withdrawn financial means, which it had planned to use on its financing, the Russian government had to use the means of the Reserve Fund. This allowed, to some extent, a neutralizing of the negative effects provoked by a cardinal change in the external and internal macroeconomic conditions and winning additional time for adapting the level and structure of expenditure commitments to the existing budget facilities.

In order to ensure the long-term balance and sustainability of budgets, define financial capabilities for the required expenditure commitments, evaluate budget risks and take actions for their minimization, in 2015 an amendment to the Budget Code was adopted. It contains a requirement for the need to develop a long-term budget forecast.

It is supposed that this document will become a tool of a complex approach to managing budget sustainability, since it will improve the ability of the state budget to adapt to temporary macroeconomic fluctuations (medium-term budget stability, sufficiency of budget safety, expansion of the limits of budget maneuver (increased flexibility in the structure of expenses).

The contents and significance of macroeconomic and budget risks underwent quality changes in comparison to the previous budget cycle, which preconditioned the specifics of the budget policy implementation in 2016–2018. In this period, the major role of the budget is to activate the structural transformation of the Russian economy, which calls for relevant changes in budget expenses. Compliance

with the conservative scenario in the part of formation of budget expenses will allow diminishing fluctuations in the total amount of expenses, which will help to gradually reduce the federal budget deficit.

At the same time, it is probable that in 2016–2019 the budget risks will remain high, which may result in short supply of revenues planned by the federal budget, reduction of the sources of deficit financing and the need for an increase in some areas of budget expenses.

As for the project of the federal budget for 2017 and the planned period of 2018–2019, then, in comparison to the year 2015, the revenues of the federal budget are expected to go down in 2019: from 16.9% to 15.0% of the GDP correspondingly (Table 1).

Table 1

Major budget indicators in 2015–2019

indicators	2015 (fact)		2016 (estimate)		2017 (project)		2018 (project)		2019 (project)	
	billion RUR	% of GDP	billion RUR	% of GDP	billion RUR	% of GDP	billion RUR	% of GDP	billion RUR	% of GDP
revenues	13 659	16.9	12 665	15.3	13 492	15.5	13 955	15.2	14 823	15.0
expenses	15 620	19.3	16 404	19.8	16 160	18.6	15 951	17.3	15 962	16.1
deficit / proficit	-1961	2.4	-3034	-4.5	-2744	-3.0	-1989	-2.2	-1139	-1.2

Source: website of the RF Ministry of Finance (www.minfin.ru)

Reduced revenues of the federal budget are caused by projected worsening dynamics of oil and gas revenues, the amounts of which will decrease from 5.8% of the GDP in 2016 down to 5.4% in 2019. As illustrated in Table 1, in the next budget cycle a gradual reduction of expenses in the federal budget is expected from 16,160 billion RUR down to 14,823 billion RUR (in nominal terms) correspondingly.

In addition, the next budget cycle will be marked by a change in the vector of the budget policy. Apart from budget consolidation, aimed at the reduction of expenditure obligations, the budget policy needs serious correction. In particular, a noticeable reduction of the "oil rent" calls for immediate change in the priorities of the budget expenses, most of which must be spent on restructuring the national economy.

Moreover, even though the budget deficit is planned to be cut from 3,034 billion RUR in 2016 to 1,139 billion RUR in 2019, there are serious doubts if these projections are feasible, since now there are no reliable grounds to expect a recovery of growth in the Russian economy in 2017–2019. In this case a fiscal gap might be expected with a further growth of budget deficit, which will result in decreasing long-term budget stability.

Dynamics of Public Debt and Debt Policy of Russia

Public debt is one of the system-forming components in the economy of any country, because its amount, structure and growth rate directly affect the devel-

opment potential of all sectors of the national economy (Afanasyev & Krivogov, 2007; Shash & Afanasiev, 2014). In the conditions of potentially growing budget deficit and depleting reserves of the sovereign funds[2] the tasks appear related to the need for increasing the amount of debt financing of budget expenses (including investment ones) (Shash & Afanasiev, 2014; Tatuev, Shash, Nagoev, Lyapuntsova & Rokotyanskaya, 2015). In the situation where the Russian economy remains in recession, constant growth of public debt is expected (Fig.).

Figure

Dynamics of the RF public debt change

Domestic debt, billion RUR   External debt, billion RUR

Source: website of the RF Ministry of Finance (www.minfin.ru)

As you can see, public debt is growing (and will grow) largely due to a rise of domestic debt, which will be more than 57% in the period of 2015–2019, whereas the growth rate of external debt will stay within the limits of 11%. In September 2016, an additional issue of sovereign Eurobonds was placed, with a nominal value of $1.25 billion[3]. It is obvious that the current growth of public debt securities is caused by lower revenues from traditional items of Russian exports and by the attempts to fulfill the expenditure commitments in full.

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[2]   Sovereign Wealth Fund and Reserve Fund of the Russian Federation. The Sovereign Wealth Fund is a state investment fund, whose financial assets include stocks, bonds, property, precious metals and other financial instruments. The Reserve Fund represents part of the means of the federal budget which must be accounted and managed independently in order to perform oil and gas transfer in case oil and gas revenues are insufficient for financial provision of the above transfer.

[3]   The time of repayment of these debt instruments is 10 years, coupon yield is 4.7%.

Apart from rising public debt, there is an annual growth of expenses on its servicing, because, due to a high interest rate of the Central Bank of Russia, the costs related to public debt servicing are growing too (2011 – 2.4%, 2016 – 3.3%, 2019 – 5.3%).

Table 2

The structure and amount of Russian public debt (2015–2019),
Billion rubles

Indicator	2015 (fact)	2016 (estimate)	2017 (projection)	2018 (projection)	2019 (projection)
Public debt, total	11 353	12 490	13 967	15 209	16 603
%% GDP	15.5	15.1	16.1	16.5	16.8
including: public guarantees	3170.3	3830.0	4136.0	4369.0	4612.0
Public domestic debt	8119.9	9064.0	10 352.0	11 581.0	12 788.0
%% of the total public debt	71.5	72.6	74.1	76.1	77.0
including: public guarantees	2328.8	2956.0	3146.0	3280.0	3400.0
Public external debt	3233.0	3427.0	3625.0	3628.0	3815.0
%% of the total public debt	28.5	27.4	25.9	23.9	23.0
including: public guarantees	841.5	879.0	989.0	1089.0	1213.0

Despite the continuous growth of public debt, the values of Russia's external debt stability coefficients remain within the threshold values (Tables 2 and 3) and it has to be considered that in the conditions of lowering reserves of the sovereign funds, in a short period the country may fully use up the available "margin of safety" in the context of the planned growth of total public debt.

Table 3

Coefficients of Russia's external debt stability

	"External debt / GDP", %	"External debt / EGP[4]", %	"Payments of external debt / GDP", %	"Payments of external debt / EGP", %	"International reserves / payments of external debt", %	External debt per capita, USD
2004	36	105				1488
2005	34	96	11	31	218	1801
2006	32	94	11	33	278	2202
2007	36	119	13	44	279	3267
2008	29	92	10	32	255	3386
2009	38	136	13	45	285	3268
2010	32	111	10	36	303	3422

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4   Annual export of goods and services.

	"External debt / GDP", %	"External debt / EGP[4]", %	"Payments of external debt / GDP", %	"Payments of external debt / EGP", %	"International reserves / payments of external debt", %	External debt per capita, USD
2011	27	94	9	31	282	3767
2012	30	108	10	35	263	4440
2013	33	123	11	40	217	5072
2014	29	107	9	32	219	4100
2015	39	132	10	32	288	3539
2016 (II quart.)	40	144	10	36	301	3549
Threshold values of coefficients						
IMF	30–40–50	100–150–200	–	15–20–25	–	–
Audit Chamber of the RF	50	130–220	–	25	Not less than 100	–

At the same time, it should be considered that in 2015 and at the beginning of 2016 the strategy of budget deficit financing relied on the means of sovereign funds, since in this period the crediting activity was low.

Table 4

Sources of federal budget deficit financing in 2017–2019,
Billion rubles

Indicator	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sources of deficit financing	*3035*	*2754*	*1992*	*1132*
Use of the Reserve Fund and Sovereign Wealth Fund	2144	1821	1143	130
Not related to the Reserve Fund and the NWF	784	933	849	1002
Sources of domestic financing of deficit	*804*	*1136*	*1078*	*1130*
public securities	449	1050	1050	1050
attraction	1151	1879	1581	1659
repayment	-702	-829	-531	-609
privatization	382*	138	14	14
precious metals	0	4	2	0
receipts	5	10	11	11
retirements	-5	-6	-9	-11
budget loans and credits made within the country	-183	29	133	155
return	155	229	333	205
extension	-338	-200	-200	-50

Indicator	2016	2017	2018	2019
fulfillment of guarantees	-8	-81	-116	-84
compensation of savings	-6	-6	-6	-6
change in the balance of accounts of the federal budget means	270			
Sources of external financing of deficit	*-20*	*-203*	*-229*	*-127*
borrowed sources	82	-32	-75	-29
attraction	201	480	209	214
repayment	-118	-513	-284	-243
public guarantees	-1	-2	-4	-4
public credits	-102	-168	-150	-94
return	93	108	167	166
extension	-195	-277	-317	-259

Analysis of the major funding sources of budget deficit for the period of 2016–2019 (Table 4) has shown that in this period there will be changes in its funding ratios, because it is planned that by the end of 2016 almost 70% of the budget deficit will be compensated from sovereign funds, while by the end of the period (in 2019) almost 90% of the deficit should be financed at the expense of government debt liabilities.

Moreover, since the third quarter of 2016 the situation in the debt markets has started to stabilize and become accompanied by lower inflation expectations and credit premiums. This is gradually causing change in the structure of deficit financing sources. Thus, the major objective of Russia's debt strategy for the next budget cycle (2017–2019) is the total transfer to market financing the budget deficit.

Transfer to a qualitatively new debt strategy agrees with modern financing trends of the public budget deficit, since the use of debt financing tools has a distinct advantage. It consists of a fairly long gap between the attraction of financial resources and the repayment of debt liabilities, which gives the government greater freedom of movement.

In this respect, until the end of 2019 the Russian government plans to use debt financing tools more actively. Thus, for example, net fundraising on the domestic debt market will be 1.05 trillion RUR in 2017–2019. However, since in 2017 it will be time to repay public debt liabilities for the amount of 829 billion RUR, the net amount of borrowings will be 1.9 trillion RUR. As for the use of external borrowing tools, the main emphasis is planned to be made on supporting the liquidity of the sovereign Eurobond market. For 2017, the RF Ministry of Finance has decided to establish a limit on external borrowings equal to 7 billion USD.

According to some projections, even though the new debt strategy of Russia implies intensive growth of leverage, during its implementation in the next budget cycle the indicator of public debt will be within 20% of the GDP, which will not exceed the safe level. However, to solve the set problems, the Russian authori-

ties need to keep the costs on public debt servicing lower than 10% and develop a number of actions for efficient adaptation of the debt policy to the dynamically changing environment in the external and, especially, in the domestic financial markets. For example, they must preclude the growth of short-term debt liabilities and their interest rates.

Macroeconomic Consequences of Debt Financing for the Russian Economy

Stability and predictability of the major macroeconomic variables is a crucial condition for ensuring favorable conditions for investments and faster economic growth. Moreover, in today's conditions, virtually every country in the world uses debt financing of the economy in order to obtain additional resources, which are necessary to start modernization processes and stimulate economic growth.

Many researchers believe that countries with their own currency have no serious financial limitations to public debt growth or capabilities for its refinancing (for example, Groneck, 2010; Krugman, 1998), because in such economies even relatively high values of public debt cannot break macroeconomic stability. However, this formula is not applicable for the countries with developing economies (including Russia). Countries with forming markets which use debt financing to mitigate external shocks can have a directly opposite effect, when a poorly controlled growth of debt liabilities can provoke new macroeconomic shocks. In this respect, attention must be paid to the risks that can be entailed by growing debt financing of the Russian economy.

One of the major hazards for Russia – a country with a large share of momentary revenues in the export structure – is in attempting to stimulate growth by making the debt larger. The result of such practice is the further pushing out of private investments and their substitution with public ones, which have proven to be rather inefficient in practice. Under the conditions of the constant debt financing of budget spending and growing debt liabilities, the state budget can end up as a tool of growth reduction, since the major problem of the continuously growing RF budget expenses is in the fact that most of them are not investments. Essentially, such actions activate the inflation spiral, which will negatively affect real personal earnings further down the road.

Furthermore, there is the probability that if the Russian authorities actively attract financial resources in the debt market, then, depending on the amounts of borrowings, interest rates will possibly go up, which will be causing further growth of expenses related to public debt servicing. Thus, for example, as early as today the interest rates for Russian debt liabilities comprise of 10–11%, whereas the total amount of public debt servicing expenses can reach 3.3% of the GDP or 4% of the expenditure budget at the end of 2016.

Growing amounts of borrowings can reduce the trust of investors in the Russian debt instruments (in the case where the budget gaps are compensated at the expense of new loans). In the case where the debt strategy orientated on the further growth of public debt continues, Russia risks getting in a "debt trap".

Under the conditions of limited financial capabilities and slow economic recovery, the Russian government should take tough action aimed at reduction of the public budget deficit. This is related to the fact that each percentage item of budget

deficit results in an analogous growth of the key rate of the Bank of Russia. Thus, a growing budget deficit necessitates tougher actions in monetary policy, i.e. the "price" of budget deficit is a growth of interest rates in the economy. By the end of 2016 the structural primary deficit of the consolidated budget will be around 4.0% of the GDP. The results of a simulated long-term economic growth show that the share of budget expenses in the GDP has an inverse proportion to the potential economic growth rates. An additional adverse factor is a growing share of unproductive expenses, i.e. social spending, including expenses of the pension system. A stable growth is demonstrated by defense expenses and expenses related to security and support of the public sector, which have grown by 10% (from 49 to 59%) since 2008.

So the problem must be solved concerning minimization of the dependence of domestic macroeconomic conditions on the dynamics of external environment conditions, and budget policy must be adapted to the low price of hydrocarbon raw materials. In order to do this, the budget policy must become more rigid in terms of lowering the level of unproductive expenses, since the structure of the currently existing Russian expenditure budget does not correspond to the conditions for achieving long-term budget sustainability and planned indicators of economic growth.

Thus, the hypothesis about a possible improvement of economic efficiency in the presence of a continuously growing public debt does not work for those countries with forming markets. It is especially true in cases where there is serious dependence of budget revenues on price misbalances in the raw material markets. In the case of Russia, an increasing amount of debt liabilities stimulates inflation processes and decreases investment activities and, thus, produces a negative effect on the level of development of the real sector of the economy (at both national and regional levels), which may be the cause of macroeconomic instability and a long-term economic recession in the country.

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POLITICAL WILL AND THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE: FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE AFTER THE REVOLUTION

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"It looks like we have elected the wrong people…"
Focus group participant

Abstract

The article analyzes the concept of political will and the role of the population in the battle with high-level corruption in post-communist Ukraine. We start with the assertion that political will in the battle with corruption is derivative of the character of the interaction between the population and the state, and in particular, to what extent the population adopts a "patron-orientation" to the political leadership of the country and holds them accountable. Accordingly, to analyze the strength and dynamics of political will, we suggest researching the way in which the population views the authorities rather than the personality of political leaders. We use a multi-disciplinary approach for understanding political will by proposing to look at it as a combination of political "want", "can", and "must" in the battle with corruption. In the methodological part of the paper, we examine quantitative and qualitative approaches to studying political will. We lay out an empirical analysis based on 14 focus groups which were conducted with representatives of various social layers of the population in four Ukrainian cities in May 2015. Analyzing the narratives makes it possible to define empirical indicators, which can be used for researching political will, particularly the age and regional distribution of the participants in the focus groups.

Keywords: political will; corruption; patron-client relationships; political role of the population; Euromaidan revolution.

Introduction

In Ukraine, corruption has become a systemic feature of society[1], reducing economic growth, undermining democratic institutions, and weakening the provision of security. Comparative indexes of corruption prepared by Transparency International, the World Bank, and other international organizations consistently show Ukraine to be the most corrupt country in Europe and among the most corrupt countries in the world. Extensive anti-corruption campaigns encouraged by the leading international political and financial institutions have so far not led to substantial progress, according to recent polls of the Ukrainian population[2].

The relatively small amount of success in fighting corruption in Ukraine is often attributed to the "lack of political will"[3]. For example, Transparency International-Ukraine (TI) noted in its report on the period from October 2014 to May 2015 that "Ukraine has achieved notable progress in reforming anti-corruption legislation, but on the other hand there is lack of political will from the Cabinet of Ministers, the President and the Verkhovna Rada to implement the new laws"[4]. Similarly, Taras Kuzio declares that "there is a near total absence of political will among Ukrainian politicians to seriously combat corruption (Kuzio, 2015, p. 326)." The presence of political will can also be used to explain reform success where there is more visible progress than in Ukraine. According to the World Bank analysis, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was uniquely successful in Georgia because of his "strong political commitment, backed by the comprehensiveness, pace, boldness, and sequencing of the reforms and, most important, the strong role of the executive in implementing them (World Bank, 2012, p. 11)." Working within this framework, observers often point out that asserting the right kind of political will for the situation is crucial. As investigative journalist turned member of parliament, Mustafa Nayyem, points out, "It is important that this [political] will appear before the people, out of despair, seek to bring a Ukrainian Pinochet to power"[5]. For Ukraine, political will is the missing element in the traditional anti-corruption triangle – strong political will, mobilized civil society, and independent mass media. Even though it is widely recognized that Ukraine currently has a strong civil society and a developed independent media, the country is not able to successfully fight corruption in the absence of strong political will.

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[1]   Corruption is a multifaceted problem with political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. In this article, we examine mainly high-level corruption, affecting the economic and political systems of Ukraine and is manifested in the kleptocracy, theft of state resources and the actions of the oligarchs. Experts see these problems as the main barriers to the economic development of the country.

[2]   See, for example, Andriy Bychenko, "Ukrainians Lost Confidence in the Authorities and Increasingly Rely Only on Themselves," Razumkov Centre Newsletter, no 24, October 9, 2015, http://razumkov.org.ua/upload/Newsletter_24_en.pdf

[3]   Although the notion "political will" could be used to analyze any kind of reforming process (general economic and political reforms or implementation of reforms in some particular areas like energy, education, medicine, pensions, etc.), in this paper while using the term "political will" we mean political will to fight corruption and to implement anti-corruption reforms.

[4]   http://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/oficial/5426.html

[5]   Mustafa Nayyem post on Facebook, September 17, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/Mustafanayyem/posts/10205281260217085

Despite the recognized importance of political will for effectively fighting corruption, the concept is poorly developed both in political science and in practical managerial applications. Frequently, the phenomenon of will is viewed from a psychological perspective and is conceived as the leadership ability and personal motivation (or internally driven initiative) of specific politicians[6]. At the other extreme, political will is seen as the entire complex of individual, organizational, and institutional elements of the system of state management (e.g., Brinkerhoff 1999). Most often, however, the term "political will" is used without any explanation, as a term that presumably makes sense in and of itself. Typically, political will is seen as some sort of impulse for anti-corruption reforms coming from the supreme echelons of authority, the head of state, or the political establishment. Given these wide interpretations, the term leaves numerous questions unanswered: What is the nature of political will as a key anti-corruption tool? What are the sources and drivers of political will? To what extent are they able to strengthen or weaken the realization of anti-corruption reforms? Is it possible to measure political will? Can you influence it?

In this article, we try to answer these questions from a multi-disciplinary perspective. We base our analysis on the assertion that in the post-communist, neopatrimonial states, the main (and often only) drivers of political will are external, not internal, coming from society rather than the individual motivations of a particular political leader or from the institutional capacity of the state. Therefore, to define the concept of political will in the battle against corruption, it is necessary to place the idea of political will within the broader context of society (Migdal, 2001). Our argument is based on the thesis that strong political will asserted by the authorities is the result of a high level of political will within the population, which is able to monitor and hold their authorities accountable in implementing a set of anti-corruption reforms.

The article begins with an analysis of the various approaches to understanding political will. We show that existing approaches undervalue the role of society in the formation of political will. Building on the institutional conception of political will proposed by political scientists (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012), and the practically oriented governance approach proposed by Malena (2009), we see the political will of the authorities in implementing anti-corruption reforms as derivative of (or a mirror reflection of) the political will of the population. From this perspective, the political will of the population is not only and exclusively through the activity of civil society organizations and the strength of direct political pressure on the authorities, but also in the character of the way that society perceives its authorities' political position, in the recognition of their own ability to influence the authorities, and in the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. In this context, the most important type of empirical research regarding political will focuses on society and the population rather than the political establishment and NGOs.

The methodological part of the article operationalizes the concept of political will. It examines the opportunities for quantitative and qualitative approaches to researching the given phenomenon. We propose an analytical framework for

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[6]   For a discussion on political will as individual-level concept see Post, Raile and Raile, 2010, p. 656.

the further development of instruments for quantitative research and also examine the opportunities for qualitative research of political will. In this article, we focus on developing the qualitative analysis. Our qualitative work is based on 14 focus groups conducted with representatives of various social groups from the populations of four Ukranian cities in the spring of 2015. In the concluding section, we discuss the theoretical contribution of this approach for empirical research examining the phenomenon of political will in the battle with corruption and analyze its methodological possibilities and limitations.

Political Will: Definitions and Approaches

As we noted above, the concept of political will is extremely popular in explaining the success or failure of anti-corruption reforms. Defining political will as the internal motivation of a political leader, combining psychological qualities and individual interests, limits the explanatory potential of the concept of political will particularly in analyzing the anti-corruption reforms undertaken in the aftermath of colored revolutions in post-communist countries.

Post-revolutionary politicians do not automatically have the motivation to fight corruption, for the simple reason that politicians who are supposed to implement anti-corruption reforms in post-communist states are often personally involved in oligarchic networks and pursue their own private interests which do not necessarily match an anti-corruption agenda (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). As institutional scholars have pointed out, it does not make sense to rely on the charitable inclinations of politicians to carry out necessary reforms (Hale, 2016). The anti-corruption effort to reform state governance which started in Ukraine after the Euromaidan revolution is a good illustration for this statement. Despite the fact that President Petro Poroshenko came to power in the wake of a popular uprising aimed largely at replacing the previous political system with a vaguely defined "European" alternative, his political will to fight corruption is limited by his own personal financial and institutional interests. At the same time, he has laid out a variety of reforms and many institutional changes are being implemented. Under such conditions, one can assume that the contradictory character of the political will of the current political leadership in Ukraine is caused by the clash of public-driven versus politically and individually driven incentives and pressures. On the one hand, there are expectations on the part of the general public that provided Poroshenko with a mandate of trust in the post-Maidan elections, on the other hand, entrenched interests (or perhaps just a lack of interest in exerting the enormous effort required to develop and implement reforms) that can block reforms remain in place.

Another disadvantage of the individualistic approach is that it is hard to measure political will when it is defined in such black box leadership terms. An effective approach to measuring political will seeks to better take into account the motivations for leadership behavior and the context within which the leaders operate. Scholars working on the sub-Saharan African countries have developed such a theory (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012). At the micro-level, Persson and Sjostedt advocate using a principal-agent theory. Under this framework, a country's popu-

lation represents the principal and the elected politicians are their agents. Rather than seeing political will as a "black box," this theory Posits that the behavior of leaders is guided by the opportunity and incentive structure they face, and that this opportunity and incentive structure should, in turn, be expected to vary considerably depending on *the degree to which the citizens are willing and able to control the leaders. In societies in which citizens take on the role of being a "principled principal,"* leaders should be expected to have fewer opportunities and incentives to act opportunistically compared to societies in which the citizens are not willing or able to take on such a role (Persson & Sjöstedt, 2012). (emphasis added)

In other words, the degree to which citizens are willing to exercise their citizenship rights to form associations and individually exert oversights of their leaders determines to what extent the leaders are able to engage in high level corruption. The political will to address corruption then is a function of public efforts. Robert Johnston came to a similar conclusion with his argument that "lasting corruption control requires deep democratization – not building democracy in an electoral or constitutional sense, but rather enabling and encouraging citizens to check abuses of wealth and power through political advocacy of their own interests (Johnston, 2014, p. xii)."

Persson and Sjostedt's article makes a real contribution because the authors argue that political will is not just voluntaristic leadership behavior, but depends on the characteristics of the society, and in particular, the legitimacy of the state, namely, the state in people's perceptions.

This focus on society takes us farther than methodologies that emphasize the state. For example, international organizations, such as Transparency International and the World Bank, which are actively involved in anti-corruption campaigns in post-Soviet states, are more interested in the effectiveness of implementing anti-corruption reforms and state management in general. From a governance point of view, PW is closely connected with implementation capacity, "and what may look to outsiders as a lack of political will to advance certain reforms may actually be a symptom of insufficient government capacity" (TI Guide, p. 6). The main problem is seen as the lack of certainty and resources to implement reforms. From this point of view, even politicians with good intentions to implement reforms would not try to do this because they are not sure that they possess enough resources and support from "all stakeholders" for this complicated enterprise. From the governance logic, in order to strengthen political will, it is important to mobilize stakeholders' support and organizational/institutional resources.

