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The mission of the journal is to create a modern platform of full value for discussion, exchange of international and national experience and specific knowledge among professionals in the field of Public Administration; for working out and further correcting the development strategy of public and municipal administration.

The thematic focus of the journal makes it a unique Russian language edition in this field. “Public Administration Issues” is published quarterly and distributed in the Russian Federation and abroad.

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- The theory and practices of the public administration;
- Legal aspects of the state and municipal administration;
- The analyses of experts;
- Discussions;
- Case Studies;
- The training and the improvement of specialists in public administration.

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ON THE 5TH SPECIAL ISSUE:
EDITORS’ PREFACE

This Special Issue of the Journal has been prepared in cooperation with the “Regional Development and Inter-Regional Cooperation” Working Group of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration of Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee)\(^1\).

In October 2015, the WG workshop was organized in Moscow. It was dedicated to cooperative inter-regional projects; areas, forms and mechanisms of inter-regional cooperation; tools for the evaluation of regional development quality and for measuring the influence of cooperation on regional economic, social, innovative and civic indexes and indicators; and the social and cultural conditions of regional development. Over 14 reports and talks were presented by scholars from 6 countries: Italy, Finland, Russia, Hungary, the UK, and the USA. Russian scholars from leading institutions, including Moscow State University, NRU HSE, RANEPA, Tyumen University, and the People's Friendship University shared their research projects which are concentrated on analyses of different aspects of the regional diversity and complexity of modern Russia.

\(^1\) The WG was established in NISPAcee in 2014, it fostering the cooperation of scholars of the region along with the topics, as:

- Regionalism and regionalization in the context of globalization: driving forces, differences, background;
- Best practices and mechanisms for sustainable regional development;
- The models of regional governance;
- Inter-regional networks;
- Regional identities;
- Strategy for successful economic development of regions: cooperation, or autonomy?
- Territorial differences and regional heterogeneity: EU and EU neighbors;
- Possibilities and different schemes of cooperation between heterogeneous regions, outside the EU, and EU regions with non-EU regions.

NRU-HSE, as the institution (together with London Metropolitan University) that is responsible for coordination of WG work, take an active role in all WG events, including preparation (and NRU HSE scholars’ participation) of the sessions on territorial development and cooperation, that were the part of the Annual NISPAcee conferences in Budapest (May 2014) and Tbilisi (May 2015). Right now the WG sessions at the next Annual NISPAcee conference in Zagreb (May, 2016) are under preparation. The huge interest of scholars, plus many applications for all WG events, shows that regional problematic in public administration is one of the most popular and promising in respect of new results and theoretic insights in Europe.
The authors of selected talks from the workshop were invited to convert their presentations into articles for this Special Issue. As Guest Editor of this Special Issue, I am grateful to all of the authors for their willingness to participate in the Special Issue, and for their efforts in preparing the articles based on their presentations.

These Special Issue research articles are divided into two groups. The first group of articles is concentrated around the problem of regional development, including the evaluation of regional development strategies (Barabashev and Semenov, Kamchatka region); data analysis for border region development (Bushko, the effects of border transparency, the West-Hungarian border area); regional governance diversity as an obstacle to the applicability of modern public administration theories and practices outside liberal democracies (Pain, Central Asia region); and sustainable development on a regional level (Kavtaradze and Casu, the ecopolis strategy for Korolev city, Moscow region).

The second group of articles focuses on the problem of inter-regional cooperation. The authors view cooperation through the lens of contradictions regarding horizontal vs vertical cooperation (Stirbu, EU influence on the devolution of horizontal cooperative processes in the UK, namely the horizontal shake-up triggered by new public management as complemented by a vertical shake-up of governance systems, fuelled by the European integration process); cooperation mechanisms of neighboring regions with close ties (Larionov, the case of Tyumen oblast, Russia, as a multi-structured region, or so-called “matreshka-style” region with a complex of cooperative decision-making procedures, shared responsibilities, resource re-distribution, and joint policy programs); case studies of some Russian regional bilateral and multi-lateral strategies (Leonard, Ilina, Plisecki, spatial components of inter-regional planning cooperation); and cooperation in learning strategies (Prysmakova, international cooperative learning and its influence on learning habits in Seoul metropolitan area).

The huge diversity of the article topics shows almost unlimited potential for the area of research in regional development and cooperation. Personally, I believe that this subject field, Public Administration, right now is one of the most fruitful in terms of governance progress. A deep practical need to re-shape the traditional, rigid and out-of-date schemes of regional interactions, to construct more sophisticated and flexible instruments and mechanisms for regional development support and to find and implement new ideas on how regions can shape their cooperative progress despite borders and limitations of different sorts, sooner or later will lead toward a series of regional shifts, not in the sense of administrative borders, but in the sense of new administrative and social behavior in regions of Europe and of neighbor countries.

Alexey Barabashev
December, 2016
SHAPING THE ANALYTIC MATRIX FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE TERRITORIES: THE KAMCHATKA, RUSSIA CASE

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Abstract

The planning of the territories’ development as well as the analysis of their capacity for an effective cluster policy have recently been blocked by the absence of appropriate instruments to support strategic decisions in the area of public management. At the same time, many such instruments exist on the level of business sector planning. Strategic management provides various tools allowing the development of the best plan for a company’s development, and the means to evaluate the plan’s implementation. Modification of the Analytic Matrix of McKinsey, as will be shown, could be a possible variant for the evaluation of the territories’ development. The selection of test-region for the implementation of proposed technology was based on some of the principles described. According to these principles, the test region for a McKinsey-type matrix of territorial strategy elaboration was selected, i.e. Kamchatka region. For Kamchatka region, the best criteria for development are specified, namely the fishing (and fish products) industry, plus the shipbuilding (and repair) industry.

Keywords: McKinsey Matrix; territorial development; strategy of regional development; ex-ante evaluation for regional governance.

Introduction: a brief history of the elaboration of the territories’ development instruments

 Territory development, at least in Russia, is currently operated on the basis of an instrument called the “Strategy of Territories Development”. The history of this instrument’s elaboration in Russia is traced back to 1992. It was originally
based on a series of regional Decrees by the President of Russia, and on the Resolutions (Postanovleniya) of the Russian Government’s initial legal measures for stabilizing the economic and social situation in the Russian regions\(^1\). Later, in 1995, the Federal Law “About State Forecasting and Programs of Social-economic Development of the Russian Federation”\(^2\) introduced the legal foundations for the mid-term planning of territorial development. However, the Law has some gaps in the regulation of processes and methods of planning, and in the evaluation of the effectiveness of territorial development under the conditions of a transitional economy.

In 2002, the next step in regional planning was carried out by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade: a Ministerial Order regarding a general pattern (Template) for the elaboration of regional programs for territorial development was issued\(^3\). Implementation of regional planning in practice began with this Order (Barabashev & Semenov, 2014). The Order also regulates the mechanisms for the coordination of regional programs with Federal governmental bodies. It became especially significant later on because of the regional programs’ coordination with the Program of the Social-economic Development of Russia in the Mid-term Period 2006–2008 which was approved in 2006\(^4\).

In 2008, the Mid-term Russian Program of Social-economic Development was replaced by the Concept of the Long-range Social-economic Development of Russia that was issued by Russian Government\(^5\). The Concept introduced the idea of a territorial industrial cluster Network with high competitive economic potential. Later, in 2008, the Methodical Recommendations on the Implementation of Cluster Policy in Regions of Russia\(^6\) was introduced by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. As the result, we can say that the epoch of massive territorial development programming and of broad preparation of regional strategies of development on levels of Russian Subjects and on a municipality level starts from 2009–2010.

\(^1\) Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 27.02.1992 N 197 «O neotlozhnykh merakh po stabilizatsii ekonomiki, razvitiyu sotsialnoy sfery i okhrane okruznykh sredy Respubliki Bashkortostan». http://bestpravo.ru/rossijskoje/ej-praktika/a9r.htm;
\(^2\) Federalny zakon N 115-FZ ot 20 iyulya 1995 g. «O gosudarstvennom prognozirovanii i programakh sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossyskoy Federatsii». http://bestpravo.ru/rossijskoje/er-instrukcii/j7g.htm
\(^3\) Prikaz Minekonomrazvitiya Rossii N 170 ot 17 iyunya 2002 g. «O sovershenstvovanii razrabotki, utverzhdeniya i realizatsii programm ekonomicheskogo i sotsialnogo razvitiya subyektov Rossyskoy Federatsii». http://russia.bestpravo.ru/fed2002/data05/tex19746.htm
The existing practice of Russian strategies in regional and municipal development has, on one hand, a lot in common with practices in the EU. The process of European “clusterization” from the late 1990s, triggered by active regional and industrial politics (Enright, 2000; Glasmeier, 2000) shows the same rapid growth and positive results during the initial phase (OECD, 2001; Porter, 2005; Regional clusters in Europe, 2002; Diversification of Kazakhstan’s Economy, 2004; Sölvell, Lindqvist & Ketels, 2003; Andersson, Hansson, Serger & Sörvik, 2004). For several countries, the development of economic industrial clusters became a form of industrial policy (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2007). Logic, based on the “selection of winners”, shows the positive effects of concentrating on best practices and on the stimulus for potentially productive regional economic activity. At the same time, the negative moments, or weak points of territorial cluster/strategy planning, consist of underdeveloped instruments for the analysis of strategy evaluation. A SWOT analysis mostly realized, as a description of external possibilities and internal problems (risks), that it is not enough for final recommendations and argued policy decisions, as was quite clearly visible in Strategy of Vologda Region of Russia (Strategiya sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Vologodskoy oblasti, 2013). Priorities and compromises for regional development are not explained in a clear way and the composition of different elements of strategy is not calculated. A simple extension of the number of indicators for effective evaluation of strategy elaboration and implementation should be replaced by a systemic approach, and the indicators must be attributed to groups that could allow evaluation of the strategy of regional development, both in its components, and in its implementation mechanisms, clearly.

Basic requirements for systematic territorial strategy evaluation

The basic requirements for territorial strategy evaluation consist of: 1) there should be expert consensus in understanding how to select, for evaluation, the significant, factual data representing different aspects of territorial (municipality, city, region) development. To select data, to distribute it into groups or blocs, and to find the principles of group relations is both a theoretic and methodical problem; 2) to specify the most effective goal-oriented measures on how to impact the system and its elements; 3) to take into account the specifics of the system itself, including the real factors, and to divide the factors according to the principle, whether the factor blocks or helps strategy implementation, to connect the factors with the collected data; 4) to complete the plan of territorial development/strategy implementation based on the selection of effective measures. Broadly speaking, these are the requirements of the systemic and implementation-oriented evaluation of the strategy of territorial development.

The theories that are relevant to the above mentioned requirements are located at the intersection of strategic management and programs and policy evaluation theory. Strategic management is mostly oriented on the instruments of business-structure support, the elements of resource evaluation, possible volume of investments, the markets of goods distribution, of sustainability of business, etc. Every company is oriented on measured indicators because the company should have
some clear plan of development and should know how to evaluate, and whether a plan is successfully implemented or has failed. Strategic changes should be measured, and the principal significance of such an approach is noted in various research (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2007, p. 683–691). The requirement to measure strategic changes exists also in the field of state governance evaluation (Mulgan, 2011, p. 389–411).

Program and policy evaluation theory, on the other hand, has long been experienced in the elaboration and implementation of instruments for ex-ante evaluation, especially in risk-evaluation. In Russia, this foresight developed more than other approaches, and it is concentrated pre-evaluation in sectorial programs and politics, such as education and science policies and programs, as represented in the leading Russian Journal “Foresight–Russia” (available at: http://foresight-journal.hse.ru/en/). If the risks are strong, the programs and policies are not allowed to be executed.

Research Task and Hypothesis

How do we combine the instruments and approaches elaborated in the field of strategic management (business-structure planning), and in the field of program and policy evaluation (risk evaluation), for better evaluation of the strategies of territorial development?

Our task: to prepare the territory plan of development and provide multi-factor analysis of the positioning of the elements of the territorial system in regards to territory strategy and plan of development on the basis of a logical scheme which is similar to the logic proposed originally by the McKinsey company for analysis of conglomerated socio-economic structures. This is the so-called Analytic Matrix of McKinsey (available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/strategy/enduring_ideas_the_ge_and_mckinsey_nine-box_matrix; http://www.12manage.com/methods_ge_mckinsey.html). Suffice to say, we would like to combine the instrument for the preparation of a measured plan of company development with the instrument of evaluation created for programs and policy preparation. For such a purpose, we will change the basic parameters of the McKinsey model and include into the Analytic Matrix selected (according to the goals of development) indicators of territorial development instead of business indicators.

The hypothesis of our research is: modernization of the McKinsey Matrix (the quasi-McKinsey Matrix) can be used as a possible tool for territory development evaluation. We will show that the results of multi-factor evaluations by the quasi-Matrix can be combined into the table that can visibly demonstrate the elements which should be first in line for territory business support. Here, the aggregate index of “market attractiveness of territory” can include the complex of development goals of a territory, and the aggregate index of “competitiveness (strength) of socio-economic structure” will be transformed into the aggregate index of the strength of all economic structures located in the territory. Such an approach could help to produce the next generation of territorial strategies of development (Nikolaev & Tochilkina, 2006).
Matrix description

To select the required indicators of territorial development, we should take into account the complex of priorities. Estimated financial expenses and results, social goals and limitations, qualified personnel limitations and demographic conditions, peculiarities of infrastructure support for changes, local legislative acts’ influence on development conditions, accessible material resources, multiplicative effects, possibility of creating an effective system of implementation and control, different risks, etc. How do we select the system of qualitative and quantitative indicators for evaluation on the basis of such heterogeneous priorities, and how do we choose the most attractive for investment and for the priorities of the citizens?

The guided principles to choose the priorities and indicators could be based on the following positions:
- Levels of significance of priorities and indicators should be the consensus of experts;
- The Elements of territorial development should be extracted in accordance with priorities;
- Elements of territorial development should be measured;
- Data should be collected for a period of at least a couple of years;
- Indicators for measuring the progress in priority achievements should be supplied by practically realized mechanisms or procedures of measurement.

These principles provide some space for multi-factor consensus in analytic descriptions of the conditions of the system. Namely, it can be described as a complex matrix that reflects the quality of factors in one dimension, and the correlation with actors positions/interest in the goals of system development in another dimension.

Such logic of analytics is well-known and reflected in different analytic models and matrixes in the business sector. At the beginning of the 1970s consultants from McKinsey & Co jointly with General Electric elaborated a complex instrument for the strategic planning of development portfolios (Aaker, 1995; Hax & Majluf, 1990). The reason for the creation of such a matrix was to elaborate a reliable method for the evaluation of companies development plans, with the possibility to take into account the possibilities and prospects of development of its different (in functional destinations and market positions) sub-structures. The quality of an element and its correspondence to the system (company) as a whole is a crucial basis for its support or termination. A decision about selection results is the identification of a winner, based on the result of a complex, multi-factor evaluation of the correspondence of elements to the general goals of the company.

The aggregated indicator of matrix “market attractiveness” in our case could include the complex of general elements of the goal system for territorial development, and the aggregated indicator of “competitiveness” could include the complex of relevant indicators for different economic agents of territory activity. The data for cluster policy is actually incorporated into the matrix.

Transformation of a McKinsey-type Matrix to the new Matrix can be described graphically as the transition from Table 1 to Table 2.
Table 1

**McKinsey-type Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Attractiveness</th>
<th>Business Strength</th>
<th>Market Attractiveness</th>
<th>Business Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Protect Position</td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
<td>Invest to Build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Invest to grow at maximum digestible rate (average for all companies of territory)</td>
<td>• Challenge for leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concentrate efforts on maintaining strength</td>
<td>• Build selectively on strengths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Build Selectively</strong></td>
<td>• Reinforce vulnerable areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Invest heavily in most attractive segments</td>
<td>• Protect existing program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Build up ability to counter competition</td>
<td>• Concentrate investments in segments where profitability is good and risks are relatively low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasize profitability by raising productivity</td>
<td><strong>Selective / Manage for Earnings</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Protect and Refocus</strong></td>
<td>• Protect position in most profitable segments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manage for current earnings</td>
<td>• Upgrade product line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concentrate on attractive segments</td>
<td>• Minimize investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defend strengths</td>
<td><strong>Limited Expansion or Harvest</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
<td>Invest to Build</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protect Position</td>
<td>• Challenge for leadership</td>
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<td>• Concentrate efforts on maintaining strength</td>
<td>• Reinforce vulnerable areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Build Selectively</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Selectivity / Manage for Earnings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Invest heavily in most attractive segments</td>
<td>• Protect existing program</td>
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<td>• Build up ability to counter competition</td>
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<td>• Emphasize profitability by raising productivity</td>
<td><strong>Limited Expansion or Harvest</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Emphasize profitability by raising productivity</td>
<td><strong>Limited Expansion or Harvest</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Limited Expansion or Harvest</strong></td>
<td>• Look for ways to expand without high risk; otherwise minimize investments and rationalize operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protect Program</td>
<td>• Protect positions in most profitable segments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To help companies to upgrade product lines, and to minimize investments in not attractive in territory lines</td>
<td><strong>Divest</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manage for Earnings</td>
<td>• To help companies of territory to look for ways to expand without high risk;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selectivity / Manage for Earnings</td>
<td>• Otherwise to help for minimization of investments and rationalize the operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Manage for Earnings</td>
<td>• To help companies to upgrade product lines, and to minimize investments in not attractive in territory lines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protect position in most profitable segments</td>
<td>• To help companies to upgrade product lines, and to minimize investments in not attractive in territory lines</td>
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<td>• Upgrade product line</td>
<td>• To help companies to upgrade product lines, and to minimize investments in not attractive in territory lines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimize investment</td>
<td>• To inform companies for the purpose to help them to sell the product at time that will optimize profit</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
<td>Invest to Build</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protect Position</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Protect position in most profitable segments</td>
<td>• To inform companies for the purpose to help them to sell the product at time that will optimize profit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Upgrade product line</td>
<td>• To consult the companies about strategy to cut fixed costs and to avoid meaningless investments in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimize investment</td>
<td>• To inform companies for the purpose to help them to sell the product at time that will optimize profit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

**Strength of Territorial Business for Strategy of Territorial Development Evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market Attractiveness of Territory</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Protect Position:</td>
<td>Invest to Build:</td>
<td>Build Selectively:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect Position</td>
<td>• Invest to grow at maximum digestible rate (average for all companies of territory)</td>
<td>• Challenge for leadership</td>
<td>• Specialize around limited strength</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concentrate efforts on maintaining strength</td>
<td>• Build selectively on strengths</td>
<td>• Seek ways to overcome weaknesses</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build Selectively</td>
<td>• Invest heavily in most attractive segments</td>
<td>• Protect existing program</td>
<td><strong>Selective / Manage for Earnings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build Selectively</td>
<td>• Build up ability to counter competition</td>
<td>• Concentrate investments in segments where profitability is good and risks are relatively low</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasize profitability by raising productivity</td>
<td><strong>Limited Expansion or Harvest</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Refocus</td>
<td>• Manage for current earnings</td>
<td>• Protect position in most profitable segments</td>
<td>• Look for ways to expand without high risk; otherwise minimize investments and rationalize operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Refocus</td>
<td>• Concentrate on attractive segments</td>
<td>• Upgrade product line</td>
<td><strong>Divest</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Refocus</td>
<td>• Defend strengths</td>
<td>• Minimize investment</td>
<td>• Sell at time that will maximize cash value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Refocus</td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
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<td>• To inform companies for the purpose to help them to sell the product at time that will optimize profit</td>
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To specify the elements of business/organizations competitiveness on territories, it is possible to point on 10 parameters (indicators):

- Are there enough of qualified personnel in organizations?
- Are organizations well adapted for changes? Are they ready to implement the innovations?
- Are organizations well equipped with material resources?
- Are the distribution systems for produced goods well developed?
- Does the business activity in the territory have a good capacity?
- Do sustainable advantages for business exist in the territory?
- Does a high reputation for produced goods and business activity exist in the territory?
- Is the business in the territory effective in an economic sense?
- Does infrastructure support for business activity (including regulation acts, communications, information network) in the territory exist?
- Does the business have sustainable contacts with different actors in the territory?

To specify the level of some business attractiveness for a territory (second dimension of Matrix), it is possible to name also 10 parameters, namely:

- Pressure on the territorial infrastructure
- Dependence on external (imported) components and raw materials
- Influence on the territory's budget of and taxation base
- Establishing of local networks and the production of product chains
- The life cycle of produced products (inside or outside of territory)
- Influence on social sphere
- Influence of local labour market
- Necessity of lobbying
- Peculiarities of local competition
- Possibility to explore the territorial resources and other positive aspects of local life.

The dimensions of the Matrix can be established in grades, for example, 100 X 100. Each indicator can be a variable from 1 to 10 (expert evaluation), and the total score can be measured for every specific territorial business situation. The lowest scores demonstrate the “narrow places” for business development in the territory, and if some “narrow places” in the Matrix are the same, it shows the strategic weakness for business development in the territory in given indicators. If a certain group of companies in the territory is located in the left upper corner of the Matrix (Table 3), and if the group is demonstrating its technological and infrastructural relations, it clearly can be named as the core for the potential cluster development of the territory. And, vice versa, the “narrow places”, or weak elements of the Matrix, that are possible to regulate, can be used as the foundation for improvement of the cluster structure of a territory.

The positive moments of the new Matrix as an analytic tool for territorial development strategy are numerous. First of all, it is based on measured indicators. Secondly, it takes into account the views on systemic territorial development risks. Thirdly, this Matrix is clearly connected with a McKinsey-type Matrix which is a well-recommended instrument for the evaluation of business organization stra-
The evaluation of territory development. Finally, it is an alternative approach toward the evaluation of territory development which is based on ex-ante models of evaluation. It is, in some ways, much more attractive than ex-post evaluation.

Table 3

Potential for cluster development in the territory (example)

Implementation: Evaluation of a selected Russian region’s strategy based on a McKinsey-type matrix

Selected Region: Kamchatka. To show how it is possible to evaluate the strategy of territorial development by a McKinsey-type matrix, it is reasonable to select regions with clear problems and a high potential for business development progress. For Russia, it is reasonable to select, as an example, the region that is located far from central parts of the country because the risks to development here are much higher, and the potential for business should be evaluated more accurately with the use of new analytic tools.

An additional argument for selecting Kamchatka as the “test” for McKinsey-type matrix usage is that the Far East of Russia was announced as one of the top priorities for strategies of regional development elaboration. Moreover, a special-
ized Ministry for priority program elaboration and implementation in the region was established namely, the Federal Russian Ministry for Far East Development7.

Kamchatka Oblast (a region in the Far East of Russia) appears to completely satisfy the criteria of selection: underdevelopment, high risk for investment due to its distance from central regions of Russia, and great potential for future economic growth. First of all, it is a depressed region that has received a lot of resources from the Federal Government. To evaluate how better to invest money to encourage potential investors to Kamchatka is the sine qua non for the effective spending of federal resources. Second, Kamchatka region is not just located far from Central Russia: it is a peninsula with a problematic transportation system, low quality roads (mostly seasonal use) and a small population on a large territory with extreme climate conditions. Mobility of human resources and the capacity for transportation of mineral resources and goods is quite limited. Seismic and volcanic activity prevents safe exploration in some areas. At the same time, it is a biggest non-frozen port in the Russian Far East with a direct gateway to Pacific Ocean routes and it has the biggest access to marine bio-resources. Last but not least, the largest military base of the Russian Fleet is located in the area, and it is a paramount requirement for the geo-political and economic support of the region, which are difficult to provide through federal budget sources alone.

Additional arguments to choose Kamchatka are provided by the possibility to compare the proposals for the Kamchatka strategy (as per the results of our research) with the proposals produced by the Strategy of social-economic development of Kamchatka which was issued in 2010 and will expire in 20258.

From a theoretic standpoint, the reasons for selecting Kamchatka region for analysis by the tool of a McKinsey-type matrix are connected with the logically simple definition of the elements of the matrix. Namely, the elements for analysis (possible activity areas for business; list of clusters; competition indexes) are clearly defined and limited in number.

Functional analysis is much easier for the chosen region. The functions of regional bodies and of the regional government as a whole in Kamchatka are limited and can be evaluated by experts more similarly (without controversy) than for the regions of Russia with heterogeneous and complicated conditions and distributed economic potential (as with Moscow, Volga, and Central Siberia regions).

To sum up, theoretically the selection of Kamchatka region as the pattern for McKinsey-type matrix construction and for the evaluation of the strategy for regional development seems appropriate because Kamchatka region satisfies the criteria of both institutional approach (function analysis) and of geographical zone specification (clusters).

**McKinsey-type matrix for Kamchatka.** The key point for McKinsey-type matrix shaping is to evaluate the risks to different kinds of business activity based on expert evaluations. Experts should know the situation in the region in detail, and

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clarify risks and opportunities according to the matrix components. For Kamchatka, the unique possibility to work with experts was created due to the special educational program (executive MPA program) that was organized through the Russian Academy of National Economics and Public Administration (RANEPA) under the President of Russia in 2014/2015. Among the participants of the expert group, representatives of the following were present: the Administration of Kamchatka and neighbouring regions’ administrations, municipal authorities, local business (services, manufacturing, mineral resources, etc.), public organizations of the region, and Federal authorities involved in decision-making for Kamchatka region.

The group was involved in in-depth discussions about existing strategic documents on development in Kamchatka region, both general strategy documents and branch strategies for different areas of economics (examples of the sector strategies are shown in the notes9). Statistic data for strategy evaluation concerning Kamchatka region was provided by sources, mostly those published by Federal and regional statistics organizations10. This included data about conditions in the social, infrastructural, and economic life of Kamchatka region.

At the next stage, the experts were asked to evaluate (10-score scale for every position) different kinds of activity, the attractiveness of each for business, including risks, and the ability of the region to compete in given selected areas according to the columns and rows of the McKinsey-type matrix (in general, 10 positions of attractiveness, and 10 positions of competitiveness). The experts’ scores were averaged for every indicator, and the averaged indicators of the 10 positions mentioned (attractiveness/competitiveness) were summed up. Finally, for each kind of activity in Kamchatka region we have found two averaged expert evaluative scores (from 1 to 100) that determine an activity area position in the matrix at the coordinates of “competitiveness” and “attractiveness” respectively.