In further developing the concept of political will, the views on the nature of political will proposed by (Malena, 2009) in her research on participatory governance are useful. She disaggregated the concept into three elements, defining political will as the sum of "political want," "political can" and "political must." Further developing this construct with regard to the battle against corruption, we can suggest that "political want" to undertake a given action is essentially political motivation, "political can" represents capacity (organizational, institutional, etc.) to undertake that action, and "political must" implies some compulsion to undertake this action. We argue that in a neopatrimonial state, such as Ukraine, the main active element for political will in the battle with corruption is "political

must," which is activated exclusively under external pressure. An important source of pressure comes from international organizations, but a stable, long-term effect is possible only when society is exerting the pressure. Thus, to research the level and dynamics of political will it is necessary to focus not on the psychological qualities of political leaders, but on society, and in particular, the mutual relationship between society and the state.

Political Will: Public Perspective

Our analysis draws on the traditional argument that successful anti-corruption reform is based on the presence and interaction of three crucial elements: strong political will, mobilized civil society, and independent mass media. However, we argue that another important element, which is missing here, is the general public. Common people usually attract researchers' attention during revolutions and studies focus on the role of mass protests in the revolutionary change of political regimes (Onuch, 2014; Zelinska, 2015). However, after the revolution, when it comes to the implementation of reforms, the focus of analysis usually shifts to state institutions, civil society organizations and the role of social players such as the media. Although public participation is seen by scholars as a critical condition of building trustworthy states in transforming societies (Rose-Ackerman, 2004), this concept has never been applied to the analysis of political will.

Civil society is supposed to play the role of intermediary between the state and individual citizens (Greene, 2014). However, previous research shows that the link between civil society organizations and the general public is still problematic in Ukraine, which makes the situation look similar to the aftermath of the Orange revolution. NGOs often live in their own world, obtaining financing from Western and other donors, but often lacking strong connections to members of the public. Some have described this situation as "NGOcracy" (Lutsevych, 2013, p. 4).

In this paper, we will look at the political will to fight corruption and implement reforms in Ukraine from the people's perspective. Political will does not work without popular support and pressure on the country's top politicians, who must define and implement policy. We proceed from the assumption that the state of the population's political will and its dynamics serve as an indicator of the level and changes in the political will of the authorities in the battle with corruption. Following the patron-client model proposed by Persson and Sjostedt, we can say that the more that the population sees itself as the "patron" (and not the client), namely that it is the one that holds power, the greater the political will for carrying out reforms. Using the patron-client analytical frame is necessary to emphasize the vector of power relations – in the citizen-politician duo, the citizen should hold a position of power in relation to elected politicians. The category of political will reflects the extent to which the population understands this power position.

In this way, we study political will in combatting corruption by examining the extent to which the population sees itself as a patron in its relationship with the authorities. Understandably, the most obvious expressions of the population's political will are political actions, protests, and the like which work through the instrument of direct political pressure. Despite all their importance, protests

in neopatrimonial states do not always reflect the real state of social consciousness. The participation of simple citizens in protests presupposes many cultural, historical, social, and political factors. Changes in the way that the population understands political institutions or states do not always find immediate expression in the form of political actions. Therefore, to analyze the political will of the population (in realizing anti-corruption reforms) it is important to research a society's *dominant relationship with its political institutions and politicians and the understanding of citizens of themselves as subjects in political relations*. The character of the population's attitudes toward the authorities does not exert direct political pressure, but in the final analysis sets the level of institutional expectations from society in relation to the existing authorities; these expectations are no less important a factor of political influence than political protests and actions.

Measuring Political Will: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches

Researching political will according to the methods proposed above can proceed with both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Here we lay out a guide for a quantitative approach, but the rest of the article focuses on a qualitative analysis.

The quantitative approach is useful if the researcher seeks to measure the level and dynamics of political will. Quantitative research answers the question of how strong the pressure from society on politicians is in forcing them to take steps in implementing anti-corruption reforms. To empirically measure this aspect, we suggest disaggregating the concept of political will into its component elements in order to operationalize it and develop a system of indicators for empirical measurement. Analogous to the approach proposed by Malena, we represent the concept of political will of the population as the sum of political want, political can, and political must:

– *Political want* denotes the presence among people of a desire to influence policy and monitor the activity of political institutions. A patron-oriented consciousness denotes a high level of *interest* in conducting reforms, being *informed* about the course of the reforms (including actively seeking out information), and a *willingness to participate* in the processes of their implementation. In contrast to a patron-oriented position is a client position, which is characterized by the absence of political interest, a low and passive level of being informed, and a dominating desire to receive something from the state and elected officials – analogous to the electorate of a clientelistic party (Hale, 2014).

– *Political can* denotes recognition of the ability to monitor the activity of the political establishment, including an effort to replace elected officials, if they do not answer the desires of the population, do not implement their campaign promises, and do not conduct the necessary anti-corruption reforms. A patron-oriented position along this parameter expresses a *high level of confidence in their ability to influence* the authorities and *the effectiveness of the work of the democratic institutions and instruments of accountability*. A client position appears in one's recognition of one's own political powerlessness and inability to influence the authorities in adopting decisions and conducting reforms.

– *Political must* is recognition of one's *civic responsibility*, viewing oneself as a part of society, which is a political subject, wielding power, and not an object of political manipulations. A patron-oriented position in this parameter is expressed in recognizing the necessity of holding elected officials accountable. An important condition of *political must* is *trust* in political institutions and the state, which is expressed by actively participating in political elections.

Following this procedure of disaggregation, researchers can evaluate weak and strong aspects of political will, trace the dynamics of specific parameters, and compare aggregate and individual indicators of political will in regional units and in various social groups. This analytical scheme is a first step on the path to developing an instrument for quantitative research. The choice of empirical indicators, the format of the questionnaire, the specific questions asked, and the measurement scales used to define the further development of the survey methodology.

In contrast to the quantitative approach, which seeks to measure the strength and dynamics of political will, the qualitative approach is designed to answer the question of how political will is constructed, which factors influence its change, and which manifestations of political will it is possible to find in the narratives of ordinary citizens. In such qualitative research, the guides for conducting interviews or focus groups should be directed toward ascertaining the character of how citizens understand their positions as political actors – the desire, ability and need to influence the political authorities, in particular, in their effectiveness in realizing anti-corruption reforms. In contrast to quantitative surveys, where the system of empirical indicators and factors is defined at the stage of developing the survey instrument, in qualitative research, the definition of these indicators from the views of the citizens themselves is effectively the final result of the analysis. As an example of this type of qualitative research for analyzing political will, we look at the empirical data collected in the course of field research in Ukraine.

Public Views: Analysis of Focus-Group Discussions

In this section, we will analyze the transcripts of 14 focus-group discussions that were conducted in April/May 2015 within the framework of an USAID project on everyday corruption in Ukraine. The focus groups were held in three large Ukrainian cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv and L'viv) and the small town of Korostyshev in Zhitomir region. In each city, focus groups brought together men and women of different ages representing different socio-professional groups. The focus group participants did not work in NGOs, for the government, or in journalism and they were not political party activists. Although these focus groups were not purposely designed to reveal the participants' desire, capability or necessity to influence elected politicians, this material can be (at least partially) used for the purposes of our study. During the discussions people expressed their attitudes towards the new political leadership and assessed the changes in the country's development after Euromaidan. Some of these narrations demonstrate people's perceptions of themselves as political actors and can serve for the qualitative analysis of how political will is constructed and manifested in people's minds. By analyzing focus group discussions, we do not mean to measure political will in Ukraine today, but to find

some manifestations or indicators of how people in Ukraine position themselves as political actors, how they assess the changes (if any) in the economy and, most importantly, in their society after Euromaidan. An additional task is to determine what criteria people use when evaluating the performance of political leaders and their ability to fight corruption.

The focus groups produced considerable interesting material characterizing the overall situation in the country, the way that the population views politicians, and evaluation of the level of corruption, among other things. In this section, we highlight only those aspects which characterize, directly or indirectly, the positions of the respondents as political actors. Specifically, this is trust in the state and in elected politicians as a necessary prerequisite for political will, the character of assessments of the changes in the economy and society after the Euromaidan revolution, and attitudes and readiness to participate in anti-corruption reforms. Accordingly, the most informative for the purposes of our research was often not just what the participants in the focus groups said, but how they spoke, what associations they used, and how they positioned themselves in relation to the authorities in their narratives.

1. *The level of trust in the state* is one of the determining factors of political will. In the context of low trust in the state, public disappointment (which dominated in all focus groups) is converted into political apathy rather than into bottom-up pressure stimulating political will[7]. In a best case scenario, it is expressed by blaming particular politicians for the economic hardships, which reflects the clientelistic political culture more than bottom-up pressure on state institutions.

All focus groups demonstrate a generally low level of trust towards the state as well as towards the elected top-level politicians. The Euromaidan, unlike the Orange Revolution, involved not only representatives of organized civil society, but wider circles of ordinary people (Onuch, 2015). These people supported the revolution because they began to believe in the possibility of change, and expected these improvements in their lives immediately after the transition in the government. For these supporters, the lack of changes is especially painful:

During the Maidan, we believed strongly, we had strong faith, but now, as more time goes by, we no longer have faith in our authorities. (Galina 1, 53–60, Korostyshev[8]).

The growing disappointment with the outcomes of the revolution is converted into mistrust of the new political leadership: *"we do not believe in the government, do not believe that we can change something" (Aleksey, 35–40 Kyiv). "People no longer believe. I think that they do not believe or have trust in anyone. (Natalia, 25–45, Korostyshev).*

One of the biggest disappointments undermining belief in the possibility of change is that the "same people are still in power." People do not see any dif-

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[7]   For a discussion of whether trust or distrust leads to political participation, see (Levy & Stoker, 2000, pp. 486–488).

[8]   Here and further, the quotations are given in italic; the name of the narrator, the age interval of the focus group participants, and the city where the focus group was conducted are indicated in the brackets following the quotations.

ference between the previous regime and the new political leadership *("I do not see any differences between the regime that left and the one in place now" Roman, 18–20, L'viv).*

The popular assessment of Ukraine's political leadership is strongly negative in each city. One cannot find a single positive narrative in any focus group discussion. People in power are generally seen as time-servers who came into power with the sole purpose *"to fill their pockets."* The most critical of the political leaders are people in Kyiv and especially the young generation:

> *There is a mafia structure in power, unfortunately … There is a feeling that people there are constantly making money … but in fact nothing is resolved and they accomplish nothing (Yevgenny 21–30 Kyiv).*

> *I have the feeling that those who were in power were full. Now they have been replaced by people who are hungrier and more evil and they simply fill their bags. That is all. (Irina, 30–45, Kyiv).*

Overall, the general common opinion can be summarized in the following quotation: *"It looks like we have elected the wrong people" (Yurii 30–45, L'viv).*

There is a threat that people are already getting so tired of the chaos and uncertainty that they would prefer to give up all together on political will and transfer all decision-making power to a totalitarian leader:

> *It is possible to elect a good leader who will be a tyrant and take everything in his fist; then there will not be a bunch of various others… (Dmitry 1) 18–20 Kharkiv).*

2. Against the general background of complaints and curses, which characterized perceptions of the authorities usually from a clientelistic position, an interesting exception came in the *calls for the need to carry out lustration*. In contrast to the complaints and lamentations, the theme of the incomplete (and unstarted) lustrations rang out more like a demand which characterized a patron-oriented position. Against the background of general mistrust in the possibility for successful anti-corruption efforts undertaken by the corrupt state, the strong demand for a process of lustration and the punishment of corrupt officials and politicians does not look surprising. Typically, ordinary citizens do not distinguish between lustration and prosecution and use these terms as interchangeable notions. The necessity to replace corrupt politicians and officials at the top level was articulated in every focus group discussion by the people themselves (without any encouragement or special questions from the moderator). The idea of lustration as such is cheered by representatives of all regions and age groups, however everybody is disappointed by the incoherency and poor mechanisms for the practical implementation of the lustration law. The people are especially outraged by preservation of an "untouchable caste" among the top-level officials. Participants express the feeling that despite lustration, the same officials are returning to the positions they held before the revolution:

> *We should carry out lustration as a top priority (Korostyshev 53–65).*

> *There have been no important cases, no one was jailed, no one was put on trial, they did not catch anyone, no one was indicted (Vladimir 46–60 Kharkov).*

Lustration is taking place at the lowest levels…while high level bureaucrats [are not touched]. Take our deputies, Yatsenyuk and all the rest. They have so many apartments (Aleksandr 25–45, Korostyshev).

On one hand, our leaders say that we should lustrate everyone who came to power under Yanukovych. On the other hand, there is no mechanism … I think that lustration will not go all the way. Or it will be taken to absurd levels so that they can manipulate it. Or somehow achieve their interests. (Igor, L'viv 21–29).

The same old people return on the sly, that is, without explaining what is going on, they return to the same position or take another position, without advertising it (Sergei Kyiv 21–29).

The only positive aspect in trust to the state is that despite the general disappointment in the new political leadership, the dominating perception is that the country is headed in the right direction, even if the quality and pace of changes after Euromaidan are insufficient *("in general, the course is correct")*. The assessments vary across region and generation. The most optimistic views are expressed by the citizens of L'viv: "I think that we are headed in the right direction, but are moving very slowly, there are many obstacles, which block movement" (Natalia, 18–20, L'viv). The citizens of the small city of Korostyshev also evaluate the general direction of the development as good: "Little by little. With great strength. Little by little we are moving in the direction that we should be moving. There are many inadequacies, but I think that we are moving little by little" (Sergey, 53–60, Korostyshev). The most negative and even aggressive assessments of the country's development are in Kyiv ("we are going backward" – Tatiana, 21–29 Kyiv).

3. The way people evaluate changes in the economy and society after Euromaidan can be also quite informative about people's political roles. While in general the progress in the country's development after Euromaidan is evaluated as extremely negative in all focus groups, there are essential differences in the criteria that people use to assess the changes. The majority of the participants evaluate the country's progress mainly through the prism of everyday economic life and growing economic hardships. This type of narration was particularly typical for the older generation. They blame politicians for rising prices on gas, electricity, inflation and a variety of other products.

Unlike the older generation, young people evaluate changes primarily through the achievement of Euromaidan goals: integration into Europe, reduction of corruption, and making the state more transparent: *"one of the causes of the Revolution of Dignity was to fight corruption. What happened was that the leadership changed but corruption remains. They say a lot in words, but the facts show something different" (Stepan Kyiv 18–20).*

Although the assessments of the changes are negative from both points of view, young people demonstrate a more "patron-type" position, when they care about long-term political goals. Notably, young people also seem to be more prepared to suffer economic hardships in favor of long-term positive perspectives. Some express understanding that economic depression is a necessary stage of economic reforms:

Each country that joined the EU recently went through this difficult step which Ukraine is going through now. Each country sacrificed something. That includes price increases for communal services and in general. Life becomes more expensive, but you do not receive a bigger salary … this will continue for some time while the overall economic situation stabilizes. The same happened in Poland, our neighbor. They also faced a very complicated economic crisis when they joined the European Union. But they survived this and the standard of living grew. They live much better than we do. In order to accomplish something, it is necessary to take this step I think. Everyone should understand this. (Marjana L'viv 18–20).

4. The focus groups demonstrated *changes in people's solidarity*, which is important from the point of view of perceiving oneself as a political actor within society. We can assume that the more people feel solidarity with others, the higher their ability to influence the political establishment is. In all of the focus groups, participants mentioned the changes in social relationships and interactions among members of society. However, the assessments of changes are different in different parts of Ukraine. Thus, in all of the focus groups that were conducted in L'viv, people (especially young people) speak of the growing trust and consolidation among citizens after Euromaidan. They mention new positive trends in people's interactions, such as friendliness and openness to each other.

In Kharkiv, in contrast, the changes in social interactions were unanimously viewed as negative. The participants pointed to an emerging divide in people's consciousness in recent years *"…Somehow relations between people have changed…a year ago there was a sort of solidarity among the people and it was palpable. Now people are divided with one person saying one thing and others saying something else" (Dmintry 18–20, Kharkiv).* Today people are *"afraid to openly express their opinions because they fear provoking conflicts" (Bogdan 18–20 Kharkiv).* However even in Kharkiv, some people also see a growing solidarity among the population, such as e.g., the volunteer movement: *"It is surprising. I never imagined such a thing. A volunteer movement." (Aleksandr, 45–50 Kharkov).*

While the assessments of the level of solidarity differ across the regional dimension, there is a positive change in people's minds that was unanimously agreed upon by all participants regardless of their age or geographical location. Namely, there is a growing popular self-consciousness and understanding of the people's role in the country's development, which is considered by the informants to be a result (or *"cumulative effect"*) of the two revolutions:

Looking back in retrospect, I can say the following: during the revolution of 2004, people got to know each other. They understood that they could unite somehow. In 2013–4 … I can say that people, probably, understood what their goal is. They understood what they should strive for. (Vladimir, L'viv, 21–29).

5. *Ability to change the authorities in the country.* For the analysis of political will, one of the most important changes that occurred in people's minds after Euromaidan seems to be the understanding that they can change their political leadership:

*I think that, in principle, things have changed. People in our country be-
came more aware. They … began to fear less. They saw that … with the change
of the authorities it was possible to change something (Roksolana 18–20 L'viv).*

We consider this change in people's minds to be the most important factor
of political will in terms of bottom-up pressure on politicians.

All in all, we can assume that although trust in the state is still low among
Ukrainian citizens, there is a growing belief in the possibility of changing the state
from below. This swelling sentiment provides a positive incentive in the develop-
ment of political will. The focus group material demonstrates that people, and
especially young people, are no longer satisfied with serving as a "business re-
source" and are beginning to acquire and internalize the role of "principal" in the
"principal-agent" model of relationships with politicians.

*Influence should be concentrated in the hands of ordinary people. I went
to the authorities and calmly said "I have these problems – to quickly solve
my problem." (Igor, L'viv 21–29).*

*"People are trying to take responsibility for themselves – finally they under-
stand that people in power are just managers who were elected for a short time.
(Roman Kharkov 21–29).*

*Before the revolution it seemed to me that the majority of Ukrainians either
did not know or did not understand this [Power to the People]. Afterwards, this
is exactly what changed; the majority of Ukrainians, of course, not all of them,
began to understand these words. Authority should be with the people. Not with
the president, not with the parliament, etc. (Roksolana 18–20 L'viv).*

6. *Perception of anti-corruption reforms.*

Corruption is seen by all focus group participants as the second most im-
portant problem hindering the country's development after the war. In general,
the anti-corruption reforms are considered by people mostly as "window dress-
ing" – not a real fight against corruption. People do not see any serious or sincere
desire among state leaders to get rid of it *(In my opinion, this is only words, Irina
Kyiv 30–45)*. The general feeling is that corruption remains the same and is even
getting more widespread *("the situation with corruption has become even worse"
(Yurii 30–45 L'viv); "I think that now corruption is stronger than it was," Valentina
45–60 Kharkov) "[Corruption] here is even evolving" (Olga 1 Kyiv, 21–29); "if you
compare us with Russia, here everyone is on the take, whereas there it is only Putin"
(Алина Kyiv 21–29).*

Against the background of the overall negative assessment of the battle
against corruption, important criteria for our analysis include how the population
sees the nature of corruption – quotidian corruption, bribe-taking by bureaucrats,
and high-level kleptocracy including the theft of state resources – and the extent
to which people see the connection between corruption and the general economic
development of the country[9]. Despite the limited opportunities afforded by the
material, there are several interesting differences between social and regional
groups. For example, while defining corruption (at the request of the focus group

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[9]   For a discussion on the distinction between corruption and bribes, see (Philp & David-Barrett, 2015).

moderator), young Kyiv citizens demonstrated broader and more profound views of corruption and its destructive impact on the economy than their counterparts in other cities. Unlike participants from regions outside the capital who mostly reduced the definition of corruption to bribes paid to public institutions and officials, participants from Kyiv primarily spoke about high-level corruption associated with oligarchic kleptocracy (stealing from the state), nepotism, "mafia"-like structures, "the illegal turnover of resources", "lack of transparency", etc.

Another criteria denoting patron-oriented relations with anti-corruption reforms is the representation of one's own abilities in the struggle against corruption. Generally, people expect that it is the state which is supposed to fight corruption in the first place. The direct question, "Who should fight corruption?" in most focus groups gets the direct answer "The state." While most of the participants (especially young people) agree that people stimulate (petty) corruption themselves, the overwhelming opinion is that it is impossible to fight the "upper-level" corruption "from the bottom" unless it is addressed by the leadership from above. Nevertheless, practically all participants lacked an understanding that it was possible to exert pressure on the state and politicians through democratic procedures (*"Why are we guilty that these oligarchs creep into the Verkhovna Rada?" (Leonid, 53–60, Korostyshev)*. People are poorly informed about the anti-corruption activities of civil society (which demonstrates yet again how NGOs are cut off from the population) and do not know about the possibilities for engaging in the activities of non-profit organizations. These characteristics can serve as indicators of weak political will and in particular "political can."

In answer to a direct question about their preparedness to personally participate in the battle against corruption, young people more often express a readiness to participate in the anti-corruption battle, but they do not understand what they are supposed to do in order to help. In other words, there is a desire, but no understanding of how to use the opportunities to influence the battle against corruption. They need leadership from the state but do not see any coherent strategy of reforms:

It seems to me that there is no elementary, banal, or I don't know, global development or direction in the country… They tell everyone to be normal. That is, don't follow a particular person, but be normal. But are there any criteria to be normal? How should one behave in our case? Everyone has his own opinion, we are all different people (Igor, L'viv 21–29).

The popular view among young people is that the best way to fight corruption is to do a *"total reboot" of the state (Dmitrii 2, Kharkov 18–20).*

The readiness to participate in fighting corruption among the general public is proved by the recent uptick in anti-corruption non-profit activism (Nashi groshi, etc). There is still considerable potential in people's readiness to support changes, which is especially strong among the younger generation.

7. *People's criteria for assessing political leaders* can also serve as indicators of political will. The assessment criteria for political will and expectations from the political leadership can be divided into two groups: those expressed from a "principal-perspective" and those from an "agent-perspective." For instance, people with an "agent perspective" would expect political leaders to use elections in order

to reward their supporters. People working from a "principal perspective" would hold leaders accountable in a "policy-making sense" (Rose-Ackerman, 2004, p. 9) that goes beyond partisan attempts and means accountability to the public in setting policy. In general, principals should expect a well-functioning state that is accountable to their people. Unfortunately, the empirical limits of our study do not allow us to implement such an analysis here.

Discussion

This paper makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. The first theoretical contribution is the further development of the concept of political will as it is used in political science literature. Our argument is that political will is not something that is uniquely associated with the qualities of a country's top leader, as is frequently implied by assessments of anti-corruption efforts. We also reject the notion that political will reflects a leader's ability to go against his immediate short term interests in order to pursue a bigger vision of reform, given that rationally a leader is unlikely to do that (Geddes, 1996). To provide a more useful understanding of political will we argue that the concept should be understood within the context of the relationship between state and society. The nature of this relationship determines the extent of political will in a society. Moreover, the nature of the relationship is defined essentially by whether people feel that they can influence the authorities and exert pressure on them to implement anti-corruption reforms.

Second, this paper makes a methodological contribution by laying out a methodology for measuring political will both in quantitative and qualitative terms. We do this by examining the expectations people have for the new leadership. In particular, by asking: Do people think of themselves as patrons or as clients? What do people pay more attention to in their leaders? Do people use client-based criteria or patron-based criteria? (Client-type attitudes towards the political leaders focus on the goods and services the politicians can deliver; patron-type expectations emphasize the ability to carry out reforms that will improve people's lives or make visible changes at the top.) Following up on this type of analysis is a topic for further research.

Finally, by conducting a qualitative analysis, this paper uses the narratives of participants in focus groups to formulate empirical indicators which can be used to measure political will. Also, even though the set of questions for the focus groups was not designed to research political will, the data allows us to make some preliminary assumptions about the evolving contours of political will in Ukrainian society following the Euromaidan Revolution. The analysis suggests, in particular, that there is a generational divide in Ukraine and that there are changes taking place in the clientelistic culture among young people. The positive changes towards the "patron-oriented" position we describe here are more apparent among young people. Their attitudes are different from those of their older countrymen. Interestingly, evidence in Russia also suggests that young people hold outlooks that differ somewhat from the previous generation, but at the same time they are also generally willing to accept the regime (Mickiewicz, 2014).

The negative tendencies are that trust in the Ukrainian state remains low among ordinary Ukrainians. Nothing has changed in this regard since Euromaidan. People have little regard for the anti-corruption efforts that have been carried out so far. Given the clientelistic environment in which they live, ordinary people assess anti-corruption reforms and institutional changes through their everyday life or clearly visible changes at the top, such as lustration or the establishment of a new traffic police force. They do not focus on long-term institutional changes.

We also found regional differences among the focus groups participants. Residents in the western part of the country are more optimistic about reform than those in the eastern regions. But the residents of Kyiv were by far the most cynical.

The limits of the qualitative approach do not allow us to draw more general conclusions, however, the analysis presented here clearly highlights a variety of changes in the political will among the population of Ukraine, which demand deeper research and explanation.

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AN OPEN GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION MODEL FOR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF RUSSIA

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Abstract

Large-scale migration against the full spectrum of demographic, economic and socio-cultural challenges in Russia highlight the necessity for further reconsideration of the deeply rooted vestiges of traditional models of public administration based on Weber's theory of rational bureaucracy. Authors argue that the newly forming concept of Good Governance through the implementation of the core principles of the Open Government model – the inclusion principle and the principle of information transparency in government – can be an adequate response to the complexity of the changing reality, i.e., Russia's current and future challenges.

The authors present an inclusive migration concept – Immigration as Affiliation (H. Motomura) – as complementing the Good Governance concept in the sphere of government migration management. To describe existing effective mechanisms of and existing barriers to this migration concept implementation, sequential analysis is provided both for the sphere of public administration, and public service in Russia.

Keywords: migration management; migrants; public administration; public service; Open Government Model; Good Governance, Russia.

Introduction

The reality of a new Russia, highlighted by a demographic shift and intensified large-scale labor migration, requires a reassessment and revision of basic principles and approaches in migration public management, as well as new forms of state regulation for the increasing complexity of the social reality, and collaboration with new social groups/actors (Obolonsky, 2011).

Transnational migration is gradually becoming an integral component of the socio-economic and political spheres of Russia against the background of an increasingly ageing population, a projected significant reduction in the working age population, and increasing labor shortages. It is thus quite clear that Russia's migration policy is aimed, above all, at comprehensively and consistently addressing three main objectives in economic, demographic, and socio-cultural spheres:

– firstly, the necessity to constantly overcome the growing labor shortages in all sectors of the national economy, by taking effective measures to implement the transition from unregulated labor migration towards replacement immigration

– secondly, a pressing need to mitigate the depopulation processes in a number of regions, as well as in the country as a whole, since by 2025 the population of Russia is going to shrink by at least 10–15 million people (medium scenario of the population projection)

– thirdly, the necessity of facilitating labor immigrants comprehensive integration into both institutional and socio-cultural environments.

As the historical migration experience of Western European countries, which modern Russia predominantly follows, has shown, achievement of the above mentioned objectives depends on a gradual reform of the system of public migration management, as well as changing the Russian migration legislation conceptual frameworks.

This migration reform requires the inevitable transition in a medium- and long-term perspective from the rigid concept of *Immigration as Contract* towards the more flexible and inclusive modern migration concept of *Immigration as Affiliation* (Motomura, 2006) as is inherent to new immigration countries. The former concept correlates with Weber's theory of rational bureaucracy (Sager & Rosser, 2009; Gale & Hummel, 2003) and clearly defines and limits the agents of public management and objects of managing; the latter is associated with the new emerging state-public governance concept of Good Governance (GG) through the implementation of the core principles of the Open Government model (OG).

The Immigration as Contract concept has at its core one simple demand that labor migrants are being forced to accept and obey: "play by our rules or leave". It is "based on the sense that fairness and justice for lawful immigrants does not require us to treat them as the equals of citizens" (Moromura, 2006, p. 10) and, the state is unilaterally entitled to make any decisions towards migrants as objects of managing without considering the interests of the latter and thus allowing a wide margin of latent and open conflicts in the future.

The most preferred alternative for Russia, on the premise that in the future it will inevitably become a new immigration country, is the phased implementation of the modern and flexible migration concept – *Immigration as Affiliation*. Correlating with the GG model, this migration concept focuses on the principle of inclusion (participation) in the process of gradual integration of labor migrants/immigrants (and most importantly – their children) in public and political relations as they are getting permanent employment, giving birth to children, obtaining the citizenship of a receiving country, and strengthening their social ties. In this process immigrants are gradually transforming "from outsiders to quasi citizens" (Rodriguez, 2008, p. 1113). In Russia, the complexity of the transition towards this modern model

of public migration management is due to the country lacking a genuine development strategy as well as articulated clear objectives in the migration sector[1], which inevitably negatively affects the quality of governance (Lee, Rainey & Chun, 2009). Another negative side-effect is related to the absolute predominance of anti-immigrant rhetoric (often of populist and pro-nationalist orientation) in the public/political sphere presented by so-called "modernizers", "conservative statists" and "cultural fundamentalists"[2] who, in varying degrees, express their commitment to the exclusive migration model of the Persian Gulf states (although the applicability of this model for the Russian context is highly questionable).

As the past migration experiences of Western European countries (which modern Russia is following) have demonstrated, the risk of the long-term use of state discriminatory practices and exclusive Weber theory's approaches in respect to "temporary" labor migrants is that sooner or later a growing latent conflict of interests becomes an open confrontation between sides. Such conflicts in the migration sphere are particularly acute and multilayered as the conflict sides often differentiated along the markers of ethnicity, religion, and legal status.

In this article the authors argue that for Russia the carefully calibrated introduction of the modern migration concept of *Immigration as Affiliation* based on the principles of OG will provide a more stable and equitable balance of interests between different groups and reduce the risk of instability (Barabashev, 2013; Manning & Parison, 2003; Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, 2003) in the economic and socio-cultural spheres.

The Core Principles of the OG Model in Migration Management

Despite the fact that Russia has not joined the Open Government Partnership platform yet, some significant steps of great importance towards the modernization of the public administration system were made in 2012 by launching the OG project in Russia[3]. The goal of this project is the revision of the principles of "traditional" public administration with its coordinate system of "agents of public management – (vs.) objects of managing" in favor of public service and civil society increasing its openness and the revision of the principles of the capacity-building of civil servants (Borshchevskiy, 2014, p. 77).

In relation to the migration administration in Russia, the transition to the concept of *Immigration as Affiliation* is closely linked to the implementation of the

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[1]   In 2012 President V. Putin approved the State Migration Policy Concept of the Russian Federation through to 2025, but it is largely lacking in strategy and practical relevance.

[2]   In the terminology of V. Malakhov, in Russia a public political discourse on immigration is "monopolized" and divided among the following players:

–   "modernizers" focus on the negative impact of a large contingent of low-skilled migrant workers as their labor hinders economic modernization in Russian;

–   "conservative statists" emphasize connecting migration with national security threats (using the broadest possible interpretation of the term "national security");

–   "cultural fundamentalists" appeal to "cultural purity" preservation (in terms of so-called "spiritual security") of the Russian society and consider migrants – bearers of an alien culture – as a permanent substantial threat (Malakhov, 2016, p. 16–17).

[3]   Open Government project (2012) in Russia (www.open.gov.ru) is mainly based on the US Open Government Directive (2009) (www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf).

following principles of modern public administration which are based on the OG model: (1) inclusion (civil society participation), and (2) information transparency.

We are going to analyze the existing institutions and administrative practices that are used to implement these two principles in the sphere of governance of migration policy and correlate the latter with the current situation in labor migration/migration processes in Russia.

The inclusion principle

Under the conceptual framework of GG the basis of this principle implementation is the "so-called "neoliberal solution", which is extending the notion of the state to include other organizations (Schultz, 2014)" (Barabashev, 2016, p. 178). As a result, a "monopolized assignment and performance of functions [*by the state in the past – authors*] is becoming replaced by a collaborative system[4] of public actors in networks of joint efforts of governmental civil society actions (Collaboration Network) (Osborne, Radnor & Strokosch, 2016)" (Barabashev, 2016, p. 178).

 In relation to migration management in Russia, at the moment it can be noted that the basis for the functioning of a new system of collaborative governance that provides cooperation between public and civil society actors (though not on the principle of separation of powers yet) has been established, as well as institutionalized mechanisms of representation of the various social groups' interests – mainly citizens, but also lawful permanent residents and foreign nationals.

Since the rights and legitimate interests of the labor migrants are not presented by any political party in Russia, the realization of the principle of inclusion is of tremendous importance. This principle can be implemented – to varying degrees – by the following representative and consultative/advisory bodies:

–   The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (www.oprf.ru) and regional public chambers as a special mechanism that promotes articulation, aggregation of social groups' interests, and representation of the latter.

–   Public/Expert Councils (consultative and advisory bodies) affiliated with relevant public authority bodies as mechanisms for conveying the considered views/expertise of certain social/professional groups with the possibility of potentially reconciling them in the decision-making process[5].

In implementing the principle of inclusion, each of the above mentioned institutions experiences certain issues associated with the alignment of the mechanisms of formation/functioning of representative, advisory/consultative bodies in correlation with the realities and specific features of labor migration processes in Russia. Among these issues are the following:

1)   Regarding the potential opportunities offered by the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation and regional public chambers for representation of the migrant workers/communities' interests, it is important to note that the following issues remain unresolved:

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[4]   See also: Collaborative Governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008).
[5]   Councils on Interethnic Relations and Migration Policy affiliated with the Committees/Ministries in constituent territories of the Russian Federation; Expert Council of the Federal Migration Service (until 2016); Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, and others.

(a) The *legitimacy of the heterogeneous contingent representation* (migrant's groups are differentiated by country of origin, length of stay and current status in Russia, professional affiliation; different life strategies of the migrants themselves at the personal level, adaptive skills, etc.)

(b) The *mechanism of the delegation of a right of representation* and promotion of the interests of migrant groups (primarily, the criteria of candidates electivity).

The Legitimacy of Heterogeneous Contingent Representation

In theory, the representation of such a significant group as migrant workers/ migrants in contemporary Russia and conveyance of its considered views/interests to the decision makers, as well as the gradual inclusion of this group into socio-economic and political processes as new actors, are important tasks for any progressive comprehensive cooptation of this contingent (at least, part of it) into the socio-economic and political sphere of the receiving country.

It should be noted that in Russia the high heterogeneity of the migrant group – a factor which is not sufficiently taken into account – can be a barrier to achieving these tasks. For example, sociological studies in St. Petersburg showed that any migrant community (often called "ethnic diaspora") consists of various social environments that are relatively isolated and barely interact with each other. In particular, taking the example of Azerbaijani migrant community, rigid boundaries between at least several subgroups were discovered. The first subgroup consists of migrants/immigrants (residents of Azerbaijani origin), well integrated and who have achieved a certain economic well-being in various spheres in St. Petersburg. During their spare time they "have a privilege to be "Azeris"... As a rule, they act as leaders of ethno-cultural autonomies. Some of them have made ethnicity a hobby, others – a profession. They claim to represent the interests of "all Azerbaijanis of St. Petersburg" (Panchenkov, 2008, p. 169) and to be the key intermediaries between "Diaspora" and regional authorities.

Meanwhile, the second heterogeneous subgroup (much larger than the first one in numbers) – consists of the new incoming economic migrants and "temporary" labor migrants. The boundary between these sub-subgroup communities is not of an ethnic dimension, but based on several interconnected criteria: length of stay in the city, degree of integration, social and legal status, lifestyles and so on" (Panchenkov, 2008, p. 169–170). Typically, the aggregation of interests of this important sub-subgroup remains problematic as it is related to candidates' electivity criteria.

The Mechanism of the Delegation of a Right of Representation

According to The *Federal Law* of the Russian Federation from 4 April 2005, N 32-FZ "About the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation" (Current state on 28.11.2015), Article 7, an important criterion for a candidate's election to the Chamber is their legal status – citizenship of the Russian Federation. Under The *Federal Law* of the Russian Federation from 23 June 2016, N 183-FZ "About General Principles of the Organization and Activities of Public Chambers of Subjects of the Russian Federation," in order to get elected to the regional public chamber the candidate should be delegated by an non-profit/NGO organization. Also, besides citizenship of the Russian Federation, the candidate should also be a resident on the territory of the subject and have worked in the sphere of his/her representa-

tion and in the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of professional and social groups for at least three years.

This criterion for electivity allows to one to constitute the right of the first smaller sub-group (see above) representatives – as a rule, the heads of national-cultural autonomies – to speak on behalf of every single person belonging to (or associating with) a certain "nationality" (ethnicity). On one hand, the lack of Russian citizenship puts considerable groups of labor migrants/migrants in the position of outsiders, whose interests may not be represented at the public level. On the other hand, the difficult procedure of obtaining Russian citizenship forces migrants to rethink their life strategies in favor of temporary stays. Thus, since the migration concept of *Immigration as Contract* dominates in Russia, many labor migrants/migrants often do not think about the legalization of their status, considering it to be a waste of time and money, and describing naturalization/legalization as a vain attempt to address an issue that is not going to bring them any dividends.

Sociological surveys on labor migrants/migrants of different origins show that about 27% of migrants are willing to stay in Russia for their entire life-time (Mukomel, 2012, p. 254). However, experts express doubts that migrants giving certain direct answers in questionnaires are necessarily going to implement them in reality. Obviously, a particular migrant, depending on many factors may, firstly, have several variable scenarios of his/her future life strategy, actualizing under the certain consequences of one of these; and secondly, they may make adjustments and change these scenarios in the light of the new circumstances. It applies both to those who, according to the questionnaire surveys, "are going stay in Russia," and to those who, at the moment, are not. Time-extended in-depth interviews with labor migrants from Central Asian countries show that they are, most of the time, likely to be in a never-ending search for the best life opportunities and adjusting their plans all the time. It is necessary to also take into account that migrant's behavior, especially of those who are coming from rural areas or small towns of Central Asia, is strongly determined not so much by his/her sole decisions, but as a result of difficult negotiations within the networks that the migrant belongs to. He/she is influenced by the general regulatory requirements (how he/she should behave), as well as the opinions of relatives and friends, and also has to protect the common interests of the family (Abashin, 2016, p. 35).

A more relevant data collection is that which was provided by the World Bank as a result of a survey of Tajik migrants who have stayed in Russia for more than three months. This survey showed that 73% of migrants prefer a temporary (circular) labor migration, 11% would like to stay in Russia for up to one year, and only 16% expressed their wiliness to establish permanent residence in Russia. The survey provided similar results for Kyrgyz migrants[6].

It has to be pointed out that presently Russia is lacking in the practice of representing migrants' interests in the Public Chamber as an institution for public representation. Russian citizenship as a formal electivity criterion for a Chamber candidate, and in being a main mechanism of the Public Chamber formation, is further exacerbating the gap in representation between the "old-timers" and

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[6]   See: World Bank, www.worldbank.org/ECA.

new incoming migrant workers who have not rationalized their life strategy yet. Thus, this criterion is putting these migrant workers in a marginal position, and pushing them beyond the framework of Russian society.

2) *Public/Expert Councils (Consultative and Advisory Bodies) Affiliated with Relevant Public Authority Bodies*

An impressive legal framework has recently been established for the regulation of the organization and modalities public appraisals and expert deliberations[7] in preparation for the decisions to be made by the Government. According to experts Y. Kuzminov and A. Zhulin, "consistency of the methodological and regulatory framework of the Open Government in Russia has no world analogues and it is recognized by many foreign partners"(Kuzminov & Zhulin, 2016, p. 4).

Public and Expert Councils (consultative/advisory bodies) affiliated with the relevant Federal and regional government executive bodies are important institutions that symbolize a progressive movement of the public administration in Russia towards the type found in advanced democracies. At the same time the practice of organization and functioning of those councils specializing on migration and migrant integration issues does not always provide an adequate response to the challenges of modern Russian reality.

We can allocate the following commonly used applied administrative practices that can have a negative impact on council performance and make them less efficient:

– The use of selective, non-transparent mechanisms of council formation;
– Admittance (by invitation) as members of councils of so-called 'leaders' of ethno-cultural associations (hereinafter – EC association[8]) and ethno-cultural autonomies (hereinafter – EC autonomy[9])[10];

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[7] The Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation from 2 September 2012, N 167 "About the public discussion of draft Federal constitutional laws and Federal laws;" The Order of the Government of the Russian Federation from 1 September 2012, N 877 "About approval of structure of regulatory legal acts and other documents, including program, developed by federal executive bodies which cannot be accepted without preliminary discussion at meetings of public councils in case of these federal executive bodies" (Current state on 15.06.2013); The Order of the Government of the Russian Federation from 25 August 2012, N 851 "About the procedure for disclosure by Federal Executive bodies the information on preparation of projects of normative legal acts and results of public discussion" (Current state on 01.04.2016); The Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation from 4 August 2006, N 842 "About the order of formation of public councils at the federal ministries, federal services and federal agencies, management of which activity is performed by the President of the Russian Federation, at the federal services and federal agencies subordinated to these federal ministries" (Current state on 23.05.2013); Federal Law of April 4, 2005 N 32-FZ "About Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation."

[8] The mission of EC associations is to establish communication between people of the same ethnicity, language and culture, to preserve and promote ethnic culture, as well as to preserve a native language and ethnic identity.

[9] Under the Federal Law of 17 June 1996, N 74-FZ "About Etho-Cultural Autonomy", EC autonomy is comprised of Russian citizens who identify themselves with a certain ethnic group that has a status of ethnic minority group that is corresponding with a certain territory. The EC autonomy mission is a preservation of language, ethnic culture, ethnic identity, and education.

[10] According to Vasiliy Filippov, often in practice, EC associations/autonomies provide a "façade" by showing co-optation and demonstrating that migrants groups are obtaining recognition of their cultural rights and legitimate interests by public authorities. Majority of EC associations/autonomies in Russia are focused on competition for the public grants for mass cultural events (the organization of the traditional folk holidays or folk concerts) and for other material benefits. Many "ethnic leaders" are using the status of the "ethnic leaders" to become government officials at the relevant "ethno-cultural agencies" (Filippov, 2001, p. 190).

- Admittance (by invitation) of representatives of often non-core and "chosen few" institutions of higher education, quasi-experts and *pervasive practice of* non-admittance of the migrant/immigrant target groups' representatives;
- Widespread lack of systematic work of the councils (their effectiveness and work on a regular basis or formal work 'for show' largely depends on the political will of the head of the relevant administrative body).

Furthermore, a special problem concerns the legitimacy of the representation of migrant groups by the 'leaders' of EC associations/autonomies. Valeriy Tishkov points out the problem of migrant/ethnic groups' heterogeneity and the varying degrees of representation of such groups by EC associations/autonomies: "...often a group of people united in a ethno-cultural autonomy, is trying to represent the interests of all the people. Meanwhile, in such organizations it is difficult to envisage the democratic election procedures. Therefore, what theses ethno-cultural autonomy organizations are talking and writing about cannot be shared by with thousands and tens of thousands of those who belong to the same nation. Due to this fact, situations fraught with serious consequences are often taking place…" (Tishkov, 2008, p. 16). Officially registered EC associations/ autonomies and ethnic organizations of immigrants from former Soviet states are characterized by their non-transparent way of functioning and the weak engagement of newly arrived migrants. Many heads of EC associations/autonomies are using their status as a tool to achieve personal/narrow group (clan, family, etc.) economic, political and other goals. In turn, this produces a replication of such negative phenomena as clientelism and corruption. Thus, the representative of the Association of Assyrians in Moscow, R. Bidjamov, describes the situation as follows: "The legitimacy of the ethno-cultural organizations is a very vexing question for all of us. It is no secret that most of them are in reality types of interest groups or clubs; they are quasi organizations that do not have strong links with the ethnic environment and are often headed by unprofessional, incompetent, ambitious leaders who are profoundly alien to democratic traditions" (Filippov, 2008, p. 7–8). Often the leaders and activists of the EC associations/autonomies are carrying out the role of intermediary between migrants and local employers, acting as ethnic entrepreneurs and exacerbating the "shadow" market economy of foreign labor in Russia. It was they who "ensured a continuous influx of laborforce from their countries and reserved job quotas for migrants under their own mediation business, turning the latter into a commodity; "took upon themselves" all the "hassles "for the legalization of the newly arrived migrants; and often sold them fake permits and medical insurances" (Yushkovskaya, 2014, p. 3), thus aggravating the situation with migrants who had been already rendered powerless.

Thus, in modern Russia EC associations/autonomies do not fit the criteria of classic civic associations which are based on principles of self-organizing, democratic procedures, non-hierarchical system of development and decision-making process, relative autonomy from the state, etc. The functional specificity of the Russian EC associations/autonomies affects the councils' work performance. A special feature is that "ethnic entrepreneurs, ethnically biased researchers, and government officials are becoming the main experts, although their self-interests lie <...> in preserving local and in particular ethnic identities" (Shabaev & Sadokhin, 2014). Often this leads to a contradiction with the mission of these

councils to provide objective expertise on interethnic relations together with the harmonization of relations between different social groups (especially between newly arrived migrants and host society members), and to contribute to the socio-cultural adaptation and comprehensive integration of labor migrants into Russian society.

At the same time, the potential of the few socially-oriented and human rights organizations that perform important functions for labor migrant groups' interests and representation, as well as the protection of migrants basic rights and legitimate interests, virtually remains unclaimed. The range of these organizations activities is very limited; they lack broad social support among migrants themselves[11]. For the most part, they are deprived of the opportunity to convey their considered views to the general public and policy makers and thus these organizations are excluded from the public and political domain. Their activities are involuntarily directed, primarily, not towards the resolution of accumulated systemic problems in the sphere of migration management, but rather towards providing social and legal assistance and support to migrants on an individual basis.

The Principle of Information Transparency in Government

Providing the general public with objective and comprehensive information about both the current state of migration processes, and appropriate measures in migration management is of tremendous importance in the light of the high levels of widespread xenophobia and migrant-phobia widespread the general population in Russian. Incomplete, inconsistent and unreliable data on migration can have a direct impact on social relations and lead to their destabilization.

Despite the legal regulations in Russia that oblige the authorities to inform the population about the state of affairs in their respective field of activities/responsibilities, "the conducted expert analysis indicates the lack of a unified State policy in respect of the information provided by government information resources, <...> led to the administrative barriers appearance in obtaining information and significantly reduced access to available information" (Dmitrieva & Styrin, 2014). In general, most websites of relevant government bodies formally comply with legal requirements, but their content does not meet the necessary conditions

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[11] On the one hand, an overall low level of organizational engagement and participation in the political sphere among migrants/immigrants; unwillingness to defend their rights and legitimate interests, including the simplification and liberalization of migration laws to work, go to school for migrant children (and continuously attend classes), or apply for permanent status in Russia, – are related to migrant/immigrant political and legal cultures they belong to as they come mostly from developing countries with underdeveloped democratic traditions and institutions.

– On the other hand, so-called "sovereign democracy" established in Russia and aggravated by corruption in the relevant agencies confront any migrant with a typical choice – either to stay quiet or not leave the workspace/temporary home to have an opportunity to work, or to be active and finally face high risk of deportation and little chance of return.

– Typical for many migrants unwillingness to defend their own socio-economic rights is due to the fact that before going to Russia they psychologically adjust, i.e. prepare themselves for deprivation, temporary heavy and non-prestigious work. And the lack of interest in the comprehensive social migrant integration in Russian society is due to, on the one hand, high level of xenophobia/migrant-phobia among receiving society members and the complexity of migrants embedding in social relations, and the impossibility of obtaining social benefits (unlike in the EU), – on the other hand.

of completeness, relevance, validity, and understandability of information for the users. That is why, according to sociological surveys, "65 percent of the daily Internet audience use social media and blogs to find objective information" (Kuzminov & Zhulin, 2016). Taking into account the specificity and growing politicization of migration-related topics, the lack of objective information may negatively impact the quality of modern governance and undermine the population's confidence in Government institutions, as well as largely affect public opinion and social relations in general.

Formation of a Professional Cadre for Public Service in the Sphere of Migration Management

Professional training for government officials is one of the key tasks of the OG principles' implementation, based on the way the realization of the modern concept of GG is in practice. From 2002 to the present there has been a consistent trend both at Federal and regional levels in Russia for the gradual targeted replacement of "civilians" at key public service vacancies by the so-called "siloviki" (candidates who served in security, militia, and military agencies). This is mainly due to the fact that current competitive selection and hiring procedures commonly used in the system of government service are not competency-based recruitment processes and are not based on the adversarial principle and openness, and thus are of "subjective and formal character ... that brings to civil service candidates with the worst professional competencies. ... " (Borshchevskiy, 2014, p. 73).

According to the expert Georgiy Borshchevskiy, among the specific features of administrative practices in Russia which make it extremely difficult to implement the OG principles in practice and to enable the government administration to function effectively, are the following factors: the recruitment by pulling strings and on the basis of personal fidelity (42.4%), lack of priorities in personnel policies (34.1%), and underestimation of the role of professional competencies in selection and recruitment process (23.5%) (Borshchevskiy, 2011).