The essence of a matrix evaluation, as argued earlier, is to elaborate the best decisions for a strategy shaping regional development. It is a guide for strategy shaping and investment optimization. In other words, to invest the federal and regional sources into areas selected by experts could be more fruitful for the pros-

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pects of private investors, from the perspective of private–state entrepreneurship elaboration. Table 4 shows the configuration of positions in a McKinsey-type matrix for Kamchatka region.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Industry of fishing and of fish products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sea transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Construction of ships, and ship repair (shipyards, dockyards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Energy production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mineral resources production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Agriculture and aquaculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Air transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Forest/wood industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To analyze the matrix, some non-trivial results, as in proposals for strategy development in Kamchatka region, can be discovered. One of two priority areas of activity here are the so-called “marine cluster”, including fishing and ship con-
struction. This was more attractive to the experts than tourism, trade, energy and mineral resources production. This is because activity area factor-analysis shows it to be the best combination of competitiveness and attractiveness indexes. It is a non-trivial result because the “peak” of attractiveness belongs to tourism, and the “peak” of competitiveness is reserved for trade. But, tourism and trade are not balanced positions, and this means that to give support and to set strategic stakes on tourism and on trade in Kamchatka can be too risky. Additionally, the in-depth analysis of other positions in the McKinsey-type matrix for Kamchatka could help to eliminate bottle necks in the development of other areas presented by the matrix (see list of areas of activity above).

One of the key principles of our analysis is: a selected group of experts has the “natural rights” to shape the strategy for Kamchatka region, despite its limited size. It is not correct to say that the group is too small, not representative, or too opinionated. They are stakeholders, and their collective position should be taken into account. Of course, it is possible to compare the preferences of stakeholders with the preferences (also in McKinsey matrix form) of a group of academic experts, of representatives of civil society groups, and of small and medium entrepreneurship (SME), which should be much bigger in size and rich in selection criteria. However, stakeholders’ preferences have an independent value.

Additionally, it is possibly to compare two McKinsey matrixes: the current one and the previous one that represents the preferences of stakeholders five years ago. The difference in preferences could reveal the trends and identify the reasons for changes in trends. And last but not least: it is possible to use the results of research for recommendations to reshape the cluster policy for the Far East region as a whole.

Conclusion

The methodology of McKinsey-type strategic matrix preparation, demonstrated in the Kamchatka case, can be transferred to other regions with much more complicated conditions and divergence in the activity areas. It should be accepted as the universal tool for strategies of territorial development elaboration. However, to move ahead one should add some additional elements to the methodology described above. Among these, three requirements could be noted. First, it is useful to construct the McKinsey-type matrix for a region not on the basis of one year of statistic data and one single expert group evaluation, but to repeat such a procedure at least twice (two years), just to avoid mistakes in the collective expert positions and to eliminate any fluctuations in statistics. Second, it is a fruitful task to compare the McKinsey-type matrix for neighbouring regions, and for regions participating in inter-regional cooperation. It could coordinate their strategies and achieve the effect of multiplication. Third, theoretically the middle ground for theories of clusters and theories of institutional analysis should be fulfilled by theories of regional strategy construction and evaluation. A strategic approach toward regional development should be grounded on the basis of ex-ante evaluation instruments, and a McKinsey-type matrix approach can be utilized for such a theory.
REFERENCES


CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST-HUNGARIAN BORDER AREA

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ABSTRACT

“Permeability” is one of the most important characteristics of borders. It is a commonplace that that borders not only divide, but also connect the two territories on either side. Otherwise, the permeability of borders has a large effect on the development of the border areas. Our examination tests this hypothesis using the example of the West Transdanubian Region. During the State-Socialist regime, this area under the shadow of the impermeable Iron Curtain became a typical periphery, where the ruling power hardly sent any resources for development. After the democratic transformation, the Austrian-Hungarian border became semipermeable border, whose connecting and filtering functions slowly came into equilibrium. Finally, after the accession to the European Union in 2004, and, even more so, the Schengen Area in 2004/2007, dominance of contact functions led to a completely open border. In order to better understand this process, our examination tries to quantify the general development level/dynamism of West Hungarian Border Area micro-regions/districts on the basis of Regional Statistical Yearbook of Hungary in 1994, in 2004, and in 2013 – in comparison with the similar data of whole Hungary. We perform this task by using one of the most widespread data reduction methods, Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Although the PCA justifies a positive correlation between the permeability of the borders and the development level/dynamism of the West Transdanubian micro-regions/districts, we point out significant intra-regional developmental differences between the micro-regions/districts as well, that depends on, in part, their proximity to the border and their degree of urbanization.

Keywords: state borders; permeability; barrier; semipermeable borders; open borders; West Transdanubian Region; microregions; districts; (micro)regional development; Principal Component Analysis.

Introduction

Permeability is one of the most important characteristics of borders (Buskó, 2012). It is often mentioned that borders not only divide, but also connect the two territories on either side. In other words, the permeability of borders has...
a large effect on the development of areas along a border. In the sections that follow, we try to test the truth content of this hypothesis, using the example of the West Transdanubian Region. During the State-Socialist regime, the essence of the Austrian-Hungarian border could be best described by the word “barrier”. The areas of Transdanubia under the shadow of the Iron Curtain – areas which otherwise traditionally had been among Hungary’s most developed – became typical peripheral areas during this period, where the ruling power sent hardly any resources for development. Although the impermeability of the Austrian-Hungarian border gradually dissolved from the 1960s onward, this only made the picture somewhat more nuanced. Thus, based on the manufacturing history of Győr-Sopron County – mainly in Győr and Mosonmagyaróvár, and starting in the seventies in Csorna and Kapuvár – vigorous industrialization began, and as a result the county gradually caught up with the economically advantaged areas of Hungary. (Rechnitzer, 2005). Elsewhere, however, investment remained subdued. After the democratic transformation, this situation fundamentally changed: the Austrian-Hungarian border became a so-called semipermeable border, in which the connecting (contact) and the filtering functions slowly came into equilibrium. But the real breakthrough was Hungary joining the European Union and, even more so, the Schengen Area, which happened in 2004 and 2007 respectively. As a result the Austrian-Hungarian border came to have exclusively a contact function, becoming essentially an open border. (An overview of the process is given in: Hardi-Nárai, 2001; Rechnitzer, 2005; Hardi, 2005). In this study we review the effects of this process on the development level of the West Transdanubian Region that lies along the Austrian-Hungarian border. To do this, in order to make evident the developmental differences within the region as well, we use the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s (Hung: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, KSH) Regional Statistical Yearbook, which contains micro-regional data. We scrutinized three years:
  – 1996, when the KSH first published sufficiently detailed micro-regional level data sets;
  – 2004, the year when Hungary joined the European Union;
  – 2013, the latest year in which the Regional Statistical Yearbook’s micro-regional level data are accessible.

Compilation of the database

In this study, first of all we must clarify some problems related to the compilation of the database. The first issue to be clarified concerns the primary regional area of the test. Although our primary goal is to examine the effect that being on the border has on the development level of the West Transdanubian Region, we have marked this area at the micro-regional level so that we can demonstrate the differences within a region. However, the micro-regional examination within a region poses a few problems. The statistical accounting unit of the micro-region was institutionalized by the President of the KHS in communication 9006/1994 (s.k.3). According to this, the “statistical system of micro-regions is comprehensive throughout the country, and does not cross county
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST-HUNGARIAN BORDER AREA

boundaries. Each micro-region is a geographically connected settlement complex, which is based on the actual employment, residential, transport, secondary care (education, health, commerce) etc. connections between the settlements. In the micro-regional system, settlements are in the attraction zone, by their connections to one or more central settlements. In the system every city is a point of attraction (co-center), but there are centers of attraction with municipal legal status (key rural settlements) as well. They are named based on the name of the central settlements”1. Unfortunately, the statistical micro-regions were created (in part) to help with unified statistical analysis, but the number and extent of the micro-regions has changed a large number of times: the 138 statistical micro-regions that were first created in 1994 were first modified in 1998 (9002/1998 (s.k.1) KSH President’s communication – 150 micro-regions), then in 2003 (244/2003 (XII.18) Government resolution – 168 micro-regions) for the third time in 2007 (Act CVI of 2007 – 174 micro-regions), and finally in 2010 (Act CXLIX of 2010 – 175 micro-regions). An even more significant change was the transformation of middle level administration after 2010, more specifically the creation of districts after January 1, 20132. As a result of this, the Regional Statistical Yearbook for 2013 no longer reports micro-regional level data for 175 micro-regions, but instead for 198 districts (including 175 rural districts, and 23 Budapest districts).

Figure

Districts in the area of the West Transdanubian Region, 2013

Source: https://www.ksh.hu/teruleti_atlasz_jarasok

1 Source: 9006/1994 (s.k.3) KSH president’s announcement.
2 Act XCIII of 2012 on the creation of districts.
For this study, we do not consider the relatively small changes in the number/area of micro-regions/districts of the West Transdanubian Region, only for the compilation of the 2013 database, in the case of which we restrict ourselves to working with the compilation of the combined data of Budapest instead of the 23 districts named in the area of the capital. Thus, the 1996, 2004, and 2013 datasets become more similar structurally, which makes our computed results easier to compare.

In the course of the study the development trends of both micro-regions and districts will be examined as a function of two dimensions:

- **border status**: micro-regions/districts that are directly on the border are called *border micro-regions/districts*, while those that do not touch the border are called *remote from the border micro-regions/districts*.

- **Degree of urbanization**: the micro-regions/districts that have an urban center with county rights are called *metropolitan micro-regions/districts*, while those without an urban center with county rights are *less urbanized micro-regions/districts*.

The second problem to be cleared up concerns the *subject matter of the study*. This was earlier denoted by the (micro) regional development level, or the trends in (micro) regional development level. But since a “development level variable” does not occur in any of the statistical sources, with the help of a multivariable mathematical-statistical method we had to create this from the actual variables in our data sources. We performed this task by using one of the most widespread data reduction methods, Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Without going into details of the mathematical analysis, I would just like to mention that PCA is usually considered successful if:

(a) The individual variables fit fairly tightly – at least with 0.25 communality values – with our principal component,

(b) The principal component maintains a large fraction of the heterogeneity (variance) of individual variables – usually at least 50%.

Here we mention that in the course of our earlier studies on a similar subject (e.g. Buskó, 2012) we usually found the following 11 development metrics to be relevant, that is, to have at least 0.25 communality values with the principal component:

- Resident population change of x+y year as compared to x year, percentage
- Share of inhabitants living in settlements with a population density over 120, percentage
- Gross income serving as a basis of the personal income tax/tax-payer, thousand HUF
- Rate of registered unemployment/jobseekers, percentage
- Dwellings built in x year per thousand inhabitants
- Households consuming piped gas as a percentage of dwelling stock
- Households connected to the public sewerage network as a percentage of dwelling stock
- Number of registered/active corporations per thousand inhabitants
- Consulting hours in outpatient service per thousand inhabitants
- Full-time Secondary school students per thousand inhabitants
- Passenger cars per thousand inhabitants
Of course the individual variables did not meet the dual criteria mentioned above (individual variables having at least 0.25 communality values; principal component retaining at least 50% heterogeneity) in every year. With all this in mind, the principal components derived from data from the 1996, 2004, and 2013 years looked as follows:

**Table 1**

The principal component analysis communality values/retained heterogeneity, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communalities</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Extraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High schoolers</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers. Income tax</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered bus.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient hours</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retained heterogeneity: 55.388%

*Source:* Author’s calculation based on KSH 1996.

**Table 2**

The principal component analysis communality values/retained heterogeneity, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communalities</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Extraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop., vs. 2001</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers. Income tax</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered bus.</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings built</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retained heterogeneity: 52.210%

*Source:* Author’s calculation based on KSH 2004.
Table 3

The principal component analysis communality values/retained heterogeneity, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communalities</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Extraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop., vs. 2001</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pers. Income tax</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas$^3$</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating co.'s</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings built</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobseekers</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retained heterogeneity: 54.334%

Source: Author’s calculation based on KSH 2013.

Results of the study

The results of the study can best be shown by creating so-called principal component scores. For this, every Hungarian micro-region/district is assigned a standardized value consisting of a comparison of its level with the levels of every other micro-region/district. The following chart shows the number of Hungarian micro-regions/districts above and below average for the years 1996, 2004, and 2013.

Table 4

Number of Hungarian micro-regions/districts above and below average, 1996, 2004 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of above-average Hungarian micro-regions/districts</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of below-average Hungarian micro-regions/districts</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum principal component score</td>
<td>3.42144</td>
<td>2.43565</td>
<td>3.01552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum principal component score</td>
<td>-1.74712</td>
<td>-2.14236</td>
<td>-1.85712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the following, we first check which of the micro-regions/districts of the West Transdanubian Region are above the Hungarian average and which are be-

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$^3$ Since the number of households with gas falls just 0.1% short of the traditionally agreed 25% communality value, with a little goodwill we decided to include it in the principle component analysis calculation.
low the Hungarian average for the given years, with special attention to their border proximity and urbanization level.

**Table 5**

### Above-averagely and below-averagely developed micro-regions/districts in the West Transdanubian Region, 1996, 2004 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996 Above average</th>
<th>1996 Below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / border micro-regions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized border micro-regions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004 Above average</th>
<th>2004 Below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / border micro-regions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized border micro-regions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013 Above average</th>
<th>2013 Below average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / border micro-regions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of metropolitan / remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized border micro-regions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of weakly urbanized remote from border micro-regions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s calculation based on KSH 1996, 2004, 2013.

In the case of metropolitan micro-regions/districts, at first glance it does not appear that there were any significant changes during the period under consideration. However, it is worth examining the situation of the aforementioned districts/micro-regions when they are compared with each other.

**Table 6**

### Principal component scores and ranking of urbanized micro-regions/districts in the West Transdanubian Region, 1996, 2004 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996 Principal component score, ranking</th>
<th>2004 Principal component score, ranking</th>
<th>2013 Principal component score, ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Szombathely</td>
<td>1.93408 (4th)</td>
<td>Győr</td>
<td>1.86605 (8th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Győr</td>
<td>1.75345 (8th)</td>
<td>Szombathely</td>
<td>1.67906 (14th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalaegerszeg</td>
<td>1.63523 (9th)</td>
<td>Sopron-Fertőd</td>
<td>1.30495 (24th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sopron</td>
<td>1.61247 (10th)</td>
<td>Zalaegerszeg</td>
<td>1.17178 (28th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagykaniszsa</td>
<td>1.02172 (26th)</td>
<td>Nagykaniszsa</td>
<td>0.73959 (40th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s calculation based on KSH 1996, 2004, 2013.
Most prominent is the markedly differing development paths in the areas belonging to city with county rights of the three affected counties (Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala). As regards to the dynamically developing Győr-Moson-Sopron County, above all the Győr-centered micro-region/district, which is most connected with Austria – the M1 motorway toward Austria, and the main train route № 1 go through this region – had a true success story in its development following the democratic transformation. Although this area had already been at a high degree of development during the State Socialist period, following the democratic transformation its development accelerated noticeably. The minor decline between 1996 and 2004 (from 4th → 8th place) is only illusory: during this period the micro-regions that came to surpass the micro-region of Győr were practically and exclusively those micro-regions which became independent from the Budapest agglomeration under the 1998 revision of the micro-region system. Of the other non West Transdanubian metropolitan micro-regions, it went on to surpass both that of Szeged and Pécs, and only Székesfehérvár and Veszprém remained ahead of it. Between 2004 and 2013, however, the Győr micro-region/district went on to surpass not only the micro-region/district centered around the other non West Transdanubian cities with county rights, but also Budapest and (except for the Dunakeszi and Budakeszi districts) the whole Budapest agglomeration. The development path of the Sopron micro-region/district shows similar characteristics. During the period under consideration, in 2004 it surpassed the micro-region centered around Zalaegerszeg, although during that period regarding rankings it was more characteristically falling behind: besides the micro-regions of the Budapest agglomeration that have just been mentioned, certain resort areas (the micro-regions around Lake Balaton and Lake Velencei) as well as a few non West Transdanubian micro-regions whose centers have county rights (Nyíregyháza, Debrecen) surpassed it. However, by 2013 it advanced to be the 6th most developed district, surpassed only by the districts of the Budapest agglomeration, Budakeszi, Dunakeszi, Budapest and Szentendre, as well as the Győr district.

As regards to Vas County, which is also close to the Austrian border, but less fortunate regarding transportation-geography, the micro-region/district centered around the county seat Szombathely is characterized by a kind of duality. On the one hand, it can be observed that it was unable to keep pace with the most dynamically developing micro-regions/districts. While in 1996 it was the West Transdanubian Region’s most developed micro-region – and was surpassed only by the Budapest agglomeration, and by the micro-regions of Szeged and Pécs – by 2004 it was surpassed not only by the micro-region centered around Győr, but by most micro-regions of the Budapest agglomeration, certain resort areas on the shore of Lake Balaton, and other dynamically developing county seats and their surrounding region (Eger, Székesfehérvár, Veszprém) as well. After Hungary joined the European Union, this trend noticeably slowed and Szombathely was more or less able to retain its position: although certain districts of the Budapest agglomeration that became independent under the district system reform (Érd, Gyál, Vecsés districts), certain recreational areas (Gárdony), as well as the districts of Sopron and Szeged surpassed it, but the districts of Székesfehérvár and Veszprém were once again behind it. Overall, we must note that the change in rank of the Szombathely
micro-region/district (1996: 4. → 2004: 14th → 2013: 17th) – especially when we take into account that in 2004 several micro-regions of the Budapest agglomeration surpassed it – which in 1996 had achieved 1st place as parts of the combined Budapest agglomeration – cannot be interpreted as a clear setback. It is simply that a few other micro-regions/districts took advantage of their more favorable conditions to get ahead, whether due to their proximity to the capital or to lakes Balaton/Velencei, or their more favorable transportation-geographic connection with Austria.

However, we have to evaluate as a clear decline the cases of two metropolitan micro-regions located in Zala County – which are not connected with the Austrian border, rather the Slovenian and/or Croatian borders – namely, Zalaegerszeg and Nagykanizsa. In the case of the Zalaegerszeg-centered micro-region/district, which is remote from the Austrian border, its relatively isolated transportation-geographic location might be the main reason that it was unable to show an advance in its development. The rail line connecting Hungary with Slovenia that was commenced in 2001, conducting a very low level of traffic, was not able to change this substantially. The possibilities of the Nagykanizsa-centered micro-region/district were hindered by its less fortunate historical inheritance – the remains of state socialist industry and the difficulties in structural change that were less characteristic of the West Transdanubian Region. This trend of setbacks can be seen as similar to the case of both micro-regions/districts (Zalaegerszeg micro-region/district – 1996: 9th → 2004: 28th → 2013: 35th; Nagykanizsa micro-region/district – 1996: 26th → 2004: 40th → 2013: 64th place), with the following differences:
- The micro-region centered around Zalaegerszeg started with a relatively more favorable position (in 1996 it was the 9th most developed micro-region in Hungary);
- In the case of Nagykanizsa the decline is much more spectacular. In 2013 with its principal component score of 0.30314, its result was absolutely average, which in the case of a West Transdanubian district whose center has county rights, is a decidedly poor result. Among similar non West Transdanubian areas, in 2013 only the districts centered around Kaposvár, Hódmezővásárhely and Salgótarján performed more poorly than this.

Finally let’s have a look, with the help of following table, at the development paths of the poorly urbanized micro-regions/districts.

With some simplification we can divide the development paths of these micro-regions/districts into three groups, and these can hardly be separated from what we have said about the urbanized micro-regions/districts. Dynamic development is most characteristic of the Győr-Moson-Sopron County micro-regions/districts. The development path of the Mosonmagyaróvár micro-region/district found here is very similar to that of the Győr district/micro-region, thus presumably here too the proximity to the border (more precisely, the M1 motorway, and the main rail line № 1) are highlighted as the driving force behind development. In other words, as in the case of Győr, we find that the Mosonmagyaróvár micro-region already had a relatively favorable position in 1996 (43rd place), but later – primarily in the period after joining the European Union – it was able to improve even on this position: by 2013 it was Hungary’s 23rd most developed district, which –
Table 7

Principal component scores and ranking of less urbanized micro-regions/districts in the West Transdanubian Region, 1996, 2004 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1996</th>
<th>Principal component score, ranking</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Principal component score, ranking</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Principal component score, ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keszthely-Hévíz</td>
<td>1.89066 (6th)</td>
<td>Keszthely-Hévíz</td>
<td>1.37057 (22nd)</td>
<td>Mosonmagyaróvár</td>
<td>1.21265 (23rd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kőszeg</td>
<td>0.79045 (31st)</td>
<td>Csepreg</td>
<td>0.9745 (30th)</td>
<td>Keszthely</td>
<td>1.1181 (25th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosonmagyaróvár</td>
<td>0.37827 (43rd)</td>
<td>Kőszeg</td>
<td>0.87657 (35th)</td>
<td>Kőszeg</td>
<td>1.05335 (26th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentgotthárd</td>
<td>0.37313 (44th)</td>
<td>Mosonmagyaróvár</td>
<td>0.60538 (46th)</td>
<td>Pannonhalma</td>
<td>0.86124 (32nd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sárvári-Répcelak</td>
<td>0.104 (59th)</td>
<td>Kőrmend</td>
<td>0.25978 (58th)</td>
<td>Szentgotthárd</td>
<td>0.63513 (46th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kőrmend-Őriszentpéter</td>
<td>0.08393 (60th)</td>
<td>Sárvár</td>
<td>0.22599 (60th)</td>
<td>Sárvár</td>
<td>0.50686 (50th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celldömölk</td>
<td>−0.11486 (71st)</td>
<td>Szentgotthárd</td>
<td>0.13648 (69th)</td>
<td>Kapuvár</td>
<td>0.44139 (57th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenti</td>
<td>−0.14331 (73rd)</td>
<td>Kapuvár</td>
<td>0.07619 (72nd)</td>
<td>Csorna</td>
<td>0.34684 (60th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuvár</td>
<td>−0.16977 (74th)</td>
<td>Pannonhalma</td>
<td>−0.06947 (77th)</td>
<td>Kőrmend</td>
<td>0.33237 (62th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csorna</td>
<td>−0.56704 (91st)</td>
<td>Csorna</td>
<td>−0.1228 (78th)</td>
<td>Tét</td>
<td>0.09135 (74th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalaszentgrót</td>
<td>−0.69226 (101st)</td>
<td>Lenti</td>
<td>−0.14419 (79th)</td>
<td>Celldömölk</td>
<td>0.04732 (77th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letenyé</td>
<td>−0.75196 (102nd)</td>
<td>Celldömölk</td>
<td>−0.17219 (82nd)</td>
<td>Lenti</td>
<td>0.00142 (80th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasvár</td>
<td>−0.97924 (113th)</td>
<td>Zalaszentgrót</td>
<td>−0.28253 (93rd)</td>
<td>Zalaszentgrót</td>
<td>−0.28949 (98th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tét</td>
<td>−0.41817 (100th)</td>
<td>Letenyé</td>
<td>−0.6116 (111th)</td>
<td>Vasvár</td>
<td>−0.58028 (114th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letenyé</td>
<td>−0.7271 (122nd)</td>
<td>Óriszentpéter</td>
<td>−0.88112 (133th)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasvár</td>
<td>−0.88112 (133th)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculation based on KSH 2013.
in view of the large number of districts that became independent of the Budapest agglomeration in 1998 – suggests even greater progress than the raw data describes. The advances in the Pannonhalma micro-region/district, which were heavily influenced by the suburbanization process in Győr (in 1996 it was still part of the Győr micro-region, in 2004 it had a below-average level of development in 77th place, however by 2013 it became the 32nd most developed Hungarian district) can be characterized similarly. Also worth mentioning are the Csorna and Kapuvár micro-regions/districts located between Győr and Sopron: although they did not approach a level of development similar to Mosonmagyaróvár or Pannonhalma in 2013, the improvement in relative ranking (also starting at a below-average level in 1996) is remarkable in these cases as well. In Győr-Moson-Sopron County even the district/micro-region of Tét, which is the most distant from the Austrian border, showed a significant improvement: throughout the period under examination it went from a below-average micro-region to an averagely developed district.

In contrast, the micro-regions/districts of Vas County are characterized by a large spread in their development levels, and stability in their development rankings. As a rule of thumb it can be said that the proximity to the Austrian border and to the county seat of Szombathely more or less determine the development level of the individual micro-regions/districts in Vas County, except perhaps in the cases of the Celldömölk- and Őriszentpéter-centered micro-region. The Celldömölk-centered one is a typical remote from the border – and remote from the county seat – micro-region/district. However, since Celldömölk is one of the most important West Transdanubian railway junctions, the micro-region/district took moderate advantage of its favourable transportation-geographic location: throughout the period under examination it remained an average developed micro-region/district. In contrast is the Őriszentpéter-centered micro-region which is near the Austrian border but due to its particular settlement structure is nevertheless on the periphery of development. As for the development dynamism, smaller, less spectacular development than in the case of our Győr-Moson-Sopron examples can only be seen in the regions around the Szombathely area. Thus the micro-region/district centered around Sárvár gradually went from an averagely developed micro-region to a medium well-developed district during the course of the period under examination. Incidentally, the most developed (Kőszeg, Szentgotthárd), the average (Körmend, Celldömölk), and the least developed (Vasvár) micro-regions/districts more or less maintained their positions in a stable manner. The micro-region of Csepreg, under the effect of the suburbanization process in Szombathely, joined the list of most developed micro-regions in 2004, while the least developed was the traditionally lagging, peripherally situated Őrség, with its center Őriszentpéter. The latter two did not become a district when the system of districts was developed, so we cannot review their development paths in the current study.

Finally, the poorly urbanized Zala County micro-regions/districts, similarly to the circle of cities with county rights mentioned here, did not perform well either regarding their development levels, or their development dynamism. The only exception is the Keszthely (in 1996 and in 2004: the Keszthely-Hévíz) micro-region/district, consistently considered one of the West Transdanubian region's
most developed micro-regions/districts, but with regards to the characteristics of this area, perhaps it is best thought of as belonging to the Balaton shore micro-regions/districts rather than the region we are examining. Other than this, the examined units located here (with the exception of the 2013 results of the district of Lenti), were not able to achieve even the average level of development of Hungarian micro-regions/districts. And this is true not only for the inner periphery of the Zalaszentgrót-centered micro-region/district that is far from the border, but also for the Lenti and Letenye micro-regions/districts which border on Croatia.