As a result, a number of government bodies regulating and managing migration processes (in particular, the Directorate for Migration Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs) clearly show common features of the civil service in modern Russia:

– "militarization" of the public administration[12] (more than half of the former representatives of security and law enforcement agencies, former officers

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[12] For instance, Olga Kirillova, Head of the Directorate for Migration Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is a Police Colonel; Igor Barinov, a Head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, a Colonel, served as a head of the FSB regional squad "ALFA" (before being elected Deputy of the State Duma (parliament of the Russian Federation) in 2003); Mikhail Ipatov, a Deputy Director of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs has worked most of his career for the military services; Police Major-General Oleg Makhno, a Head of the St. Petersburg Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Implementation of Migration Policy, served most of his carreer under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation before being appointed by the Lieutenant-General Georgy Poltavchenko, current Governor of St. Petersburg who most of his career served in KGB and police agencies; Vadim Y. Okrushko, a Deputy Director of the St. Petersburg Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Implementation of Migration Policy, is a Police Colonel and most of his career served in police agencies.

of the KGB/FSB[13], in particular, are in leadership decision-making positions) (Kryshtanovskaya, 2006; 2015)
–   general "deintellectualization" of political and executive elites (Kryshtanovskaya, 2002, p. 161; 2015) as a result of the ongoing decline in the educational levels of its representatives since 2002[14] and the common practice not to hire (not to invite) specialists with professional competences in a particular occupational area of public administration
–   noncompliance with principles of public accountability and information transparency, to a greater or lesser extent[15].

Nowadays in Russia, public migration agencies, in essence, serve as the "migration police"[16]. This is rooted in the specific public management/leadership style related to the previous professional experience of most public senior executives and a number of staff members who previously served primarily in the security services, and thus lack appropriate competencies/training/experience in such a challenging segment of public governance as migration/immigration management.

According to an expert review by G. Borshchevskiy on the OG project in Russia, to correct these negative trends in public service in Russia, the following basic steps in the sphere of personnel policies are required:
–   to introduce mandatory selection procedures for public senior executives, and not for junior staff only as is the case at present
–   "to bring professional post requirements for the civil service positions into line with relevant professional standards" (Borshchevskiy, 2014, p. 77).

In times of increasing complexity of migration processes, the lack of civil servants (especially in senior positions) who have obtained professional training and experience in the relevant field of governance to some extent may be one of the main factors causing the so-called crisis of modern state governance – "the inability of States to cope with increasing number of challenges of innovative development, speed, complexity, and unpredictability of changes (Obolonsky, 2014, p. 145–146), and to create flexible management tools..." (Barabashev, 2016, p. 166).

According to Alexey Barabashev, expert on crises of state governance and public administration processes, in Russia at the moment the following precursors of this crisis can be found in state migration management:
–   "mechanisms of administrative control ... are inadequate to the scale and depth of the problems"
–   management solutions are "outdated, costly and corrupt", and do not reflect "the complexity and new phenomena in social life." (Barabashev, 2016, p. 166).

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[13]   It is indicative and symptomatic that in 2016 the Federal Migration Service was disbanded, and became a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
[14]   As a result, civil servants' career advancement has no correlation with their education/professional training profile (Borshchevskiy, 2014, p. 75), and the latter loses its meaning.
[15]   An exemplary case is the web-site of the St. Petersburg Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Implementation of Migration Policy (www.gov.spb.ru/gov/otrasl/kmormp/).
[16]   St. Petersburg Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Implementation of Migration Policy is a good example in this regard (Rozanova, 2016).

Conclusion

The current stage of state migration management can be described as transitional, which combines an eclectic conjunction of Weber's theory of rational bureaucracy together with selective implementation of the OG principles based on the new concept of GG.

It is highly important to note that in 2012 the Russian government, together with experts from the community, laid the foundations for the migration concept *Immigration as Affiliation*, practical implementation of which requires the systematic introduction of the respective principles of the OG model in the framework of the developing flagship concept of GG. Analysis of the practical experience of the introduction of GG, including through the principles of OG, shows that the problems in its implementation include the lack of goal-setting system, inefficient quality of education and training for public servants, and the closeness of the group of participants in the partnership between Government authorities and public/civil society associations:

– Under current conditions of intensification and complexity of migration processes the GG concept formulated as "a network of interaction between the *State* and *citizens* where *citizens* [*highlighted by the authors*] participate in managerial decision-making processes, and their organizations and associations are presented in the system of State administration" (Barabashev, 2016, p. 171) does not fully meet the challenges of the new reality in the sphere of migration management. The concept omits from "civil society" labor migrants and most "potential citizens" ("quasi-citizens" – in terms of H. Motomura), who are in the "transition" stage by becoming increasingly active participants in economic, social and political processes in host countries.[17] Such an artificial separation between citizens and non-citizens in regard to migration is in conflict with the basic principle of OG, namely, the principle of inclusion.

– A deficit of civil servants (especially in senior positions) who have high levels of education, advanced professional training and practical experience in the relevant field of migration management may lead to incoherent and sometimes detrimental actions, and aggravate the so-called crisis of modern state governance.

– Lack of any State goal-setting system/National Strategy is a factor that has a negative impact on the quality of State governance in general. The absence of a vector of the country's strategic development in the sphere of migration (either on the way to new immigration countries with inclusive public management practices, or on the way to Persian Gulf countries with their rigid exclusive approaches and practices) will prolong a situation of uncertainty, sooner or later unleashing demographic and socio-economic instability.

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[17] The (self) segregation of migrant/immigrant communities in the past in Western Europe (particularly, in Germany) that led to instability in social relations and forced the decision-makers to reconsider the principles of interaction with minorities presented by migrants/immigrants. The current political move from the migrant exclusion approach towards concept on comprehensive migrant integration is based on the OG concept that facilitates immigrant cooptation and larger participation in governance/decision-making process.

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PUTTING PEOPLE LAST: LESSONS FROM THE REGULATION OF MIGRATION IN RUSSIA AND TAJIKISTAN

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Abstract

This paper analyses the recent developments and general direction of migration policy in two former Soviet Union countries – Russia and Tajikistan – from the lens of the current narrative in the field of migration research, paying attention to the economic and demographic reasons for migration, its legal and political framework, and the nascent integration and inclusion programs. While explaining the roots of the existing migration policy, and distinguishing between the migration policies of sending and receiving countries, the paper defines such terms as migration regime, migration mechanisms and migration regulations. The paper concludes that Russian migration policy reflects the inconsistency between the de jure liberal principles/ norms and their de facto restrictive application. The deeply embedded desire to limit an influx of the "Other" in Russia presents a serious threat to migration policy and the future economic development of the country. By contrast, while developing a comprehensive legislation, Tajikistan lacks the political will and resources to monitor its implementation and progressively demand the delivery of the results.

Keywords: Russia; Tajikistan; migration policy; migration regime; migration mechanism.

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A little bit of theory

There is a lack of common terminology for describing national migration policy, strategies, regimes, and mechanisms, and for distinguishing one from another, due, not least, to the broad range of notions included in these terms by academics, practitioners and national stakeholders. Nowadays various terms such as a "migration policy" (Geddes, 2002; Boswell, 2003; Chudinovskikh & Denisenko, 2004; EU Commission, 2015a); "migration regime" (Kosnik, 2014); "migration management" (Thym, 2010, P. 50ff; Gulina, 2016 a, b), "migration control" (Light 2012; Buckley, 1995), and "state control over human mobility" (Torpey, 2000; Geddes, 2002; Eltis, 2002) have been used to describe and analyze state activities in regulating migration flows.

It is important to note that migration strategy, migration policy and migration mechanisms differ from each other, as well as the fact that the migration policy of sending countries vary from the migration policy of receiving countries. In this article, **migration policy** is understood as "rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and measures) that national states define and [enact] with the objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal composition of […] migration flows" (Czaika and de Haas, 2013, p. 489). Migration policy as overarching government views, priorities and long term goals related to immigration and emigration – should be distinguished from the **migration regime**, which is formulated to frame the policy, and depending on the country of migrant origin, migrant educational background, and other circumstances, could for example be liberal, restrictive, or neutral. Migration regime, as Kosnik suggests, is "the outcome of a field of forces where different kinds of agencies and institutions intervene, including migrants themselves" (Kosnik, 2014). The migration regime determines the practical implications of the migration policy in the short- to medium terms. **Migration mechanisms** such as visas, quotas, residence and work permits, etc, comprise the components of the migration regime. Migration mechanisms together with the migration regime and **migration regulations** (laws, decrees, strategies) comprise migration policy.

There is a plethora of scholars whose work is based on analysis of migration policy and their key-mechanisms in different countries. Mayda and Patel (Mayda & Patel, 2004) review the migration policies in 14 OECD countries over the period 1980–2010; Bjerre et all (Bjerre et all, 2014) analyse the immigration policies in 33 OECD countries over the same period; Ruhs (2011) compares 46 countries and their migration policies for regulating labor migration in 2009; de Haas et all (de Haas, 2015) tracks migration policy changes in 45 countries between 1945 and 2014. Given previous scholars' work, the current paper outlines the migration policy specifics of the migrants´ receiving country (Russia) and the migrants´ sending country (Tajikistan).

The German scholar Ulf Rinne views migration policy through two mutually linked components: a) the selection and settlement ("mobilization") component, which sets the rules for individuals' entry, exit and stay in the country; and b) integration policies and programs that aim to improve the economic and social outcomes of newcomers (Rinne, 2012). The first type of immigra-

tion policy aims at managing quantity, professional quality, and the educational, gender and social background of immigrants in the host country. Immigration countries use various mechanisms, such as a points-based system (Canada, New Zealand), labor quota (Russia, the USA) and other legal restrictions and/or preferences (EU, EUEA)[3].

The second type of immigration policy – or integration policies – include measures such as: a) welcome programs, b) language training, c) labor market programs, and d) anti-discrimination policies (Eurostat, 2011). Without a doubt, programs, initiatives and measures aimed at immigrants' integration are considered to be the most important component for a successful immigration policy of migrants´ receiving countries (Schulte & Bayat, 2007, p. 22; Craig 2015; Malakhov, 2015; Varshaver & Rocheva, 2016). Both components depend on the state's and society's interest in (re)integrating or disconnecting with newcomers.

While Rinne's scheme accurately reflects migration policy in receiving countries, applying this scheme to sending countries will produce different results. To adequately analyze migration policy in sending countries, the above two components transform into the following:

The selection and settlement component will include measures aimed at: a) the creation of domestic jobs and limiting migration flow abroad; b) assistance in migrant selection and settlement in receiving countries, and c) measures at increasing the employability of migrants;

The integration and reintegration measures include: a) activities aimed at developing repatriation programs and supporting returnees after they come back home; b) protection of its nationals abroad, including social and human rights aspects; and c) agreements aimed at harmonizing social support, pensions, and tax issues between the countries. Migration and (re)integration as facets of public life adopt a specific legal framework depending on subjective and objective factors shaping and influencing it.

Rinus Penninx et al (Penninx, 2008) note that before the 1990s, migration and integration had established themselves as "more or less independent fields of research and theory". This has led to the striking difference between migration policies´ promises and their application in the real life (Penninx, 2003; Joppke & Moravska, 2003). Nowadays integration policies are used to improve the economic and social outcomes of newcomers, to support those settlers who are willing to become a part of the host society and to detect those who are not. In the 1990s, American sociologist John W. Berry put forward four concepts of immigrants' interaction with their host countries: marginalization, segregation, assimilation and integration (Berry, 1997). Unsurprisingly, countries try to avoid marginalization and segregation, and even assimilation strategies are considered perilous (Spencer, 1997; Hansen, 2000). Integration and re(integration) has become a key element of modern migration policy. However, integration or inclu-

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[3] The EAEU member states, i.e. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, promote the free flow of goods, services, labor and capital among its members. According to the EAEU treaty, member states are not allowed to implement any restrictions on the labor force from other member states. The employers are allowed to hire workers without special permission. Workers can stay in the host country as long as they have a valid employment contract. Without a contract, they are limited to stays of 90 days (like all other CIS citizens).

sion (Duszczyk & Góra, 2012; Houtkamp, 2015) – as the next step of integration – need to take into account those factors which often influence the outcome of migration – country of migrant´s origin, length of their residency, and personal background. Successes of inclusion need to be measured by the wellbeing of migrants and their offspring, elements which are able to show the outcomes and successes of inclusion policy in the best fashion (Saggar et al. 2012, p. 19).

Geographic and Economic Scope and Background

The geographical scope of the current paper is determined by the common historical background, social-linguistic ties between inhabitants, and the high numbers of labor migrants coming from Tajikistan to Russia. Sharing a common "Soviet" past, Russia and Tajikistan have opposite migration flows (with Russia being the receiving country, and Tajikistan being the sending country) and subsequently different political-legal components in their migration policies.

In 2015, the GDP of Tajikistan was 48.40 billion TJS, or about 7.87 billion USD – making it one of the poorest countries in the region- and 1.9 billion USD, or above 24% of the GDP, were the recorded remittances of Tajik migrants working in Russia (Agency on Statistics 2016 & Central Bank, 2015). The World Bank provides an even higher number – according to its estimates for 2014, Tajikistan remittances contributed to up to 42% of the GDP, equaling 3.1 billion USD. In 2015, when the number of Tajik migrants in Russia decreased by 3.8 percent due to the economic crisis and the fall of the ruble, the estimated decline in remittance receipts in Tajikistan was as high as 24% (World Bank, 2016).

More than 1.5 million foreign workers are employed in Russia annually on the basis of labour patents (RIA Novosti 2015). Tajikistan provides the second-largest number of labour migrants to Russia after Uzbekistan. The leading Russian demographic expert Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya expects that by 2030, labour migrants from Tajikistan will replace labour migrants from Uzbekistan as the largest ethnic migrant group on the territory of the Russian Federation. (Zayonchkovskaya, 2016).

Before the devaluation of the Russian rouble, more than 84% of all labour migrants from Tajikistan chose Russia as their destination country, with the rest going to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries (Ryazantsev, 2016). With high numbers of people of employment age and the low level of infrastructure development and a limited domestic labour market, 9% to 25% of the Tajik population of employment age goes abroad for work. According to official data from the Migration Department of the Republic of Tajikistan, 744 000 labour migrants were registered in 2013 (about 9% of the total Tajik population of 8 million). Local experts estimate that up to 2 million Tajik citizens are migrants who travel abroad for varying periods of time, usually for labour (WHO Europe, 2014). The majority of them choose Russia as their final destination. If in today´s Russia one worker leaving the country is replaced with 12 who arrive, in Tajikistan, one newcomer entering the country is replaced with 600 who leave (Rayazantzev & Horie, 2011, p. 44).

And this is not surprising – in 2009, the average monthly salary in Tajikistan was equivalent to 68.6 USD, which is the lowest wage in the Commonwealth of In-

dependent States. In contrast, average salaries in Russia in 2009 were 689 USD. Unemployment rates were 5.5% in 2013 in Russia, and 11.6% in Tajikistan, which is the highest in the region (Ryazantsev, 2016). Work abroad remains the most important factor in the economic development of the country where unemployment is the highest among young people and women.

Russia needs the labor force and demographic potential that immigrants bring, as it belongs to the category of countries with a shrinking population, birth rates below substitution and rapidly increasing numbers of people of old age. According to the Russian statistics office, the numbers of people of employment age has been decreasing since 2011 and will continue its sharp decrease during the 21st century. In 2011–2020 the number of people of employment age will decrease by 9 million or a staggering 8–10% of the total (Klepach, 2013). In 2014, the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation presented three possible demographic estimates for Russia, with low, medium, and high demographic scenarios which differ significantly from one another in terms of migration gain (the breakdown of migration inflow and outflow). According to the low scenario, the Russian population will be 145,404,600 by 2025, and will experience a migration gain of only 211,800 people. The medium forecast indicates a population of 148,341,600, with a migration gain of 338,900. The high scenario predicts 150,704,000 people and up to 466,100 in migration gain. In all three scenarios net migration is a significant variable. However, the low and medium scenarios imply a general depopulation (a decline of 490,000 people in the low scenario and 36,900 people in the medium scenario) and indicate migration inflow as a way to maintain the current population size (Gulina, 2016; Federal State Statistics, 2015).

In contrast, in Tajikistan, in 2000–2012, the population increased by 29.4%, and is currently 8.2 million, which is 42% more than in 1991, when Tajikistan became independent. The majority of these people are of employment age (15–64), and the proportion of the population in this category is rapidly increasing – in 2011 it comprised 61% of the total population. This creates stress for the economy and problems in providing employment for these people (Cooperation Program of the ILO and Tajikistan 2013).

Cumulatively, these factors raise a number of unique demographic, economic and development issues both for Russia and Tajikistan, underlining these countries interdependence on each other for economic growth and development, and stimulating the need for active collaboration in the migration sphere.

Development of migration policy and institutions

Russia

One can identify five stages in the development of the immigration legislation in the Russian Federation. **The first (preparatory) stage**, in 1997–2002, included the creation of a legal framework – the adoption of the Citizenship Law of 2002 (Law on Citizenship, 2002) and Law 115-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in Russian Federation of 2002 (Law on Legal Status, 2002), as well as the concept of Russia's demographic development until 2015 (Demographic Concept, 2015) – the instruments which set out the main principles for

regulating migration. These laws specified the types of documents mandatory for foreign citizens and stateless persons residing in the RF: *"vid na vremennoye prozhivaniye"* – temporary residence permit, and *"vid na zhitel'stvo"* – permanent residence permit, and established requirements for the acquisition and loss of citizenship.

The second stage, in 2002–2006, signified the further development of migration mechanisms with the introduction of employment quotas for labor migrants arriving in Russia on the visa-regime, expanded and clearly specified the powers given to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), and signed agreements on labor migration within the CIS countries. Migrants from the CIS were generally exempted from the visa-regime. The institute of citizenship took form, with a somewhat simplified process for granting citizenship to citizens of the CIS. The definition of state interests within migration policy has taken place, as the country has started developing legislation and policy to further its strategic goals and national interests, with more detailed migration policies and strategies.

The third stage, in 2007–2009, called by national experts "a liberal revolution", included a) the simplification of the rules for hiring and registering labor migrants arriving in Russia on the visa-free regime, b) the introduction of employment quotas for migrants arriving in Russia on the visa-free regime, and c) reallocation of a portion of the migrant workforce from central Russia to the other regions such as the Urals, Siberia and the Far East.

The fourth stage began in 2010 and continued until 2015, with further detalization of migration mechanisms. Work patents for individuals arriving on the visa-free regime which allowed them to lawfully reside and work in the RF were introduced; companies received the chance to hire highly qualified professionals beyond the quotas set by the government; fingerprinting labor migrants arriving in Russia on the visa-free regime, when they are issued work permits, was introduced (Gradirovsky, 2010). Russia has started negotiations and entered into agreements with key labour migrant sending countries, in order to ensure a regulated migrant flow and implementation of the rules.

Presently Russia is going through **the fifth stage**, characterized by a striking lack of consistency. On one hand, the new Concept of Migrations strategy until 2025 (Migration Concept, 2012) for the first time recognized that migration is necessary to address the changes in the demographics of the country and counterbalance the decrease in the population. The Strategy has shifted from being concentrated on "limiting" migration flows, overcoming "migration crisis" and seeing migration as a threat to the security and wellbeing of the country, to paying more attention to attracting highly educated migrant pools and increasing the migration profile of the country abroad. The realization that Russia needs a migration influx for maintaining its labour market in order to compensate for the demographic decrease of the population was long overdue.

Another positive development happened after the involvement of the Russian Constitutional Court in 2015, bringing the policy in line with international standards. In 2015, the Constitutional Court found a restrictive rule outlined in the law "On the rules for exit from and entry to the Russian Federation",

the law "On the legal status of foreign nationals", and law "On prevention of the spread of disease caused by HIV in the Russian Federation" requiring that migrants need to present an HIV-free certificate in order to enter Russia, to be unconstitutional (Constitutional Court, 2015).

At the same time, there are other legislative initiatives that could be seen as being anti-immigrant and strictly region-oriented. Federal law N 207 of July 27, 2013 introduced regionally differentiated liabilities for violating immigration rules[4]. The Law 376-FZ, adopted at the end of 2013, introduced certain restrictions on the entry of migrants from the CIS countries, the so called 90 out of 180 days´ regulation (Federal Law N 36 FZ), as well as sanctions, both for foreign and Russian nationals, for violating the registration requirements ("Rubber Apartments" Law). In January, 2015 a new system of obtaining patents was introduced, with stricter liability for violating patent terms. The new rules include requirements to pass a Russian language test, proof of knowledge of Russian history and the basics of the legislation, and proof of medical insurance. These examples of anti-immigration policy may be the tip of the iceberg, and some certainly seem geared toward constructing a restrictive migration regime for the citizens of the CIS.

New evidence of restrictive migration policy trends took place at the beginning of 2016, when power and duties of the Federal Migration Service were transferring from under the auspices of the Government of the Russian Federation to the Ministry of the Interior, thus underlining the law-enforcement incline in the policy as such, and emphasizing the view of migration as something that needs to be restricted and contained (Gulina & Utyasheva, 2016; Decree, 2016).

Tajikistan

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan, as with other countries of the former Soviet Union, had no experience in how to regulate migration and had no expertise related to policy development in this area. A national migration agency did not exist, and the necessity of its creation was not immediately apparent to decision-makers. Military conflicts created refugees and internally displaced persons requiring support and social protection. Transparent borders made easy transnational travel at a time when citizenship status was not defined and many people remained in neighboring countries without proper identification for years and even decades. Statistical data collection on migration did not exist.

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[4]   For example, the failure of a foreign national or a person without citizenship to properly register in Moscow, the Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, or the Leningrad oblast is punishable by an administrative fine of between 5,000 to 7,000 rubles (about $200) and deportation from the Russian Federation (see Article 18.8 on the Code of Administrative Offences). Yet the same violation committed in other parts of the Russian Federation entails administrative fines of between 2,000 to 5,000 rubles with or without deportation. In fact, the law says that foreigners who breach immigration rules in Moscow ought to be deported, while in other Russian regions they might be allowed to stay. A similar territorial-specific approach to employers' responsibilities is manifest in new versions of Article 18.15 (on the "Unlawful engagement of a foreign citizen or person without citizenship in labor activities in the Russian Federation") and Article 18.16 ("Violation of the rules of engagement of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship in labor activities at trade outlets, including shopping complexes"). A violation of these rules leads to fines ranging from 400,000 to 1,000,000 rubles (up to $30,000) for employers in Moscow, and only 250,000 to 800,000 rubles in the regions.

Over the next few decades however, after realizing the necessity and importance of migration policy, Tajikistan produced a relatively high number of migration concepts and strategies, and currently possesses a developed and constantly updated legislative and normative framework on migration and employment. The development of the legislation and policy framework in Tajikistan could be divided into **three main stages**. The **first stage** (1998–2008) concentrated on the establishment of institutions and regulations, trying at the same time to determine its direction and priorities for the future. Thus, in 1998, Tajikistan became one of the first Central Asian states to adopt a Concept of State Migration Policy (Tajikistan's Migration Concept, 1998). In June 2001, Tajikistan adopted the Concept for Labour Migration by Tajik Citizens Abroad (Tajikistan's Government Regulation, 2001), that encouraged unemployed citizens to become migrant workers in other countries. The **second stage (transition stage) – 2008–2010** – while continuing to build institutional capacity, saw a temporary setback when many migrants were forced to return home because of the economic crisis of 2008 in Russia, and Tajikistan came to realize the necessity of negotiating its interests on a political level in order to facilitate the employment and status of its citizens abroad. This stage sparked conversation about the protection of Tajik labour migrants abroad.

The current third stage – 2010–2016 – includes further realization of national priorities, including attempts at redirecting and expanding migration flows from Tajikistan, protection of the rights and interests of migrant workers, raising their social guarantees, skills and potential of the labour force. This stage's political rhetoric underlines that the current high number of migrants is a temporary phase in the country's development. Observers note that all the migration documents of Tajikistan had one principal flaw – the envisaged activities were neither financially supported not connected to specific implementation plans and plans of action. The lack of implementation, including a lack of finances for putting strategies into effect, lack of political will to insist on it, and lack of developed action plans and ministerial responsibility for accountability hindered effective implementation of the migration policy in the country. It remains to be seen, if this stage in Tajikistan will be accompanied by a more comprehensive implementation of migration priorities.

The legislative documents of the current third stage include the National Strategy of Labour Migration of Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan Abroad for 2011–2015 (Tajikistan's Government Regulation, 2011); Law On Combating Human Trafficking (2014), Law on Migration of 2013 (Tajikistan's Government Regulation, 2013), Law On Private Employment Agencies, Law on Improvement of Employment (2003), Strategy of National Development until 2015, State Strategy of the Development of the Labour Market until 2020 (Tajikistan's State Strategy, 2011), Strategy on Improving the Wellbeing of the Citizens of Tajikistan for 2013–2015 (2012), and the State Program on the Realization of the Concept on the Development of Legislation in Spheres of Labour, Social Protection and Education for 2012–2015 (Tajikistan's Government Decree, 2012).