Conclusions

From the results of our examination we can conclude that the permeability of borders has a positive effect on the development of the areas along the border. After the democratic transformation, when the Austrian-Hungarian border became firstly a semipermeable, and later an open border, significant development has been detected in the area of the Hungarian West Transdanubian Region. However, this development process is far from homogeneous. Micro-regions/districts of the traditionally most advanced Győr-Moson-Sopron county show a more dynamic development than those of the moderately developed Vas County or the poorly developed Zala county. Moreover, development levels and dynamism of the West Transdanubian micro-regions/districts are also connected with their border status and degree of urbanization. Thus we found that the micro-regions/districts that are directly on the Austrian-Hungarian border – especially those whose urban center is a city with county rights – have more favourable positions than those which are less urbanized and remote from the border. Finally, it is important to remark that the results of the micro-regions/districts that are close to the Croatian (or less characteristically: the Slovenian), and not the Austrian border, are decidedly poor. It seems that the developmental effect of the Austrian border (in the European Union and totally open since 2007), and the Croatian border (only in the European Union since 2014, but still not part of the Schengen Area) have a qualitative difference, and themselves may illustrate the complexity of the (micro-)regional effects on the development of the Western borders.

SOURCES

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REGIONAL AND NATIONAL DIVERSITY AS A FACTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY DEVELOPMENT: PROBLEM STATEMENT

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Abstract

The article discusses the problem of the applicability of modern public administration theories and practices outside liberal democracies. The theory and practice are not universal; they do not apply to the conditions of the most numerous type of state in the world, namely nation-states, with «hybrid» political regimes and a mixed system of economic, social and cultural relations. The type of political and socio-economic development of these states cannot be defined in some fields; it is extremely resolute in being temporary and transitional. This is especially true in societies with clan and patron-client relationships, where these prevail at each level of the civil service hierarchy. By using the examples of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the author shows that this type of relationship gives rise to corruption, but also performs a number of important functions in the social sphere, and could sometimes be used as capital modernization by the authorities. Russia, described in the article as a country with ruined social mutual aid traditions, demonstrates that clan relationship traditions continuing in a number of Central Asian countries may cause less damage than full social atomization. The paper is aimed at formulating a hypothesis of the feasibility of convergent approach in public administration theory development for further research. The core idea represents the counter convergence of the theories and the real conditions of governance in various nation-states with hybrid regimes. The article is based on the author’s own research and the public administration department’s student studies, performed under his supervision.

Keywords: globalization, hybrid regime, clan traditions, corruption, modernization, universalism.

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Introduction: Universality borders in the context of civil service evolution

The fundamental idea is that the criteria exists for evaluating public administration effectiveness and civil servant activity even though it has been historically changed all over the world\(^2\). The Weber – Wilson concept (at the beginning of the 20th century) was determined by measuring the effectiveness of bureaucrats’ conformability with adopted state standards. By the 1960s, new concepts such as Responsive Administration appeared to assess the activities of civil servants, depending not only on the state executive’s rules and regulations, but also on their service to society. This criterion was specified later and in the 1980s the concepts and programs of public service reform appeared (New Public Management). At that time, evaluation of civil servants depended on the effectiveness of the services to their citizens. In 2000, in countries with high levels of modernization, the civil service was reformed. The countries involved (Germany, UK, USA and others) named this process differently but the social meaning remained the same and consisted of the humanization of public services, increasing subordination in terms of the public interest, and the growth of public control over government activities.

In my opinion, the outline of public service evolution corresponds to reality. However, can we consider this statement as a universal tendency for the whole world? Absolutely not. This tendency is characteristic of only a narrow circle of law-bound states declaring the rule of law which protects primarily human rights. In these states the activities of all governmental levels, including the supreme power, submit to stable laws or court decisions, and the people, of course, are a source of power (Allan, 1998). According to the WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 only about 30 countries adhere to the rule of law in practice\(^3\). At the same time, the UN consists of 194 countries, whereas the total numbers of countries, considering unrecognized states and countries with limited recognition, are estimated at between 262 and 270 countries. Therefore, this trend of public service evolution covers only about 11–12% of the world. Estonia is the only post-soviet state with the rule of law (14th place in the WJP Rule of Law ranking), and Georgia is close to the group of leaders (31th place). Both these countries are objects of this study, as well as Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which received low estimates in the WJP ranking (89th, 93th and 97th respectively). Therefore the objects of our study, excluding Estonia and Georgia, could be attributed to any number of countries with a hybrid political regime. According to Philippe C. Schmitter’s definition of a hybrid political regime, it combines some features of democracy (as a rule, a simulated multi-

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\(^2\) The assumption of the head of the Public and Local Service department A. Barabashev, the seminar in September, 2015 (NRU HSE).

\(^3\) The international NGO World Justice Project developed the Rule of Law Index in 2010. It measures the countries achievements in terms of legal protection, which is based on the universal rule of law principles. The World Justice Project. 2014 Rule of Law Index (http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf).
party system, elections, parliamentarism) and real authoritarian management, which means full or partial executive branch control over parliament, judiciary and mass media (Schmitter, 1994).

The hybrid nature of the political regime in Russia is demonstrated by comparing the rules of the main legislative documents with its socio-political reality. For instance, in the first section of the Russian Federation Constitution the country is defined as democratic, federal and law-bound, however many experts believe that the actual system of government is far from the claims of the rule of law in the Russian Federation (Hedlund, 2006, p. 775–80). Well-known political sociologist Timothy Colton, who was constrained by the Russian Presidential Executive Office in a meeting with the leader of the country within the Valdai forum, suggests that in Russia the essence of the rule of law idea, which should reflect the establishment of popular sovereignty as the source of power, were suppressed. Nevertheless Russian people – the citizens, the voters – are actually an object of manipulation by the establishment and bureaucracy (Colton, 2005, pp. 103–117).

Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could be defined as countries with a multicultural socio-economic system and non-consolidated society. In these countries, the elements of the market economy coexist with vast areas of state monopoly, and post-industrial social institutions are exist in parallel with a pre-modern society.

If the trend of governance humanization is a characteristic of a limited numbers of countries defined as states with the rule of law, the question about the direction of the evolution of countries with hybrid regimes arises. When speaking about the universal and non universal trends of government it is necessary to keep in mind that thinkers and politicians have their own thoughts on «universalism» and «universal tendencies», thus these words have represented different notions at different times. In Roman times the idea of universalism served to justify imperial rule; during the Crusades (Middle Ages), universalism was interpreted as the idea of the Universal Christian state under the aegis of the Pope. Later, Islam proclaimed a similar idea – a worldwide Islamic community (Ummah). In times of confrontation between two blocs of the world (the second half of the 20th century), each one proclaimed its own universalism: the Soviet Union countered collectivism (proletarian internationalism) with the West’s values of individual freedom, the rule of law, universal suffrage, electoral competition between political parties and protection of civil rights. All of the above features characterize liberal-democratic political regime (Jary & Jary, 1999).

At the end of the 20th century, liberal universalism seemingly won the battle against other universalistic projects. As it was thought, the last dictatorships fell between 1970 and 1990 (in Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia), the process of decolonization was completed, and the «Socialist camp» (block of communist countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America) ceased to exist. All these developments have led to the emergence of new democracies. Samuel Huntington thought it was a process of the third and final wave of global democratization (Huntington, 1991). Around this time Francis Fukuy-
ama wrote his famous article «The End of History», which illustrates the end of the pre-liberal history of the humanity (Fukuyama, 1989). Indeed, by the 1990’s liberal democracy had gained a leading position in the world, and not only because it provided higher performance in labor productivity as well as the quality and duration of human life. The liberal project was also the most flexible and expansive; it incorporated elements of individualism, collectivism, capitalism and socialism. The most developed countries are both liberal and social; they ensure the development of private initiatives and general social security, especially for the weakest categories of people. However, at the turn of 20th and 21st centuries liberal universalism had a new formidable opponent – anti-globalism, whose followers did not put forward an alternative project of universalism, and disputed the necessity and possibility of a single universal way for the development of humanity. In this case, anti-globalization is understood as a variety of political forces advocating for the protection of cultural identity and cultural traditions (local, religious, ethnic, national, state, and others.).

One of the globalization paradoxes is the simultaneous display of two seemingly mutually exclusive trends from the end of the 20th century. On the one hand, the certain standardization of different cultures is observed, on the other hand, there is growing cultural differentiation and disintegration, defined as a special phenomenon in science and called the «ethnic and religious renaissance» (Comaroff, 1994, pp. 35–70). It refers to the rise in interest in the traditional group, «ascriptive» forms of identity (ethnic, religious, racial, clan and communal) and traditional social practices. Modern traditionalism has many faces and a different nature; it reflects sincere and hypocritical politically motivated concern about the devastating effects of uncontrolled modernization. This process is driven by many factors, but I assume that one of the most important is the «social construction of neotraditionalism» (artificial traditionalism), which was used by pre-modern societies’ elite to resist modernization processes under the pretense of protecting traditional cults and values (Pain, 2011, pp. 118–191). However, there are objective processes of resistance to globalization.

Relationships between the countries and nations of the world expand in a globalization context, but at the same time the cultural heterogeneity of global development grows. Modernization, covering more and more territory, has come into such regions where the inner life is poorly prepared for its inception. In some «third world» countries which have been exposed to modernization under pressure from external forces, this process was accompanied by the destruction of traditional institutions and ways of life, that resulted in an increase in the social disorganization of societies. These events marked one manifestation of a globalization crisis. Another manifestation was the fact that in countries where a nation-state had not developed, tribalism and conflict intensified, splits in tribal, ethnic and religious groups revealed themselves, and there was an explosion of religious fundamentalism and terrorism. A variety of conflicts and terrorism has claimed the lives of thousands of victims. From 1990 to 2010 the number of victims of terrorist attacks were 72,519 people in Iraq; 14,157
people in Pakistan; and 12,649 people in Russia (Belozerov, Suprunchuk, 2012). At the beginning of the 21st century, such conflicts covered not only the former colonial countries and societies with unfinished national unity, but also the nation-states of Europe and the United States. Even in relatively developed countries, such as Russia, in the 1990s attempts at strong but fragmentary modernization caused widespread dissatisfaction among the population which increased due to the propaganda of political forces who were not interested in the modernization of a country, especially not the modernization of its political and legal system.

The rise of hybrid political regime

At the turn of the second and third millennia public demand for authoritarian stability was emphasized due to the local establishment and it led to the legitimacy of hybrid political regime. For a time theorists of political transition considered that such regimes were temporary (Huntington, 1990). Nevertheless, life has shown that these regimes are fairly stable and persist for decades. The assumption of a single-line evolution of such regimes in the direction of democracy only was not justified. In contrast, cases of regime movement in the opposite direction and the increase in authoritarian characteristics were common. The most striking example is Russia. According to Timothy Colton, all institutions of democratic government created in the 1990s either became inefficient by the beginning of the 21st century or were frozen (Colton, 2005, p. 103).

One of the most distinctive features of hybrid political regimes is a high susceptibility to corruption, which almost totally defeats the state machine. This corruption has the typological features inherent in all hybrid regimes. It is also characterized by numerous specific properties related to the historical and national-cultural features of different countries; primarily those that have kept stratification in society.

In our research, we distinguish three types of stratification in society:

1. Societies which have retained some features of tribalism, blood and kinship: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, several autonomous regions of the Russian North Caucasus;

2. Societies which have lost features of tribalism but retain features of patriarchal community relations and territorial clans: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan;

3. Non-traditional society with quasi-traditional institutions and unconsolidated population: Russian, Ukraine, Belarus. Residents of Russia (excluding the populations of the Russian Federation national republics) lead Europeans in terms of their weakness in preserving traditional, family and geographically-neighborly relations. Russian citizens have the lowest values of collectivism, mutual aid and trust (Inglehart, 2005). At the same time, they are highly dependent on the state and its bureaucracy. Such dependence does not implicate protest among most of the people and it is perceived as the norm, or as a national tradition.
The features of a bureaucratic hierarchy and corruption in societies with clan traditions^4

There are a lot of corruption definitions but the most suitable for the purpose of this article is the broad interpretation of this concept which was proposed in the 1990s and determines corruption as the abuse of public office for unofficial purposes (Klitgaard, 1998). The Russian researcher Georgy Satarov was one of the first to single out the specifics of corruption in the rule of law states with hybrid political regimes (Satarov, 2002, p. 42). The first type of corruption was named «Western». In this case, corruption is a market where corrupt services are sold. The blowing stage is characterized by occasional relationships between the actors of a corrupt deal, and an apical one in the presence of intermediaries (agents) who help to communicate to the «sellers» and «buyers». «Eastern corruption» is characterized by stable, non-market patron-client relationships, when an influential patron uses his position to provide people addicted to him (customers) with services to ensure their loyalty or enlist their support. The main channels of patron-client relationship operations of eastern corruption systems are patriarchal family ties and compatriotic and other traditional systems of social relations, which we shall call «clan traditions» in this article. In Central Asian countries, as we will demonstrate, both types of corruption relations are present, but the «eastern» type dominates. However, this type is also heterogeneous, because different nations have different clan traditions. Some of these nations led mainly nomadic lifestyles in the recent past (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan), the others were settled and agricultural in the past (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).

Leonid Gusev, referring to the opinion of the Kazakhstan Institute of Philosophy Academy of Sciences director Abdumalik Nysanbayeva, wrote about the significant role of tribalism in contemporary life of the republic (Gusev, 2005). According to his works, the political and legal system of modern Kazakhstan is determined by patron-client relationships. The main group of this relationship consists of three traditional tribal associations, called zhuz^5: senior – «Uly» (southern and south-eastern Kazakhstan – there make up about 35% of the population); middle – «Orta» (northern, central and eastern Kazakhstan, which includes the largest city Alma-Ata, about 40% of Kazakhstan's population), and younger – «Kishi» (West Kazakhstan – 25% of the population). Some especially revered, although small, groups are not included in the zhuz hierarchy. The members of these groups called «torus», who are the direct descendants of Genghis Khan, and «skin», who are the descendants of the first Arabs to bring Islam to the Kazakh steppe and perform the Hajj. These are a type of alien Vikings of the Kazakh nation and its «blue blood» (Gusev, 2005).

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^4 Clan is the word of Celtic origin, meaning "offspring". For Celtic peoples (the Irish, Scots, Welsh, and others) it is defined as tribal communities with common ancestors. Currently, the term is often used as a metaphor for strong informal ties, reminding the family, such as "mafia family".

^5 A zhuz (Kazakh: jüz also translated as "horde" or "hundred") is one of the three main territorial and tribal divisions in the Kypchak Plain area that covers much of the contemporary Kazakhstan, and represents the main tribal division within the ethnic group of the Kazakhs.
My research (in particular, interviews with representatives of the Kazakh diaspora in Moscow and with government officials in Shymkent region and Almaty, Kazakhstan) has shown that researchers, unprofessional observers and publicists often inadequately assess the role of tribalism. If the publicists are residents of the republic, but not ethnic Kazakhs, they often exaggerate the effect of safety and some traditional structures, such as that of the zhuz. In contrast, Kazakhs are prone to underestimate their influence for various reason, for instance, the fear of being branded as «backward». However, it is difficult to find any Kazakh who would not remember what race, tribe and zhuzu his family belongs to. One of the interviewed Kazakh Diaspora representatives said that her father, a famous Moscow professor, integrated into the Russian cultural environment and did not try to give his children a kazakh education, or even teach them the kazakh language, but, at the same time, he persistently instilled in his sons the knowledge of their ancestry to the seventh generation. Such knowledge is the main thread linking the Kazakhs with their ethnic group. It is natural for members of a nomadic culture, where a person's identification with his family, tribe and Zhuz (union of tribes erstwhile) is more informative than the link with the territory.

Zhuzes. In the past, knowledge of the seven generations was sort of an essential attribute of a nomadic life, because it prevented closely related marriages and violation of genus endogamous prohibitions. In Soviet times, blood and kinship relations have become the most important form of adaptation to the new conditions of life, preserved despite the Soviet program against «tribal vestiges», and forcible bringing nomads to a sedentary lifestyle. In the process of collectivization, the protective function of the whole blood and kinship relations system emerged, and did not allow class xenophobia to develop in Kazakhstan in Russian forms («the poor against the rich»). It saved thousands of lives. In terms of the Soviet economy («shortage economy»), ancestral ties became a convenient form of limited benefits access, primarily because of their flexibility and closeness to the state. The same features in the current circumstances are a convenient tool for corruption channels. At the same time, generic ties compressed and today their highest level, called a zhuz, does not play such a significant role as it did before. A zhuz does not have management institutes and common rituals which should progress communication. As our interviewee in Moscow noted, there is no sense in asking a man for some favor simply because he is the same zhuz. Mutual aid in the form of patronage is usually limited by the levels of one or several genus of a tribe. Belonging to the same zhuz now reflects regional differences in identity, for example, southerners (senior zhuz) are more traditional than the eastern, central and western regions' residents, (middle zhuz). As one of the interviewed Shymkent officials said «Almaty citizens (middle zhuz) are our Europeans. They have a completely different mentality. Shymkent citizens, Southerners, are like residents of Texas in America, we are a rich, not very educated people, but mobile and enterprising «. Some experts see a direct relationship between people belonging to a particular zhuz and their concentration in different state structures of Kazakhstan. According to Rashid Jumaly, «the older zhuz occupy a privileged place in the Presidential Executive Office and Parliament, medium zhuz control the ministries, and the younger (lower) clan manage cities and regions» (Jumaly, 2015). Nevertheless, the
author did not provide any evidence to confirm this conclusion and, in my view, his statements are too categorical. There is a possibility of other explanations for the phenomena. If there is a high concentration of members of the same zhuz in some regional institutions, it may just be the result of the patron selecting candidates from compatriots, and this is a consequence of belonging to one zhuz.

A genus, even the largest one, is still a more compact community than a zhuz. The members of the genus know each other, sometimes not personally, but through some close relatives. They may interact with each other at certain celebrations, funerals or in family groups. The entire clan obviously know its most famous and influential representatives.

Big family. Despite the significance of a genus, the main manifestations of Kazakh mutual aid now focus on the level of large patriarchal families. In Shymkent region, it is, as a rule, a three-generational multiline family, which includes not only the descendants of the patriarch (grandfather, great-grandfather) but also the descendants of his brothers. Such families can consist of more than 50 people. Alma-Ata is normally dominated by small nuclear families (parents and children) as the owners or tenants of small urban apartments. However, here, the patriarchal family plays the main role in its consciousness and in the actual socio-economic relations. Members of this family, besides participating in numerous family ceremonies, also provide joint care for their parents and older family members. The most important function of the family today is the career guidance and educational assistance for their youth. If one of the family members is well educated and settled in the city, it motivates the other younger family members to move the parents may even eventually move to the city.

The unique ability to adapt to new territorial conditions always distinguishes nomadic cultures from those of traditionally sedentary peoples. The ability of Kazakhs to move with their origin genus contributed to their tremendous ability for adaptation. In some ways these socio-cultural characteristics explain the «miracle of Astana», which means a double increase in the population of the city in less than a decade (from 1999 to 2007). It happened after a stable decline over decades (Pain, 2014, pp. 73–83). It is also astounding that the city, which is located in a zone with a harsh cold climate and was almost ethnic Russian, has increased its population due to the influx of ethnic Kazakhs, whose number has tripled during the specified time. The scale of this unique growth of inhabitants could not be explained by economic factors (high levels of investment) and administrative measures. All of these factors affected all of the various groups of people in Kazakhstan, but Kazakhs from the far south moved to Astana instead of ethnic Russian, prevailed in the suburbs and previously constituted more than half of its population. They were also noted to have the highest level of survival in Astana, despite the radical climate change when compared with the living conditions in their original places of residence (Pain, 2014).

The observed phenomenon can be considered as one of the principal cultural elements of nomadism and as a system of patron-client relations. However, such relations are not only used to solve domestic problems or for the cities’ development. In states with predominance of authoritarian institutions, patron-client relations have an impact on the formation of the entire state service apparatus.
According to D. Sharafutdinova, the presidents of all Central Asian republics surround themselves with trusted people from their clans after taking office. Commissioned officers do the same within their own environs. The chain of civil servants built on this principle runs from top to bottom and ends at municipalities. (Sharafutdinova, 2015). The fact is that such recruitment is rarely made public and commented on, although Uzbekistan is the leader of cover-ups in this area. Only in the case of high-profile scandals, when the government is interested in showing off their fight against corruption, is Uzbek society allowed to know about it. A case of this kind occurred in Uzbekistan in 1989. At that time information about a screening by President Islam Karimov to check information was announced literally everywhere. The president, for some reason, chose Hayot Gaffarov, the hakim (mayor) of Navoiy region, as the object of this demonstration of the fight against corruption. It turned out that Gaffarov had personally selected every employee yet only those who were loyal to him and belonged to his inner circle, the clan. As a result, he replaced 90% of the district and city managers, the entire administrative apparatus, heads of the economic and cultural spheres, and public organizations. Similar facts were revealed a few years later during an inspection of the activities of Samarkand Region hakim, Alisher Mardiev. The inspection surge passed through the law enforcement, judicial and tax authorities, labor exchange, local departments of the Central Bank, municipalities and other institutions (Taksanov, 2002).

Clans in Uzbekistan differ from Kazakh clans because the settled population in Uzbekistan have dominated since ancient times. In Uzbekistan, clan formation was based on territorial features. Members of Uzbek clans are more like compatriots than relatives; they build their clan relations not on age or position in the family system, but by reference to a number of utilitarian features, primarily a man’s wealth and his personal achievements in obtaining social and political influence. The most powerful representatives («patrons») are at the higher levels of the clan and always support the dependent members of the community («clients»). Expert evidence indicates that in Uzbekistan the four most influential clans (Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara and Fergana) compete for political power (Tolipov, 2010, pp. 142–158).

D. Sharafutdinova identifies the following common features of bureaucracy functioning in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, leading to corruption (Sharafutdinova, 2015):
- State hierarchical structure reflects signs of cronyism due to the system of patron-client relations formed by lower and higher links;
- Positions of officials are secured due to inclusion in the specified system of relationships and the accumulated resources in terms of social ties;
- Appointment of civil servants is perceived as the possibility of privileged access to limited resources;
- A public servant continuing the tradition of patron-client relations uses an official position for unofficial purposes; corruption (in its classical sense) becomes a systematic and inevitable phenomenon in such a relation system;
- Society puts up with corruption and accepts it as an inevitable and normal phenomenon.
In addition to these common properties, the essential features of the bureaucratic organization of the clan system and the manifestations of corrupt relations are preserved in both countries. In Kazakhstan the clan system is more closed, exclusive, and focused only on relatives with varying degrees of kinship. In Uzbekistan a member of the clan and bureaucratic system can be almost anyone with accumulated economic capital and significant resources in social connections. However, the Kazakh clans are put on display and are known because kinship cannot be kept secret. The Uzbek system of territorial clans is classified, or even conspired. The restriction is maintained by the authorities. Information about this issue is off-limits to the public except in occasional campaigns against corruption. The interviewing of the public about the crime situation in the country, which took place at the behest of law enforcement agencies for two years (from 2008) has not been formally published, and stopped entirely in 2010 (Uzbekistan: Assessment and Recommendations, 2010). Another feature of Kazakhstan clan traditions and related forms of corruption is the limited spread of these traditions due to the fact that according to the last population census (2009) only 63% are Kazakhs (their share in the total population was lower than before). According to the previous Soviet population census of 1989, the Kazakhs were a minority (39% of the population). That part of population, which is not included in the Kazakh clan and tribal structure, is also included in the system of corrupt relations, but it is a different type of corruption. G. Satarov determined it as Western corruption; a market of corruption services that are open to any person in need. In the first (lowest) level an official takes a bribe to solve the everyday problems of a customer, at the second level (the highest) bribes are taken as «commission» related to the conclusion of major contracts, money laundering abroad, permits to conduct banking operations with budgetary funds, providing loans, preferential export quotas, etc. (Chebotarev, 2004).

In spite of the seemingly archaic clan traditions in Kazakhstan retaining features of tribalism, the state generally is more advanced in the development of its legal system and less corrupt than Uzbekistan. According to research by the Heritage Foundation, administrative corruption in Uzbekistan is the highest in the Central Asian region, significantly surpassing Kazakhstan (http://www.heritage.org/index/excel/2014/index2014_data.xls). In the ranking of corruption risks by Transparency International in 2014, Kazakhstan is in 126th place, outrunning Uzbekistan (166th) and Russia (136th). This fact has many explanations. In my opinion, the most important condition for the greater advancement of Kazakhstan in the sphere of fighting against corruption is intensive involvement in the global division of labor, including communication with foreign investors (closer than in Uzbekistan and in Russia, in recent years), and greater openness to international law and inspection by advisors in line with the abovementioned countries. Kazakhstan, for example, actively cooperates

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7 2014 Index of economic freedom, The Heritage foundation.
with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which consults Central Asia countries on corruption. While Kazakhstan took the advice of the OECD and started to improve its anti-corruption program, Uzbekistan participated only in the monitoring (Sharafutdinova, 2015).

About the convergent approach in the development of the theory and practice of public administration

At least two-thirds of all countries year on year are recognized as archaic and backward from the norm, judging by the rating of the rule of law and corruption security (Index of corruption risks). The first reason is that reference samples rather than average value (when the anomaly is a deviation from the extremes) are taken as the norm. Secondly, the features of reference, «normative» states, are based only on the model of liberal democracies. This approach is in conflict with common sense and modern concepts of political philosophy and sociology experts. The contradiction between the West's uniqueness as a special cultural area and its role as a model for the rest of the world became visible to many researchers in the 1970s. This contradiction was not seen in the early stages of the modernization spread beyond Europe (for example, at the time of Max Weber), but it became obvious after decolonization, the emergence of new states and their involvement in the process of modernization. This period witnessed huge differences in the shape, pace and sequence of modernization steps in different countries. It was subsequently discovered that several local models of modernization were successful and competitive. This allowed the advancement of the idea of Multiple Modernities (Eisenstaedt, 2000).

Within the framework of this theory, phenomena such as clan traditions cannot be determined as archaic, or as negative as deviant behavior. We have tried to show that these traditions are not only deeply rooted, but justified because in modern conditions they have important social functions in relation to the disabled population, provision of territorial mobility and maintaining the stability of a society split into tribal, ethnic and religious groups. Many nations of the former Soviet Union have kept their social traditions in spite of the Soviet totalitarian policy of combating «traditional vestiges.» At the same time, the example of modern Russia shows what can happen to a country where traditional relationships are destroyed and new civic ones do not appear.

The traditional mechanisms of social control together with the institutions that kept these traditions has been almost completely dismantled on most of the Russian territory. Rural communities have been firmly forgotten and left in the middle of the last century. Religious communities (orthodox parishes) were destroyed during the Soviet era and their role is unlikely to be restored today (Dubin, 2006). What about family relationships? Their destruction in the Russian environment, bringing close contacts to the level of occasional communication is a universally recognized fact. The complete oblivion of basic kinship terms denoting relatives outside the small nuclear family points to the weakening of family and kinship ties in Russian.
Neighbor relations in the cities are filled with real content only within the entrances of the multistory apartment buildings. At the boundaries of a single entrance, they will be limited, shaped as an occasional greeting to each other. In addition, it is difficult to find general agreement of all the residents of the apartment building. Sociologists highlight that in modern Russian cities «Neighbors are perceived partly as a forced, imposed element of the environment» (Shmerlina, 2006).

Fifteen years of the Levada Center’s sociological monitoring of post-Soviet Russian society life revealed the monotonic weakening of all kinds of social connections and the compression of the interpersonal communication sphere to the level of person’s apartment. Two-thirds of all respondents consistently limit their weekly contacts during off-hours, communicating only with family members and relatives. More or less regularly in off-hours outside the apartment individuals communicate with colleagues at work (20% of respondents), members of a voluntary social or cultural organization or sports club (5% of respondents), and people from the same church (2% of respondents) (Dubin, 2006).

There is no doubt that the idea of Russian society as a collectivist, cathedral and communal is a myth. On the contrary, today this society is one of the most authoritarian in the modern world. This fact creates conditions for various forms of authoritarian manipulation of the mass consciousness. Francis Fukuyama, highlights the negative assessment of fragmented intergroup relations in Russia and the low level of trust in society, believes that a «familistic society is where the overriding ways of social instinct implementation in the family or the wider kinship structure (clans and tribes) have a higher level of socialization than in modern Russia. In Russia members of the public are not able to unite with each other» (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 57). Everyday life in Russia gives many examples of how, through a shortage of citizens’ legal protection on the part of state, competitive advantages are obtained by representatives of the ethnic communities (such as the peoples of the North Caucasus republics of Russia), who keep close traditional ties. These connections provide an intra-zone of confidence, which is necessary to conduct business and provide various forms of collective protection. In this regard, evaluation of these types of informal relations within the framework of the Multiple Modernities theory are justified as an appropriate response to the current norm.

More and more professionals of political philosophy and sociology conclude that cultural differences will continue to grow, and the area of universalism will shrink to a narrow set of modern institutions and values. The list variability depends on the author. Thus, according to Habermas, universal features of modernity are characterized primarily by the development of civil rights and freedoms (Habermas, 1985). Another well-known philosopher and sociologist, A. Martinelli, sees universal features in modern societies’ pursuit of innovation, as well as in «the increasing structural differentiation of society and the formation of independent national states» (Martinelli, 2006). Specific features of universal values may also vary depending on the thinker’s point of view, but the main principle for differentiation of the narrow scope of versatility and the wide diversity of modern national models becomes a basis for social sciences. I will try to formulate a hypothesis about possible mutual convergence in the development of public administration theory of various national states, based on the above-mentioned theoretical materials.
Hypothesis formulation

It is assumed that the convergence may occur in two opposite directions.

1. From national to universal («from bottom to top»). This statement refers to the evolutionary adaptation of national states and hybrid political regimes to the reference samples of public administration. This is the classic scheme of modernization, but we need to clarify that there is the possibility of development only in the narrow sphere of universal trends, namely:
   - The sphere of human and life values, health, safety and comfort development. As international comparative sociological research has shown, this development leads to the changes of the social values structure: the transition from the desire of mere survival to the values of self-expression. (Inglehart, 2005). This trend corresponds to the main direction in the development of public administration towards more humanization;
   - The sphere of technological development, including the implementation of new technologies in public administration. For example, computerized government (e-Government) is an electronic document management system of government, based on the total automation of administrative processes, simplification of procedures for citizens' communication with the authorities (facilitation of property and business registration, tax payments etc.) This practices are perceived positively all over the world; only bureaucracy could react negatively;
   - In addition, there is a high possibility of the release of post-Soviet authoritarian societies from those stereotype minds that have a relatively short historical basis, formed only in the Soviet times. The experience of Estonia, other Baltic States and Georgia gives quite good examples of how, in just a few years after democratic reform, the mass consciousness changed and led to the efficiency of public administration reform, including reforms in the area of fighting against corruption (Borovskikh, 2015).

2. From universal to national («from top to bottom»). Adaptation of the theory and practice of public administration to the diversity of regional, cultural and national countries’ characteristics. Not only must the country with hybrid political regimes adapt to the advanced models of public administration, but also the theoretical materials of public administration have to change, become more flexible for adjusting to the various conditions of more than half the countries of the world.
   - Firstly, it is necessary to find a new approach to accounting for deep-rooted social traditions remaining in the national culture and the mass consciousness for a long time, sometimes for centuries. In my opinion, it is advisable to consider clan traditions differentially, to legalize nepotism in some cases, to emphasize the cases when these phenomena do not interfere (or sometimes contribute to) the socio-economic modernization of the state. In this article, these positive examples were presented based on Kazakhstan analysis. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s example points to another trend when nepotism and patron-client re-
lations are factors which are freezing the archaic political regime and socio-economic regression;

– In a number of possible changes to the theory of public administration in the direction of consideration of national specificity are the suggestions of a differentiated approach to the definition of bribery and the emphasizing of its forms which could be legalized (Oak, 2015, pp. 580–604). When the government will understand that certain phenomena are so rooted that the classical legal methods to counteract it are powerless, then perhaps the authority would find Brazil’s experience very useful, where bribes are legal and called «zheyto». Besides, for every action or inaction of state officials there is a clear price list. Bribes to officials are passed through specially certified couriers, called «despachante.» This form of legalization of bribes allows citizens to understand what exactly the authorities, can do, at what time and for what money.

Conclusion

My study is still at the initial stage, so the majority of ideas expressed in this article are preliminary; they are only hypotheses which need to be tested. However, I have high confidence that the productive idea of Multiple Modernities must be considered in public administration theory in recognition of the need for improving the national diversity integration of the modern world.

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“EKOROLËV” – DIMENSIONS IN URBAN AND COUNTRYSIDE PLANNING OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

To provide sustainable development (and not just growth) of urban areas, experts and regional authorities should jointly follow the principles of Sustainable Development (SD) that were originally proposed by the fundamental work *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al., 1972) which described global, national and inter-regional strategies, plans and dynamics for urban development. As a result of SD, a new (more sustainable) type of urban strategy, ecopolis strategy, can be proposed.

We will present an example of such an urban ecopolis strategy. It was elaborated for Moscow Region city Korolëv, combining architecture, planning and design, ecosystem restoration, evaluation of risks and calculation of resources required for strategy implementation. The ecopolis strategy for Korolëv city (“E Korolëv project”) was produced over several years by a special task force – a joint Italian and Russian team along with the city council of Korolëv (Kavtaradze, Casu, 2011) – which concentrated the project around key elements of ecopolis strategy, as described in the article.

**Keywords:** sustainable development; environmental project; risk management; urban regeneration; ecological networks

Introduction: Approaches to Sustainability

**Approaches to Sustainability: EcoPolis**

The “ecopolis” concept was elaborated in the 1980s as an application of the theory on “Coherent Development of Nature and Society” (Brudny, Kavtaradze, 1981; 1985). Ecopolis is a town and immediate surroundings where humans and ecosystems are coherent with nature. Fragments of Ecopolis are recognisa-
ble in many cultural landscapes and towns as green areas, urban forests, brooks and channels. Ecopolis is a wishful human settlement of the future whose ecological parameters are controlled and whose inhabitants are prepared for constant change, in both mode of life style and nature. Large-scale research and an experiment on the mutual adaptation of man and nature have been taking place in Poushkino (Moscow region) since 1980 with the in-depth participation of local citizens and town's administration. In many cases, when describing eco-cities in practice, in different continents and countries, difficulties arise in finding any scientific background to the projects – besides taking care of city’s metabolism, air and water quality, and energy saving by means of urban planning. This approach, which started in the 1980s, has been published and discussed many times (Sukopp, Henke, 1988; Numata, 1988; Deelstra, 1988). As far as we know, the “Ecopolis concept” was not developed or implemented into international practice, even after several reports on international conferences and two World Exhibitions (Tzukuba, Brisben). Nevertheless, space design and ecological research took place in Russia at Krasnoyarsk laboratory, and the “Biosphere2” large-scale experiment in Arizona was heavily supported by the Ecotechnics Institute in London, whose support still continues today. So called eco-settlements are popular in modern Russia and mainly operate without any academically correct science reference or research, and only by using organic farming and traditional agriculture activity in comparatively small communities (Gerzberg, 2015).

**Coherent Development of Nature and Society as the SD concept of Ecopolis**

In Russian science it is customary to refer to the world famous philosopher, thinker and natural scientist Vladimir Vernadsky. His theory on the biosphere was one of the key steps in applying his concept to reviews and improvement in planning. The term “ecopolis” (Brudny, Kavtaradze, 1981) covers the historical experience of previous policies and imparts a practical modern vision of our vital dependence on biosphere conditions and the functioning of non-replaceable ecosystems.

The “sustainability” catch-all title has lately become part of the lexicon of the environmental project (and, not surprisingly, in the original meaning of the verb to sustain) proposed by the School of Architecture at Alghero (Sardinia, Italy), often referred to in a descending scale, particularly in architectural dimension and construction, or in qualitative and quantitative methods. However, within the features of this genre it is still possible to find, particularly in the “non-negotiability” of environmental values, both natural and human, a search for “strong” sustainability, in the sense given by Herman Daly (1990, 1992) of non-substitutability of natural capital by “artificial” (human, social and economic) capital: the sum of natural and anthropogenic capital can be kept at a constant value, or each component can be kept constant. The first approach is reasonable if we think that the two types of capital are interchangeable with each other. The second point of view is reasonable if we think that natural and man-made capital are complementary. Both sides must therefore be maintained intact (separately or jointly, but with fixed propor-
tions) because the productivity of one depends on the availability of the other.
The first approach is called “weak sustainability”, the second “strong sustain-
ability” (Daly, 1977, 1996).

Theoretical and applied research, and project teaching, address the rela-
tionship between population, activities and places, highlighting the limits of
resources – renewable or not – through a critique of the approaches used by the
so-called Ecological Economics (de Jouvenel, 1965; Boulding, 1966; Knees et
al., 1970; Beckerman, 1972; Georgescu Roegen, 1972; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979;
Pearce and Kerry Turner, 1990; Costanza, 1991; Martinez Alier and Schlup-
1995; Daly, 1996; Solow and Stiglitz, 1997; Linton, 1998; Munasinghe, 1999; Pig-
ou, 1999; Passet, 1996, 2000; Martinez Jusmet Alier and Roca, 2000; Kavtaradze,
Likhacheva, 2012; Gagarina et al., 2015). Criticism of the established models
will appeal as much to claim non-substitutability of resources (Daly, 1996), as
the potential and limitation of approaches based on the carrying capacity (Hui,
2006; Sayre, 2008) or on the “footprint” due to lifestyles (Wackernagel and Rees,
1995; Chambers et al., 2001). The strands of applied research and teaching at
Alghero, not necessarily channeled into any project, move mainly along two
complementary and not necessarily alternative lines: one project is aimed at
reducing energy and scarce resources (water, soil) consumption. The other re-
search project aims to a different, more complex “measure” of the sustainability
of choices, policies, plans or projects, by using decision support systems for the
assessment of different alternatives.

The first strand of teaching and research, which unfolds in collaboration
with local institutions, moves from a review of a local building tradition that
does not focus on formal or stylistic features but, rather, on “environmental rea-
sons” of settlements, their role of mediating energy and their bioclimatic func-
tion (Spanedda and Serra, 2007; Bulla et al., 2012) systems, identifying routes of
development and regeneration of dwellings (Norberg-Schulz, 1995) which may
be based on these aspects. This exploratory path is project-oriented and is also
accompanied by educational and research activities related to:
– energy production from renewable sources (Delitala et al., 2001; Arnulfo
and Marini, 2010; Gazzano et al., 2010);
– the recovery of construction traditions with low environmental impact
(Bacchini et al., 2012);
– the development of eco-friendly and durable building materials with a more
sustainable lifecycle.

The second strand, which moves sometimes in parallel to and sometimes
jointly with the first, at times by the same people, has been investigating the
assessment of design and planning options according to established discipli-
nary guidelines but also improving them with innovative proposals. One first
example is the testing of a variant of the ecological footprint à la Wackernagel,
applied to the settlement choices related to tourist flows, whose developments
have led to the proposition of some original models of interaction between
tourist populations and territories (Cecchini, 2009), and – especially in doc-
toral dissertations – the expansion of some methods, algorithms and proce-
dures for the assessment of the effects of tourist flows on the urban fabric, the landscape and the environment: from the critical analysis of some sets of urban sustainability indicators (Antonini, 2010), to proposals for their integration with the effects of tourist flows on historical urban fabric and some indicators of use of environmental services (Antonini and Cecchini, 2009; Antonini, 2010), to a critical reading of the trivialization (Muñoz, 2004) in the built landscape induced by collective images related to tourism, to the attempt to measure the relationship between tourist populations and territories (Can-naos, 2010).

This attempt to investigate soft aspects, which are more difficult to measure in terms of the relationship among people, activities and places, then sees a fruitful line of research in the application of the social dimension of sustainability, according to the capability approach proposed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1993, 1999; Nussbaum, 1999; Phipps, 2002; Clark, 2006) and applied to the evaluation of the quality of inhabited places, starting with the most vulnerable populations (Blecic et al., 2013), which promoted further research along the same lines, though more oriented towards so-called social capital. The latter has developed another peculiar variation: public participation in decision-making and assessment which is being pursued both in educational and in field activities, both in theoretical and applied research (Casu, 2013; Plaisant, 2013), both in helping local territories in planning, urban regeneration, and also with the production of ad hoc tools for online interaction. This research is not limited to “work with people” by searching for their empowerment (Friedmann, 1992), but also seeks to explore implicit, latent design scenarios, relevant to self- and hetero- representations and images of the territory by its different kinds of population (Pittaluga, 2008).

These lines of research and action come together and intersect with the approaches of sustainability-oriented policies which aim to tackle climate change, facing, on one hand, mitigation of the effects and, on the other, the adaptation to change. One case of the first type is represented by the aforementioned strategies of bioclimatic design, intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere and reduce the phenomenon of so-called urban heat island (Oke, 1973). A case of the second type is offered by the responses to climate change – that, in terms of land and urban policies, are inevitably different according to their geographical, but especially financial, contexts – that can offer new variations taken by the design and planning choices in consideration of the so-called “urban metabolism” (Blecic et al., 2011) or ways of dealing with the probable increase of the water level (e.g. the Sustainable Urban Drainage System: Butler and Parkinson, 1997): a set of search paths currently still in progress.

The latter horizon explored by the research – the impact on the man-made environment by climatic factors and their particular consequences, leads to an issue that in recent years has resulted in different attitudes to planning, which now include the issues related to risk and hazard. This has led to the development of research: on the one hand in the direction of modeling, simulation and a better interpretation of phenomena (Trunfio, 2004; D’Ambrosio et al., 2006;
D’Ambrosio et al., 2012) and, secondly, towards constructing an awareness of the environmental risk more widely felt and extended to local societies, including through intensive training programs, involving actors, institutions and other territories, involved and upset by natural disasters.

Only in very recent years environmental risk has started to be discussed in accordance with ecosystem conditions and their carrying capacity. What should be avoided is that theory continues to be separate from large scale experiments, likewise practical planning with continuing long term monitoring. To sum up, the present description of the basic principles of SD should include:

- taking into account climate changes and mitigation consequences through urban planning;
- shifting projects to marine and aquatic systems, including underwater settlements;
- taking into account biodiversity and environmental issues based on field ecology;
- Use of IT systems and simulation modeling of the metabolism of highly urbanized territories.

This short and reliable non-exhaustive list of teaching, research and lines of action is witness to the program which led to an ethics of places related to each other, and to the communities that inhabit them (Norberg-Schulz, 1985), in a continuous process that gives rise to a shared notion of territory.

International conferences show the main urban planning groups’ interest in applying ecology as a form of landscape planning and design. These experiences often see the productive cooperation of soil scientists, ecologists and sociologists, in some way. Real multidisciplinary cooperation is recognizable in the environmental project. At first glance, the key points of the environmental project appear to correspond to those of Landscape Urbanism (Russell, 2001; Mostafavi, 2004; Waldheim, 2006), especially in the pursuit of an environmental structure as a generative structure, and in the project to lead the evolutionary process. The environmental project is characterized according to some recurring themes, especially in relation to teaching experience (Casu, 2011), that are easily recognizable in the Ekorolëv project:

- ecological and socio-territorial contextualization: so the design exploration is less attentive to seek its formal character when searching for nature and history signs to define the general pattern, and looking for consistency until the design of the individual elements of the structure;
- orientation to the process, rather than to the form (Tiallingij, 2000), which facilitates inter-scalar relations;
- processuality, for which the form is given by the succession of temporary steady states (Daly, 1977; Pigou, 1999), whereby
- priority to the public and social dimension of spaces;
- constraint as an opportunity for the project;
- synthesis of ecology, landscape, urban planning, infrastructure and architecture;
- intervention in edge areas, in transition between different environmental and settlement situations (Tiallingij, 2000): the main objective is therefore
to overcome the bio-geographical, functional, social conditions of isolation and consequent fragmentation.

These characters would also imply reversibility with respect to any stationary configuration: a goal that can only be approached in a search for being “light on the earth” and containing the footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1995; Chambers et al., 2001; Kavtaradze, Lychkina, Volkov, 2010; Kavtaradze, 2015) on the environment.

In a new Russian magazine about Attractive Urban and Rural Landscapes, URBAN, best practices are shown in terms of good places for people, or “green” places: sometimes articles only discuss the results in terms of moving grass in cities (Ignatieva, Ahrné, 2013). We need to underline that ecosystem theory as an academic discipline is slowly penetrating practice.

Towards a more Ecological Korolëv

With financial aid from the Italian Minister of Education and Korolëv Institute of Management, Economics and Sociology, the School of Public Administration at the Lomonosov Moscow University, together with the former Department of Architecture and Planning at the University of Sassari, proposed a two-year cooperation and student exchange program. An inter-active format was chosen, consisting of intensive Summer Schools: planning and design workshops interbedded with ‘expert’ seminars, simulation sessions, games and role play, field trips, and cultural interchanges. The program provided one intensive Summer School that took place in Korolëv, and another intensive Summer School in the context of the Sardinian Geo-Mining Park. Both Schools shared some planning and design topics and devices (e.g.: soil, water and air pollution; systems of phyto-remediation; brown fields and wastelands reuse), in a general framework of Sustainable Development that inverted its scales and paradigms. In Korolëv the project was developed at an urban scale, and inserted into the general ecological network; in Sardinia a network of places was the starting point and the environmental issues (e.g.: mobility, land reclamation, blue and urban green infrastructures) were treated in a more detailed scale.

The project was multidisciplinary in several dimensions:
- Scientific and educational practice;
- Latin and Slavic cultural cooperation in research and project;
- Jointly organized field studies, art interpretation and IT as an everyday instrument of planning and decision making;
- The result was tangible and presented: both to officials of Korolëv town and published (Kavtaradze, Casu, 2011) and to the Geo-Mining Park Authorities.
- The international team work gave produced educational results and the project wa being a mode of cooperation.
- The initiative of university professors was positive and used later in different local projects by repeating some of the information. Several years have now passed and Ecological Korolëv has become an innovative project for local architects and for other sustainable development plans to be released.
Developing a desirable future EKorolëv science-city

A “city of the future” design is demonstrated in many student competitions as well as national and international architect exhibitions. Looking through old English, French and Russian magazines it is difficult to find any case of their implementation after 10, 20, 50 years. It seems to be a professional exercise only. Ecological Korolëv is also an intellectual model (look above) that is positively based on successfully recognized (natural, social) barriers, that in the project were often overcome. Among them are long term working restrictions: the risks of which could be relevant many years later; restrictions that come from the type of landscape, ecosystem dynamics, human needs etc. and reveal themselves decades later. It seems to be the main role of science and field work: recognize value and avoid conflict between artificial and natural ecosystems.

For project participants and educators it looks similar to first steam automobile, that is moving so slowly and noisily that it kills any imagination that it will have a fantastic future.

To be certain in our underlying result we need to mention some important points.

– Korolëv town was a really good opportunity to begin with. Very well educated citizens, advanced administration, world famous space technologies: the right place to start a multidisciplinary project from scratch in cooperation with the best universities.

– SD principles suit Korolëv as a complex that combines intellectual, engineering and advance space philosophy and technologies: citizens are motivated to try new approaches and are ready to be involved in experiments.

– Korolëv is a potentially perfect “ecologically friendly city”, due to its situation across the direct boundaries of “Losiny Ostrov” National Park and near the biggest megapolis. The importance of this natural neighbor requires further comment.

Korolëv is situated on a moraine-water-glacier plain and part of Meshchera physiographic province that occupies the eastern part of Moscow region. The climate is characterized by moderate cold winters and warm summers. The town’s population is more than 172,000 people. Today Korolëv has the status of ‘science city’ (awarded on 12 April 2001). The city occupies 52 square kilometers. It is a center for the rocket-space industry. The city is bounded by other towns: Mytishchi, Pushkino, Fryazino, Shchelrovo and the city of Moscow. The southern boundary is formed by “Losiny Ostrov” National Park.

“Losiny Ostrov” is the biggest National Park in the vicinity of a megapolis and occupies a territory of 11,816,000 hectares. Moscow Ring Road passes through its territory for 7.5 kilometers, dividing it into urban and regional parts. The flora and fauna is very rich: 45 mammal species, 185 birds, 9 amphibians and no less than 20 fish species. Many of the flora and fauna species of the National Park are included in Russian national and regional Red Data Books.

It became clear that our project would encounter several universal problems of SD so we established: meaningful communication “bridges” that opened up the possibilities for mutual understanding; reciprocal communication be-
tween scientists, municipal administration, planners, National Park authorities and Korolëv Technological University. Then we are able to work together.

It is extremely important to work in a 3D real environment particularly as each suggestion requires an immediate answer to several certain questions: why, where and what will happen in several years. Answers need to be drawn on paper and recognized on screen. Multidisciplinary projects are the result of intensive team work, by a team that is working together for many days, shoulder to shoulder, in the same few rooms, and traveling and even cooking together etc. Then there are the discussions, though not arguing. We think that Korolëv-science city as a polygon and the EKorolëv project are a valid example of steps in the right direction and a method of project design that needs to be qualified. An Italian planners’ vision of landscape, ecosystems and social network was productively presented by Alessandra Casu along with fully implemented scientific data from long term research conducted by the city’s ecologist Vladimir Volkov.

In Korolëv six “principles” for a more sustainable development were proposed, each one calling for a system of actions to implement ecological planning, and aiming to reach the implicit objectives that each principle intended. According to the original notion of SD, the principles, their objectives, and the related actions propose a strategic approach that tries to make ecological, economic and human aspects work together (Tab.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme of principles for local EKorolëv SD and related actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>6 principles of sustainable development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Save and improve ecological network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Closing the Cycles: Environmental resources management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural resources management</td>
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<td>Edge design</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainable Housing</td>
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<td>Risk management</td>
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On closer inspection of the proposed principles, some implicit objectives and disciplinary topics emerge:

– *Save and improve ecological network* means the recognition of the environmental structure of the place, and claims for actions aiming to maintain it, facing the fragmentation and improving the connectivity.

– *Closing the Cycles: Environmental resources management* recalls the need for an adequate management of scarce resources, in a sort of symbiosis among people and environment, where this can also provide places for implementing a new, better “sociability”. Actions are mostly related to the management of rain and storm water, and to the lifecycle of the “second matters”.

– *Natural resources management*; the Natural Park is shared by Korolëv and the Moscow Metro Region. Along its edges, anthropogenic pressure is threatening the natural resources and their maintenance; at the same time, the lack of recreational and educational places can threaten even more by increasing anthropogenic pressure on the environment, calling for actions that can balance these antagonistic needs.

– *Edge design* faces the transition between urban and rural, urban and natural, by interposing forms of buffer zones in which each function is gradually included and “absorbed” by the ecosystem.

– *Sustainable Housing* not only calls for the need to avoid soil consumption by regenerating wastelands, brownfields, neglected or abandoned areas: it also calls for a stormwater drainage system to provide new recreational areas, and design devices to save energy and scarce resources, and to avoid monotony in housing by balancing density and social needs.

– *Risk management* faces either adaptation to flooding and the management of stormwater or industrial risk (many factories related to aero-spatial and military technologies are located in Korolëv) and consequent nano-particle pollution.

Implementation of the EKorolëv project might have a different strategy and tactics. The most reasonable in given conditions is to improve certain places and elements that are meaningful and coherent with the whole project, and can be implemented by the city’s Green service. Also, the highways were improved and have taken a part of the traffic load from the national park. One attractive proposal by EKorolëv was to create a recreational area on the Green space over the covered water supply channel. Though even a good project is not easy to implement in a living city. It is well known that the municipal government usually has independent tactics and important tasks that should be done tomorrow. This explains the importance of the small scathes’ figures in our article as it is language of the project. Words are good to give names to principles and pictures to demonstrate options of their implementation.

The six principles, and the actions to implement them, match together in a sort of Strategic Master Plan (Fig.) that shows their localization and how they can match and work together.

The Master Plan is accompanied and better detailed with other visuals, in which every single idea is represented by sketches, graphics, photo-simulations and suggestions. For the public audience a PPT presentation was also provided, helping with images, slides and animations.
The main theme is the resources management:
- for natural resources, this is addressed in talking about Losiny Ostrov Natural Park and its edge in touch with the urban fabric, and talking about connectivity;
- for energy, this is addressed in talking about sustainable housing, paying attention to bio-climatic design, and to the life cycle of buildings, infrastructure and urbanized land;
- for materials, paying attention to the lifecycle and the system dynamics related to waste production;
- for water, it is treated in small catchment areas – that provide not only sustainable drainage, but also recreational areas – and with waste-water treatment plants that can also provide areas for educational and recreational purposes.

The second topic is the safety of population, treated using risk management:
- for industrial heavy metal pollution, mainly using the green infrastructure to mitigate it;
- for flooding – which should be strongly considered in the face of global Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) – by designing a network of channels, paths for the water, and places to accumulate it, also providing recreational areas surrounded by new more sustainable districts.
The real results: local responses

The final project was submitted to the mayor and the administration, experts, students and teachers from several Moscow region high schools, and was published bilingually in Moscow the following year once the practice part in Sardinia had been completed. The EKorolëv project was also presented at several conferences, professional meetings and the architecture biennial.