The legislative framework of the current stage could be seen as part of a complex, as one body of legislation with defined objectives and priorities, with migration issues streamlined into other normative document. Migration issues as a de-

velopment factor is taken into consideration in the Migration strategy. Labour migration issues play a significant role in the National Development Strategy (2015), and the Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2011–2012 of Tajikistan (GIZ, 2012). The National Program on the Enhancement of Employment (2004), also prioritizes the creation of new jobs, new mechanisms for partnerships between employers and employment agencies aimed at creating new jobs, the creation of a database of available vacancies, and measures aimed at determining demand and supply in the area of employment (no 19, para. 41).

The migration strategy is meant to regulate and manage labour migration, in order to incorporate migration policy in a broad developmental model and to elaborate sensible and thought-through policies with a specific road map for implementation and financing. It serves as the main guiding document for the implementation of the objectives of the National Development Strategy in the area of labour migration management, giving priority to the creation of new employment and the upgrading of existing jobs, the preparation of migrants for work abroad, and the protection of labour migrants' rights and interests in other countries.

The stated priority of migration policy in Tajikistan is the creation of employment in Tajikistan itself, with labour migration seen as a temporary measure aimed at reducing pressure within the country. Curbing illegal migration, and the creation of bilateral and multilateral agreements directed at migrant protection, as well as the establishment of new markets through the development of international cooperation, are among the stated priorities of the government. *The National Strategy of Labour migration of citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan abroad for 2011–2015* (hereafter Strategy) proposes activities for the reform of the outdated existing system. The main directions of the Strategy are more people-focused that in previous documents, including social-economic and legal protection for migrant workers, and the high quality professional education of migrants. The overarching message of the Strategy is that migrant labour is not a commodity, but rather an asset of the country, to be cherished, preserved and developed. The Strategy also mentions the necessity of measures aimed at forming a positive image of Tajik migrants abroad.

Migration mechanisms

Migration mechanisms form part of the migration policies, and consist of rules for entry, stay and exit. They are designed to manage the flow of migrants and exist to ensure residence permits, labour certificates and visa grants are in line with the government's annual planning level. States possess the broad authority to regulate the movement of foreign nationals across their borders and on their territory through passports, visa-admissions, a points based system, quotas, residence provisions, exclusion and expulsion of aliens, and frontier controls (Martin, 2003, pp. 31–3). Due to space limitations, in-depth discussion of the visa regime is beyond the scope of this paper and we therefore concentrate on migration mechanisms more closely related to the discussed topic instead (i.e. the right work).

Russia

The rules of entry to and exit from the Russian Federation, visa arrangements and the legal status of foreigners and stateless persons on the territory of Russian Federation are ruled by laws on the Legal Status of Foreigners of 2002, Legal Entry To and Exit From the Territory of RF of 1996, and the Migration Registration of Foreigners and Stateless Persons of 2006. Russian migration policy uses diverse migration mechanisms, i.e. quotas, temporary work permits, patents (and various requirements to get them, such as culture and language exams) both for labour migration and resettlement on the territory of Russia.

As part of its migration mechanisms, the Russian government sets up temporary residency permit quotas for foreigners according to Article 6 of the Law on Legal Status of Foreigners. According to Government Regulation N 2197-P of October 29, 2015, the annual quota for temporary residency permits was set at 125,900 in 2016; 151,175 in 2015; and 146,627 in 2014. A temporary residency permit might be granted to a foreign national on the territory of the Russian Federation outside the quota (Art. 6–3, Law on Legal Status of Foreigners) in cases whereby he/ she:
–   Was born on the territory of the RSFSR and was a citizen of USSR;
–   Is married to a citizen of the Russian Federation residing on the territory of Russia;
–   Has at least one disabled parent who is a citizen of the Russian Federation;
–   Has a child who is a citizen of the RF;
–   Has invested the amount set by the Government of the RF, etc.

Additionally, the Russian government annually introduces educational quotas for foreign nationals interested in obtaining secondary education, advanced education, or doctoral and post-doctoral education programs on the territory of Russia (Government Regulation 2013). In 2014, the educational quota for foreign nationals was 15,000, including participants in the Compatriot Return Program (Ministry of Education Decree, 2014).

Some important migration mechanisms that set Russia apart from many other countries, and deserve to be discussed in this article, are those in the State Program of Support to Voluntary Return to the RF of Compatriots Residing Abroad (hereafter: Compatriots Return Program).

The Compatriots Return Program serves as an instrument to help solve the country's demographic and economic problems. Russian regions are divided into territories with priority resettlement and other territories (President Decree, 2012). Before 2013, regions of Russia participating in Russia's State Program of Support to Voluntary Return to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Residing Abroad had been divided into three categories: border territories strategically important for Russia and characterized by shrinkage of the population" were registered as the category of priority settlement (category A); territories where large investment projects are carried out requiring mass participation of resettlers due to the labor force shortage on the local market (category B); territories with stable economic development where over the past three or more years the overall population size has been falling or population drain had been recorded (category C) (Law 99-FZ).

Nowadays, the regions of Russia participating in Russia's State Program of Support to Voluntary Return to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Residing Abroad are divided into two categories: territories with priority resettlement and other territories (President Decree, 2012).

The Compatriot Return Program´s participants enjoy the highest level of state support in the Far Eastern and Siberian Federal Districts, particularly in the Republic of Buryatia, Khabarovsk Region, Magadan Region, Sakhalin Regions, the Jewish Autonomous Area, etc. It could be argued that the heavy emphasis on the relocation of compatriots was dictated by the country's desire to limit its migration flows to culturally homogeneous and ethnically Russian citizens of the former USSR, and had its roots in the historic unease with different cultures and lack of interest in integrating migrants, and adapting society to a more tolerant and diverse environment.

Tajikistan

The rules of entry to and exit from Tajikistan are ruled by the law of the Republic of Tajikistan on the legal status of foreign citizens, and the Rules on Stay in Tajikistan for foreign nationals (Tajikistan´s Law on Legal Status, 1996; Tajikistan´s Government Decree, 1999). Foreign citizens need entry and exit visas, and if foreign citizens stay in Tajikistan for longer than 6 months they need a residence permit (Art 5).

As outlined above, the selection and settlement component in a sending country includes measures aimed at: a) the creation of domestic jobs and limiting migration flow abroad; b) assistance in migrant selection and settlement in receiving countries, and c) measures at increasing the employability of migrants in general.

As mentioned above, one of the stated national priorities of Tajikistan is to increase economic development in the country by creating domestic jobs. The State Program on the Employment of Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan (2014–2015) emphasizes domestic job creation, improving the economic outlook of the country and encouraging entrepreneurship and small business creation, as well as government support for unemployed and vulnerable groups. It also includes assisting people in finding employment domestically, cooperation between employment agencies and employers in order to ensure synergy in the direction and mechanisms of creating new jobs, and helping people improve their employability. In order to increase employability of certain vulnerable groups, there are a number of activities, such as quotas, promotion of education and vocational training and re-training, self-employment and small business, and professional counseling. Measures aimed at an increased employability of youth are given priority (Tajikistan's State Program on Employment, 2014).

Tajikistan's extensive network of State Migration Services cover every region of the country and several offices in Russia work primarily to provide assistance with migrant selection and settlement in receiving countries. The Migration service operates a network of pre-departure centres for counseling and training migrant workers. However, according to observers, the State Migration Service is a weak institution which, despite its wide institutional mandate, struggles to fully achieve its mandate. It only registered 10% of the entire number

of labour migrants, and struggles to operate the system of professional education and training. A network of private employment /recruiting agencies was created to help prospective migrants find employment in the receiving country. In addition, the government developed a labour market information system, designed to help connect employers and job seekers. However, due to the lack of regulation capacities and low demand by potential migrants, the impact of these initiatives is low (GIZ, 2012, p. 5).

Tajikistan operates on bilateral agreements with destination countries aimed at protecting the rights and interests of migrants, and educational and professional development. For example, it directs increasingly more energy to the adaptation of its workers in Russia, helping them find employment in the host country, adapting their skills to the host country's job market, and even providing vocational training for professions in demand in Russia, and assisting migrants in getting necessary papers and obtaining employment abroad. It also signs bilateral agreements between host and source countries related to labour migration, promoting cooperation between host and source countries' employment agencies (Tajikistan-Kuwait Agreement of August 16, 2011; Russia-Tajikistan Agreements of 1992 and of 2013).

Currently, the Russian-Tajik intergovernmental commission has prepared a series of additional accords complimenting the framework migration agreement, aimed at providing the organized and orderly recruitment of migrants to Russia by official Russian agencies; strengthening the information flow about persons violating visa and migration regimes, and signing agreements about re-admission (which presupposes Tajikistan's consent to take back irregular migrants deported from Russia). One notable gap in the discussed normative framework is the absence of performance evaluation indicators, responsible agencies, action plans and a clearly defined time frame for the implementation and monitoring of the above documents.

It is important to mention that both countries are currently engaged in intergovernmental discussions about the introduction of a visa regime for the nationals of Central Asian countries in order to enter Russia. In early 2013, members of the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia proposed amendments to the migration legislation in order to introduce visas for Central Asian nationals entering the territory of Russia. The idea has been discussed broadly for a number of years but so far it has not come to fruition due to the demographic, economic and geopolitical interests of Russia in those regions (Gulina, 2013). The discussion is however continuing.

Nowadays, an apt management of migration flows, which includes decisions on visa arrangements, is part of the political process which defines and is being defined by economic, political and socio-cultural relations between countries (Berg et al, 2006; Sedelmeyer, 2002). Both current cases – Russian and Tajikistan – have shown this in a clear way. A visa regime restricts a person's freedom while enabling nation states to make individual decisions about the need for or desirability of any single person's sojourn in the country (Salter, 2004). A visa-free regime means a high level of trust and confidence between the states that have mutually agreed to it and enhances the degree of citizens' freedom.

Migration mechanisms as a part of integration policy

Russia

Russia presently does not have an integration strategy. Discourse on immigrant integration is limited to strategies such as an obligation to pay for a Russian language course and an obligation to get a Russian language proficiency certificate. In 2010, the former Federal Migration Service, established a Board for Promoting Integration (FMS Order, 2012). The Board's departments were authorized to develop a strategy for integration and interaction with NGOs and ethnic organizations, and to liaise with the public and the media at a federal level. The creation of the Board had not been followed by the creation of similar agencies under the patronages of regional migration services nor did it have an impact on the law-enforcement practice. As a result of misleading policies toward newcomers, the general population still sees migrants in Russia as a threat that needs to be subject to tough controls, and not as people in need of integration support:

– 71% of Russians are convinced that immigrants are mostly criminals and support their deportation.
– 73% support tough measures by the authorities against immigrants.
– 53.3% view them as ignoring Russian language and culture, and having difficulties in communication.
– 42.3% characterize them as low skilled and poorly educated persons.
– 35% are irritated by the "untidy and repulsive appearances" of newcomers.
– 18.7% disapprove of their bad manners and indelicacy (Levada, 2013).

However, there are a number of initiatives towards immigrants, at least in theory, designed to facilitate their adaptation to modern Russia.

The urgency of language unity was stated by President V. Putin, when in 2002 he mentioned that "it is important that newcomers have a chance for adaptation in the country. Reaching this goal is our elementary requirement to the newcomers wishing to live and work in Russia, their readiness to learn Russian culture and language" (Putin, 2012). Since then, the reasons for which Russian language proficiency needs to be proven, has expanded.

First, a Russian language test, as a precondition for obtaining citizenship of the Russian Federation, was introduced by the Decree of the Russian President on November 14, 2002 (President Decree, 2002a). Ten years later, language requirements had significantly broadened and included migrants working in social spheres. In November, 2012 the new law came in force, obliging migrants employed in the field of housing and communal services, trade and consumer services, to pass an examination comprising the Russian Language, Russian History and Basics of the Russian Legislation (Federal Law N 185 FZ). A foreign citizen submitting an application for a work permit or extension of a work permit in the fields of housing and communal services, trade and consumer services is required to provide a document proving their knowledge of the Russian language.

This rule is being developed further: the introduction of compulsory examinations in the Russian Language, Russian History and Basics of the Rus-

sian Legislation must be introduced to all foreigners regardless to their status and legal document. The draft mentions that such provision will ensure a more effective social adaptation and integration of migrants into Russian society and at the same time will contribute to easing tensions and preventing threats to interracial harmony.

A number of regional and local programs exist in Russia aimed at immigrants' deeper knowledge of Russian language and culture. For example, since 2012, St. Petersburg has run the Program for Harmonization of Intercultural, Interethnic and Interfaith Relations, Promoting a Culture of Tolerance for Newcomers in St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg´s Program, 2010). Within the framework of the program various courses and educational activities for immigrants have been organized. The special language and adaptation courses for women and youths designed by the NGO "International Information Centre" and the Regional Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Sverdlovsk Region has been popular among migrants in this region.

–   Adaptation of migrants through community initiatives

There are few initiatives towards immigrants´ adaptation supported and structured by the civil society sector in Russia. Targeting the change in the situation at the end of 2013, the Ministry of Regional Development developed a document that established financial and institutional assistance and support from the state to the NGOs dealing with the social and cultural adaptation and integration of immigrants. The idea of adaptation and integration appeared in Russian immigration discourse as part of the FMS´ initiative in March, 2014. The government planned to require the new immigrants coming into Russia to sign an "adaptation contract" upon arrival if they wished to obtain a residence card and/or working permit (Law Draft, 2014). This idea is still under consideration.

(RE)Integration policy of Tajikistan

Integration and reintegration measures in the sending countries include: a) activities aimed at developing repatriation programs and using skills of returnees in the domestic labour market after they are back home; b) protection of its citizens abroad, including social and human rights aspects; and c) agreements aimed at harmonizing social support, pensions, and tax issues between sending and receiving countries.

Tajikistan has achieved some headway in developing its job-market and its national economy. National analysis shows that the jobless rate in the country have been slowly falling, with new jobs created in agriculture, food and sales. However, the number of people working in the manufacturing sector has fallen, resulting in the de-industrialization of the economy (Ryazantsev, 2016).

Tajik migrant workers could be divided into two groups, the first being seasonal workers who come to work in agriculture and construction, and who typically return home for the colder months. This group of Tajik citizens comprises 75–80% of all seasonal migrant workers in Russia (Ibid). The second group remains in Russia for extended periods, but frequently lacks legal status. Therefore, any questions on the social protection of migrants after and during their employ-

ment in Russia, as well as human rights protection, are problematic subjects for Tajik national reintegration policy. Measures to protect migrants in the host country include Tajikistan, through multilateral agreements and negotiations, trying to increase the possibility of its citizens obtaining right of residence, employment protection and social security, as well as the transferability of social benefits acquired abroad.

Another point of discussion is the impact of Tajik migrant remittances on country development. Paradoxically, the remittances that migrants send back to Tajikistan do not lead to significant investment in the local production. There is evidence that migrants and their families invest only small sums in developing businesses and enterprises. Money transfers from migrants in Russia stimulated growth only in one particular sector of the economy – construction – with many Tajik workers using the money to remodel and build new homes. No doubt, remittances stimulate consumption and the economy in general in Tajikistan, however, unfortunately red tape and a lack of government incentives preclude people from starting their own businesses and investing in production and services in Tajikistan. Due to the lack of any coherent policy, the impact of many labour migrants living and spending money in their host country is also limited. Thus, the (re) integration mechanisms are still less designed to meet Tajikistan's economic and social needs and migration demand.

Challenges and negative consequences posed by the violation of migrants' rights

The challenges posed by migration with the gaps in regulation and policy are largely predicated on the lack of cooperation and coordination between the interests and migration policies of the receiving country and the sending country. The negative consequences of the current mismatch between the migration policies of Tajikistan and Russia has resulted in migrants' human rights violations, a lack of social protection and guarantees, and a growing level of xenophobia and anti-migrant movements among the general public in Russia. Migrants' rights are part of modern migration policies and abuses of migrants' rights are one of the most hotly debated issues today (Abashin, Pashkova, Varschauer).

Right to Education
Numerous facts on immigrant workers' children being denied admission into public schools are reflected in the "Memorial" report on "The situation of children from vulnerable groups in the Russian Federation" (Memorial Alternative Report, 2014, pp. 31–34). The report rates amongst the discrimination practices, the requirement of migrant parents to provide additional documents to enroll their children into a public school, made by authorized educational bodies, based on the Order of the Education Committee of St. Petersburg N 1674 from 07.07.2012. It is estimated that there are 138.000 children from Tajikistan in Russia, which is almost 12% of all foreign minors in the country. Although, theoretically, there should be no barriers for children of migrants to enroll in day-care or school in Russia, in reality, it is often unaffordable.

Right to health care

The right to quality and professional medical care is dependent on the immigrant's legal status, residence permit, the existence of an employment contract, and the certificate of compulsory health insurance (CHI).

Among all of the above mentioned documents, the certificate of compulsory health insurance is the most significant for getting health care services in Russia. Its existence means that the foreign national is employed on the territory of Russian Federation through an employment contract, and that his/her employer contributes, as required by law, compulsory health insurance fees to the Federal Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund and their territorial health insurance offices (Federal Law N 212-FZ). According to Regulation N 186 of Rendering Medical Assistance to Foreign Citizens, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation in March, 2013, only those immigrants can get free (unpaid) access to professional health care services in Russia

However, there are difficulties in realization of the right to health care for immigrants due to the "wasteful costs of medical insurance policy, lack of motivation for employers to protect the immigrant workers´ health and the lack of free choice among medical facilities in case of compulsory medical examination" (Kuznetsova & Mukharyamova, 2014). To solve these problems, the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection introduced, in June 2013, draft legislation obligating employers and their employees to buy private, voluntary medical insurance. According to the authorities' information, the initial cost of the voluntary medical insurance could be from 500 Rub up to 12000Rub (Yevplanov, 2013) and could resolve the difficulties in realization of the right to professional medical care for immigrants.

Before 2011, according to reports, there had been no problems with migrant children obtaining health care, even when they did not have the necessary documents. More than 70% of migrant children received the necessary health care, more than half of them free of charge. Since 2011, the situation has changed, and healthcare departments currently refuse to provide free healthcare to children of migrants, as they do not possess the CHI (Florinskaya).

The right to a pension and unemployment benefits

The serious legal obstacles for ensuring the social rights of migrants were and are the non-admission of foreign citizens and stateless persons into the social security system of Russia. The pension benefits and medical insurance schemes are closed to most newcomers (Shokhzoda, 2012). At the end of January 2014, the Russian Ministry of Labor sent the cabinet of ministers draft legislation obligating employers to buy sickness and maternity insurance for those workers who work in Russia but do not have either a permanent or temporary residence permit. Since January 1, 2015, maternity leave benefits, unemployment and pension benefits are available only to employees – citizens of the Eurasian Economic Union and Tajik labour migrants are still excluded from these social protection schemes.

In early 2016, Tajikistan and Russia announced an end to negotiations regarding pension provisions for Tajik labour migrants working in Russia. It is announced that currently, experts from both countries are working out the details

of these agreements, as well as their implementation plan. The extent to which these agreements will be implemented and reinforced remains an open question. Russia and Tajikistan unfortunately have a history of failed negotiations, and agreements that never come to fruition, or which work for a short time only. For example, on October 29, 2013, the governments of Russia and Tajikistan signed an agreement on streamlining labour migration. In particular, it was decided to extend the term of the work permit from one to three years. Unfortunately, this provision was enforced for just over one year, and in 2014 Russia annulled this agreement and introduced labour patents.

Conclusions

The above analysis shows the close ties and dependencies that Russia and Tajikistan have. It also shows the power imbalance in the relationships of the two countries which impact policy development and implementation. Russia and Tajikistan as countries with diverse migration profiles (receiving country vs. sending country) confirm that national migration policy must take into account the demographic, economic and social needs of the country.

In order to achieve its proclaimed goals of improving its economic outlook and demographic situation, Russian needs to clearly face the reality that it needs a coherent and human-friendly migration policy, comprehensible migration mechanisms that are rooted in diversity, tolerance, and respect for human rights. Russia has a lot to learn in terms of integration mechanisms and ways of modifying migration flows.

In the case of Russia, making the country unattractive to migrants and posing unreasonable requirements will not help it achieve its economic development goals. Russia has proven to be a country with very strict but unclear immigration rules and implementation practices. Russian immigration policy is veiled in seemingly liberal slogans although its application is explicitly illiberal. Nowadays Russian reality is likely to teach immigrants coming to Russia a hard lesson.

In the case of Tajikistan, paying less attention to (re)integration migration mechanisms will force a dependence on migrant remittances and outwards migration. Tajikistan proclaims migration as a way to alleviate poverty at a national level, but the country faces a lack of coherent migration policy, and the impact of migrants returning from abroad to their country of origin and spending money in Tajikistan is also limited.

Both countries posed by gaps in their national migration policies and the lack of coordination between the migration mechanisms of Russia and Tajikistan. The current management of migration, in and between both countries, shows that each sets its migration policy less dependently of the other. The negative consequences of the current migration policy mismatch are rooted in migrant´s human rights violations and the negative presumptions about migrants among Russian inhabitants.

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AGGLOMERATIONS AS STRATEGIC ACTORS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

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> *Through its complex orchestration of time and space,*
> *no less than through the social division of labor,*
> *life in the city takes on the character of a symphony:*
> *specialized human aptitudes, specialized instruments,*
> *give rise to sonorous results which,*
> *neither in volume nor in quality,*
> *could be achieved by any single piece.*
> *(Mumford, L. 1938 / 1970, 4)*

Abstract

Globalization has been changing the urban landscape rapidly in recent decades. Suburbanization, urban sprawl and intensive migration have transformed former territories with a mix of urban and rural settlements into huge high urbanized regions which play a key role in the development of nation states and macro-regions of the world.

They have also become sites for the concentration of problems such as terrorism, crime, ethnic conflicts, economic disparities, hatred and exclusion, because of their size and magnetism as points of prosperity.

The goal of this article is to show the historical process of agglomeration-building in Europe (e.g. Paris and Berlin), the USA (e.g. Tristate NY) and Russia (e.g. St. Petersburg, Samara – Togliatti Agglomeration) and to explore actual problems of strategic planning in these city-regions. The city-regions are analyzed within the frame of a holistic approach (top – down direction). Large city-agglomerations in Russia are, at present, possible motors of growth and development. The elaboration of strategies for them could be the starting point in the recovery of the economy and society. But the experience in this field is not broad enough to lead to positive and rapid results. This makes a comparative analyses of international examples extremely important for Russian governing bodies and social groups.

In the research we use statistical data – demographic, economic and political – to show the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of agglomeration development in the 21st century.

Keywords: agglomeration; strategic actor; strategizing; holistic approach; motors of growth; comparative analyses.

"The idea that cities can be characterized as actors in a global economy is controversial and has been conceptualized in many different ways" (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 58). The 21st century has brought multiple challenges with it. Among these are the rapid growth and radical restructuring of the urban world. In the 20th century, in the industrial age, cities had already began to play a key role in a development of technics, culture, sciences and other aspects of human civilization. But the city form has been changing rapidly and in the past decades, suburbanization, urban sprawl and intensive migration have transformed former territories with a mix of urban and rural settlements into huge highly urbanized regions with dense populations and intensive relations of various kinds between settlements situated within their borders: political, economic, cultural and social. New means of transportation has made it possible to look at these regions as a whole of some kind and required the search for new organizational structures, principles, rules and mechanisms of governance.

To describe multiple sprawling urbanized landscapes and city networks researchers have been using various terms: including the much discussed "megalopolis" of Jean Gottman (Gottman, Megalopolis, 1961).... archipelago economy, galactic city, string city, limitless city, endless city, liquid city, global city region, world city-region, mega-city region, polycentric metropolis, new megalopolis, megapolitan region, metro region, polynuclear urban region, super urban area, super region.... mega region. All these termini are collected and interpreted by the authors of the book "Megaregions: Globalization's new urban form?" John Hurrison and Michael Hoyler (Hurrison & Hoyler, 2015, p. 1) to show how different the views about the modern urban form and its specific character are. The main subject of this essay collection (published by Hurrison and Hoyler), about US, European and Chinese urban megaregions , is an urbanized territory developed more or less organically during a long period of history which is typically enormously competitive and progresses to a very "good quality of life" for its citizens. Megaregions are shown in the essays as actors able to cross administrative and political borders including borders of autonomous regions, subjects of federal states and even state borders as well.

Cities have been acting like this throughout history. The Hanseatic League, as a commercial and defense union of market cities, dominated the flow of goods in the Baltic Region through inter-city trading networks for four centuries (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 57). The nodes of the network were cities not only in West and North Europe such as Hamburg but also in East Europe such as Novgorod.