The large scale of the EKorolëv project and its multi-dimensional presentation gave both theoretical and instrumental results:

- The EKorolëv project demonstrates an ensemble of principles that need to be implemented simultaneously: “one by one” tactics bring more conflicts than results.
- Urbanization is maybe the most complex system created by humans: the transformation of such systems needs to be firstly modeled, and the best scenario with the lowest risk should be chosen.
- EKorolëv is a project with low ecological risks in the long term and could be used as a prototype of the ecopolis mode of urbanization.
- EKorolëv states that a coherent co-evolution of society and nature is possible and needs to be scientifically modeled and implemented in regional and urban planning, as in human way of life and everyday philosophy and practice.
- In the given conditions Russia needs to design strategies of urbanization and choose an ecological mode for new and old cities. “Humanity is not able to jump out from Nature” (N. Baransky motto), “Build inclusive, safe and sustainable cities and human settlements” (IIS, 2014): towns need to take care of nature, as it was underlined in the UN GA in 2015.
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NEW SPACES FOR CHANGE: POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY DEVOLUTION IN THE UK

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Abstract
Modern state governance in Western Europe has undergone significant changes in the past thirty years. The horizontal shake-up triggered by new public management was complemented by a vertical shake-up of governance systems, fuelled by the European integration process and the increasingly prominent role of the regions both in economic development and in democratic renewal. The devolution process in the UK represents one of the most significant constitutional reforms of the British governance system, with deep political, administrative and policy implications. Drawing on a nine year old longitudinal study of the unfolding of the devolution process in the UK, this article explores the challenges and opportunities offered by the new political spaces created by devolution. The argument put forth in this paper is that devolution, whilst acting as a catalyst for differentiation and innovation both at process and output level, has lacked strategic vision in the re-shaping of the policy framework of the UK, thus exposing serious limitations of the current governance system, especially in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the new governance frameworks, but also in terms of long term sustainability.

Keywords: regionalism; devolution; policy fragmentation; spaces for changes; multi-level governance.

Introduction
Modern state governance has undergone significant changes in the last thirty years as a result of a deep entrenchment of the neo-liberal orthodoxy and its associated reforms in Western democracies -new public management -, and of the increased socio, economic and political interconnectedness resulting from globalisation and, in the European context, from the integration process. The United Kingdom, arguably, pioneered some of the new public management rhetoric and practice as successive governments since the 1980s sought to re-draw the boundaries of the state, its role in economic development and in rolling back the bureaucratic machinery of the welfare state (Rhodes, 1996). Moreover, since 1973, when it became a member of the European Community, the UK
has also absorbed the dynamics of the European integration process (Bache and Marshall, 2004; Bache, 2007). More recently, since 1997 when the devolution process was launched, the United Kingdom’s political, administrative and policy landscape has become increasingly fragmented and the new devolved administrations have pursued different policy directions (Adams and Robinson, 2002; Adams and Schmuecker, 2006).

Traditionally, the UK, despite its multi-national status and the asymmetry between the historic regions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, has presented strong features of a heavily centralised unitary state (Keating, 2010). The policy making machinery, heavily concentrated in Whitehall departments in London, has often been described in public administration literature as mostly opaque, bureaucratic, and centralised (Rowlands, 1998). The governance of the UK relied on a strong central government, deriving its support and legitimacy from a constitutional setup anchored in a majoritarian system – thus favouring strong executives –, ministerial responsibility and parliamentary sovereignty as underlying constitutional principles.

The first wave of modernisation of the British governance system included a horizontal shake-up of government infrastructure and processes triggering what in academic literature is often contextualised as the paradigmatic shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, from hierarchies to quasi-markets and networks (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Rhodes, 1996). Public sector reforms such as privatisation, agentification and the co-option of the private sector into the delivery of public services prompted new ways and new labels for the means of conducting government business: ‘steering, not rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), new public management, joined-up government etc (Flynn, 2001). More recently, the rhetoric of new public governance features co-production to describe the new dynamics between design and implementation of public services and the interconnectedness between the public, the private and the third sector (Bovaird, 2006; Pestoff, 2013).

A second wave of modernisation of the British governance landscape, which forms the focus of this article, marks the vertical re-configuration of the British state. This article distinguishes between two stages in this vertical shake-up of the British governance system, marked by the process of devolution. First generation devolution was launched in 1997 in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The process, highly political and constitutional in nature, has been largely a top-down process dominated arguably by compromise and lack of vision (McAllister and Stirbu, 2015). It created a new tier of democratic politics in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and has essentially re-shaped the UK as a multi-level, quasi-federal system of governance (Bogdanor, 2003). Arguably, the context has been set by transformations within the European Community, where regional and cohesion policies emphasised the role of regional or mezzo-level decision making (Hooghe, 1996; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity, introduced under the Treaty of Maastricht, has fuelled a discourse that focuses on regional empowerment (Web and Collis, 2000) rather than on the primacy of the central government in economic development and planning. In the UK, these trends were also coupled with at-
tempts to silence nationalist demands arising in Scotland and Wales, revitalise the democratic process, and better accommodate the diversity within the Union (Bogdanor, 2001).

The second generation devolution - to English cities and counties - is a form of co-ordinated localism and decentralisation of power, driven by economic growth aspirations as well as survival instincts within the context of deepening austerity in the UK and the toughening of central government (Stirbu, 2015). The process, fragmented and piecemeal so far, started in November 2014, when the Greater Manchester Combined Authority secured an extensive devolution package with the UK Treasury, closely followed by Sheffield City region. In line with the government's *Northern Powerhouse* rhetoric supporting growth in North England as a counterbalance to London's economic dominance, the *Devolution to Cities and Counties Bill 2015–16* was introduced in Parliament after the Conservatives' electoral success in May 2015. This second generation (English) devolution, although essentially very different to that in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as it seeks to address mainly economic rather than democracy deficits, contributes nevertheless to the complexity of the governance framework in the United Kingdom.

The spatial fragmentation of the policy landscape arising from devolution and decentralisation led to a diversification and territorialisation of policy spaces, actors and processes (Keating et al 2009). The consequences in terms of output and outcomes, especially from the perspective of first generation devolution, have largely been accounted for from different perspectives. Some focus on policy differentiation and policy transfer within the UK’s nations (Loughlin and Skyes, 2004; Keating, 2003, 2006; Keating and McEwan, 2005), whilst others focus on innovation and divergence in specific policy areas in the realm of social care, care for the elderly, social justice, and education (Greer, 2004).

Nonetheless, there is a deficit of reflection upon devolution’s transformational capacity at the level of institutional structures and processes. This article explores some of the challenges and opportunities offered by these new political spaces created as a result of the asymmetric process of devolution in the UK. The argument put forth in this paper is that devolution, whilst acting as a catalyst for differentiation and innovation both at process and output level, has lacked strategic vision in the re-shaping of the policy framework of the UK, thus exposing serious limitations of the current governance system, especially in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the new governance frameworks, but also in terms of long term sustainability.

Drawing on a seven year longitudinal study on the UK devolution process, this article provides, first, an overview of the governance landscape of the UK and its constituent regions. It will then focus on the vertical shake-up triggered by the process of devolution by outlining some of the innovation through devolution from a Welsh and Scottish perspective with a focus on policy process differentiation and integration of services. Additionally, the paper will overview some of the major challenges presented by the advent of these new spaces for change in the policy landscape of the UK and will draw lessons for countries that are currently undergoing decentralisation reforms.
This article uses multi-level governance as a theoretical background, and advances the 'spaces for change' perspective as a tentative framework for conceptualising and explaining the variants of governance patterns that exist across the United Kingdom and the shifting locus of decision making from central governments to multi-actor arenas.

Devolution and the fragmentation of the policy arena in the UK

Devolution was launched in 1997 by the then newly elected Labour government. The process involved the creation of new democratically elected and accountable institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland which enjoyed various degrees of power, featured different electoral systems and different ways of operating. The three institutions are also different in size and in the way the transfer of their functions was achieved. The Scottish Parliament, arguably the most advanced form of devolution in the UK (Bogdanor, 2003), enjoyed –from the very start- tax-varying powers and had a clear legislative system delineating reserved and devolved powers. At the other end of the spectrum, Wales was noticeably the least developed of the three systems. The National Assembly initially had only secondary legislative powers in specific matters (previously in the Secretary of State's portfolio), whilst the Westminster Parliament retained legislative competence in all other matters (Rawlings, 1998).

First generation devolution has not happened in a political vacuum. It has its roots in historic claims for self-government and self-rule in the Celtic regions and also in the administrative decentralization epitomised by the creation of the Scottish Office and the Wales Office in Whitehall (1881 and 1964 respectively) that dealt with local affairs in Scotland and Wales. Secondly, devolution has also been linked with the rise of regionalism in Europe that created an impetus and acted as a catalyst for calls to address the democratic deficit in the Celtic nations (Bogdanor, 2003; Rawlings, 2003), thus bringing government closer to the citizens (Burrows, 2000).

In practice, devolution has been extremely fluid and is still unfolding in the United Kingdom, thus living up to the expectations or premonition of the former Secretary of State for Wales Ron Davies when he famously described it as a 'process not an event'. From a constitutional perspective, the set-up of new legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland meant that new polities, or political spaces were created, deriving their legitimacy from a series of Acts of Parliament and referendums. To date, the constitutional settlements for Scotland and Wales in particular have withstood a great deal of change and adaptation, seeking to absorb the inherent changes and challenges posed by the dynamics of new political spaces. In Scotland, the drive for independence and the continuous public and political deliberative exercise over it constitutional future, culminated with a referendum in Autumn 2014, which produced support (yet not overwhelming) for a place in the Union rather than outside it. In Wales, the constitutional flux was more focused on redressing the inadequacies of the initial set-up and on constitutional alignment with Scotland (Stirbu, 2015).
Following the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 and the upsurge in support for the Scottish Nationalist Party the devolution rhetoric shifted dramatically across the UK. The devolved administrations in Edinburgh and Cardiff have been calling for constitutional protection of their legislatures and for various degrees of income tax devolution and fiscal powers, whilst the UK Government has been pushing a rather top-down, yet uncoordinated set of reforms to the governance of England, which include devolution deals for English cities or combined authorities and a significant reform in the local government financing system (Stirbu, 2015).

The political and policy landscape of the UK was in 2015 much more diverse than it was two decades ago. No less than four different electoral systems are used to elect representatives at local (the Single Transferable Vote is used in Scotland), regional (the Additional Member System is used in Scotland and Wales), national (First-Past-the-Post) and European (regional lists) levels. Minority and coalition governments have become the norm rather than the exception in Scotland and Wales, where nationalist parties are or have been in government (SNP in Scotland since 2007), or in coalition (Plaid Cymru and Labour in Wales 2007–2011) (Seyd, 2004; McAllister, 2007; Osmond, 2007).

Furthermore, public policy in Britain has undergone some diversification due to devolution (Adams and Robinson, 2002; Adams and Schmuecker, 2006; Keating, 2003, 2005; Keating and McEwan, 2006), the policies of devolved governments often departing from the Whitehall policy line (for example on tuition fees in Scotland and Wales, free prescriptions and bus travel in Wales, free personal care for the elderly in Scotland). And lastly, of interest to this paper, the policy making process has also suffered some diversification as well. Various academic studies highlight innovations in the policy arena made by parliamentary committees in Scotland and Wales and their significant contribution to policy (Arter, 2004; McAllister and Stirbu, 2007b; Keating, 2010). Similarly, the devolved administrations seem to be more inclusive in their decision making; public engagement and participation being highlighted as one of the significant advancements through devolution in Wales and Scotland (Stirbu and McAllister, 2011).

As mentioned previously, devolution – a process, not an event – has been extremely fluid. This dynamic, manifested through constant negotiation and renegotiation between London and the periphery of the policy competence boundaries, powers and institutional infrastructures supporting devolution deepened the process to a great extent. To illustrate this, the debates around the financial aspects of elected and non-elected politicians’ activity (Hansard Society, 2009; Roger Jones IRP Report, 2009) have brought proportional representation, reform of the House of Lords, and reform of the House of Commons to the political agenda, whilst unveiling significant differences in the way the institutions in Wales and Scotland dealt with the issue of expenses, as opposed to Westminster. There are a lot of examples of policy crossovers and cross-fertilization.

This confirms, to an extent, devolution’s experimentation and innovation capacity (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007b). However, the questions that arise are: Has the policy landscape, both in terms of the process and the outcome, been changed significantly through devolution? And what are the major challenges and opportunities that these new spaces for change present us with? And finally,
are there any lessons transitional countries or countries undergoing both constitutional and administrative reforms can learn from the UK Experience?

In order to answer these questions, this paper is going to focus on the impact of devolution on the policy making process and outcome in Wales. This paper will investigate, through a series of cases and examples, how constitutional arrangements in Wales created and facilitated new policy practices (via extended and compulsory consultation processes with the civil society etc.) which in turn led to policy diversification between Wales and the rest of the UK.

Conceptualising spatial policy changes in Britain

The link between major constitutional changes and policy making is not always straightforward. However, in the case of devolution, as it is with other similar reforms such as regionalization and decentralisation, the links are more than obvious. Academic literature on federalism and regionalism has long proposed the argument that territorial units in federal structures act as laboratories for democracy (Galle and Leahy, 2009) thus opening up the potential for the development of radically different policy practices between the constituent regions (Mooney et al., 2006).

From a British perspective, most of the academic literature on policy making in the UK has mainly used three theoretical approaches to understanding and improving it. The Westminster model, an analytical framework proposing a clear separation between policy and administration (policy is made by the elected politicians and carried out by civil servants) is based on assumptions of simple plurality, with governments carrying out their electoral promises in the policies they formulate (Keating, 2010). The model is helpful in understanding various aspects of Whitehall departments’ policy making but does not account for more recent transformation in the policy sphere, completely disregarding notions of public participation and policy deliberation.

The rational model, proposed by Hogwood and Gun (1984), sees policy making a rational staged approach, where various decision-making actors intervene so that they solve particular policy problems or achieve specific policy goals. This model is particularly useful in understanding the different phases in the policy process and allows for flexible interpretations on who intervenes in the process, and how.

The incremental model of policy making is arguably a pragmatic theorization of what happens in practice in the policy arena. Governments’ ability to follow the rational model religiously is hindered by the complexity of modern day governance, by the scarcity of time and resources and by the institutional entrenchment and path dependency. The focus is on small steps of ‘what it works’ rather than leaps of faith into what rational evaluation and research says (Gregory, 1989).

All three models are only partially helpful in explaining the complexities of policy making and public service delivery in the UK post-devolution. There are significant limitations in all of them, particularly when it comes to explaining the various features of the policy landscapes in Scotland and Wales, for instance, post devolution.
Multi-level governance theories (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001) might come in handy in this case as they account for the existence of various policy communities across the different levels of government and also for the type of intergovernmental relations that exist between the central government and the territorial units (Dente, 1997). Multi-level governance includes a body of theoretical work that seeks to explain the dynamics in modern governance of states and supranational organisations. Dente (1997) uses a three layer categorisation of federal or quasi federal arrangements in order to explain the link between various power sharing models and the socio-economic complexities of the context. His categorisation includes: the co-ordinate / layer cake federalist model, which implies clear demarcation and independence of the jurisdictions at state and federal level. This model is often associated with stable socio-economic and political contexts. The second model proposed is the co-operative federalism, to be found in mostly transitional contexts, and competitive federalism, a model which implied competition between the various level of government for power, resources and legitimacy. The later model characterises a turbulent context. Other interpretations of multi-level governance – governance spread across multiple levels of authority, have been used to explain the emergence of the European Union and the deepening of the European Union integration process (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Hooghe and Marks define a two-fold typology of multi-level governance relations and focus on the core-periphery dynamic (2001). Their typology is determined by the centrifugal and centripetal forces that act within the governance infrastructure – forces that see power being concentrated towards the centre / core, whilst the periphery follows – centripetal; and forces that see power, authority and decision-making migrating from the centre towards the periphery – centrifugal forces (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). These forces are not static within a complex political system and, in line with other theories on European integration (see the supra-nationalism vs inter-governmentalism debates), the momentum swings between the two driving forces, thus favouring the centre or the periphery. This implies a constant negotiation and re-negotiation of the governance terms in a given political context.

Multi-level governance can thus be a starting point in explaining and contextualising the process of devolution in the UK and, more importantly, in explaining its inherent fluidity and impact on the policy arena. Bache and Flinders (2004) as well as Bulmer et al (2002) have opened the road to such investigation already.

Next, this paper will outline the main features at constitutional, institutional and policy level in the UK, with a focus on Scotland and Wales – reported to the rest of the UK. This overview focuses on the impact these arrangements have had on the policy arena. However, a word of caution is necessary here: this is not an impact study using crude measurement of indicators but an institutionalist overview linking theory and practice in the UK’s devolution practice.

Devolved powers and competencies:
new policy arenas created

Devolution in the UK is asymmetrical; this means that the constituent regions have competencies to act in various areas to different degrees. The devolu-
tion model in Scotland is a reserved powers model, implying that the Scottish parliament has competency to act in all policy areas (transport, education, justice, health etc), except for those reserved by Westminster (such as defence, monetary policy, constitutional affairs etc). Welsh devolution however, has operated on very different parameters, in a conferred powers model – the Welsh Assembly has power to act only on certain clearly specified policy areas, all the rest being retained by Westminster. The Draft Wales Bill 2015 proposes changes that would bring Wales onto a reserved power model similar to Scotland.

What has been the significance of this asymmetric power sharing model in the UK on the policy making process? Firstly, it meant that Scotland and Wales dealt with different systemic constraints in the development of their policy making. The Welsh model, strung by complexity and cumbersomeness, has been and still is, due to the way the powers were transferred, heavily reliant on Westminster and Whitehall. From a policy perspective, the model requires not only the Welsh ministers and civil servants to carefully navigate the legal and constitutional boundaries of the policy area, but for their Whitehall counterparts to do the same, so that they do not act on areas in which the Assembly has competency. Any policy decision stemming from a Whitehall department is bound to have an impact on Wales (unless stated so deliberately). Thus, an inventory of such powers and competencies is mandatory.

Since the inception of devolution, the Welsh model has presented challenges for policy makers in Whitehall and Cathays Park but also to the parliamentary sides in Cardiff Bay and Westminster. Legislating in unclear areas is time consuming and generates bureaucratic processes that have nothing to do with the substance of policy making but all to do with policing the policy-making process. Moreover, that fact that the Welsh devolution model has suffered the most reviews and transformations to date (i.e. the move from corporate body structure to parliamentary structure, enhanced legislative powers via Legislative competence orders, a referendum on primary powers) meant that intergovernmental relations between Cardiff and London have been more prominent and the negotiation and renegotiation of devolution boundaries between Wales and the UK has been a constant feature of devolution. The Draft Wales Bill proposals, put forward by the Secretary of State for Wales in October 2015, and the criticism it attracted from all sides of the political spectrum (National Assembly Presiding Officer, 2015; CLA Committee, 2015) in Wales as well as from academics (McAllister and Stirbu, 2015) signal that Welsh devolution is still far from a long lasting settlement. There are obviously policy implications for this; first, in terms of clarity of policy and jurisdictional boundaries between Wales and England; and second, in terms of policy instruments available to the Welsh Government to enforce its distinctive legislation.

From a Scottish perspective, the unfolding of the devolution process there brought different challenges and opportunities. Scotland had the ‘luxury’ of a clear cut model that allowed the Scottish Parliament to flex its muscles in terms of designing new, Scottish fit for purpose policies. The expectations over policy differentiation between Edinburgh and London have been great from the start. Keating (2010) highlights significant differences that took place at the institutional level
of policy making. However, Cairney (2004) and others point out that in terms of policy divergence devolution has been rather evolutionary than revolutionary. Nonetheless, politically, the Scottish Independence referendum in 2014 and the subsequent surge in support for the Scottish National Party under the new leadership of Nicola Sturgeon, offer a clear indication of Scotland’s distinctiveness within the Union. The policy implications of this political distinctiveness are visible in the SNP’s visible opposition to the London based Conservative government’s continued austerity programme in the UK, a sentiment that is echoed to an extent in Wales as well (White, 2015).

To sum up, in as far as the Welsh developments have been focused more on redressing constitutional abnormalities than on devising a radically different policy context in Wales, Scotland has struggled with rather great and self-imposed expectations. Having said that, one feature present in both countries has been the bargaining over new and more robust powers. This bargaining has taken different forms: in Wales it was mostly about institutional re-adjustment, whereas in Scotland the debate has been more political.

**Devolved governments**

The policy epicentre in both Scotland and Wales, post devolution, lies in their devolved governments, the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government respectively. Institutionally, these are descending directly from the Scotland Office and the Wales Office. Moreover, given that the devolution process did not extend to the civil service, and that system still operates on the Unity of the British Civil Service, the Scottish and Welsh governments, at administrative levels have inherited a lot of the practices of Whitehall.

Keating (2010) argues that there is a significant degree of differentiation in the policy making machinery between Edinburgh and London. The Scottish Government has made a clear move towards a new policy focus that aligns administrative responsibilities with policy problems for instance. Similarly, the way the Scottish Government Senior Civil Service is organised, with much shorter lines of communication than in Whitehall, means that since 2007, when the SNP came into power, the hierarchy in decision making has been significantly reduced (Keating, 2010). This creates a series of opportunities in the Scottish Government. First, policies can be developed across directorates, thus adopting a more holistic approach that is in fact practically possible in Whitehall (given the way departments are set-up and how the chain of communication and decision making operates). Secondly, given the strong links that Scottish government has with policy, communities and networks in Scotland, one can argue that there is scope for more evidence based policy making. The role of local government in Scotland is also important as a source of policy advice (Keating, 2010).

As far as challenges are concerned, the biggest challenge faced by the new policy makers in Scotland has arguably been the lack of policy capacity existent in Scottish government. Therefore, the criticism that Scotland has not been innovative enough in the first year of devolution in terms of creating policy diverging from those of Westminster, have the roots in this capacity deficit experienced by the Scottish Government (executive at that time) and the Scottish
Parliament. The Scottish Executive has sought to redress that since 2006 and the initiative took a new impetus with the election of the SNP government in 2007. Training on the policy skills of civil servants has been introduced into the Scottish government since 2006.

From a Welsh perspective, the experience of the first years of devolution has been different. The Welsh government, given its limited powers and the systemic constitutional constraints faced in its first four terms, has been branded as innovative in navigating the murky waters of the newly emerged Welsh policy landscape. In contrast with Scotland, some academics have branded some of the Welsh achievement in policy as more innovative. Policy initiatives, such the creation of the Children’s Commissioner for Wales, have been applauded and will soon be adopted by the Scottish counterparts for instance (Williams, 2003; Birrell, 2009).

Role of the legislatures
Arguably, legislature’s role in policy making is extremely limited in executive dominated majoritarian systems. Their role in making legislation is confined to scrutinising and embedding government proposals, rather than initiating policy proposals themselves. However, devolution in the UK presents us with an interesting case of parliamentary committees becoming more involved actors in the policy arena. In Wales in particular, the set-up of the National Assembly with only limited executive functions - hence, no legislative pressures- and with committees that joined scrutiny and policy development roles, meant that the policy making machinery in Wales was augmented. Previous studies into the Assembly’s subject committees’ policy development role show that these have been extremely innovative in the way they contributed to the policy making process (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007b). The committees have virtually created new venues of policy deliberation, separate from those of the Welsh government. Policy deliberation also took a very different form, focusing on evidence-based policy making, involvement of stakeholders, openness and transparency of the process, as well as a commitment to inclusiveness. The committees covered areas that normally escape the interest of government. Some of the most notable policy inquiries conducted by the Welsh subject committees included a review of the governance of football in Wales and a review of dance, for instance. Welsh committees can also initiate legislation and, coupled with the Assembly’s standing orders and its precedents in allowing more committee and private member initiated legislation to pass through the Assembly (more so than any other legislature in the UK), the policy arena in Wales has been surprisingly diversified.

Nonetheless, the small capacity of the Assembly (a very small size, only 60 members) has acted as a recurring hindrance. The small pool of members has to cover wide areas of policy portfolios and struggle with multiple memberships to committees. Capacity issues have featured as a main weakness of the Welsh devolution model (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007b; Bates, 2003; Osmond, 2004, Richard Commission 2004l Silk Commission, 2014).

To sum up, the infrastructure supporting the policy in Wales and in Scotland is becoming more robust and has exhibited a series of innovative features. At the heart of these new policy arenas sits a commitment towards inclusiveness.
Service integration

One of the most significant departures of devolved government in Scotland and Wales from the UK norms of agentification has been the reform of delegated governance in the new polities, mainly addressing the issue of non-departmental public bodies exercising government functions. Critics of the quango-land mention lack of transparency and accountability as the prime concerns (Birrel 2008). Scotland and Wales have pursued similar policies in tackling quangos, with variable results. The Welsh Government’s decision to bring three of Wales’ most important quangos in-house in 2004 – the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), in charge of economic development; the Welsh Tourist Board (WTB) and the Education and Learning Wales (ELWa) – was criticised for the lack of consultation, transparency and thorough analysis as regards to the effects of burdening an already overloaded state (McAllister, 2009).

Birrel (2008) too argues that the rationalisation and democratisation of the delegated governance sphere had rather limited outcomes in the devolved administrations. This raises the question about the strategic capacity of the new governments to carefully map out an optimal distribution of government functions in their new polities. Wales in particular has struggled with capacity deficits on multiple levels. An added dimension in Wales was the limited capacity of the Welsh voluntary sector as well at the outset of devolution (Cole, McAllister and Stirbu, 2013). Nonetheless, some of these capacity issues have been overcome by the statutory duty of the Assembly (and the Government) to work in partnership with the voluntary sector, business sector and local government.

Nonetheless, a rationalisation of delegated governance can create different opportunities, ranging from an increase in the capacity of the devolved governments by pulling resources together, to increased accountability and increased strategic capacity overall.

Conclusion

This article has presented an overview of effects of devolution on the policy framework at the fringes of the policy landscapes in the UK, focusing on Wales and Scotland. The devolution process has been advocated as a far-reaching constitutional reform in the United Kingdom. Apart from the political and constitutional asymmetric institutional arrangements that devolution generated, and the fluidity associated with it (i.e. the deepening of the process by extending the degree of self-rule in the home nations, and the various changes undergone by the political institutions especially in Wales), one significant consequence of the devolution process is in regards to the policy making and the policy delivery process.

This article concentrated on highlighting the extent to which the new Welsh and Scottish political spheres have acted as laboratories for democracy and to what extent innovation has been facilitated in the home nations. Throughout this investigation, we have found that the new political spaces in Wales and Scotland do present a series of significant variants from the UK / England level. From a policy making perspective, devolution has created new political and administrative arenas, new spaces for change, with new political actors exercising their power and
competence. The policy space has not only been fragmented on a territorial basis but undergone significant changes at process and institutional levels.

First, the rhetoric on the policy making arena has been focused on not only doing things differently from Westminster but also on aiming to have different outcomes in terms of policy. The debate over policy divergence/convergence in the UK as a result of devolution has been extremely heated in academic circles. Significant divergence in terms of policy making institutional arrangements has been evidenced in both Scotland and Wales (McGarvey & Shephard, 2002; Loughlin & Skyes, 2004). Despite inheriting a policy making machinery so deeply rooted in Whitehall practices, the devolved administrations have managed to achieve a certain degree of separateness and differentiation from their London counterparts. In Wales, for instance, this has a lot to do with the fact that the principle of partnership between the Welsh Government and its social partners (voluntary sector, business sector and local government) was enshrined in Wales’ first constitutional document (the Government of Wales Act 1998) making it mandatory.

Secondly, devolution has arguably created more differentiation in process rather than outcome in policy. Both Scotland and Wales have adapted their policy making infrastructure and have pioneered new public engagement practices for instance; the policy making machinery in both countries operates on a more holistic level, with policy being developed across themes and the chains of command and communication being shorter that in Whitehall.

Thirdly, the asymmetry in devolution presented some challenges but also opportunities. There are examples of successful policy learning and transfer between administrations. However, the flaws in the original design of the devolution settlements meant that a lot of the focus, especially in Wales, has been on redressing some constitutional anomalies rather than on developing fit for purpose policies for Wales. Moreover, the new decentralisation dynamics in England, pursued without a strategic and coherent analysis of the whole of the UK policy framework risks introducing further fragmentation. Whilst this can foster innovation, the lack of the democratic renewal element in England might pose serious challenges to public accountability and scrutiny.

Fourthly, without disputing the democratic value of devolution and without undermining the inclusiveness focus of policy making in Scotland and Wales, there is not sufficient evidence to support the claim that devolution has made public service delivery in Wales and Scotland more efficient and effective. The devolution dividend, however quantified, did not seem to have reached the Welsh people for instance (Price, 2015). The failure of the Welsh government to reduce NHS waiting list times in Wales is particularly notable.

There are particular lessons that we can draw from the UK’s experience with asymmetric territorial devolution. Firstly, asymmetry can be a catalyst for experimentation and innovation. Secondly, the success of any form of decentralisation will be dependent on the policy and the institutional capacity of the constituent units. Thirdly, path dependency can hinder the development of new practices especially when the devolution of power does not permeate the political party system and the civil service.
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AREAS AND FORMS OF REGIONAL
COOPERATION IN MULTI-STRUCTURED
(MATRESHKA-STYLE) REGIONS
(TYUMEN REGION, RUSSIA)

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Abstract

The problem of the administrative, economic and social sustainability of a group consisting of neighboring regions with close ties has no clear solution yet. Should closely-tied regions in the long run form a centralized system of administrative bodies, compress their budgets into one, and construct unified social programs, or not? To answer this question, in the article we describe a case that represents the paramount form of cooperation amongst closely-tied regions. It is the case of the so-called multi-structured region, or “matreshka-style” region, where all the relationships culminated.

Analysis of the history and the present conditions of inter-regional cooperation, its areas and forms, in a unique multi-structured region of Russia, namely the Tyumen region1, shows that such centralization has its limits, and instead of “rough” centralization, more sophisticated procedures (programmed forms of economic cooperation, legally introduced forms of administrative coordination, structured distribution of management functions, combination of partially connected inter-regional budgetary processes) should be elaborated to provide the sustainable development of closely-tied regions.

Keywords: inter-regional cooperation; a multi-structured region (“matreshka-style” region); separation of powers; indicators of programs; theory of administrative functions, strategic planning.

Introduction

The problem of the sustainable development of closely-tied regions based on their inter-regional relations has been discussed since the 1870s at least. It is traced in Europe back to relations inside the Alsace–Lorraine group of regions (established during the period of the Franco-Prussian war); in the USA to the Washington Metropolitan area Council of Governments founded in 1957 (Washington DC, Maryland and West Virginia), and to the Minneapolis urban triangle located at the intersection of the municipal communities of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Maplewood and Saint Paul; in China

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1 Tyumen region is “matreshka-style” region that is comprised of three independent regions of the Russian Federation: Tyumen Region per se, Khanty-Mansiyskiy autonomous district-Yugra and Yamalo-Nenetskiy autonomous district.
it is the special economic and technological zone (SEZ) at Shanghai and Chengdu, etc. The main theoretical (with practical implementations) problem for the development of closely-tied regions is: how to combine administrative, economical and social rules and procedures for region-participants? Is it possible to set up a joint inter-regional administration and to unify the legislation of the regions, allowing them to act evenly for the purposes of sustainable inter-regional development?

Many studies in the field of inter-regional cooperation are devoted to the economic aspects of integration and development of the regions:

- Clusters as a key element in the metropolitan region concept (Litzel & Möller, 2011);
- Level of vertical alignment or integration of federal-state-local economic development policy and degree of horizontal alignment or integration of economic development strategy (Creating Global Competitive Economies: 2020);
- Special economic zones as a basis for rapid economic development, the epicenter of the reforms and the grounds for the introduction of new business models and activities (Mohiuddin, Regnière, Su, A. & Su, Z., 2014); types of special economic zones (Pakdeenurit, Suthikarnnarunai & Rattanawong, 2014).

There are also studies on the administrative (Wang & Li, 2013) and administrative-territorial relations of regions (Glezer, Kolosov, Brade, De Lille & Sluka, 2014). Some studies consider the social aspects of inter-regional cooperation and integration (Maher, 2015; Butz, 2014; Shey & Belis, 2013).

To find working practices and use benchmarking tools for the sustainable inter-regional development of closely-tied regions, we propose to pay attention to the most interconnected regions. For Russia, this is the so-called “matreshka-style” regions (or multistructured regions) that consist of some quasi-independent entities. For such regions, we can find forms of cooperation on different levels which have already been polished by practice. The existence of such regions shows ultimately that some kind of symbiosis for closely-tied regions is possible. Our case study – which concentrates on the Tyumen region, a historical and practically functioning example of a “matreshka-style” region, well-known amongst Russian researchers (Dobrynin, 2015; Ivanov, 2002; Ulyanov, 1997) – shows that instead of a mono system of governance, what arose here was a much more complicated managerial, social and economic phenomenon with distributed functions, cooperative finance flows, correlated local legislation, and multi-level social programs. It can be the approach for others regarding regional cooperation, if regions would like to set close ties.

The genesis of inter-regional cooperation in the Tyumen region

The Russian Federation as a federal state is comprised of 85 regions. Not all regions have the same legal status or level of economic development. Two out of the 85 regions – the Tyumen and Arkhangelsk regions – are called multi-structured, which makes them unique.

The Tyumen region’s peculiarity is that it is comprised of three independent regions of the Russian Federation – Tyumen Region per se, Khanty-Mansiyskiy autonomous district-Yugra and Yamalo-Nenetskiy autonomous district (hereinafter – the autonomous districts). At the same time, territories of the autonomous districts are a part of the Tyumen region territory.
This territorial structure was defined during the Soviet period of Russian history (in 1944) and affirmed later by the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993 (see part 4 of Article 66).

The Russian Constitution proclaims the principle of equal rights of all regions of the Russian Federation. However, this principle does not exclude the accession of autonomous districts in the Tyumen region. The relationship between the Tyumen region and autonomous districts can be seen as a manifestation of the law of dialectics – the unity and struggle of contradictions.

Let us have a look at the rationale behind the Tyumen region.

The territory and the population of the autonomous districts are included in the territory and population of the Tyumen region. Therefore, the population of the autonomous districts should be involved in the elections of the legislature and the governor of the Tyumen region.

Moreover, accession of the autonomous districts in the Tyumen region presumes a partial jurisdiction of the Tyumen region over the autonomous districts.

The autonomous districts believed that their accession into the Tyumen region is just a form of interaction between peer regions. They see the Tyumen region as just a set of its «southern territories.» Accessions, in their view, cannot serve as a basis for the formation of a combined government nor for the distribution of the jurisdiction of the Tyumen region over the autonomous districts. Moreover, the relationship between the autonomous districts and the Tyumen region should be regulated only by mutual agreement, i.e. a contract.

Another subject for disagreement is redistribution of financial resources. The corporate landscape of the region was formed so that a significant portion of corporate income tax goes to the budget of the autonomous districts.

In 1997, the conflict was through Constitutional Court proceedings. The Constitutional Court in its judgment dated 14.07.1997 N 12-P formulated the following legal position underlying the current state of relations in the region:
- The autonomous district, being an equal region of the Russian Federation, at the same time is a part of the Tyumen region. Accession requires the governments of both equal regions of the Russian Federation to ensure the preservation of territorial integrity and unity in the interests of the region’s population;
- Accession does not mean that the autonomous district is losing the elements of its status – territory, population, system of government, legislation;
- The power of the Tyumen Government shall apply to the territory of the autonomous districts in the cases and to the extent permitted by federal law, the statutes of the Tyumen region, autonomous districts and the contract between them;
- The Tyumen region and the autonomous districts have the right to transfer the exercise of their power to one another on a voluntary basis, by contract or by the adoption of the law;
- Absence of a contract cannot serve as an obstacle to the distribution of the jurisdiction of the Tyumen government over the territories of the autonomous district.

On the basis of this legal position, the following principles of relations in the region were adopted:
1) The independence of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts in the implementation of their economic and social policy;
2) Equality, mutual respect and the aspiration to achieve common prosperity and development;
3) Access to mutual information, coordination and consistency of actions;
4) Observance of agreements and contracts and responsibility for their implementation.

Separation of powers and the fields of inter-regional cooperation

Separation of the powers of the Tyumen region government and the autonomous districts is based on the principle of equality.

At the same time, the government of the Tyumen region exercises the following powers in the autonomous districts:
- Powers assigned to them by federal laws (see Table 1);
- The powers of the federal executive bodies, delegated for implementation to the executive bodies of the Tyumen region;
- Joint powers of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts in accordance with the agreements;
- The powers delegated by the governments of the autonomous districts to the government of the Tyumen region (see Table 1).

**Table 1**

**Examples of the powers of the Tyumen region government over the territories of the autonomous districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The powers set by Federal Act (paragraph 3 of Art. 26.6 of the Federal Act of 06.10.1999 № 184-FZ «On general principles of organization of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of subjects the Russian Federation»)</th>
<th>The powers delegated by the state authorities of autonomous districts bodies of state authority of Tyumen region (Art. 16 of the Charter of the Tyumen region)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The formation and maintenance of the archives of the region;</td>
<td>- Protection of economic interests of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts in the federal bodies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prevention of inter-municipal and regional emergency situations, natural disasters, epidemics and elimination of their consequences;</td>
<td>- Coordination of actions for energy management, communications, aviation, river, rail and pipeline transport, the protection of law and order, protection of information resources of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organization and implementation of regional and inter-municipal programs and projects in the field of environmental protection and ecological safety;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The establishment and protection of specially protected natural areas of regional importance;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support for agricultural production;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support for socially-oriented non-profit organizations;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning the use of agricultural land;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reservation of land, withdrawal of land for public use of the region;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintenance of the roads of regional or inter-municipal significance;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The regional supervision over the safety of roads of regional and inter-municipal significance;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organization of public transport services by air, sea, roads;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintenance, the development and organization of the operation of civil airports;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintenance, the content, the development and organization of river ports;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provision of state guarantees of the right to receive public and free pre-school education, primary general, basic general, secondary education, providing additional education for children;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The organization of secondary vocational education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As you can see, the powers of the Tyumen region government have a complex structure. This is due to the partial recognition of the jurisdiction of the Tyumen region government over the autonomous districts. In fact, Federal Act detailing 06.10.1999 N 184-FZ delegates the powers of the autonomous districts in favor of the Tyumen region (see column 1 of Table 1). Thus, we have to conclude that the autonomous districts lose the status of equal regions and the federal structure has an asymmetric character.

Let us look at the consideration of the situation in terms of the theory of functions.

Imagine that the powers of public administration are \( x \) – this is the domain of the functions of government \( y \). In the process of implementation of the powers of public administration a function acquires a particular value.

\[
y = f(x),
\]

where:

- \( y \) – The function of government, the dependent variable of \( x \);
- \( x \) – independent variable, the powers of the authorities in the form of specific actions;
- \( f \) – possible actions \( (x) \), for example, budgetary financing of the exercising of powers. It is possible to express by multiplying budget expenditures \( (p) \) and action or event under the authority \( (x) \). Budget expenditures can be determined by various methods: the method of comparable market prices (market analysis), the tariff method, cost method and others.

Thus, the value of the function of governance can be expressed by the formula:

\[
y = p \times x.
\]

In this case there are no powers. That is, the values of the government’s autonomous districts are reduced to zero. In other words, there is nothing to manage in the presence of their own taxes and the budget.

What should we do in this situation? There are three options.

1. Delegate the same powers as the other regions of the Russian Federation to the autonomous regions;
2. Refuse to model a multi-structured region. This route was taken by the most multi-structured regions of the Russian Federation in the 2000s. Currently, in the Russian Federation there are only two multi-structured regions – the Tyumen region and the Arkhangelsk region, including the Nenetskiy autonomous district.
3. On the basis of an agreement, transfer back the jurisdiction of the autonomous districts powers. Inter-regional cooperation in the Tyumen region is developing according to this scenario.

Since 1st January 2005 the Tyumen region has given the autonomous districts powers assigned to by law (paragraph 3 of Art. 26.6 N 184-FZ), reserving its right to fund certain activities. Thus, the Tyumen region has limited jurisdiction. This situation was determined by the contract between the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts.

As a result, since 2005, interaction between the Tyumen region and autonomous districts has been carried out in the following fields:

1) Development of a common strategy in pricing policies, taxation, budgeting;
2) Ensuring provision of food, consumer goods, new technologies for their production, construction of enterprises and social facilities, the development of the construction industry;
3) Development and implementation on the basis of equitable participation in regional programs. For each program, the Tyumen region and autonomous districts sign a contract which contains shared responsibilities of each party;
4) The development of common property;
5) The development and implementation of common approaches to issues affecting the interests of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts in the spheres of culture, education, health, urban planning, environmental protection, transport, communications, protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, pensions, social insurance, archives, and the social protection of the underprivileged.
6) Implementation of joint legal regulation in the use of natural resources;
7) Combating catastrophes, natural disasters, epidemics, epizootics, and the management of their consequences.
Inter-regional cooperation in these areas is carried out in various forms.

Forms and mechanism of inter-regional cooperation

Analysis of the interaction practices of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts reveals the following forms of inter-regional cooperation (see Table 2).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational forms – the forms of coordination</th>
<th>Legal forms</th>
<th>Economic forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Joint meetings of the legislative bodies of the Tyumen region, the Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts;</td>
<td>– Contracts;</td>
<td>– Programs of the Tyumen region;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– The Council of the legislatures of the Tyumen region, the Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts;</td>
<td>– Agreement;</td>
<td>– Joint ventures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Board of Governors of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts</td>
<td>– Joint legal acts</td>
<td>– Mutual funds;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main form of cooperation is through the government programs of the Tyumen region, representing a range of joint activities. Their approval is preceded by organizational and legal form (Picture 1).
The mechanism of cooperation of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts

During the implementation of the government Programs the provisions of the Treaty between the public authorities of the Tyumen region and the autonomous regions are realized and economic forms of cooperation are utilized.

Since 1 January 2015, the region has had a new state program «Cooperation» for the period up to 2020\(^2\). The Program was developed by the Government of the Tyumen region on the basis of proposals by the autonomous regions.

The purpose of the Program is to further develop the integration processes in the economy and the social sphere of the region (Table 3).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|p{15cm}|p{15cm}|}
\hline
\textbf{Program Objectives} & \textbf{Expected results} \\
\hline
- Encouraging movement of the retired from northern territories of the region to the southern regions; & - Provision of social support to certain categories of population who moved their permanent residence from the territories of the autonomous regions to the south of the Tyumen region; \\
- Create a database of qualified human resources in the region, the provision of professional education; & - The provision of social benefits for the purchase of residential premises for those who left the autonomous districts in towns south of the Tyumen region; \\
- Development of the transport network and transport services; & - Improvement of transport infrastructure and road safety; \\
- Provision of specialized health care & - Increase in the level of security of the inhabitants of the autonomous regions, institutions of culture, sport, health, child care institutions, institutions of general and specialized secondary education; \\
- & - Reducing the time required for elimination of the consequences of emergency situations, reducing the damage caused by emergencies, fires, including forest; \\
& - An organization providing high-tech medical assistance to residents of the autonomous regions in the regional specialized institutions and organizations \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^2\) The official portal of public authorities of the Tyumen region. Access mode: http://admtyumen.ru/ogv_ru/finance/programs/program.htm?id=1087@egTargetGrant
The total funding for the program „Cooperation” is 50 443 million rubles, distributed in the areas and activities of the Program (Table 4).

### Table 4
The main activities of the state program «Cooperation»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>The main activities</th>
<th>Expenses for the entire program period (2015–2020), mln.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of regional roads</td>
<td>27467.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organization and implementation of projects in the field of environmental protection and ecological safety</td>
<td>158.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Creating and ensuring the protection of state nature reserves and natural monuments of regional value</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Organisation of transport services by road, rail, inland waterways, air</td>
<td>2186.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The development of intra-regional cooperation and increasing the competitiveness of the regional agriculture producers</td>
<td>1014.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Construction and reconstruction of social facilities which provide services to the population of the Tyumen region, including the autonomous regions</td>
<td>6441.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Provision of professional education</td>
<td>36.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Implementation of projects in the field of sports</td>
<td>86.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Prevention of emergency situations of regional scale, natural disasters, epidemics and reducing the damage caused by emergencies</td>
<td>263.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Organization of specialized health care</td>
<td>9122.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The source of financing is a portion of the corporate income tax of the autonomous regions. Such a mechanism is determined by the contract between the government of the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts.

Under the terms of the agreement, the budget of the Tyumen region receives 29.5% of the corporate income tax of the autonomous regions. This revenue is also intended to finance part of the authority of the Tyumen region which exists throughout the region, including the autonomous regions (p. 3 of Art. 26.6 N 184-FZ). However, as noted earlier, the Tyumen region on 1 January 2005 transferred these powers for independent implementation by the autonomous areas. Thus, the Tyumen region consolidates significant resources of the autonomous regions.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Program is held annually on a single criterion – the level of funding for the Program (Table 5).

### Table 5
Evaluation of the Program «Cooperation»

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The level of funding for the Program, %</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Not less</td>
<td>Not less</td>
<td>Not less</td>
<td>Not less</td>
<td>Not less</td>
<td>Not less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89
As shown in Tables 3 and 4 the Program does not define outcomes in specific terms. In other words, the value of the functions of government is not determined according to the formula \( y = p \times x \).

The following indicators can be offered to measure the effectiveness of the Program and inter-regional cooperation in general:

- The proportion of people of retirement age who need to improve their housing conditions and thus relocate from the Far North areas to the southern areas of the Tyumen region;
- The length of regional roads that do not meet regulatory requirements as a proportion of the total length of roads of regional significance;
- The proportion of the population living in towns of the Tyumen region and the autonomous regions that do not have access to regular road, rail, water or air transport;
- The share of agricultural goods produced by regional agricultural producers proportion to the combined regional product in the Tyumen region and the autonomous regions;
- Children who require preschool institutions as a proportion of the total number of children of preschool age;
- The surface of occupied school buildings meeting general modern requirements (in square metres).

In 2014 the Federal Act „On the strategic planning in the Russian Federation” was adopted. It defines a system of strategic planning at every level of public administration. So, the methodologically correct decision is to determine the place of the „Cooperation” program in the system of strategic planning of social and economic development of the region.

The system of strategic planning at regional level can be represented in the following diagram (Picture 2). In the picture you can see steps of strategic development and supporting Acts.

**Picture 2**

**The system of strategic planning of social and economic development of the region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning the development indicators</th>
<th>Forecasting</th>
<th>Approving programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy of social and economic development of the region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The forecast of social and economic development of the region in the long term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The budget forecast of the region for the long term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The forecast of social and economic development of the region in the medium term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The action plan to implement the strategy of social and economic development of the region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The map of territorial planning in the region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted above, the first step of the strategic planning is the goal setting, which is carried out under the strategy of the region. The strategy sets the directions, goals and priorities of social and economic development. The strategy should also include the indicators – the values of governance. The indicators are the final results of programs. The immediate results of the programs should be planned in accordance to the indicator. Thus, the end results \((y)\) – are the dependent variables of the immediate results \((x)\). So, the end results are the indicators for assessment of the effectiveness of public administration in general, and individual programs, in particular.

Application of this model of strategic planning to the relationship between the Tyumen region and the autonomous districts will be a new stage of inter-regional cooperation.

**Conclusion**

The study demonstrates a unique example of cooperation between regions that make up a single multi-structured region. The peculiarity of the inter-regional cooperation of the Tyumen region and autonomous districts is the horizontal redistribution of financial resources in order to implement activities in the field of software for the social and economic development of the whole territory and its population. The Tyumen region performs the functions of administrator of programs and financial resources in this matreshka-style region. The Russian Federation only has the function of coordinator in the event of disputes and contradictions.

**REFERENCES**


THE OUTWARD DIMENSION IN RUSSIA’S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: A MAPPING OF PROSPECTIVE COOPERATION

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Abstract

There is a critical spatial component in the emerging cooperative Russian planning model for economic growth across the federation. Although in Russia, as in the EU, this spatial modeling for joint action and cooperation has not entirely displaced the older model of competitive fiscal federalism and public policy doctrine of the 1980s, the newer cooperative model, emerging from the globalization of supply chains and cross-regional externalities, encourages integration rather than competition within larger functional macro-spaces. It embraces both cross-regional and cross-national pooling of human and other resources. There has been considerable Russian research on regional integration (Shishkov, 2001; Butorina, 2011; Kolesov, 1996; Kulikov, 2002) and internationalization (Vardomskiy, 2002; Kosolapov, 2005; Belousov, 2011; Skatershchikova et al., 2002; Tsygankov, 2004). This paper contributes to the existing research by developing a new database to map the strategies of regional authorities. In this paper, we develop three case studies to show program development and implementation of bilateral and multi-lateral strategies. Our information represents a complete survey of selected regions from the material available at this time, showing design and strategy, and some implementation. Our survey is the first attempt we are aware of that traces the new cross-regional arrangements.

Keywords: Cross-regional, governance, federalism, strategic planning, externalities, integration
Introduction

There is a critical spatial component in the emerging cooperative Russian model for economic growth across the federation. Although in Russia, as in the EU, this spatial modeling for joint action and cooperation has not entirely displaced the older model of competitive fiscal federalism and public policy doctrine of the 1980s, the newer cooperative model, emerging from the globalization of supply chains and cross-regional externalities, encourages integration rather than competition within larger functional macro-spaces. It embraces both cross-regional and cross-national pooling of human and other resources. Key works have described recent developments in regional integration (Shishkov, 2001; Butorina, 2011; Kolesov, 1996; Kulikov, 2002) and internationalization (Vardomskiy, 2002; Kosolapov, 2005; Belousov, 2011; Skatershchikova et al., 2002; Tsygankov, 2004). This paper contributes to this literature by developing a new database to map the strategies of regional authorities. In this paper, we develop three case studies to show program development and the implementation of bilateral and multi-lateral strategies. Our information represents a complete survey of selected regions from the material available at this time, showing design and strategy and some implementation. Our survey is the first attempt we are aware of that traces the new cross-regional arrangements.

In the 1990s, regional isolation in the Russian Federation was encouraged by what was then called “the Parade of Sovereignties” reflected in the highly decentralized 1992 Confederation Treaty. The 1993 Constitution, however, did not support the extremes of this prior document, although it reflected a core consensus at that time on the importance of regional autonomy. Gradually, the Russian government reestablished institutions which had been strengthening the central government, by means of a promulgation of decrees and the passing of laws on federalist economic security (e.g., the Presidential Decree of 29.04.1996 N 608 «On the State strategy of economic security of the Russian Federation Basic Provisions»). Its objective was to identify effective instruments for the establishment of uniformity of law and the economic recovery of the regions, along with their linkages across industries and supply chains comprising the Russian internal market. After 2000, when a period of rapid growth began, the cross-regional benefits of this internal market would result, if encouraged, in having an effect on a wider spread of regions. Massive fiscal recentralization took place over the next fifteen years, in part to encourage returns to scale and also to guarantee improved social services for all citizens, regardless of location (Uskova, 2009; Ilyin, 2013; Unusov, 2009).

Since 2000 researchers have observed increasing integration in regional markets, although the income gap among regions has not significantly diminished (Artobolevsky, 2001; Granberg et al., 1997; Grinchel, 2014; Gelvanovskiy, 2008; Marshalova, 1998; Yudanov; 2004). For that reason, and because of important theoretical shifts in the understanding of policies fostering economic growth in large federations, strategic planning is now oriented toward bringing governance levels together to coordinate, synchronize and help pool costs and benefits of budgeting for growth, while continuing to foster diversity (see the
Russian Federal Law 'On Strategic Planning' [28.06. 2014], N 172-FZ). The law calls for closer cooperation between federal, regional and municipal levels and creates a legal basis for the planning and programming of cross-level, cross-regional socio-economic development.

Literature Review

Conceptually, cross-regional innovation and development policy planning both in the EU and the Russian Federation emerged from evident interdependences across space and between levels of government. In system-terms, “National Innovation Systems” and “Regional Innovation Systems” proponents have argued in the past for a spatial level and reach that is relevant, particularly for innovation policy. In economic geographic terms, regional industrial concentration and core-periphery differences within countries are powerful evidence of knowledge-intensive collaboration and formal and informal institutions active across local and regional levels (Cooke et al. 1998; Howells 1999), where effective partnerships and supply chain relationships benefit from the national regulatory framework. Fromhold-Eisebith (2007, p. 227) identifies that interdependencies:

“...usually owe their existence to nationally determined and constructed infrastructure, institutional or political settings (Batheit & Depner, 2003; Bunnell & Coe, 2001; Cooke, 2002; Freeman, 2002). This is even true for federal nations where central governments still leave their marks on STI regulation and incentive structures, despite a strong role of individual state governments.

Because of interdependencies, OECD cross-regional research concurs, regional policy should span across internal borders; there should be coordination and cooperation among regions and with the federal center.