In his famous book "The Culture of Cities" the American urbanist Luis Mumford prophesied a full decline and death of the city in the 20th century. For a city as a civilization phenomenon, Mumford outlined updating the six stages of evolution concept of his teacher Patrick Geddes (Geddes, 1915): Eopolis as a pre-city is not relevant today, but the second one – the Polis – being a settlements group comprising some social system with common economic, political, cultural and other functions is today mostly the core city of large agglomerations and huge mega-regions. For Aristotle and Plato, polis was the most significant element of the antic world-system.

Of great importance in Mumford's classification is the Metropolis as the main city in a definite region and the last stage of development from his point of view. The largest metropolis' of the 21st century are world-cities or global cities of different size (mostly mega-cities with a population of tens of millions) and extremely high influence in the mega-regions of the world. Three other stages in Mumford's urban world picture are connected with decline and destruction. As a result, the Megalopolis, the Tyrannopolis and the Necropolis appear (Mumford, 1938 / 1970, pp. 285–292). But later, Jean Gottman's Megalopolis is not such a sign but a new form of urbanized area where agglomerations are growing together because of economic development and new means of transportation. The main factors influencing the urban processes are geography, history and the economy, but beside these are also social changes such as intensive migration. Migrants are attracted by cities like magnets and cities are growing faster.

In the 1960s the creator of the concept of "Ecumenopolis" (a city made up of the whole world, a planet wide city) Constantinos Doxiadis described the absolutely new urban form in his forecast made up for around 2050. Not nation states but rather cities had to become the main centers of development and everyday life. Among the modes of transportation in his works are not only cars (mostly drawn by electricity), and railways of different forms (mostly underground and elevated), but also low earth orbit spaceships. On the surface of the city the only host must be a citizen able to move freely on foot in clean ecological surroundings. (Doxiadis, 1968). The main feature of ecumenopolis is the freedom of a man to choose a place to live, to work and to have rest without any borders. Not all of Doxiadis' ideas have become reality but large agglomerations and the suggested mega regions are the first steps to the new planet-wide city.

All concepts show the difficulties and problems connected with the definitions of urban forms developed in the modern world. Even more complicated is the matter of a description of their size (territory and population), borders, structure, governance systems and estimating the role of a "city" in the processes of production, consumption, migration, development, socialization, functional and spatial integration, and differentiation.

For the purpose of our research we extract from the multiple and complicated urban world some rather compact, closely interconnected, densely populated territories and define them as agglomerations. The Russian urban researcher Georgy Lappo calls agglomerations "galaxies of cities" (Lappo, 2012, p. 92). The kind of relations and connections between cities and other settlements in agglomerations, from our point of view, can be expressed better with the term "constellations" showing close contacts which create possibilities for more intensive and rapid development of the area. The main characteristic feature of agglomerations is that they are not only territorial entities but also an uninterrupted process of development and change which has to be planned, organized and evaluated. Today, agglomerations play a role typical of cities in the classical meaning of the word since the antiquity and perhaps earlier, and untill the beginning of the last century. The city has not died. Its death in the "information age", according to the authors of the "Urban Theory" Alan Harding and Talja Blokland (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 70), is much exaggerated. The city

has changed radically but has remained a key actor in the 21st century. In the globalizing world where "the space of flows" is more developed than the "space of places", agglomerations as an "urban form" stay to be "important nodes" because the "space of flows is not placeless" (Castells, 2010).

It is not easy to find the starting point of agglomeration-building in the history of different city-regions. Most areas of such kind developed in the 20th century simultaneously with industrialization and intensive economic development. Concentration of firms and production sites required massive workforces and workers lived mostly in nearby smaller cities and other settlements.

At present, the Paris agglomeration includes eight departments of the Ill' de France region and its 465 communes (French municipalities). As a core of agglomeration the City of Paris had a starting point of its history in Roman epoch in a form of a military settlement. Later on, the city – Ville de Paris – developed as a market, as a political center of the French kingdom, and a cultural, economic and religious center. With the urbanization, industrialization and intensification of mobility, two "crowns" connected with the core were being formed intensively: the "small crown" – the first concentric ring around the department Paris nearer to the city consisting of three other departments (Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne) and the "large crown" which has four departments (Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines, Essonne, and Val-d'Oise). The next stage of the agglomeration process took place after World War II when "New towns" were built to absorb the growing population in order to prevent overcrowding of the capital city.

At that time the Paris agglomeration within the Ill' de France region limits had a population of more than 12,005,077, or 18.2 percent of the population of France (Estimation de population, 2014). But new developments took place just at the beginning of this year. On the 1st January 2016 an absolutely new territoriality was born – the Métropole du Grand Paris with four departments – Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne; plus seven communes in the outer suburbs, including Argenteuil in Val d'Oise and Paray-Vieille-Poste in Essonne, which were added to include major airports. Grand Paris covers 814 square kilometers and has a population of 6.945 million people. (Scruggs, The "Grand Paris" era begins, 08.01.2016).

Besides this, we must not forget the Paris Metropolitan area which plays an important role as a statistical area showing the reach of commuter movement to and from Paris and its surrounding suburbs, has a population of 12,405,426 and extends the territory of the Ill' de France region. In reality, the borders of the agglomeration are moving with the growth of the population and with the development of the transport facilities, making it possible for the citizens to go further and further in search of workplaces and different services.

The three-state metropolitan region around New York City is even larger with an estimated population within the Metropolitan statistical area of 20,182,305 (Annual Estimates, 2015) and within the Combined statistical area of 23,723,696 (the same). The first entity includes 25 counties of the states of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The second is referred to as a Tri state region with 33 counties of the states New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. In reality, the economic and

social interconnections are most dense in the region of the Combined statistical area. The core city, founded in 1624 before the creation of the states and the USA as a whole, was transformed into the municipality in 1898 with the consolidation of Brooklyn (until then a separate city), the County of New York (which then included parts of the Bronx), the County of Richmond, and the western portion of the County of Queens (The 100 year anniversary of the consolidation of the 5 boroughs into NY city was in 1998). The opening of the subway in 1904, first built as separate private systems, helped to bind the new city together. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the city became a world center for industry, commerce, and communication uniting five counties. Thousands of migrants have been striving for the "Big Apple" during for decades and have brought their cultures, religions, languages with them. Currently 800 languages are spoken in the city. The region was already seen as a whole at the beginning of the last century and the fourth "Regional plan" for the Three-State NY is already on the way and has to be accepted in 2017. The Three-State NY is a statistical area but its importance in the development of this part of the USA has grown immensely through time because of the intensive work of the Regional Planning Association (RPA) making all possible efforts to harmonize the quality of life and living conditions in all municipalities and parts of the region. The RPA as a union of science, business, policy, ecological thinking and citizens participation is "transcending election cycles, partisan interests, state borders and human prejudice in its work" (Shaping the Region, 2014, p. 3).

At present, the Metropolitan Statistical Area of New York is one of the most populous agglomerations in the world. It makes the administration and policy making problems in the region extremely complex and the role of the region, in the USA, on the American continent and in the world, enormous. The experience of strategic planning in the region covers about 100 years and is an exclusive example of developing strategic plan and implementing it in a very rare regime of subsidiary policy-making with leadership taken by local business and research, communities and citizens.

Greater Berlin was united within actual borders in the 1920s and includes many former cities which had already existed in the Middle Ages. The first steps in this direction were already made before World War I. In 1912 the 'special purpose alliance was created to solve the problems of economic and infrastructural development. Due to the activities of the Alliance, large parks such as Tiergarten, Treptower Park and others have survived in Berlin. The intensive necessity of Berlin's cooperation with other municipalities around it is evident in the history of the Berlin underground (Untergrundbahn). At the very beginning, this transportation system was built separately in different parts of the region. And only after the establishment of the Greater Berlin municipality in 1920 did the construction of the rationally organized mass transportation system for the entire region become possible.

The unification of Berlin with its surroundings was a complicated political procedure in the Prussian parliament and the decision was made after a severe struggle between the left oriented social-democrats and independent democrats, right oriented national parties and the party of Center. The result of the

struggle was a compromise and in the municipality of Greater Berlin the districts – former city-municipality – parlty maintained their autonomy. Nowadays, the size of the agglomeration has become larger and the region is estimated within different borders. The agglomeration includes the territory of Berlin and 50 municipalities of Brandenburg situated near the city-state as well as the capital city of Brandenburg – Potsdam – and has a population of 4,470,000. In 1995 the political unification of both subjects of the German Federation, Berlin and Brandenburg, was planned and prepared but did not happen. Besides the entity of the agglomeration, the Berlin/Brandenburg metropolitan region exists as a statistical unity comprising both Länder with all their municipalities. The Berlin city-state is the core of the region and influences all processes and affairs on the territory as Germany's capital city, the largest city in the country and the political, economic and cultural metropole in this part of Europe. According to Eurostat statistics the capital region Berlin-Brandenburg is even larger.

In Russia, nobody considered the regions of large cities as integral systems with special features and functions during the Soviet period. Cities were only meant to be production sites and industrial centers.

In the second decade of the 21st century, in Russian law there are still no such terms as "agglomeration" or "metropolitan region (area)", which is considered by many researches and practitioners in the field of planning and public government as the lack of a legal base for the development of Russia's urban regions (Shchitinskiy, 2013).

St. Petersburg (former Leningrad) has been developing since 1917, originally as an industrial center of military production. But since the first days of its existence, very near to the city smaller cities and towns were built as summer residences, fortresses and industrial centers. They exist today and their key role remains – connection with the core and carrying out multiple functions for it: living, safeguarding the history, developing sciences and arts, and the production of goods and services. At present nine cities (Petrodvorets, Lomonosov, Pushkin, Pavlovsk, Sestroretsk, Zelenogorsk, Kolpino, Kronstadt and Krasnoje Selo) and 21 other settlements are parts of St. Petersburg – one of 85 subjects of the Russian Federation, the so called federal city – autonomous municipalities but also parts of the city's administrative districts.. We can characterize the second largest city of Russia also as a city-state like Berlin because of its competences in the federal state.

The second group of cities in the St. Petersburg agglomeration are politically parts of another subject of the Russian Federation – the Leningrad Region situated around the city-state. The boundary between both subjects makes the unification and complex development of the agglomeration as an entire system a complicated matter: it is not absolutely clear where this border is situated and it is not marked politically or administratively. So the agglomeration does not exist as a definite territory with an economically or socially knitted-together system. Districts of the Leningrad Region such as Vsevolozhskij, Gatchinskij, Kirovskij, Tosnenskij, Lomonosovskij and (less so) Vyborgskij (6 from 17) are generally included into the agglomeration, whereas others are seen as a remote periphery not important for further development.

The differentiation of the region's districts according to their importance to the city-state makes the integration of the agglomeration more difficult and the merging of both regions seem not possible. Remote territories fear that they will not be developed at all and their resources will be used by the city-state for its own needs.

Besides the mononucleus agglomerations in the world there are many multinucleus conurbations, also called "polycentric" (Pain, 2015), where two or more large cities unite the territory into the system and create a highly urbanized region with more opportunities for economic development and social cohesion.

In the early 21st century, agglomerations also became an important issue in Russia because of the development problems connected with the most relevant features of the country: the largest territory in the world, a relatively small and diminishing population, and the necessity for rapid development of economic, infrastructural and social subsystems. Which was why strategic plans and other concepts were developed in different parts of Russia. One such concept was devised in the Samara region (oblast) for a territory between Samara and Togliatti along the Samara bend. The key centers of the region over a distance of about 170 km are the six cities – Samara, Togliatti, Chapayevsk, Novokuybyshevsk, Zhygulevsk, Syzran – plus six other towns. The total population is more than 2.7 million.

In a research report from the "Giprogor" Institute, the conurbation is described as a "densely populated area consisting of the highly developed Samara agglomeration, the little developed Togliatti agglomeration, the developing Syzran agglomeration and the natural recreation resort of the Samara bend" (Institut Giprogor, 2011). On 30 August 2016, eight city-districts and nine municipal districts of the Samara region signed an agreement with the Regional government about the cooperation and development of the agglomeration. The signing partners were the cities Samara, Togliatti, Syzran, Novokuybyshevsk, Chapaevsk, Zhygulevsk, Octyabrsk, Kinel, and the municipal districts of Bezenchuksky, Volzhsky, Kinelsky, Krasnoarmeysky, Krasnoyarsky, Privolzhsky, Stavropolsky, Syzransky and Shigonsky (Aleshin, 21.09.2016).

One of the most relevant factors of influence for conurbation building is the competition between the Samara Region and the Republic of Tatarstan – one of the most developed regions of Russia. The city of Samara is unable to compete with the cities of Tatarstan, particularly the capital city Kazan. But the economic power of the conurbation including Samara, Togliatti and Syzran can help the region to develop more rapidly and intensively to match competitors in other parts of the Volga mega-region.

The importance of agglomerations for the national and, subsequently, global economy can be illustrated with the percentage of GDP produced in the regions. For the Ill' de France region, it is estimated as 30%, for the New York Combined Statistical Area – 8.3%, for the Metropolitan Region Berlin/Brandenburg – 5.1%, and for St. Petersburg (in the borders of the Subject of the Russian Federation) – 12%. With the growth of the urban region's territory, the population and the production grow and the functions become more multiple and diverse.

The highly urbanized regions described above have many differences but one common characteristic feature is the most important for our research. It is their strategic role in the development of their hinterland, countries and megaregions of the world. From this point of view, the new type of the urban policy and politics has to be analyzed within the frame of a"holistic" approach. The decision making in an agglomeration is not exactly the same as in a separate city. The interests, approaches and possibilities differ greatly. "The social, the cultural, the political, the natural and the economic" (McCann & Paddison, 2014, p. 220) dimensions within the agglomeration create the space with more than only three classic dimensions (width, breadth and length) thought typical for the territorial objects. First of all, the space of an agglomeration includes time as a very important factor, and also the political will of governing bodies and groups, and besides this there is individual rationality.

The infrastructure that has created Castells' "space of flows", in other words, is likely to have been superimposed upon an earlier "space of places". Some places have been better able to adopt it than others. "Thus, people do still live in places. But because function and power in our societies are organized in the space of flows, the structural domination of its logic essentially alters the meaning and dynamic of places. The dominant tendency is toward a horizon of networked, ahistorical space of flows, aiming at imposing its logic over scattered, segmented places, increasingly unrelated to each other, and less and less able to share cultural codes. Unless cultural, political, and physical bridges are deliberately built between these two forms of space, we may be heading toward life in parallel universes whose times cannot meet because they are warped into different dimensions of a social hyperspace (Castells, 2010, pp. 458–459).

The hypothesis of the hyperspace developed by physicists (Kaku, 1994) and mentioned by Manuel Castells in his works (Castells, 2010, p. 407) makes it possible to explore the space of agglomeration as the space of flows and to find out the multiple forces whose influence is creating a new power constellation typical for the information society of the 21st century.

In the indefinite surroundings of transforming states, like Russia, such analysis is very difficult because of rapidly changing interaction rules and the absence of stable goals and organizations to fulfil the developed programs and strategies. But in all of the agglomerations during recent decades, some common features have become most important:

1. The information society created space where the flows of a different kind have become more important as places as such. The generation of social space (Castells, 2010) happened through the development of new facets never seen before because of the objective impossibility of their existence in former times. Not only have megacities become magnets and centers of economic and political development with the appearance of new organizational forms and modes of human behavior, but also large cities in their regions with less dense population and settlement networks.

2. Most important processes in modern development, technology and scientific innovations are developed and transformed in places with concentrated flows of information and communication. And nobody denies the role

of large agglomerations as nodes for this flow. The core city can sometimes not be the most suitable place for producing advanced services typical for the new information society because of the high expenses, but the nearby settlements can play the role of supplementary areas.

3. New transportation modes are needed to knit the agglomerations together and are developed everywhere. Rail plays a leading role as before but the speed is becoming so high (up to 400km/h) that the space and time are compressed and it is already possible to live hundreds kilometers far from the core city and still feel like a citizen.

4. Space is crystallized time. Time and space cannot be understood independently of social action (Castells, 2010, p. 441).

5. Three layers in the space of flows play a defining role in modern agglomerations: the material support of the space of flows is actually constituted by a circuit of electronic exchanges; the second layer is constituted by its nodes and hubs hence the space of flows is not placeless; the third important layer to the spatial organization of the dominant, managerial elites (rather than classes) (Castells, 2010, p. 444–445).

Time and space, which are the strongest factors distinguishing the urban world, are characterized by researchers and practitioners working in the field of strategizing as the main principles for developing and implementing every kind of strategy. "… analyses shows that the ruling dominant law of strategy is different from the ruling law of politics or economy… In strategy, however, the major law is the law of time…. A time-sensitive analyses of a strategy is a criterion that must always be in place through the development and implementation of all elements of any strategy…. Analyzing the strategic practice proves Napoleon's point of view that the two most important criteria of the strategic decision-making process are time and space" (Kvint, 2016).

Different sorts of socio-spatial connections and differences, movements and immobilities are fundamentally about power (McCann & Paddison, 2014, p. 221). This idea is also relevant for large agglomerations. Their size makes them centers of political and economic power. All chosen examples demonstrate the rightness of the thesis. New York City is one of four global centers with stock exchanges and other financial institutions functioning 24 hours a day, producing multiple services and activities unique to the modern world.

The notion of the "global city" is more a symbol, an imagination than the real territory. "The global city is a process rather than a place" (Castells, 2010, p. 443). The 8 million population of New York City could never have a large enough work force to produce all the products and services now connected with the financial, economic and political center of the USA, North America and the world. Only the Tri-state region with its 20 million is large enough to play the key role in a world as a global city and to be one of the global players in world politics. The same can be said about Paris. In competition with London, Tokyo and NY, the municipality of Ville de Paris would not stand a chance.

The researches of the "Globalization and World Cities Study Group – GAWC" from Loughborough University (UK) (Globalization and World Cities Research Network) suggested the empirically proven modern classification

of world cities on the basis of a score system evaluating four types of city functions: accounting and audit, advertising, financing and banks, insurance. All cities are grouped into four ranks and 12 categories – **α**, **β**, **γ**, **d**. New York is among the most powerful "world cities" α++, Paris belongs to the category α+, Berlin – β+, St. Petersburg – γ+, Samara is not presented in the classification.

Entertainment, cultural services, tourism, recreation and other services typical for world cities sometimes become as important as finance and insurance branches. Not occasionally, St. Petersburg has been competing in recent years with such famous European touristic centers as Paris, London, Barcelona and others for the title of leading tourist destination and won the first place in 2015 and 2016 (World Travel Awards, 2016). Among the strategic goals of the cities, the sustainable development of the surrounding region – the territory of agglomeration – often means not only the preservation of natural resources for future generations but also the development of different economic branches such as cultural and ecological tourism, different kinds of recreation, and ecology as a new technological sphere.

As examples of interconnection of the core city and the region around it in agglomeration, we analyzed different projects for preserving natural areas and park space in a core as well as in the regions. Such measures were foreseen already in the First Regional Plan for Tri-State New York, in the documents of the special purpose alliance in Berlin, and in the development plans of Greater Paris where the new entity, The Metropole of Grand Paris, was created in 2016, primarily for economic reasons but also for ecological cooperation. In Russia, the problem also must be solved in the regions of large cities. Around St. Petersburg, the "garden cities" of former imperial residences must be preserved not only as objects of historical heritage but also as resorts and places where the recreation industry can be developed as a leading economic branch. One of the pearls of the upcoming "Samara agglomeration" is the famous Samara bend and one of the largest and best known Russian rivers – the Volga.

The urban-rural distinction in agglomerations gains new qualities. It declined of importance through the age of industrialization. "In an urbanized world urban is everywhere and nowhere" (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 11). But nowadays the task of integrating both elements becomes more important and complicated. The footprints of large cities mean contamination of the earth's surface, air and water that have to be cleaned and restored to enrich the city-life with new colors, emotions, scents and sensations.

The concept of "world cities", first developed by John Friedman (Friedman, 1986) and later refined by Peter Hall, is of special importance for analyzing agglomerations. Hall's "world cities" (Hall, 1996) contain key political and related functions (national governments, professional organizations, trades unions, employers' federations, head-quarters of major companies), major centers of trade (via major ports, road, rail and air infrastructure), key commercial functions (banks, insurances etc.), concentrations of professional services (health, law, higher education, research, media), and luxury consumption and entertainment functions (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 77). All of them naturally were and are agglomerations because of their size and structure.

Since 1981, another notion used by the United Nations in connection with large agglomerations is the notion of a megacity (Population Reports, 1981, p. 38). With a population more than 10 million, they are structural agglomerations with many settlements within their borders. There were 37 megacities in 2015: in Europe – 5 including Moscow in 22nd place (population 16.9 million), London, and Paris in 32nd place (population 12.4 million). Urban territories such as Tokyo, Jakarta, Seoul, Karachi, Shanghai, New York City, Manila, Mexico City, Delhi, Beijing also fall into this category.

Economic and the political power are closely interconnected in the modern world. The networks of large cities often play a key role in the process of decision-making about global problems such as climate change, migration flows and ethnic conflicts.

For a long period "political scientists … have tended to proceed on the basis that cities can be defined, however imperfectly, by the boundaries that are relevant to political decision-making; that is, by areas covered by a local or metropolitan government. Studies that required a broader focus have embraced other definitions such as a "travel-to-work area", a "standard metropolitan statistical area", a conurbation, a "functional urban region"…" (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 9). But nowadays examples show that different dimensions of regions surrounding large cities create new types of economic and political entities: autonomous regions, economic zones, and statistical areas with special administrative and political functions.

The problems of cities are considered crucial for mankind in the 21st century – the first century where the urban population has exceeded the population of the countryside. The new agenda will be accepted by the UN Habitat III in October 2016 in Quito (Ecuador) (United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, 2016). The fulfillment of their territorial functions across administrative boundaries, acting as hubs and drivers for balanced sustainable and integrated urban and territorial development at all levels, creation of sustainable and inclusive urban economies, by leveraging the agglomeration benefits of well-planned urbanization, high productivity, competitiveness and innovation; reinvigorating long-term and integrated urban and territorial planning and design in order to optimize the spatial dimension of the urban form and to deliver the positive outcomes of urbanization, are seen as the main goals of agglomeration building and development.

In this context it should always be remembered that "… national economies are …. constellations of regional economies, each with a major city at its core, each requiring specific and customized strategies" (Harding & Blockland, 2014, p. 59).

The experience of more developed cities is particularly useful for agglomerations in less developed and developing countries. Namely the development of three regional plans of Tri-State NY could play an important role as a pattern for Russian agglomerations where the strategizing is in an entirely new direction and is connected with a number of problems.

It appears that the agglomeration of huge masses of people and value in certain places only happens occasionally. In reality geographic and historical factors

do influence the process intensively. Two leading drivers of population agglomeration in every case are the geography of the region and its history (Goerlich & Mas, 2009). But nowadays the influence of both these factors can be moderated or strengthened by the development of strategies whose goals are sustainable growth and intensive development according to the interests of citizens in the region seen as a wholesome system. According to this idea, all of the large agglomerations in the world, particularly in developed countries, are creating and implementing strategic plans for the long term development of mostly large territories because it makes the urbanized region more competitive and at the same time sustainable.

A very early example of a strategy developed for a region with many different polities (states of the USA, counties and municipalities) was The Regional Plan published in 1926 as mentioned earlier. At that time it was nothing short of revolutionary to create a common rationality for a Tri-State Metropolitan region with a large population and many partisan interests, state and municipal borders, and human prejudices also mirrored in different election cycles. All the difficulties of the strategy development process had been overcome with the help of in-depth research, an interdisciplinary approach and building the partnerships of multiple actors of regional development, including political parties, civic organizations, business leaders and communities of other kinds. By that time, the mechanisms of civic engagement had been developed by the Regional Planning Association as the main leader of the process. The RPA is an independent, non-profit organization. During more than ninety years of its existence the Association has gained credibility not only in the New York region but also in many parts of the USA for its long and successful experience in the development and implementation of the three Regional Plans of Tri-State New York (Shaping the Region, 2011).

Regional strategies were not rare in the first decades of 21st century. In 2011 the "Innovation strategy" for the Metropolitan region Berlin/Brandenburg was developed by the Common Planning Authority for both subjects of the German Federation and accepted by the governments of both Länder. The cooperation between Berlin and Brandenburg was very important for the region as a whole because of the difficulties with the unification of Germany and the processes started afterwards: completion between Berlin and Brandenburg for businesses, the public and finance. The border between the two Länder became a hindrance for development. Besides that, Berlin as a large city and the capital of Germany could take advantage of Brandenburg's natural resources and at the same time stimulate further development of the neighboring Land. Now both territories are working together (Strategy Report. Metropolitan Region Berlin / Brandenburg, 2009) in some clusters – energetics, healthcare, optics, IT, media, creative industries, transportation, mobility, logistics. On the Brandenburg agenda there are also some specific clusters that are also relevant for Berlin, including provision production and supply, the metal industry, chemicals and synthetic materials, and tourism. The example of the Berlin/Brandenburg Metropolitan Region shows the need for cooperation within Metropolitan Regions comprised of two federal subjects without having their merger connected with many political-ad-

ministrative difficulties. Some spheres are administrated by common authorities as was shown above with the example of developing the Innovative Strategy.