The shift in regional policy favoring inter-level and across-space coordination is coordinated through a nation's export policy, fostering integration of regional trade and linkage with foreign countries that contribute to the rising value of the internal market, where factors of production are, or can be, a single resource base (Tsygankov, 2004). In this context, cluster policy, along with support for technoparks and economic zones, aims to bring international networks to remote regions via investment, and is an example of taking advantage of interdependent federal and regional systems of innovation (Petrov 2012). Porter (1993) shows that the competitiveness of even very distant regions can have an influence on national competitiveness. From his multi-region models, Krugman (2004) shows the location of competencies to be critical in strategic decision-making in regard to organizational and production innovation and diffusion. Finally, and more directly relevant here, inter-regional cooperation through social spheres can be a source of attracting investment, expanding demand for cross regional consumption of local production. There has been some empirical work on how the expansion and strengthening of commercial and cultural ties among regions of the Russian Federation builds innovation capacity nationally (Saveliev, 2014).
In this paper we find the key avenues of cross-regional cooperation in the Russian Federation to be as follows:

1) Scientific and technical collaboration: cross regional support for professional projects, innovation, joint entrepreneurial exploration;

2) University linkages: Cross-admission of students within sub-national units, student exchanges, cross-regional teacher training;

3) Cultural cooperation: opening cross-cultural communication channels among regions, joint conservation efforts, joint promotion of national-scale achievements of indigenous peoples, exchange in the promotion of Russian language and Russian art;

4) Cross-regional government and private sector infrastructure projects for cross-regional tourism: joint tourist programs and fairs;

5) Youth cooperation: encouragement of exchange among youth organizations in education and recreational and sport activities.

Data and Method

The regulatory framework for assessing regional policies is the Regional Federal Strategy (S) document, which is coordinated in close consultation with the national strategy. The Federal law (17 December 1999) № 211-FZ «On general principles of organization and activity of associations of economic interaction of the subjects of the Russian Federation,» provides guidelines on the inter-regional associations which coordinate economic relations. According to Art. 2 of 211-FZ, these associations, non-profit organizations founded by regional authorities, are intended for inter-regional integration and regional development. Therefore, with these goals, the agencies generate other agencies and structures, the most important of which are interregional «associations» for economic cooperation.¹ Since 1991, eight such associations have been formed from the former Soviet-era delineation of «economic regions»: «North-West», «Greater Volga», «Siberian Accord», «Central Russia», «Black Earth», «North Caucasus», «Greater Urals» and «Far East and Trans-Baikal».

From economic cooperation, macroregions are expected to build networks of industrial supply chains across regions with shared services (Rukina. 1998). The Appendix shows export-import data among macro-regions—the Central Federal District, Northwestern Federal District, and Volga Federal District—for just one sector, metallurgy, showing the extent of industrial networks.

On a planning level, economic cooperation associations coordinate inter-regional tourism, mutually developed tax guidelines, credit arrangements, and demographic policies. Inter-regional relations in this sphere are oriented toward scientific and technological cooperation, joint projects in finance and credit, investment, joint activities in communications, mobility of labor, efficient resource use and exploration, and the pooling of transportation costs.

¹ http://www.sibacc.ru/en/
The activities and objectives of regional authorities are assessed here by text references in strategy documents, including the monitoring of outcomes. For this paper, we use a comparative case study of three regions to assess the level and direction of outreach from the basic descriptions of strategies provided on the official websites. The official websites of the regions vary in detail, including some with concrete initiatives and their duration. We find both federal and regional innovations, initiatives and priorities. This study forms part of a larger media study from the official Internet regional portals.

The three Federal Districts are the Central, Northwestern and Volga macro-regions. In general, for these regions, strategies give voice to many of the same challenges, areas of concern, and outreach: transport and logistics, tourism, culture development, education and industry. The aspiration is for more cooperation in the spread of SMEs and in the development of cluster initiatives. There is a common theme of agreement in tourism and cultural affairs—jointly developed tourist routes and jointly held international forums and conferences.

Results: Strategies for Cross-Border Relations

Relatively few regions have active international relations as their main strategic goal. Regions aspiring to attract cross border projects tend to establish agency centers for export support, centers for inter-regional and international business, and centers to organize exhibitions and presentations as well as trade and economic missions to partner countries. Overwhelmingly, the focus of such international relations is bilateral.

In regard to cross-border agreements, the enclave of Kaliningrad is particularly active. It participates in multilateral cooperation for the Baltic Sea region, a large-scale project entailing many small initiatives. Since 1993, for example, in support of activities of the Council of the Baltic states, it has implemented cooperation in energy and its efficient use, including the legal framework for cross-border interaction in the electricity sector, infrastructure projects (for energy) coordinated with Poland including a new cable for DC delivery, an increase in bandwidth in the interstate section of 330 kV AC and, with Lithuania, the construction of a joint Baltic nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad region. Also, it leads the way in the development of the International Youth educational complex «Baltic Artek», a project for voluntary cooperation between the universities of the Baltic Sea region, and in various projects for biodiversity conservation including the protection and reproduction of fish species. The project HELCOM\(^2\) in the Kaliningrad region has achieved «Improvement of the protection of the Baltic Sea from land-based threats, sources of pollution: the load of nutrients from agriculture, and the risk of hazardous waste» (including a project reducing hazardous and agricultural discharges in the Baltic Sea – BALTHAZAR)\(^3\).

\(^2\) [http://helcom.fi/Pages/Kaliningrad-Oil-Terminal.aspx](http://helcom.fi/Pages/Kaliningrad-Oil-Terminal.aspx)

\(^3\) Baltic Hazardous and Agricultural Releases Reduction.
Finally, there is evidence of long-standing cooperation from the 1990s in agreements with Poland (1992), Lithuania (1999) and Belarus (on 1999). To summarize, Kaliningrad has partnerships with 21 regions, including foreign states, and urban areas of the region have their own agreements.

The Strategy of oil abundant Bashkortostan does emphasize international cooperation, although the main trend reflected here, as elsewhere, is cross-border connections. Similarly, the Far Eastern Federal District, like the North-West Federal District and Bashkortostan, has a clear international orientation with cross-border cooperation. Finally, in the Northwest, the Arkhangelsk and Pskov regions are in the process of developing international agreements.

Results: Strategies for Cross-Regional Relations

In contrast with their relatively limited international orientation, most regions show substantial outreach to other regions in the Russian Federation. The bustling inter-regional commodity exchange, for example, shows the presence of strong ties between the regions and grounds the theoretical expectation that cross-border relations are fruitful in large federations (see Table 2).

In regard to these cross-regional ties, however, strategy documents are primarily bilateral and not «economic zone» or macro economic region oriented. This is presumably because the institutions that are well established for inter-regional relations are mostly located within administrative units.

All regions in the Russian Federation have bilateral agreements, many with up to 20 and some up to 80. One example is the agreement drawn up at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (2015) for cooperation between Kaluga and Leningrad oblasts in the spheres of commerce, the economy, science and technology, and culture, and envisioning joint innovation and investment projects. The strategy announced business ties and networking along with joint concerns over the environment and in sports. The two regions have strong existing ties in the automotive industry, with a holding company in St Petersburg having its machine building operation in Kaluga, and they aspire toward connections in pharmaceutical clustering, agricultural supply chain development, tourism and communications. Kaluga also has an agreement for coordination with Ryazan and Tula in the development of industrial standards. Leningrad has a framework agreement with Murmansk region for linkages in commerce, the economy, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation; this has been active from 1997.

In the Central Federal District, six regions have cross regional strategies of significance: Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kursk, Lipetsk, and Orel. These six have identified specific projects for the implementation of inter-regional cooperation. Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel, and Tambov spelled out especially clear strategies. Belgorod is among three— with Bryansk and Kursk— which have evidence of numerous projects with other regions of the Russian Federation, as well as with foreign countries. By contrast, Kostroma, Smolensk, Tver’ and Yaroslavl’ take no more than a formal approach to inter-regional cooperation.
Results: Themes of Cross-regional Relations

It is important to observe that regions anticipate that the major impacts of cross-regional policies and interactions will be felt through the diffusion of technology and externalities—benefits—among regions along the supply chain. Some regions aim for a technology strategy—to get government grants for cross-regional cluster initiatives—that will, they aspire, result in information infrastructure which, at a minimum, will assist in the building of more technologically oriented inter-regional connections (Petrova, 2012).

It should be noted that regions in the Central Federal District have far more complete documentation available in their strategies than other regions. About half describe the exact mechanisms of inter-regional cooperation, or specific projects, by area. Thus, Ivanovo describes the joint cluster initiatives, shared technological communications companies and close cooperation of public authorities to realize their Transport Strategy. In the Central Federal District it is common to cite shared cross-documentation with neighboring regions designed to identify new common areas of potential cooperation. Tambov, for example, prioritizing interregional cooperation, has both joint infrastructure and industrial projects, and it is developing cross-regional cultural projects. Karelia prioritizes transit and large transport and logistics corridors, along with joint industrial production in coordination with regions of the North-West and neighboring Nordic countries.

Briefly, a comparative assessment of the quality of specification in expectation of future cooperation in Figure 1, shows the more specified arrangements of longer duration existing among regions of the Central Federal District:

In the Central Federal District, as can be seen in Figure 2 below, innovation support and transport coordination are the most important spheres for cooperation with neighboring regions:
The North-West Federal District also exhibits evidence of extensive interregional cooperation, although mostly in aspiration, among Vologda, Kaliningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, St. Petersburg city, and the Komi Republic. Only in Kaliningrad was there any mention of concrete projects. Novgorod and St. Petersburg express goals for an inter-regional migration policy.

Kaliningrad Oblast, Republic of Karelia and the Nenets Autonomous District provide descriptions of measures to implement inter-regional cooperation. For Nenets, Arkhangelsk and Pskov, however, interregional cooperation is at the stage of formal study rather than results. Five regions have cooperation agreements: Vologda, Kaliningrad, Murmansk, Republic of Komi, and the city of St. Petersburg. Their proximity shows its importance in linkages that create aspirations for further agreement. However, only Kaliningrad, already ahead in international connections, has concrete projects listed.

In the six regions, there also is some interest (Kaliningrad, Karelia and Nenetsk) in migration policy coordination, as below.

**Figure 2**

Orientation of Cross-Regional Cooperation in the Central Federal District, percentage of all documents, %

**Figure 3**

Orientation of Cross-regional Cooperation in the North-West Federal District, percentage of all documents, %
In the Volga Federal District, Kirov, Penza, Mari El Republic and Perm, there is formal declaration of support for inter-regional collaboration. Strategically, in the Volga Federal District, only three regions – the Republic of Bashkortostan, Chuvashia and Samara, are going ahead with plans for interregional cooperation. The Republic of Chuvashia, for example, specifies some mechanisms of inter-regional migration policy. Specific projects are also noted in the Strategy documents of the Orenburg region and Kirov.

**Figure 4**

**Orientation of Cross-Regional Cooperation in the Volga Federal District, outreach direction as a share of all strategy documents, %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation of Cross-Regional Strategies in the Volga Federal District, share of outreach documents, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

With the adoption of the major new Federal Law (28 June 2014) No 172-FZ, «On Strategic Planning», regional authorities are now beginning their own analysis of the success of prior strategies, a review mandated in the new law. They are to seek new and revised instruments to improve social and economic development by, first, analyzing existing strategic planning documents in terms of their targets and priorities and improving them for the further development of sectors and spheres of governance. We looked at these analytic materials for our three federal districts – Central, Northwestern and the Volga.

On the whole, depiction of the result of over twenty years of governance for integrating the internal market shows sustained county-wide aspirations yet active connection being sought only in the Central Federal District and some parts of the Northwest. Thus, to overcome the splintering impact of the early post-transition years, when regional policies became more isolationist, there has been a strong counter effort by the central and regional authorities to cooperate cross-regionally, at least in formal declarations. The key area of intended and actual cooperation is industrial production. From the mid-1990s, across
these three districts, regions have revived the industrial connections from the Soviet-era «economic regions», when centrally planned supply and transport chains linked «territorial complexes» one part of the Russian Federation to another. More actively and more recently, these regions are exploring cultural and tourism connections, showing embedded cultural ties among these central districts that go back centuries. In their current review process, there is sustained prioritization of technological advancement by clusters, showing widely shared global understanding associating growth with technological innovation and its diffusion.

Even if for some districts the documents are mostly aspirational, they show locally assigned importance of priority areas of transport, logistics and communications, particularly near export nodes. This communication of outreach interests addresses the general problem of connectivity in Russia and the need for joint action and programs to overcome it. The near universal aspiration for cooperation in cluster initiatives reinforces the understanding that science and technology are viewed as crucial for capturing value in production; the key partners in the field of interregional cooperation in this regard, however, are located mainly in the Central Federal District. Regions aim at stronger ties with Moscow and its surrounding regional complex.
### Export/Import of goods

<p>| Table 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Export of rolled ferrous metals, thousand tons | Import of rolled ferrous metals, thousand tons | The ratio of export of rolled ferrous metals to import, thousand tons (Export minus import) |
| Belgorod region | 643 | 751 | 559 | 78,8 | 112 | 93,2 | 564,2 | 639 | 465,8 | Exporter |
| Kostroma region | - | 0,7 | 0,5 | 72,7 | 230 | 235 | -229,3 | -234,5 | Importer |
| Lipetsk region | 1861 | 2400 | 3101 | 67,3 | 59,9 | 74,5 | 1793,7 | 2340,1 | 3026,5 | Exporter |
| City of Moscow | 47 | 259 | 268 | 1660 | 2256 | 2914 | -1613 | -1997 | -2646 | Importer |
| Smolensk region | - | 176 | 152 | 100 | 99,2 | 85,7 | 76,8 | 66,3 | Exporter |
| Tula region | 93,7 | 276 | 415 | 73,2 | 388 | 355 | 20,5 | -112 | 60 | Exporter |
| Moscow region | 7,2 | 0,3 | - | 1519 | 2585 | 3575 | -1511,8 | -2584,7 | -3575 | Importer |
| Vologda region | 3536 | 3845 | 3765 | 88,9 | 125 | 129 | 3447,1 | 3720 | 3636 | Exporter |
| City of St. Petersburg | 245 | 197 | 157 | 751 | 787 | 847 | -506 | -590 | -690 | Importer |
| The Republic of Bashkortostan | 15,9 | 9,6 | 33,7 | 351 | 460 | 520 | -335,1 | -450,4 | -486,3 | Importer |
| The Udmurt Republic | 244 | 319 | 296 | 117 | 129 | 133 | 127 | 190 | 163 | Exporter |
| Perm region | 392 | 229 | 253 | 395 | 420 | 565 | -3 | -191 | -312 | Importer |
| Kirov region | 80,4 | 84,1 | 75 | 48,1 | 51,1 | 56,8 | 32,3 | 33 | 18,2 | Exporter |
| Nizhny Novgorod region | 326 | 107 | 535 | 1728 | 1400 | 1022 | -1402 | -1293 | -487 | Importer |
| Orenburg region | 1258 | 1250 | 1101 | 70,4 | 71 | 111 | 1187,6 | 1179 | 990 | Exporter |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food products and agricultural raw materials</th>
<th>The products of the fuel and energy complex</th>
<th>Chemical products, rubber</th>
<th>Wood and pulp and paper products</th>
<th>Metals and products from them</th>
<th>Machinery, equipment and vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exporter</td>
<td>Importer</td>
<td>Exporter</td>
<td>Importer</td>
<td>Exporter</td>
<td>Importer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia, total</td>
<td>16196,2</td>
<td>43075,9</td>
<td>371791,8</td>
<td>3613,6</td>
<td>30739,2</td>
<td>50129,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central federal district</td>
<td>4552,9</td>
<td>22953,7</td>
<td>204331,7</td>
<td>1660,3</td>
<td>8442,7</td>
<td>34870,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern West federal district</td>
<td>2485,2</td>
<td>12527</td>
<td>29969,4</td>
<td>332,7</td>
<td>4104,8</td>
<td>6002,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga federal district</td>
<td>836,8</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>45600,8</td>
<td>475,1</td>
<td>11688,4</td>
<td>3321,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STRATEGY SOURCES

1. Postanovlenie pravitel’stva Belgorodskoi obl. ot 25.01.2010 N 27-pp (red. ot 03.06.2013) «Ob utverzhdenii Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Belgorodskoi oblasti na period do 2025 goda»


3. Ukaz Gubernatora Vladimirskoi oblasti ot 02.06.2009 N 10 (red. ot 31.10.2014) «Ob utverzhdenii Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Vladimirskoi oblasti do 2030 goda»

4. Zakon Voronezhskoi oblasti ot 30.06.2010 N 65-OZ (red. ot 02.03.2015) «O Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Voronezhskoi oblasti na period do 2020 goda» (prinyat Voronezhskoi oblastnoi Dumoi 23.06.2010)


7. Rasporyazhenie Administratsii Kostromskoi oblasti ot 27.08.2013 N 189-ra «Ob utverzhdenii Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Kostromskoi oblasti na period do 2025 goda»


10. Rasporyazhenie Pravitel’stva Orlovskoi oblasti ot 03.10.2013 N 363-r (red. ot 03.10.2013 N 363-r) «Ob utverzhdenii Investitsionnoi strategii Orlovskoi oblasti na period do 2020 goda»


14. Постановление Правительства ЯО от 06.03.2014 N 188-p (ред. от 13.02.2015) «Об утверждении Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Yaroslavskoi oblasti do 2025 goda»

15. Распоряжение администрации Архангельской области от 16 декабря 2008 года N 278-ra/48 «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Arkhangelskoi oblasti на период до 2030 года»

16. Постановление Правительства Вологодской области от 28.06.2010 N 739 (ред. от 15.06.2015) «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Vologodskoi oblasti на период до 2020 года»

17. Постановление Правительства Калужской области от 02.08.2012 № 583 «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Kalyuzhskoi oblasti na dolgosrochnuyu perspektivu»

18. Постановление ЗС РО от 24.06.2010 N 1755-IV ZS «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Respubliki Kareliya do 2020 года»

19. Постановление Правительства РК от 27.03.2006 N 45 (ред. от 25.02.2015) «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Respubliki Komi na period do 2020 года»


21. Постановление Собрания депутатов Ненецкого автономного округа от 22.06.2010 № 134-sd «Об утверждении Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Nenetskogo avtonomnogo okruga на perspektivu do 2030 года»

22. Областной закон Новгородской области от 09.07.2012 N 100-OZ «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Novgorodskoi oblasti do 2030 года»


24. Постановление Правительства Санкт-Петербурга от 13.05.2014 N 355 «О Strategii ekonomicheskogo i sotsial’nogo razvitiya Sankt-Peterburga на period до 2030 года»


26. Постановление Правительства Республики Башкортостан от 30 сентября 2009 года N 370 «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Bashkortostan to 2020 года»

27. Постановление Правительства Республики Мари Эль от 31.08.2007 N 214 (ред. от 05.12.2011) «Об утверждении Strategii dolgosrochnogo sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Respubliki Marii El»

28. Закон RM от 01.10.2008 N 94-Z «О Strategii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Respubliki Mordovija do 2025 года»
29. Постановление Правительства Нижегородской области от 17.04.2006 № 127 (ред. от 20.03.2009) «Об утверждении стратегии развития Нижегородской области до 2020 года»

30. Постановление Правительства Оренбургской области от 20.08.2010 № 551-пп (ред. от 11.08.2011) «О стратегии развития Оренбургской области до 2020 года и на период до 2030 года»

31. Закон Пензенской обл. от 04.09.2007 № 1367-ZPO (ред. от 17.04.2015) «Об утверждении стратегии социально-экономического развития Пензенской области на долгосрочную перспективу (до 2021 года)»


33. Постановление Правительства Самарской области от 09.10.2006 № 129 «О стратегии социально-экономического развития Самарской области на период до 2020 года»


35. Закон РТ от 17.06.2015 № 40-ZRT «Об утверждении стратегии социально-экономического развития Республики Татарстан до 2030 года»


37. Постановление Правительства Ульяновской обл. от 13.07.2015 № 16/319-P «Об утверждении стратегии социально-экономического развития Ульяновской области до 2030 года»

38. Закон ЧР от 04.06.2007 № 8 (ред. от 30.12.2013) «Об утверждении стратегии социально-экономического развития Чувашской Республики до 2020 года»
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BREAKING IRON CHANNELS OF INTERNATIONAL LEARNING: ADOPTING MEAD’S TYPOLOGY TO SEOUL METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

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Abstract

The main purpose of the study is to refresh the theory of institutional and organizational learning by applying knowledge from anthropology to public administration. Empirical evidence drawn from South Korea’s capital city supports the applicability of Margaret Mead’s typology of knowledge transfer among generations. Similar to human beings, once grown-up and developed, cities are ready to give lessons to their teachers. First-hand and secondary data from the lesson-drawing habits of Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) explains learning paths from the United States and other developed countries and back. The study also illustrates an integral component of learning from peers, when SMG benchmarks best practices from cities in other developing countries.

Supported by the example of American-Korean relations, SMG’s case confirms previous theoretical propositions that the old-established channels of learning are hard to break when they are rooted in history and culture, and, thus, in line with the tastes of the electorate and the private preferences of governmental officials. Meanwhile, the study also shows that the era of knowledge transfer exclusively from parents to children is over. Seoul has applied enormous effort/completed enormous work to establish itself as a benchmarkable model internationally.

The study has a practical application as it offers an outline of programs and instruments that can be used by an agency for successful benchmarking from abroad. The study is original in the way it combines organizational theories, comparative public administration and anthropology. Being of an exploratory nature, the current research tests Mead’s typology that can be further applied in different countries.

Keywords: Seoul Metropolitan Government and education, lesson-drawing, benchmarking and knowledge transfer, Margaret Mead, institutional and organizational learning.

1 Acknowledgements: Public Administration Department at Florida International University, Seoul Metropolitan Government, Korea University
Iron channels of learning, similar to Weber’s iron cages of bureaucracy, are hard to change. Cross-national learning of best practices has become an integral part of globalization, where developing countries often learn from the developed. But what happens when the transformation process is successfully completed? A vivid example is Seoul, South Korea. The openness of Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) to the best foreign practices has created a unique situation where effective policies of both developed and developing countries have been absorbed. The open adoption of foreign policies is one of the reasons why, in half a century, Seoul entered the group of the world’s top ten economically powerful cities and became itself a role model to emulate.

Over the last few decades, Koreans have been doing their development homework and have already become a benchmarkable example: “... In just 50 short years [Seoul has] become one of the world’s top 10 economically powerful cities and a role model for other cities around the world to emulate” (SMG 2010a, 7). In the period 2008–2013 alone, 71 offices of Seoul Metropolitan Government used 216 cases of administrative policy adopted in foreign countries; whereas, Seoul had already pursued around 30 that others benchmarked (SMG 2014a).

Meanwhile, SMG’s technological development is in contrast with its institutional stasis. Both the citizens of Seoul and its public officials still look up to the United States. For instance, an essential activity for the promotion of an employee continues to be the participation in U.S.-based internships and study-abroad programs, and a lot of foreign practices are learned from the U.S.-based Americans, whom SMG recruits as overseas correspondents. The purpose of the current article is to use the case of the local government of Seoul to examine established directions of international learning, as well as to emphasize the growing role of alternative learning paths. This article demonstrates that the era of sole borrowing from the older generation of the leaders is over.

To understand the established iron channels of learning we should look at their nature. Unfortunately, public administration theories are not totally helpful. The theoretical contribution of the current article to public administration literature is also of a benchmarking nature. The aim of this article is to draw some lessons from others, in this case, from other science disciplines. Thus, it examines the roots of the established directions of international learning, utilizing knowledge from disciplines other than public administration. Studies on learning culture occur all across social sciences. Anthropologists, for instance, have done some especially diligent work studying the exchange of practices between adults and children.

The discussion on Seoul’s learning practices is framed around Margaret Mead’s typology of learning (Mead 1970). As a cultural anthropologist, she theorized various directions of knowledge transfer between parents, peers and children. She came up with three directions of knowledge transfer among generations: Post-figurative – the knowledge is transferred from adults to children; Co-figurative – children and adults receive their knowledge mainly from their peers; Pre-figurative – the knowledge transfers from children to adults. In this article, the «parents» are the developed countries that Korea, as a «child», used to benchmark. The article discusses the learning practices on a municipal level that occur in various departments such as transportation, sewage, or garbage disposal.
Note on Methodology

Interestingly enough, it is difficult to find references about today’s SMG post-figurative learning, making any information about its current lesson-drawing from abroad hard to quantify. In the mass media and in the discussions with the SMG officials, the success is usually credited to SMG’s innovation. Specific applications of foreign practices, foreign institutions and policies in Seoul are not widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, despite the lack of research conducted on this phenomenon, the process of copying foreign practices is happening on every level of Korean government.

Due to the lack of recent empirical evidence in the literature, the current article undertakes an exploratory effort to shed some light on modern benchmarking practices and the tools used to achieve the best outcomes. The empirical part of the article is based on first-hand data obtained during a field trip to Seoul Metropolitan Government, where interviews with the chairs of various departments were conducted. The study-abroad program data was obtained from the Human Resource Department. Moreover, in trying to find explanations for the observed phenomena, the author conducted an in-depth interview with Dr. Sunhyuk Kim, a professor from the Department of Public Administration at Korea University. Dr. Kim is an expert in Korean politics, foreign and comparative policy, as well as Korean-U.S. relations and international cooperation.

On the other hand, the information about co-figurative and pre-figurative learning patterns is readily available in open access resources as well as in the SMG reports and publications. Moreover, the sharing of domestic good practices is supported by aggressive overseas marketing. In 2008, SMG significantly increased the budget for overseas marketing efforts to 40 billion won (US $35.6 million) from 5.3 billion won in 2007 (SMG 2010b). Thus, the discussion of co- and pre-figurative learning is mostly built on the empirical observations coming from the secondary data.

Who is the Learner?

Before immersing into debates about various channels of Seoul’s lesson-drawing, the level of analysis needs to be clarified. When the article talks about the organizational learning of SMG, it refers to the acquired knowledge and borrowed practices of the agencies and the departments. The author adopts the perspective that government officials are only the transporters of a policy from one country to another with this policy ordered by the citizens. The citizens’ demand is acknowledged during the learning process in democratic societies, where the benchmarking from foreign countries takes a bottom up approach, rather than top down.