Another case of metropolitan development in the region with the core world- and global city is the Ile-de-France Region around the capital-city of France, Paris. The Île-de-France Region is historically seen as the natural surroundings of the capital and the domain of a king, existing already as a socio-economic entity since 6 May 1976 and having gained economic and political powers in the course of regionalization in the 1980s and 1990s. The integration in the region is very close but since 1 January 2016 the entity with a smaller area and popula- tion than the Ile-de-France Region. the so called Métropole du Grand Paris, was created with the main strategic goal of improved coordination between the core city and its suburbs. One of the ways to reach this goal is to roll out the massive expansion of the Paris Métro subway system to offer better mobility to citizens in the suburbs.

The process is very difficult and many observers are skeptical about the powers of the new local government level among the many others in the politi- cal system of France (communes, departments, regions). But according to the regulations, the Métropole du Grand Paris will be governed by an elected coun- cil (209 members) and the president, with the responsibility for such issues as housing, environmental protection and local planning. The latter being one of the most important from the point of view of strategizing.

With the creation of the new entity, Paris is among other cities of the world that are trying to develop more efficient territorial strategies to heighten the role of the agglomeration as a strategic center in the modern globalizing world. Paris is one of the most prominent cities not only in Europe but also in the world (global city a+). At the same time, the dimensions within the "city" borders – Ville de Paris – are not large. A ring road follows the pattern of the medieval city walls and Paris' territory is in this case 7.5 times smaller than New York City and 15 times smaller than Greater London. The new entity is 7.8 times larger than the commune Ville de Paris and even larger than New York City. This means that new possibilities of development, especially in housing issues, are created. At the same time new transportation and environmental problems also appear.

The main idea of creating Métropole du Grand Paris, as articulated by Nico- la Sarkozy in 2007 (Scruggs, 2016), was the integration of Paris with its suburbs to make possible unified decisions and hence develop more competitive strate- gies for the capital city of France, its main historical, cultural, scientific, admini- strative and service center.

Not all of the citizens of Paris and its suburbs are enthusiastic about the new development. They ask some important questions: whether the expansion of the territory will lead to territorial ghettoization and apartheid between rich and poor or drive gentrification and force the poorest to move further from the city center (Durieux, 2016).

If it seems that the problems of North American New York and European Berlin and Paris are not relevant to the large Russian urban centers it is total- ly wrong. The issue of economic development is closely linked to the problem of interconnection and knitting the core city or core cities with the adjusting

territories, sometimes politically independent from the core (as in the region of St. Petersburg) but sometimes included into the same political entity (subjects of the federation such as Samara, Togliatti, Syzran and other settlements in the Samara Region) and is today on the agenda of the federal authorities, at both regional and municipal level.

First of all, the "Plan (agenda) of agglomeration development in the Russian Federation" (Mnisterstvo economitcheskogo razvitiiya, 2015) has to be mentioned. The draft was first developed by a working group of the Ministry for Regional Development which disappeared in September 2014. But today the document is once more causing public debate. On the huge territory of Russia, with its relatively small population and small population density, the concentration of the population in the most developed and prosperous centers is inevitable. These are the largest cities which, with their surroundings, most have a population in the agglomeration area ofmore than 1 million citizens. Both cities analyzed in this article are in this category.

During the last decade the "Strategy" for St. Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia, was developed twice. In 1997 the so called "Strategic plan for St. Petersburg" (Generalnyi sovet strategitcheskogo plana, 1995) was developed and accepted by the General Council of the Strategic Plan for St. Petersburg. A decision about the beginning of the work had been made at the City Conference on the 1st December 1996 and included broad civic participation as an important condition. The main strategic goals were "Creation of a favorable economic climate", "Integration into the world economy", "Improvement of the habitat", and "Creation of a favorable social climate". In the text the transformation of city economy was stressed. For the first time in the city's history, its own form of development had to be chosen by itself, identified without the dictate of the federal center and without counting on its help. The city has to find and establish its place in the world economy and on the postindustrial world map. The development of St. Petersburg as a gateway to Europe, as a cultural capital, as an open economy and as a safe city were set as strategic priorities. The Strategy declaration was signed by 143 members of the Council including the Governor of St. Petersburg, members of the Federal and Regional Legislations, authorities, members of civic organizations, top managers of private organizations and public institutions, famous scientists, and artists. However, implementation of the document was not consistent enough and sometime later it had almost been forgotten about.

That's why on 13 May 2014 the new "Strategy of economic and social development of St. Petersburg until 2030" (Komitet po economicheskoy politike i strategitcheskomu planirovaniyu Sankt-Peterburga, 2014) was examined and accepted with the resolution of the city government. The document was developed by a working group acting on behalf of the Department for Economic policy and Strategic Planning of St. Petersburg with the participation of researchers from different city organizations. Civic participation was organized over the Internet and many citizens expressed their opinion about the strategic goals and priorities. "The creation of public values, forming out and introduction of progressive ideas, St. Petersburg's development as a center of world cul-

ture and international cooperation" (Ibid., p. 50) was formulated as a strategic mission. The mission is turned more towards the outer world and the general (strategic) goal of the document – more towards the citizens, civil society and business of St. Petersburg. It is aimed at ensuring a stable life quality for citizens, improvement and increase in the city's global competitiveness on the basis of national development priorities, sustainable economic growth and the results of technological innovations (Ibid., p. 64).

A move to the polycentric model has to become the key direction towards more efficient space development. It means the well-managed and coordinated formation outside the main central business district of St. Petersburg, an agglomeration sub centers system and horizontal connections between them not only within city-borders (not more than 10–15 km from the ring road – Kolpino, Pushkin) but also on the periphery (Ibid., pp. 119–120). The instruments of this development are the "Charts for complex territorial planning of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region", the new General plan for St. Petersburg (to 2035) on the basis of the socio-ecological approach and the strengthening of interconnections between both region's infrastructure (Ibid., p. 121). The problems and main tasks of the agglomeration development (planning, coordination, and infrastructure including the transportation system) are formulated in the Strategy but form only a small part of the document (Ibid., pp. 129–130).

Much more consistent ideas are expressed in another conception prepared by the political party "Yabloko" (Apple) under the guidance of G. Yavlinsky in 2014. On the first pages of the "Greater St. Petersburg. 21st century. Conceptual Development Strategy for Megapolis " it is stressed that the core city and its surroundings should be considered as a wholesome strategizing object where the decision making is not disturbed by administrative borders, i.e., the official responsibility zones of two subjects of the Russian Federation – St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. In this case the agglomeration can be developed to become a global communications center generating finance resources in a number of economic spheres and service branches, creating events for a world community through the cooperation of citizens, authorities, and different communities. The approach of the "Greater St. Petersburg. 21st century" is much less formal, centralized, brought from above and more oriented on modern values and needs than the "Strategy 2030" (Yavlinskiy, G., 2014).

A more complicated structure than mononucleus agglomerations is characteristic of conurbations with multiple subcenters inside of which there are other elements – every subcenter could be seen as a separate agglomeration, which is the case with the Samara – Togliatti conurbation consisting of the highly developed Samara agglomeration, the less developed Togliatti agglomeration and the developing Syzran agglomeration. In 2011 the "Giprogor" Institute conducted the research thought to be a base for the draft of a further agglomeration territorial development citing the words written in the 20th century by the famous economist Vasyli Leontief: "The effective functioning of the economy depends on the rational organization of the territory" (Institut "Giprogor" 2011, p. 13).

The future of the large area along the Samara bend of the Volga river is connected with the development of the territory as a whole. It will make the urban

area more competitive in Russia and create possibilities for the region within the agglomeration borders and also for the subject of RF around it to find new directions of economic and social evolution on a larger scale (Europe, other continents, the world). In 2013 the working team including Russian and foreign experts developed a set of recommendations for working out an agglomeration building Strategy for the Samara region. The environment (primarily the preservation of natural resorts through creating a new urban structure), Transport and Mobility (in the cities it will be possible to improve the roads and public transport systems, and between them, with plans to use the fast commuter trains direct to the Kurumoch airport and between Samara and Togliatti and also to smaller settlements on the way), Business, Finance, and Territorial Development (according to the integral plan) were included as the main priorities (Mamaev & Working Group, 2013, pp. 10–12).

Conclusions

All over the world one of the hindrances in the development of agglomerations is poor infrastructure. The problems of these systems plus the high improvement costs necessitate the need for special programs and resources for their implementation. It slows the speed of change and makes the agglomeration less competitive on all levels. The difficulties grow due to the complicated territorial structure and require new approaches to the structural organization not only of the territory as such but also of different processes within its borders.

Large cities in Russia have extra problems to be solved. The first is the absence of the legal idea of an agglomeration, which makes the dependence on several authorities from different parts of the region one of the most relevant factors influencing all decisions; the federal level, the level of the subjects of federation, and the municipal level each have their own interests which are not always identical with the needs of the agglomeration as a whole and its parts. The second important matter is the lack or full absence of experience in the field of strategizing and in such a case it is also very difficult for the core city and its agglomeration to define their strategic role in the world and to formulate priorities for further development.

Hence, for the St. Petersburg and Samara-Togliatti agglomerations it is extremely important today to analyze the actual situation and work consistently on the strategic documents in short-, middle-, and long-term perspectives.

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REGIONALISM AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS IN FEDERAL STATES

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of regionalism on the mechanism of distribution of powers between the levels of authorities within the federal states. The objectives of the research are:
–   to identify and classify the different models of distribution of powers in modern federations, based on the examples of Switzerland, Belgium and the Russian Federation;
–   to determine the principles of distribution of powers;
–   to find the most effective models of distribution of powers;
–   to make practical recommendations on distribution of powers for the Russian federal system.
System analysis and comparative analysis methods were widely used as well as a didactic method.
The result of the research: Regionalism determines the particular model of distribution of powers in modern federations; the regions initiate the principles of distribution of powers such as subsidiarity and enhanced cooperation.
Conclusions:
–   the modern federal settings demonstrate three models of distribution of powers depending on the role of the regions (constituent units) within the federation;
–   the principle of subsidiarity is proved to form the basis for the most effective models of distribution of powers in modern federations;
–   the agreements between the constituent units of federations and the federal center and the units are the result of implementation of the principle of enhanced cooperation.

Keywords: federalism, regionalism, regionalization, distribution of powers, subsidiarity, enhanced cooperation.

Introduction

In the coming decades, regions will determine the future of federations worldwide: they will play a decisive role in ensuring the effectiveness of federations being understood as an absence of conflict and the cooperation of a federal

center and constituent units, and federal-regional relationships based on mutually agreed distribution of powers according to principles of subsidiarity and enhanced cooperation.

This article is aimed at demonstrating that regionalism, taking place in federal states and in states with a certain degree of decentralization and autonomy, is becoming a worldwide phenomenon, having its cradle in Western Europe and spreading widely to the Americas and Eastern Europe, especially to the territory of the Russian Federation. In federal states, regionalism influences the distribution of powers between a federal center and constituent units, shaping the particular models of distribution of powers. Regions initiate the principles of distribution of powers such as subsidiarity and enhanced cooperation.

The principle of subsidiarity is a constitutional principle in a number of federations such as Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. It means that a federation should undertake action only if constituent units cannot exercise it efficiently and achieve the relative goal. More powers should be allocated to the layers of power under the federal level, thus the action is brought nearer to the citizen. A federation comes into play in exclusive circumstances; its role is subsidiary to those of the units.

The principle of enhanced cooperation in the federal context means the treaty arrangements among constituent units (the horizontal dimension) and between a federal center and constituent units (the vertical dimension) in further widening and deepening mutual cooperation, going far beyond the margins established in the relevant federation. It is a constitutional principle in a number of federations, such as Germany, Switzerland, the USA and the Russian Federation.

Regionalism as a prerequisite for distribution of powers

In every given country, regionalism has different roots: economical, ethnic (Keating, Wilson, 2014, p. 840), cultural, linguistic (Keating, 1998). Regionalism develops both in unitary and federal states. Irrespective of the form of a state where it evolves, regionalism inevitably leads in this form or another to the question of distribution of powers between central government and regions. This is the question of stability or instability of a federal state (Farukshin, 2001, p. 98). Each country establishes its own mechanism of distribution of powers using different basic principles. In spite of the fact that in different areas regionalism is fostered by various driving forces and has specific roots, the process is comparable and has common legitimacies.

Before entering into explanations on the topic, it is expedient to clarify the definitions which will be used in this article. In European nation-states, we observe both regionalism and regionalization. In spite of one root of these two notions, there is a clear distinction between them (Loughlin J., Kincaid J., Swenden W., 2013).

Michael Keating treats regionalization as a nation-state initiative to reconstruct internal state structure and *pass down* [*italic* is mine – G. Sh.] some of the governmental functions to territorial entities. This reduces the burden of vast

governmental tasks and brings decision-making closer to the citizens, thus making the whole system more effective. It is the source where the principle of subsidiarity is rooted.

Regionalism is inspired by territorial entities and the driving forces behind it are economic and/or ethnical and cultural endeavors of regional elites and the population. Regions claim not only mere execution of federal decisions, but also the right to make decisions of their own and execute them by their own means.

"The region is a contested territory and there is continuing tension between the strategy of regionalization as state policy, and regionalism as a movement from below" (Loughlin, 1994).

In order to access the role of regionalism in shaping the models of distribution of powers we shall refer to the case studies of Germany, Switzerland and the Russian Federation.

Distribution of powers in different federal settings

1. **Switzerland**

Switzerland is composed of 26 *cantons* – constituent units of federation, where seventeen cantons are German-speaking, four cantons are French-speaking, one canton is Italian-speaking, three cantons are bilingual (German- and French-speaking) and one canton is trilingual (German-, Romansh- and Italian-speaking). Switzerland is a centripetal federation: it was formed of formerly independent states. This circumstance defines the very essence of the Swiss federation and the mode of distribution of powers. The cantons possess all the rights of a sovereign, with the exception of those which they delegated to the federal center. Thomas Fleiner writes: "the cantons have the residual and *original* [*italic* is mine – G. Sh.] power" (Fleiner, 2000, p. 17). Because at supra level, the Confederation is a new body, which originated from the sovereign cantons, its powers are precisely enumerated in the Swiss federal constitution. Cantonal competences are not listed (with mere exceptions), because it is presumed that the cantons possess all the rights inherent to the sovereign and these rights are evident.

This principle is laid down in Article 3 of Swiss constitution, which reads as follows: "The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution: they exercise all rights which are not transferred to the Confederation" (Constitution of Switzerland, 1999). Under this provision "all the powers of the federal government have to be spelled out in the federal Constitution" (Fleiner, 2000, p. 17). The Constitution of 1874 contained the provision which stipulated that the federal government could only claim competencies by interpreting the relevant articles of the Constitution. This provision was changed in the new Constitution of 2000. Article 42 of this states:

"(1) The Confederation shall accomplish the tasks which are attributed to it by the Constitution.

 (2) It shall assume the tasks, which require *uniform regulation* [*italic* is mine – G. Sh.]".

Federal powers. A number of articles of the Swiss constitution define exclusive powers of the Confederation. As a rule, in the text of the Constitution the term "a federal matter" is used. Most of the federal powers are in the legislative sphere. These are matters which require uniform regulation. We find them in Article 54 (foreign relations), Article 58 (3) (the use of the army), Article 60 (1) (legislation on the military and on the organization, the instruction, and the equipment of the army), Article 61 (1) (legislation on civil defense), Article 87 (legislation on rail traffic, cable cars, navigation, aviation, and space travel), etc.

Cantonal powers. One of the major powers of cantons is the right to have their own constitutions, which is provided for in Article 51 of Swiss constitution. The cantonal constitution must be approved by the people, and must be subject to revision if a majority of the people so requires.

As Flora Goudappel points out, "exclusive powers of the Cantons are only mentioned in the federal Constitution when they are an exception to exclusive powers allocated to the Confederation'" (Goudappel, 1997, p. 45). For example, Article 54 (1) defines international relations as a federal matter, while Article 55 (1) and (3) determines the rights of cantons in this sphere: "to participate in the preparation of decisions of foreign policy, which concern their powers or their essential interests", and "to participate in international negotiations as appropriate, when their powers are concerned". It was fairly noticeable in the scientific literature on constitutional law that it is difficult to provide for a list of possible exclusive powers of cantons (Ibid., p. 47).

Thomas Fleiner mentioned that with regard to the actual distribution of powers between the Confederation and cantons, the new Constitution does not contain any important changes. One of the major aims of the new Constitution was to give the actual system a modernized wording, but to avoid any significant amendments that would dramatically change the balance of powers in Switzerland (Fleiner, 2000, p. 18).

The principle of subsidiarity is clearly evident in the text of the Swiss Constitution. It is presumed from Article 3 – "They [*cantons* – G. Sh.] exercise all rights that are not vested in the Confederation"; and is expressly stated in Article 5a2 "Subsidiarity": "The principle of subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and performance of state tasks". The provision granting *all rights* with the exception of those vested in the Confederation to the cantons brings the decision-making closer to the citizen. The Confederation intervenes in exceptional cases; its role is subsidiary to those of the cantons.

2. **Belgium**

Belgium represents the most recent and the most complicated example of federal-type arrangement in Europe. Formally, the Belgian federation was formed in 1993, when changes were introduced into the Belgian Constitution. Federalization of Belgium was the result of regional movement, the active position of communities and regions and their endeavors to gain more powers. The Constitution leads with the declaration of Belgium: "a Federal state made up of communities and regions" (Article 1 of the Constitution of Belgium). Bel-

gium consists of three communities and three regions (articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Belgium) (Constitution of Belgium, 1993).

The Belgian constitutional system follows the rule of assigning one power to one entity (Veys, 1993, p. 135) and distributes mainly exclusive powers. Different systems of distribution of powers are used in cases of communities and regions.

The powers of communities are provided for in Articles 127, 128 and 128 of the Constitution.

According to Article 127 (1) the responsibilities of the French and Dutch Community Councils are:
1) cultural issues;
2) education, with the exception of:
    a) the determination of the beginning and the end of mandatory solidarity;
    b) minimum standards for the granting of diplomas;
    c) attribution of pensions;
3) inter-community co-operation, in addition to international cooperation, including the drafting of treaties for those matters described in (1) and (2).

According to Article 129 of the Constitution, the French and Dutch Community Councils exercise legislative power, excluding the federal legislator, on the use of language for:
1) administrative matters;
2) education in those establishments created, subsidized, and recognized by public authorities;
3) social relations between employers and their personnel, in addition to corporate acts and documents required by law and by regulations.

Article 128 of the Constitution provides for legislative power of the French and Flemish Community Councils in *personal issues*. Such personal issues are to be determined in the special law adopted by majority vote, provided for in Article 4 (2) of the Constitution. Such special law – the Special Institutional Reform Act – provides for the powers of the French and Dutch Community Councils to issue legislation in the sphere of medical care, the aid to families and children, etc.

According to the Article 130 of the Constitution the German Community has powers in:
1) cultural issues;
2) personal issues;
3) education, within the limits established by Article 127, § 1, par. 1, 2;
4) inter-community co-operation, in addition to international cooperation. including the conclusion of treaties, for issues described in 1, 2 and 3.

The peculiarity of the Belgian federal system is the existence of a double set of federated entities. Along with communities, there are regions. The powers of the regions are not listed in the Constitution. We find only a reference provision in Article 39, which states that the regional bodies shall have the power to manage matters which are determined by law, with the exception of those referred to in Articles 30, 127 and 129, within the jurisdiction and according to the manner established by law. Such law is the Special Institutional Reform Act of 1980, its Article 6 determines the powers of the regions: water management, town and country planning, waste products, etc.

Community and regional governments enjoy powers in the international sphere. As provided for in Article 167 (3) of the Constitution, they conclude, in matters that concern them, treaties regarding matters that are in the scope of the responsibilities of their Councils.

We can conclude that Belgian communities were created in order to fulfil cultural, linguistic and educational tasks, while Belgian regions were created with the purpose of urban development. The range of powers of the communities and regions is rather narrow.

For the purposes of the present research at least two major characteristics of the Belgian federation are important:

1) the multi-ethnic character of the country, uniting three major linguistic groups: French, Dutch and German;
2) the fact that the Belgian federation was formed of a unitary state.

The existence of three linguistic groups in Belgium and the necessity to ensure peaceful and cooperative relations between them represents a difficult task for the Belgian federation.

The fact that Belgium was formed of a former unitary state foreordained the basic principle of distribution of powers between the federal center and communities and regions. The Belgian constitutional system has as its core the rule that all power originates from the federal center, i.e. the federation, as far as the federation is a successor of the former unitary state. Following this logic, the constitution of Belgium focuses on a clear and detailed description of the powers allocated to the communities and regions and not on those allocated to the federal center, because it is presumed that the federal center possesses all original sovereign power and there is no need to clarify it. Here we see the same logic as in the Swiss constitutional system but find it "up-side down". Switzerland was formed by independent slates, which are considered to have their original sovereign power and the powers of cantons as successors of these formerly independent slates are not regulated in the Constitution of Switzerland (with some exceptions). On the contrary, the powers of the "new" entity – the Confederation – are determined precisely in the Constitution.

3. Russian Federation

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave a new impulse to the development of regionalism in the Russian Federation and other assignee-states. Regionalism in Russia was rooted in the increase of self-consciousness of titular nations in the former autonomous republics and their demands for autonomy, sometimes in extreme forms, such as claims for sovereignty and self-determination in the form of creation of an independent state. Titular nations often relied on the rich economic resources they have on their territories, such as oil and gas or powerful defense-industry complex enterprises left after the Soviet era, as an economic basis of sovereignty. The most powerful among the constituent units of Russia – the autonomous republics – declared state sovereignty right after the Soviet Socialist Republics of the former USSR. The first into this row was the Republic of Tatarstan followed by the other nineteen. The period of declaration of state sovereignty by the Russian regions was called *the parade of sovereignties*. Some of the autono-

mous republics were planning to increase their status to that of the union republics and among the latter to become co-founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For example, after its declaration of state sovereignty the Republic of Tatarstan was a party in negotiations in *Belovezhskaya Pusha*, but did not succeed. The period from 1992 to 1999 was a time of active regional movement in the Russian Federation. It was even more than just regionalism; it was the decade of the formation of completely new state structure, which can be characterized as federal with certain confederal elements. At the end of the 20th century, the Russian Federation consisted of 89 constituent units: twenty-one national republics, six *krai*, forty-nine *oblasti*, two cities of federal importance – Moscow and St. Petersburg, one Jewish *Autonomous oblast* and ten *autonomous okruga*.

The distribution of powers mechanism was multi-fold and regulated in: 1) the federal constitution; (2) treaties on delimitation of authorities between the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the constituent unit; (3) constitutions (*ustavi*) of the constituent units of the Russian Federation; (4) the Federative Treaty of 1992 (actually three treaties); (5) federal laws.

Federal Constitution. The system of distribution of powers in Russian constitutional law comprises different types of powers: exclusive powers of the federal center, exclusive powers of the constituent units, shared powers of the federal center and the constituent units (joint competence), namely framework legislation. The above-mentioned types of powers are provided for in the federal constitution (Articles 5, 71. 72. 73. 76). In practice, concurrent powers exist, but they are not mentioned in the Constitution. These are situations when the constituent units pass legislation on matters of joint competence while the federal center is reluctant to do this. If, however, the federal center finds it necessary to pass federal legislation on the issue of joint competence, it is doing so while not taking into account the provisions led down by the constituent units. The constituent units then have to amend their legislations according to the federal law.

Distribution of powers is provided for in the three articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 71 contains the list of exclusive federal powers, such as the adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws and supervision over compliance with them, the federal structure and territory of the Russian Federation, etc. Article 72 of the Russian Constitution provides for the list of authorities in joint competence of the Federation and the constituent units. Article 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that beyond the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on issues within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the constituent units of the Russian Federation, the constituent units of the Russian Federation shall exercise the entire spectrum of state power. This provision was partly clarified in a small number of articles of the Russian Constitution. Article 5 (2) provides for exclusive powers of the constituent units, i.e. the right of the republics to have their own constitutions and legislation and the right of the other constituent units to have *ustavi* and legislation. Article 76 regulates distribution of powers in the legislative sphere:

"1. On matters within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation, federal laws shall be issued and in accordance with them laws and other regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall be adopted.

…

4. Outside of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation republics, territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous regions and autonomous areas shall effect their own legal regulation, including the adoption of laws and other regulatory legal acts.

5. Laws and other regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation may not contravene federal laws adopted in accordance with parts 1 and 2 of this Article. In the event of a contradiction between a federal law and any other act issued in the Russian Federation, the federal law shall apply" (Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993).

Treaties on delimitation of authorities between the bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state power of the constituent unit. The possibility to conclude such treaties is provided for in Article 11 (3) of the federal Constitution: "The scopes of authority and powers of the bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall be delimited under this Constitution, Federal and *other Treaties on the delimitation of scopes of authority and powers* [*italic* is mine – G. Sh.]". The constituent units, above all the republics, of the Russian Federation were not satisfied with a distribution of powers pattern set down in the federal constitution due to its ambiguity. The Republic of Tatarstan was the first to propose the federal center to sign the "Treaty on delimitation of jurisdictional subjects and mutual delegation of powers", which was signed on February 15, 1994 (Treaty on delimitation of jurisdictional subjects and mutual delegation of powers, 1994). The example of Tatarstan was followed by 48 constituent units of the Russian Federation, which concluded the treaties of distribution of powers with the federal center (but not on mutual delegation of authorities).

However, the federal trend in the Russian history of the 90s was narrowed by the campaign on the harmonization of legislation of constituent units with the federal legislation. The treaties on distribution of powers were in force for the period specified in the respective texts. The treaty between Moscow and Kazan was in force for 10 years and in 2007 took the form of Federal law (Federal law N 199-ФЗ, 2007) with a much more modest list of distributed powers.

These vertical treaties between the federal center and the constituent units demonstrated the tendency of enhanced cooperation. The provision of Article 11 (3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation proves the existence of the constitutional principle of enhanced cooperation between the federal center and constituent units in the Russian Federation. Such treaties give an interpretation of the Article 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which forms a gray area, leading to multiple misunderstandings and discussions; filling the legal gap in defining the powers of constituent units. The Russian Constitution clearly lists the exclusive powers of the federal center and the shared powers

of the federal center and the constituent units. However, it is silent about the list of powers of constituent units; this can be formed only residually. In our opinion, this residual principle decreases the efficiency of the mechanism of distribution of powers as well as the efficiency of the federal system in Russia. The vertical treaty arrangements between the federal center and the constituent units clarify the delicate matter of power distribution, and prevent possible conflicts of competencies and tension between different layers of power within the federal system, thus fostering and enhancing federalism. These vertical treaty arrangements together with treaties among the constituent units themselves reflect the principle of enhanced cooperation in a federal system.

Nowadays in Russia, the distribution of powers mechanism has changed from multi-fold to practically constitutional. The constituent units are reluctant to conclude treaties with the federal center while the role of the constitutions (*ustavi*) of the units and the federal laws on this matter is small. This is the situation where "the sharing of powers between the federal government and the state and provincial governments often evolves to a point at which federal powers became exclusive but state/provincial powers remain shared" (Majeed A., Watts R., Brown D., 2006: 4).

Major results

1. Consequences of regionalization and regionalism on the state structure

It is likely that regionalization has a minor impact on the state structure, especially on the form of government. As a rule, a state is unwilling to change the state of affairs, it merely delegates certain powers to a lower level of government. Even if the new entities are established, it is done for the purpose of fulfilling new tasks on a certain territory and has nothing to do with the form of government.

On the contrary, regionalism as an initiative "from below" may have an impact on the form of state structure. In its extreme form, it can lead to the establishment of a federal form of government. Some authors presume that regionalism loses its final goal if it does not lead to federalism. Jansen states that it has been shown that regionalism misses its aim if it does not follow its own dynamical impetus, i.e. if it is not followed by federalization which transfers, step by step to the regions, the responsibility for their own affairs and their co-responsibility for the federal state (Jansen, 1999: 202). However, regionalism does not necessarily lead to federalism, it can end up somewhere between a unitary and federal form of government.

In federal states, regional demands in economic, political, national or ethnic spheres take a form of the claims for competencies and financial resources to carry out these competencies. These claims are addressed to the federal government, and it is a party that has to share competencies.

2. The influence of regionalism on the model of distribution of powers

There appears to be some logic behind a clear definition of powers of the entity, which was not originally in place, and which originated out of the other or by the will of others. Therefore, in Switzerland we have formerly independent

entities which formed the federation. These entities were sovereign then and are sovereign now, which means they possess the range of competences usually attributed to the sovereign. The cantons then formed the federation and delegated a number of their powers to it. The new sovereign's competence is clearly defined in the federal Constitution. Such legal regulation fosters progressive and effective development of a federation out of former independent units.

In the Russian Federation we find the opposite. The federation was formed based on a unitary state, which means the new entities were the constituent units, not the federation. In this process of formation of a federation, the powers are transferred from the center to the constituent units, i.e. from full sovereign to the entities, sovereignty of which is under dispute. In the Constitution of the Russian Federation, we do not find any provision on the sovereignty of constituent units. It can be theoretically drawn out of the provision of Article 5(4), where one type of constituent unit – the republics – are modestly, in brackets, called "states".

3. Regionalism in multiethnic states

The history of state governance justifies the thesis that it is very difficult to manage multi-ethnic polities. Multi-ethnic societies represent a challenge for governments due to a number of peculiarities: cultural, linguistic, religious and others. In addition to the primary task of achieving effective governance, what also emerges is the necessity to harmonize inter-ethnic relations, satisfy the demands of ethnic minorities and even fit minorities' claims for self-governance into the realm of state structure.

Ethnic challenges seem even greater in federal states with a clearly defined ethnic component. These countries face both globalization and localization. Examples of older effective ethnic federations exist, such as Switzerland, as well as recently shaped ethnic federations such as Belgium. In the Russian Federation, the ethnic component appears to be a defining factor.

Conclusions

In terms of state structure, the major consequence of regionalism is the distribution of powers between the federal center and the constituent units.

In federations, where the role and voice of constituent units is strong, more powers are granted to them. If the degree of activity of constituent units is low, a federal center reserves more powers while the powers of constituent units are listed residually and not even listed in the federal constitution and federal laws. The above three case studies demonstrate three models of distribution of powers in federal states:

1) with clearly defined federal powers and residual powers of constituent units (Switzerland);
2) with clearly defined powers of constituent units and residual powers of a federal center (Belgium);
3) with clearly defined powers a federal center, shared powers of a federal center and constituent units and powers of constituent units themselves (the Russian Federation in 1994–2004).

As the case studies show, the distribution of powers models are formed based on two principles: the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of enhanced cooperation. The principle of subsidiarity helps to improve the effectiveness of a power distribution mechanism in federal states as well as the effectiveness of a federation itself. It brings the decision-making closer to the citizen, to the lower levels of government. It is evident that from its high position a federal center is unable to realize all the local problems of a population of particular constituent units; the lower levels of government are closer to revealing and understanding these problems. The principle of subsidiarity is proved to form the basis for the most effective models of distribution of powers, such as in Switzerland. It is not a constitutional principle in the Russian Federation, but it should be considered as such and used in conjunction with the principle of enhanced cooperation.

The principle of enhanced cooperation is an important constitutional principle in a number of federations, such as the Russian Federation, Germany and Austria. In the case of the Russian Federation, it was the basis for the model of distribution of powers which existed in 1994–2004. This model was distinguished by its legal regulation of exclusive powers of constituent units in the treaties on delimitation of authorities between the federal center and constituent units as an addition to those of a federation and shared powers of a federation and the units. As a result, the gap in the legal regulation of the units' powers in the federal constitution was filled. Since the treaty between the federal center and the Republic of Tatarstan of 2007 is the only existing example, we can conclude that constituent units are reluctant to use the mechanism of enhanced cooperation in its vertical dimension.

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GOVERNMENTAL MECHANISMS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF MASS MEDIA IN RUSSIA'S NATIONAL REPUBLICS

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Abstract

The systems of public administration in the national republics have one significant difference when compared with other types of regional subjects ("oblast" or "kray") in the Russian Federation. These systems have governmental media (state media) founded by public authorities and these media outlets' assets are in the ownership of these authorities. It gives a certain originality to both the national republics' and Russia's administrative practices and mass media functioning. It is common for experts to criticize the national republics' public administrations for withdrawal from the libertarian model, but most often, this critical thinking does not clarify the reasons which could have looked "positive" from the libertarian perspective. These reasons are the major factor in making public authorities maintain state media.

The paper aims to synthesize the practice of governmental administration of mass media in the national republics and explicate the administration model by considering the example of Buryatia. The authors give their own definition to the concept of "state media"; identify public authorities' and mass media's interaction principles as well as institutional specifics of mass media's functioning in the national subjects of Russia. The authors argue that state media's functioning is justified. Being a political institution, state media experience a serious impact of various social factors including political, economic and legal ones. In the process of political management, their interference provides the mass media with a resource potential.

The state mass media in Buryatia is founded by its government and operates under the supervision of a special body in the Administration of the Head and the Government of the Republic of Buryatia. In practice, this body is an operator and manager of the mass media industry and it possesses all the resources it needs, including financial, to run the industry. All the state media outlets have been joined into "Buryaad Unen Publishing House", a state autonomous institution. It provides state services via the implementation of particular func-

tions. One of these functions is conducting the state politics and policy that is the consequence of the political forces ratio on the regional and federal levels. The other functions include legitimization of law, publicizing activities of public authorities, and preservation and development of the national language (the Buryat peoples' language). The latter state media function is of major importance in the national republics.

The research approach is an environmental sociological analysis studying the influence of various social factors which are making an impact on the choice of government mechanisms for administering state media. For analysis of various aspects of state mass media's transformation into a social subject of policy, the authors combine sociological with institutional and discourse research methods.

State mass media in Russia functions as the result of a unique mechanism of governmental and public administration that has no precedent in developed countries. In its turn, in addition to informing the public, state mass media also implements a number of functions, allowing it to solve a layer of issues, from national to political ones. This phenomenon can be found mainly in the national republics of present day Russia.

According to Article 22 of the Republic of Buryatia's Law "On the Government of the Republic of Buryatia" (O Pravitelstve, 1995) the government as the supreme executive body of the Republic of Buryatia is to implement the uniform state policy, including in the field of the relations between different ethnic groups in the region (mezhnatsionalniye otnosheniya). Within its authority, the government is to realize, provide and protect the rights and freedoms of a person and citizen. To implement the state information policy, the President (nowadays Head) of the Republic of Buryatia V. Nagovitsin founded, in 2007, the Information and Analyses Committee as a division of Buryatia President's and Government's Administration. According to the provision on the Committee (Polozhenie, 2007), it is to bear all the responsibility for the implementation of public policy in the information field via a number of obligations. It should be noted that besides ensuring that the President-Prime Minister of Buryatia adheres to the terms and conditions for fulfilment of his constitutional powers in the field of the state information policy, and giving publicity to the President's and Government's activities, the Committee must design and implement programs to develop and support the republic and its districts' periodicals, electronic mass media, publishing and polygraphs.

As outlined in the provision issued in 2008 (Polozhenie, 2008) the Committee, among the other functions, has to develop the means and ways for a quick information response to problematic situations; offer CEO candidates for media outlets; design state policy towards mass media and mass communications; and develop control systems covering expenditure of the allocated funds on mass media and mass communication development programs.

These functions show that they have set the universal objectives to the Committee to implement simultaneously. Production of mass information goes hand in hand with the direct administration and management of a number of industries, including publishing and polygraphs. Thus, the Committee ceases to be a common governmental division but turns into a department having all the resources, including financial, to manage industries. As a result, the state mass media joined to the autonomous state institution, Buryaad Unen Publishing House, has become the institution providing state services. Functional uniqueness of the state media stretches far beyond its actual mass information functions, as it is related to conducting the state politics and policy that are a consequence of political forces ratio on the regional and federal levels. The other functions include legitimization of law, publicizing activities of public authorities and preservation and development of the national language (the Buryat peoples' language). The latter state media function is of major importance in the national republics.

From the perspective of the widely known "four theories of the press", there are four approaches to mass information. They are the authoritarian theory, its continuation – the Soviet communistic, and two approaches opposite to these, including the theory of social responsibility, which is a modification of the third, libertarian theory. The eldest of these is the authoritarian theory, having originated during the Renaissance. According to it, the press has to function in the direction of top to bottom. The theory considers the press as the state's servant responsible only before the authorities. It has defined an initial model for the majority of world's national press systems.

The Western press in general and the American in particular, were initially founded within a liberal society where the right for the search for truth is considered to be a natural and inherent right of an individual. Consequently, the press has to be a partner in the search for truth. At the same time, libertarianism has sputtered out within the liberal society, as the authors of "the four theories of the press" concept show (Peterson, Siebert, Schramm, 1998). As far back as the 1930–1940s it became obvious that it was becoming more and more difficult for the press to be a free market of ideas. It has increasingly been dependent on the monopolistic capital. In this situation, the freedom and independence of the press from power (in this case the power of the capital) could hardly be argued.

The theory of social responsibility has been developed as the continuation of and, at the same time, essentially different from the libertarian model of the press. It is based on a fundamental premise of society that the monopolistic position of the media and power oblige them to be socially responsible. It means they should see that all sections of society are fairly presented in the mass information sphere and that the public has information enough for making its own opinion.

The Soviet communistic theory of the press has been considered to be a variety or a continuation of an authoritarian model. In the late Renaissance society, the truth was to come from the spheres close to the power, but the communistic press needed to support the domination of the party. The difference between the Soviet model and the classical authoritarian one is that the Soviet press has not been privately owned but has been in the possession of the state. Therefore, matters of profit have not guided it.

Certainly, from a current perspective this classical theory looks rather schematic as it *a priori* comes from a liberal premise that the state and society are absolute antipodes. The political system in itself does not guarantee a democratic character of any of its institutions. It is only a general mechanism, a political construction. D. Easton, a classical author of the system theory (1953), characterizes a political system as no more than a complex of interactions by means of which they distribute power resources within a society.

If the press is organizationally or politically related to the state, it is incorrect to consider it an apologist of the press' non-freedom. We argue a state, a municipality or any public structure as well as an individual must have equal rights for the foundation of mass media. Many years ago, G. Altshul (1984), one of the distinguished mass media researchers, attempted to enforce people to consider the myths about "the fourth power" in a new way. He argued that mass media throughout the history had been no more than a blind chronicler of the others' deeds. In the case of mass media's active role in political life, it had been an agent of these or those public forces.

It is certain the state mass media depend on dominating political groups and thus it should be considered a power institution. They communicate ideas and norms, being offered or having been already applied, on behalf of the state. In this sense mass media can be considered a governmental institution (in the USSR the state represented by the Communist party was the only and exclusive owner of the press). Therefore, it is fair under current conditions for Russia to have state media. The power on various levels, one way or another, continues to own the mass media or it has the resources to influence the information policy of the press.

In addition to the print media, nowadays the state has a controlling stake in ORT, the open joint stock TV company; exercises full control over VGTRK TV company and has a stake in NTV TV company. It means they control the all-Russian TV channels. In the Republic of Buryatia there is a single state TV company (the Buryatia State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company), a branch of VGTRK. Therefore, there is no regional government television.

Any mass media, whether it is television or a radio, print media or on the Internet needs a lot of financing. Therefore, there is a great probability that any private mass media will be guided and controlled either by large corporations or by small companies financing its activity. In many cases, this media is aimed at promoting private interests but not public ones. Nevertheless, they contribute to the major purpose of the mass media which is to help society in its search for truth and the solution of political and social problems by presenting opposing facts and opinions. The mass media also serve as the public instrument of control over the government and power structures of any country (Chetvertkov, 2012). In its turn, the government, as one of the actors in public sphere, also has the right to compete for the public's attention via its own mass media and present its vision and explanation of the truth.

Thus, the state media should be considered as a state organization, implementing the functions of public administration in an indirect form (because according to definition mass media is not a power authority). State mass media

include, firstly, editions founded by the state; secondly, mass media receiving financial aid from the state in the form of the budgetary subsidies and allocations or other legal forms. Thirdly, organizations whose property organizationally and legally is in the state's ownership. For example, according to Article 3 of the Federal Law "On Autonomous institutions" (Ob avtonomnykh, 2013) the property of autonomous enterprises and other forms of organizations is assigned to them according to the right of operational management provided by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. This means that the property being operated by an autonomous organization belongs to the Russian Federation, to the subject of the Russian Federation or to a municipality. We define state media as a periodic print edition, a web media, a TV channel, a radio channel, a TV program, a radio program, a video program, a film chronicle program and other forms of periodic distribution of mass information under a constant name, founded by the state and represented by its authorities in order to implement state functions and reach national objectives. As a rule, this mass media is under the control of the state and accountable to it, financed from the federal or regional budget and constantly using state property.

State print mass media is founded according to the Federal Law "On general principles of the organization of legislative (representative) and executive power bodies in the subjects of the Russian Federation" (On general, 1999). Article 26.3 grants the subjects of the Federation the right to establish print mass media to publish its regulations. The law has allowed assigning "Buryatia" and "Buryaad Unen" newspapers the status of official state republican print media and now they are a source of official publications of normative legal acts.

In the Republic of Buryatia, the state mass media were founded in the form of two state print periodic media outlets joint in one legal entity – a State unitary enterprise "Buryaad Unen" Publishing house. This merger happened on February 20, 2001. Before this date, both outlets had been independent legal entities existing in the form of public institutions. According to the current legislation, unitary enterprises are commercial organizations having a single founder. In the case under consideration, the founder was the Administration of President and the Government of the Republic of Buryatia (nowadays – Administration of the Head of the Republic of Buryatia and the Government of the Republic of Buryatia). All the property of the enterprise was under state ownership, and budgetary subsidies were the main source of financing.

Over time, the number of editions issued by the enterprise constantly increased. In 2006, the Publishing house joined the Buryat book-publishing house which was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 2009 the Soyel-kultura Publishing house joined; a publisher of two literary journals "Baikal" (in Russian) and "Baygal" (in the Buryat language). These were very significant editions not only for the Republic of Buryatia but also for the whole of Siberia as well as the Far East. Due to public financing, these journals received a new impetus for further development. In April 1, 2013, SUE Buryaad Unen Publishing House was transformed into the Public autonomous institution of the Republic of Buryatia, "Buryaad Unen" Publishing House. The legal status of the organization actually did not change. It preserved the key criteria of a state (public) enterprise

as all the property of the publisher was still under state ownership, its activity was financed by the republican budget, and the founder was the Administration of the Head and the Government of the Republic of Buryatia. However, since that time the Publishing House has been obliged to follow the state task in issuing newspapers. The state task is a document accepted annually by the founder of the publishing house, identifying the major objectives of newspaper issue, the key requirements to the content of releases and the volume of publications needed. In particular, in 2013–2014, the state task included in its requirements to publish official information, information on activity of government bodies and officials of republican public authorities, and normative legal acts of the Republic of Buryatia.

The status of an autonomous establishment gives it considerable freedom in economic activity towards a legal entity. Besides obligatory materials set by the state task, media outlets can publish advertisements and other kinds of paid papers. There are no restrictions in this respect and state media are equal with private media in their placement. Nevertheless, as far as state media must publish first what they are ordered and second what sells well, the fight for advertisers is a great challenge to them. The public newspapers Buryatia and Buryaad Unen can barely compete with popular newspapers and magazine, because the circulations and popularity of the latter can be several times higher. For instance, the number of copies of each release of the New Buryatia newspaper reaches 50 thousand while the state newspaper Buryatia releases from 3 thousand to 10 thousand copies. In the search for other sources of financing, public mass media are trying to source more advertising and publish more paid articles and custom (biased) papers, but finances from the budget and income from subscriptions and advertising still do not cover production expenses. Therefore, budgetary subsidies continue to be the principal source of financing for the print media in Buryatia, which only aggravates their dependence on the state.

First, the state mass media has been designed to conduct political policy of the state, which is a consequence of the political forces ratio on the federal or regional levels. In the regions with a strong, centralized power, control over mass media is tougher. On the contrary, in the regions where the fight for power is highly competitive and there is a strong opposition, the antagonism of the groups is explicated in the fight for media space. Control is primarily exercised via financing, when participants of political processes pay (sometimes secretly) the media's operational costs, making it dependent. The other ways of setting control are building personal confidential relations with journalists, lobbying for the appointment of "close" persons to senior positions in media outlets. Thus, the competition of political groups make it necessary for state authorities to run their own media which can be considered a power institute as well and as such needs good operating (Dagbayev, 2004).

The theory identifies three types of interaction between mass media institutions and their founders (Prokhorov, 2011). These interaction types define the information policy of the media's editorial office. According to the first interaction type, a founder directly sets tasks editorial staff and thus a media acts as a political body. This type of relation mostly suits the state and party press.

They exercise the second interaction type when an editorial staff founds a mass media edition and issues it. It is obvious that the independent mass media belongs to the second type. The third interaction type is explicated in the case when a founder pursues the aim of filling in a certain information niche and provides freedom to the staff in the manner of their achievement of the aim.

Print state media play a principal role in the legitimization of law. Since 2013, Buryaad Unen Publishing House has rendered state services publishing laws of the Republic of Buryatia, and regulations of executive authorities of the Republic of Buryatia in its newspapers. The official electronic site of the Government of RB (Organy, http://egov-buryatia.ru/) states the total amount of issue of "Buryatia" and "Buryaad Unen" newspapers in 2014 made 5564 strips, and 4173.7 of them published content related to the state task. The major parts of the content were Laws and regulations of public authorities of the Republic of Buryatia which made up 62.1% of the content or 2592 strips. In addition to the communication of regulations via print media, they also placed sections of normative documents on the pravo.gov.ru federal website and the official site of the Republic of Buryatia's Government. Thus, the state print media is of benefit to the Buryatian authorities as it helps to reduce difficulties in publicizing their public policy and introducing laws and regulations, whereas the other regional bodies are facing problems in this area as they lack their own media.

To reach a larger audience the Government involves non-governmental mass media. One of the involvement mechanisms is making contracts with media of various organizational and legal forms. In 2014, the Government signed 11 state contracts with the leading Buryatian TV channels, and 45 state contracts with republican and regional newspapers and news agencies. The total time on TV channels broadcasting about public authorities amounted to 2115 minutes. The total share of information materials on Buryatia's executive authorities made up 47.5% of the total newspaper sites, with 12% of republican print media and 35.5% of the regional one. In fact, the planned figure was exceeded, though it was less than the indicators of 2013. Reduced financing for information maintenance in 2014 caused the decrease. Nevertheless, as the Information and Analytical Committee states, the level of the audience's knowledge of executive bodies has increased as a result of their efficient media relations.

However, the primary social mission of the state press in the national republics is the preservation and development of the national language (the language of the minor or the title ethnic group of the republic). Nowadays, in all of the national republics there are print periodicals in the language of the title nations of these regions. For instance, the Republic of Tatarstan has the "Vatanym Tatarstan" newspaper, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area publishes "The Khanty Yasang", the Republic of Kalmykia issues "Halmg Unn", Buryatia prints the "Buryaad Unen" newspaper in the Buryat language, etc. In fact, nearly all of them are state editions, as the majority of the commercial press is not able to issue in the ethnic language, as they do not sell in large enough numbers.

Thus, by issuing mass media in the language of minorities, governments provide the rights that are fixed in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In particular, Article 26 guarantees an individual's freedom in usage of his native

language to communicate, educate, learn and create (Konstitutsia, 2003). In a multicultural society, mass media in the language of minorities contribute to federal public policy objectives: a) preservation and development of cultures and languages of the people of the Russian Federation, strengthening their spiritual unity and b) ensuring the rights of indigenous ethnic groups and ethnic minorities (O strategii, 2012).

Therefore, the governments of the national republics use legal norms to found state media in the languages of ethnic groups. The federal law "On the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation" (O yazykakh, 1991) and the law of the Republic of Buryatia "On the languages of the peoples of the Republic of Buryatia" (O yazykakh, 1992) have developed the legal basis for issuing this media. The laws granted the subjects of the Russian Federation the right to adopt the languages of the indigenous people, living on their territories, as state languages. According to the law, Buryat along with Russian was legislatively recognized as the state language. Consequently, the government has received the right to found state media in the Buryat language. The "Buryaad Unen" newspaper performs the laws above publishing the content, which is common for mixed types of newspapers (including politics and policy, business, entertainment and advertising), but it is the only media, publishing normative legal acts of the Republic of Buryatia in the Buryat language. To translate them from Russian they spent 418.5 thousand rubles.

The other type of Government media relations for promoting the Buryat culture and language are electronic media relations. The mechanisms involve providing electronic auctions and making contracts on rendering services. For instance, in one of the auctions its participants have competed in the design and broadcast of conceptual TV programs in the Buryat language for children and the youth. The Buryatia TV and Radio Broadcast State Company has designed and has been broadcasting an entertaining and educating program. They have invited the best professionals that use advanced methods in teaching the Buryat language. Russia-24 and Russia 1 TV channels broadcast the Altan Naran program twice a week.

We argue that the legal and economic mechanisms of governmental interactions with mass media contribute to improving and increasing state services in the national republics, promoting legal and ethnic culture, and increasing information on public policy and knowledge on the activities of the public authorities. These mechanisms allow the involvement of private mass media in the promotion of the legal norms, mastering the native language and communicating public policy in an efficient way. State media play a special role being a major contributor to these processes. For further improvement of its functioning, we need to introduce new normative acts. These will border activities regarding state services and journalistic performance itself, that they will not be able to control politically.

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