Despite the previous experiences of the dictatorial regime, the current level of democracy in South Korea is relatively stable. As Chaibong Hahm, a senior political scientist, formerly a professor at Yonsei University and the University of Southern California, puts it, South Korea has been strengthening its positions as a democratic state:
“Despite South Korea’s messy democratic trajectory, it has miraculously achieved consolidation. The first major development is that the turnover of power during the past two decades has enabled all major political figures, factions, and parties to take turns governing the country, making them “responsible stakeholders”. Second, the successful inclusion within the system of leftists and progressives has broadened the ideological spectrum, making it more flexible, open, and liberal. Third, “elite pact-making” between various political factions and figures, decried at the time as “unprincipled” and “undemocratic,” actually contributed to smooth transitions between governments with radically different ideological orientations. Finally, even major internal and external shocks have contributed to the consolidation of the democratic system each time they were successfully overcome” (Hahm 2008, p. 15).

Moreover, South Korea performs relatively well in the Transparency International indices. The highest is the Human Development Index, where this country is at 15th place out of 187. The Rule of Law and Voice & Accountability are 81% and 69% respectively in the percentile rank. They have a significant openness of budget and control corruption (69%) relatively well, which puts this country at 43rd place in the world rankings. Most affected by the corruption, from the citizens’ perspective, are political parties and legislature (Transparency International 2015).

The facts above provide sound grounds to assume that SMG considers citizens’ preferences when choosing the benchmarkable models. Therefore, the choice of countries to benchmark is not only driven by the government officials, but also by the citizens. How SMG meets citizens’ demands will be further discussed in the following section.

Post-figurative: United States Again?

The rapid development of Seoul was not solely based on the wisdom and creativity of local politicians and administrators. The overall openness of the Korean government to the best foreign practices created a unique situation that allowed the absorption of effective policies, of both developed and developing countries. Benchmarking from overseas became an essential part of the reforms and transformations that occurred on a great scale inside the Korean capital.

The history of introducing Western culture to Seoul goes back to the end of the 19th century, when such novelties as railroads, electric trams, and telephones were brought from the West. The first modern hospital in Seoul, Gwanghyewon, was opened in 1885 by American missioner Dr. Alen (today it is one of the best hospitals in Korea comprised of top medical staff). Another example from the 19th century history is Tappol Park, built at the site of Wongaks temple in 1887. It became the first modern park built in a Western style in Seoul (SMG 2010a, 22).

Throughout the 20th century, referring to advanced countries remained one of the predominant logics when promoting practices from overseas. It was particularly prominent in the aftermath of the East Asian economic crises in the late 1990s. The Korean president Kim Dae-jung was very eager to emulate practices from abroad. His leadership created a general political atmosphere in which officials had a framework for the transfer of any policy (Kim 2011).
Today, lesson-drawing and policy transferring remain common practice, with the globalization of our societies speeding up the transfer process (Kim 2011). However, the interviews with the SMG officials showed that they were rather salient on the 21st century benchmarking from the West. Paradoxically, the main reason that there is limited information on policy transfer into SMG from abroad, is due to its mass acceptance in the past, which was almost perceived as a general phenomenon. For instance, the budgeting system and personnel management systems are based on Western models. Studying the Korean governmental structure and policy making process is very similar to studying the American or European processes. Kim (2011) points out that the Korean political system is very eclectic, consisting of many different elements from different foreign models. For instance, political structure from the very beginning was based on an American model; the Korean Constitution emulated Germany’s; and then was implemented through the Japanese model. Another example is the Korean presidential system which allows the President to appoint the prime-minister, a unique policy that puts the second in command in a rather weak position. However, the check-and-balances between the three branches of government are founded on the grounds of the American presidency model, where the president and the vice-president act in unison with the Vice President interacting closely with the president. The only modification is that the American vice-president is called the prime-minister in South Korea.

The SMG’s behavior today is consistent with the methods of policy learning suggested by Dolowitz (2000) who points out that civil servants are the first category of agents who play a crucial role in policy transferring. A lot in Seoul has been benchmarked from the United States. In Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg’s (2012) study, civil servants were the ones who developed contacts with foreign partners and eventually picked up role models. Similarly, Dolowitz (2000) advocated that educating civil servants on a benchmarking model is positively related to foreign policy adaptation. Similarly, the SMG adopts various tools for benchmarking with a special emphasis placed on the educational programs for the employees. The Human Resource Department of Seoul Metropolitan Government each year recruits qualified individuals for a program, which allows various departments of SMG to send their employees abroad. Being overseas allows governmental employees to improve their qualifications by receiving graduate degrees and participating in internships.

Studying abroad became a very popular program in the SMG, not merely due to the curiosity of public officials about foreign lands, but due to the career opportunities that the completion of this program offers to its participants. According to the Mayor Se-hoon Oh (Plott 2008), constant promotion is the main goal for any public officer. Therefore, any additional qualifications and past awards and achievements could be of utmost importance in the government where competition is extremely high (there are about 10,000 officers who work for the Seoul Metropolitan Government). Traditionally in Korea, serving as a government official in Seoul is considered the greatest glory of all for a family (SMG 2010a, 17). Once a person finds herself in the governmental structures, the next most desired experience is to go and study abroad, especially in an environment filled with increasing career competition and a constant desire for promotion.
On average, the SMG sends forty employees a year to study abroad (See Table 1), with the majority of staff working on their Master’s degrees, rather than participating in internships. This is proof that Seoul continues with its learning traditions. However, it is currently visibly focused on the United States. The country-destination is extremely unbalanced: the majority of the SMG's staff (73%) venture to the U.S. Another note-worthy destination is the United Kingdom (10%), while other countries such as China, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, and Australia are rarely used for study abroad programs (SMG Study Abroad 2011). During the interviews, the majority of high level governmental officials, including the chairs of the departments, responded that they have been on the study abroad program, and the majority stated they studied in the United States (personal interviews during the field trip, 2011).

A number of reasons explain this pattern. In his «Families of Nations», Castles (1993) argues that the transmission of policy ideas among states is facilitated by geographical, linguistic, cultural and historical ties. The Seoul case proves and expands Castles’ (1993) typology, as well as confirms observations from other regions in the world that learned from their “parent” countries.

Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of international contacts in policy transfer studies (Bennett 1997, Wolman and Page 2002). In particular, Rose (1991) names both psychological and ideological proximity, which depend on history and culture, as determining factors in selecting the foreign models. The United States has become the main model for the SMG in a similar fashion. As Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg (2012) prove in their study, the first contacts made by a domestic actor with its international counterparts are of the utmost importance when considering the models for benchmarking. Policy transfer is more than a mere political procedure; it includes the incorporation of political values and ideologies (Randma-Liiv 2005). Militarily, politically, and economically, Korea’s recent developments were strongly influenced by the United States. The Korea-U.S. alliance was the most important and the most crucial during the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>US (73%)</th>
<th>UK (10%)</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMG HR department
Cold War period. Today, likewise, the United States remains the most important ally of the Republic of Korea.

Several scholars have further suggested that the benchmarking practices usually occur between countries that speak the same language (Wolman 1992; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg 2012). English is one of a lingua franca in the Asian region being even more important than, for instance, Japanese, because of its global representation (Miyawaki Hiroyuki 2002). Unfortunately, the language factor is too weak an explanation for the skewedness in the pattern of the countries chosen for a study abroad trip: each year, two-five employees go to the United Kingdom, and over thirty travel to the U.S.

Previous research about international learning shows that fascination with the developed West plays a large role here. There is the general willingness of the transition countries to be or look «like the West» (Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg 2012, Randma-Liiv 2005, Ivanova and Evans 2004, Prysmakova 2013). Koreans have a deep-routed fascination with American culture, which they equally call Western culture (Kim 2011, Prysmakova 2013), as noted from the observations of the Koreans use the terms Western and American as synonyms in their every-day life. They say “Western style of life” and “Western culture”, yet, when the context is analyzed, it becomes clear that they imply exclusively American culture rather than European, or a combination of the two. Meanwhile, huge differences exist between these notions. The idea of a welfare state, for instance, could not be called American (or Western in the average Korean perception), because it is a purely European development. The interview with Kim (2011) proves this state of affairs, suggesting that only a small minority of intellectuals would know the sophisticated differences between Western, European and American. Kim (2011) hopes that correct perception of the notion of “The West” will change in light of a new Free Trade Agreement signed between the European Union and South Korea.

How does this fascination affect the Korean overseas model-drawing? Preoccupation with all things American eases the justification process for the adaptation of new policies and development projects. For Koreans, if a policy or an institution is American-made, it means that it must be beneficial. There is a massive popular perception that if it works for the U.S., obviously the strongest and the most affluent society in the world, then there is no need for justification. This phenomenon ties in well with the previous studies that have shown that states often look for inspiration from governments which have proven to be successful or attractive (Mosseberger and Wolman, 2003; Rose, 2002; 2005). Thus, Randma-Liiv (2005) argues that it is easier to «sell» a policy proposal in domestic political circles and to the public as a successful foreign experience, than argue for a “home-made» solution. For the SMG and other Korean politicians, the easiest policy to «sell» would be one from the United States.

Yet, the preferences of SMG officials towards the U.S. are not built on fascination alone. The last element in the post-figurative learning formula is a convenience factor. It simply implies comfort for your family and for you as a person. Applying it to the benchmarking, the question becomes how easy the process of learning for a foreigner in particular settings is, and how much personal effort should this person put in to adjust to the local culture before being able to ab-
sorb the new knowledge. A foreign-friendly and open American environment, welcoming individuals without considering anybody a stranger, making it much easier to adjust to this type of location, versus merging with natives in a European country. Being more than just a policy-transfer source, the U.S. also becomes a convenient place for the government officials’ families to go for an extended trip. Therefore, there are strong grounds to assume that personal life preferences, combined with the high quality of life, also become significant reasons why the SMG officials predominantly go to study in the United States.

Before moving to the other paths of international lesson-drawing, it should be emphasized that the overall popularity of the United States in South Korea, does not always serve as the best example. Not every policy, institution or idea can be transferred from the United States. Some vivid examples speak for themselves. An SMG practitioner should not try to benchmark the U.S. welfare or health care systems. Neither should they try to emulate American public transit. When Koreans are searching for lessons to draw on for their welfare sector, they benefit more by looking at European models. When trying to improve public safety, primary education, or environmental policy, they also should not establish the U.S. as a model.

Indeed, Seoul’s local government has realized these facts and has been benchmarking from other developed countries through tools other than the education of their employees. For instance, the conservators of Sang-am DMC landfill adopted German technologies (information gathered during the field trip); the utilization of idle spaces as urban parks that encourage kids to become familiar with the woods and nature was benchmarked from Northern European countries (SMG 2015a); shared city bicycles were implemented on the basis of the VELIB system of Paris, France, and BIXI of Montreal, Canada (SMG 2011). These are good examples of how SMG should continue to benchmark counties other than the United States, despite the fact that the strong iron channels of lesson-drawing from the parent country are very hard to break. The current article suggests that depending on the policy sector, the entire discourse about policy transfer should be divided by the policy type.

Co-figurative: Learning from Peers

Developed countries learn from each other; at times it even reaches the point when a situation practically becomes comical. A famous example given by Rose (1991), when American public officials issued a report entitled “Lessons from Europe”; in response, French policymakers produced a report entitled “Lessons from the United States”. Which poses the question: Are Western countries always perfect models for lesson-drawing? Even though the Eurocentrics have a tendency to agree with the above, it is debatable whether the wealthiest nations of the world provide the best lessons for transition countries (Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg 2012). Randma-Liiv (2007). Do the richest nations of Europe serve as the best lessons for transition states, such as post-communist countries? The above papers offer advice on switching attention to the developing worlds of Latin America and Asia, and South Korea seems to be following that advice.
Even when the SMG does not send its officials to developing countries, they utilize other tools to learn from them. The Koreans have already realized the value of others’ experience and have been keenly emulating certain policies and structures from those developing countries facing the same problems with similar resources. Thus, despite the fact that South Korea remains post-figuratively enthusiastic about everything “Western”, there is a visible shift towards configurative learning from its peers. The SMG lesson-drawing patterns are open to borrowing from the developing countries. The introduction of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system as an option for their urban transport, for instance, was inspired by the analogous in Latin American cities. In introducing the BRT, Seoul drew on the lesson of the Latin American cities Curitiba and Bogota (Field trip 2011). Other examples are ‘citizens’ deliberative committees’, which, during the previous government, came from Brazil, and the policy on banning prostitution and sex trafficking, imported from Taiwan (Kim 2011). In reference to the latter case, the countries are constantly learning from each other: Taiwan imports policies and institutions from Korea and vice versa. Both the committees and the ban were implemented at the national level, yet found broad application in the largest city of the country.

Furthermore, the SMG applies considerable effort in gathering foreign practices through its system of the SMG Overseas Correspondents Program. This program allows a student from any country to serve as Seoul’s overseas correspondent for modest monetary compensation, and submit reports on the best practices of overseas cities. The reports and policies are then considered by the SMG, which applies the ideas and suggestions it approves to further bolster its policies. Topics requested by the SMG are typically related to Housing Policies, Seoul Transport Operation Information Services, Cultural Policy, etc. An example of the latter is the governmental request to conduct research on residencies for artists in Beijing and Berlin. The information includes mission statements, strategies, management structures, facilities, programs, activities, as well as general information on well-known artist residencies (SMG Overseas Correspondent Program 2011).

The government plans to increase the number of correspondents to three hundred (SMG Overseas Correspondent Program 2015). The fact remains that the lion’s share of correspondents are in the United States (See Table 2). At the same time, if analyzed by region, the majority of correspondents are located in Asia, which supports the case of active co-figurative learning from peers.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Webpage of SMG Overseas Reporters*
Since the Chinese capital has already emerged in the discussion above, the focus smoothly transitions to the special role that Korea’s closest neighbors play in their lesson-drawing. The main finding: Giant economies such as China and Japan are seldom mentioned by the SMG policy-makers as sources for lesson-drawing. Despite the fact that both of them are rarely referred to in the official settings, each of these two countries have been influencing Korean policy-transferring patterns for quite some time.

**Japan.** Even though Japan has strongly influenced the formation of the Korean political and administrative systems, the role of the lesson-drawing from that country is not emphasized by the governmental officials for a few reasons. First, Rose’s (1993) idea that post-communist countries are especially willing to emulate the West, could be generalized for other developing countries. Any country which has experienced an occupation, and once freed from that burden, has a tendency to emulate others that have done the same with their invaders. Looking up to the democratic West is often a good start. These practices can be observed in most former communist countries in Eastern Europe and in South Korea which used to be under Japanese rule.

Second, the transfer of policies from Japan has been so overwhelming, that there is no need to emphasize that some policies or institutions are transferred from that country (Kim 2011). The entire economic miracle on the river Han – a modern Seoul-city – and the fact that South Korea developed from one of the poorest to currently one of the most developed countries, is totally predicated on emulating the Japanese model. In fact, Korea’s constant emulation of Japanese Policy has some referring to it as “The Second Japan”.

Literature says that Japan remains in pole position, yet Asia’s next giant – as Alice Amsden (1989) called it – is South Korea. Though her work is mainly focused on the economic development of the country, she emphasizes a learning process built on invention and innovation, one that spurs on industrialization. Comparing Korean development to that of Taiwan and Japan, Amsden names this type of a growth model as «late industrialization». In this model, a country or firm purchases foreign technology and then actively learns to use it, which results in improvements and even higher quality production of existing goods. In this way, a country’s initial lack of technological experience becomes its advantage.

Both institutionally and in terms of an industrializing strategy, Korea has benchmarked Japan. However, the practice of sending government officials to Japan to improve their qualifications and degrees is not as popular (see Table 1).

**China.** Borrowing ideas from abroad is more than a mere experience of the last few decades for Korean governments. The process of policy transfer has an age-old history. For centuries, China used to be a benchmarking model for Korean governors. In 1872, a civil minister Park Gyu-su visited China and afterwards developed an interest in the Enlightenment period and contributed scientifically to advances of the Korean state, called Joseon at that time. Recently, however, policy transfer from China to Korea has not been as common. In contrast to ancient times, when the Korean peninsula was under the strong influence of the Chinese Empire, today China is not seriously relied upon as a policy model by policymakers, journalists, or intellectualists.
One of the main reasons for avoiding Chinese models resembles one of the factors in favor of lesson-drawing from the United States. Korean policy-makers shy away from benchmarking the models if they face difficulties with justification and citizens’ acceptance. If an SMG policy-maker has to sell a policy, he could barely justify it by saying: «This is something China is doing and we need to copy it from China». According to Kim (2011), in terms of any policy “it is absurd” to talk about China as a model, despite the fact, that the underlying reasons are not stressed. Even though China is not currently used as a model, Koreans would benefit if they considered the Chinese public health care system, which is comparatively better in terms of transparency, choice, and open access to more retail-oriented policies, than that of the United States (International Insurance News 2010). Despite this fact, the majority of Korean policy-makers are limited by their citizens’ apprehension to take China seriously. Having Japan, the U.S. or Western European countries as lesson-drawing models makes general sense to the public. Even some Latin America counties like Brazil would be easier accepted by Korean society as a benchmarkable model, than a policy or an institution copied from China.

Despite the ubiquitous rejection of Chinese models, China became one of the G2, and continues to narrow the distance between itself and the United States. Chinese approaches to public problems could soon become globally accepted practices that should be copied, and then the value of Chinese examples will be reevaluated. Kim (2011) is optimistic about changes in the benchmarking preferences of Koreans. He is hopeful that in the future Korean governments will have more incidents of policy transfer from China, even though today neither the central government nor the SMG accept China as a country of benchmarkable practices. Since the time when the interview with Dr. Kim was conducted, there have already been visible changes towards Chinese-Korean benchmarking. For example, Seoul followed the steps taken by Dujiangyan – a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site in Chengdu, Sichuan Province – when it received its registration with UNESCO (SMG 2014b).

Pre-figurative: Serving as an Example

If the current research had taken place in the 1980s, the interviews with public officials would include a lot more references to American and Western models. Today, however, Koreans are rather proud of what has been achieved. The study is conducted at a time when South Korea feels that it is its duty to pay off the countries that have supported it in tough times. A number of good practices are benchmarked from the SMG today.

Seoul as the South Korean capital is the city with the highest concentration of benchmarkable models in the country. Foreigners come to learn from South Korea, and the SMG strongly encourages them to do so. The SMG openly advertises its major strengths: traffic management, IT, electronics, and water and sewage services. Recently, Seoul has pursued around thirty projects, which have been benchmarked by overseas municipal and central governments. In 2009, Seoul city was awarded by the United Nations Human Settlements Program for the Cheong-
gyecheon river restoration, the SHIFT long-term housing rental system and the transformation of Nanjido from a former dumping site into an eco-friendly park (UN-Habitat 2015). This award is a clear sign that the UN recognizes all three practices as the best world models and encourages others to learn and to follow.

Developing countries eagerly draw their lessons from Seoul's recent developments and innovations. China is currently benchmarking the SMG's “Park Won Soon Act”. This document sets out a number of anti-corruption measures and controls that track irregularities committed by public officials. The Act is considered a successful practice, as after its implementation in Seoul, the number of crimes committed by public officials dropped by approximately one seventh, and the number of wrong-doings reported through hotlines increased more than ten-fold (SMG 2015b). Singapore is learning its own ways to emulate the energy policy of the city of Seoul. Among other benchmarkable projects and policies, Singaporeans study environmentally friendly buildings such as the New Seoul City Hall and the Energy Dream Center in Sangam-dong (SMG 2012). Pre-figurative practices are not only limited to the Asian and Pacific region, as developing countries from around the globe are equally eager to learn from Seoul. Thus, Trinidad and Tobago is currently benchmarking Seoul waterworks (SMG 2014c).

The SMG helps interested parties from the developing world by promoting Seoul's best practices. For instance, it organized a Master's degree course for government officials from developing countries. The SMG organizes this study program as a part of the Official Development Aid project (SMG 2010a, p. 49). Its main purpose, as stated by the SMG, is to provide foreign officials with an insight into urban administration. Despite the apparent pre-figurative learning from Seoul by foreign cities, co-figurative elements of learning are also present: through the participation in common projects, foreigners bring in their perspectives and experience from abroad.

The question can be raised as to whether teaching other developing countries is pre-figurative learning and not co-figurative. Both approaches are true, depending on the view point. This article takes the perspective that because several decades ago Korea was in the list of the ten most undeveloped countries – giving lessons to anybody who was higher up that list is to a certain extent giving pre-figurative lessons to one's “parents” (as in Mead's typology). Meanwhile, the author also agrees that the most interesting/purest pre-configurative is the examples of what the developed countries have been recently learning from the SMG, and what this local government has to offer the long-established global leaders.

Being not only innovative but also very successful, Seoul's waterworks and sewage systems equitably attract the attention of the developed world. U.S. cities are equally interested in the project that started in 2001 by the then newly elected mayor, Lee Myung-bak, who promised to restore the Cheonggyecheon River. For decades the riverbed stayed covered by concrete and was used as the freeway. The goal was to improve the city center both economically and environmentally. By the end of his term, the Cheonggyecheon was flowing freely through the heart of downtown Seoul, and the project became a worldwide lesson-drawing model. At least two river restoration projects in the United States – Los Angeles River Revitalization and the restoration of the river zone in Chinatown of Honolulu –
benchmark the Cheonggye Stream Project (City of Los Angeles 2015, Honolulu Government 2011). Besides the river restoration in Seoul, the Honolulu project also draws lessons from two similar American projects. So, while Honolulu officials could have looked exclusively at domestic practices, they consciously choose the Korean practice as an example as well.

American Honolulu is also benchmarking another Seoul project. Initially attained from Europe, adopted and improved, Seoul city bike system is a benchmarkable model for other developed countries. The current implementation of a similar system in Honolulu, Hawaii, is heavily based on the Seoul bicycle network in the Korean capital (Honolulu Government 2015).

Seoul has a number of other projects that developed countries should draw lessons from. For example, in certain areas of technology, even the United States, the one-time leader in this field, bears witness to the type of reversal which often happens (just as it does with parents and kids) as it now lags behind other countries in certain areas. Seoul is more advanced in its use of modern IT technologies. Thus, the city has developed a number of e-government practices that have become worldwide benchmarkable models. To name a few, on their official websites the city highlights:

- M-Voting, a service for policy-making that allows citizens to vote for the issues related and influential to daily living anywhere and anytime via computer or mobile phone (WeGo 2014);
- e-TAX, which is the online tax payment service that allows citizens to check tax by categories, pay for tax, search and store the payment receipts, and deposit or use tax mileage. Pay Tax Anywhere and Anytime Convenient Payment for Citizens Released Korea's first “Smartphone Application for Tax Payment” (WeGo 2014);
- 120 Dasan Call Center, a service that allows quick and easy access to various information about Seoul with a single call, such as living information, transportation user guide, and travel information. Already, 440 local institutions have benchmarked the 120 Dasan Call Center. Also, 44 cities from 27 countries, including Moscow and Guangxi Province in China, have researched the services (WeGo 2014, SMG 2010c).

In addition to the E-government innovations, Seoul transit system is another great model that the U.S. could research and learn from. The Transportation Operation and Information Service (TOPIS) had more than 1,200 foreign heads of state, ministers, and vice ministers of transportation departments and numerous transportation experts visit their facilities. Seoul's "intelligent transportation system" has been constantly improving since 2004 when the city began to overhaul its public transport systems (SMG 2013). As for benchmarking, visitors are often interested in Seoul's eco-transit. The city developed a rapid-recharging system for electric passenger cars and electric buses, based on the nation's advanced electric vehicle technology (SMG 2010d).

The Seoul Metropolitan Government puts a lot of emphases on the City's ecology and its sustainable development. One benchmarkable example is the newly constructed Han River Art Island, an environmentally-friendly building located on an island. One fourth of its total energy is from new renewable energy
such as hydrothermal, geothermal, solar, and fuel cells. As well as this, the cooling and heating systems in the building rely 90% on natural, renewable resources (SMG 2010e).

Conclusion

South Korea's case proves that it is hard to break old-established iron channels of learning, especially when rooted deeply in history and culture, and in line with both the tastes of the electorate and the private preferences of governmental officials. The current research confirms the findings of Randma-Liiv (2005) and Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg (2012) that the convenience factor in drawing lessons from one particular country could overshadow other crucial factors such as general applicability of the model itself. Therefore, the Seoul Metropolitan Government should be aware of the possible politically-biased selection of their role models, as it may lead to a democratic deficit by forcing governments to rely on foreign models chosen by civil servants. One must also note, the SMG is additionally supported and influenced by the electorate in this process.

Moreover, the context for any policy in a relatively stable country, such as the U.S., is much different from that in South Korea. Margaret Mead (1970) connects the extension of a pre-figurative type of learning to increasing uncertainty in a rapidly changing environment, and therefore the conditions of a child maturing are different from those experienced by the parents. South Korea has made a fundamental breakthrough in this learning process by becoming, in less than half a century, one of the most developed countries.

The grounds for the SMG’s practice of policy transfer lies in the unique challenges it faces, different from any other transitional country. For Central and Eastern Europe, Randma-Liiv (2005) names such challenges as the shortage of domestic know-how, experience in policy making and administration, accompanied by general uncertainty. Possessing great creativity potential and considerably high levels of experience in both policy-making and policy-transferring, the main challenges for the SMG are the high speed of city growth, and the pressure from the population to westernize their approach to administration.

Ironically, despite various examples of policy transfer to the SMG from abroad, international influence on average has been rejected by SMG officials. The SMG officials point out that the SMG neither imitate nor benchmark from abroad, and every policy implemented is an innovation of the government itself (personal interviews during the field trip, 2011). Although a grown-up kid at this point – the SMG – currently behaves as a rebellious teenager. When asked about either benchmarking or inspiration of any type from the outside, the SMG officials state that innovation is what leads government reform. As the chiefs of the SMG departments emphasize, Seoul incorporates more innovation than imitation (from personal interviews with SMG officials in 2011). Meanwhile, despite the official denial, benchmarking or lesson-drawing practices could be noticed almost in every sphere of the SMG. For example, even though 120 Dasan Call Center might have some unique features and particularities, the idea of a public call center was clearly not invented in Korea.
Seoul continues to develop at enormous pace and the urgency for fast responses to new challenges is as high as ever before. The speed of Seoul’s development creates a situation, where even more questions are raised, and simultaneously one needs quicker responses. For example: how does the city manage a giant landfill that once was out of the city but due to the fast construction of suburbs now appears in the middle of the city? How does the government efficiently operate a call-center in the city with a population of 10 million? How does it manage tough traffic and persuade residents to give up driving private cars? The success in answering these questions lies in the established environment of domestic innovation and creativity supported by constant benchmarking from abroad.

REFERENCES


40. Study Abroad Program by Type of the Program and by Country 2011, Seoul Metropolitan Government.


