MODERN CITY SAFETY
AS A COMPLEX PROBLEM

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Abstract
The issue of security has become one of the most important problems in modern cities. The beginning of the 21st century has shown rapidly increasing urban criminality. Large agglomerations without inherent integrated communities and with decentralized governance cannot implement the regime of law and order efficiently. Without security, a city’s development and growth is not possible. Many factors influence the condition of security in cities but a leading role is played by two of these: the rate of citizen participation in the criminality prevention process through community integration, and the position of the police force in the structure of the country’s organizational law enforcement systems.

Two examples show the importance of the powers of delineation in security matters. In New York City, the Police Department is a part of the city administration and implements policy formulated by the Mayor and the City Council. But in St. Petersburg and all other Russian cities, the Governor/Mayor, City Government/Administration and Legislative Assembly/City Council are not paramount actors in the security policing process. The federal state, as presented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, formulates security policy and its departments on all levels (regional and municipal) implement it according to principals and through methods fully determined by the federal authorities. These two models and their effectiveness are compared in the article.

Keywords: urbanization; security; safe cities; just cities; crime prevention; city administration; police.

Introduction

In 2015 the UN General Assembly adopted a plan of action “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” – a document that includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 global targets (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Goal 11 states the necessity to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”. In order to achieve this, access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and the upgrading of slums should be ensured, and inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management enhanced. These measures will offer an opportunity to reduce social tension in urban areas.

“Safe city”. Main characteristics

The urbanization process spreading throughout the world at an accelerating speed is leading to the simultaneous urbanization of modern crime that in turn is becoming one of the most complicated and diversified – in both form and level of gravity – phenomenons of the city life. The gigantic scale of modern cities, the alienation of human beings, and the decline of spontaneous social control characteristic of small cities and rural areas aggravate the social situation as a whole, including negative tendencies in the criminal sphere.

“The Safe Cities Index 2015” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015) based on an index composed of more than 40 quantitative and qualitative indicators that are split across four thematic categories: digital security; health security; infrastructure safety; and personal safety focuses on 50 cities selected by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), based on factors such as regional representation and availability of data. At the top of the ranking we see Tokyo, the capital of Japan (85.63 points), the world’s most populous city with 37.9 mil people in the Tokyo – Yokohama agglomeration (Demographia World Urban Areas, 2017). In different categories, Tokyo also performs strongly: digital security (1st place, 87.18 points), health security (8th, 76.26 points), infrastructure security (5th, 89.79 points) and personal security (3rd, 89.31 points) (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, pp. 31–33). From analyses of other city characteristics we see that safety is closely linked to wealth and economic development: Rankings by Income Classification (upper-middle income, US$ 30000 up to 50000, 1, 85.6); Livability Index (18th out of 140), Worldwide Cost of Living (123 – 1 is the cheapest), Business Environment Index (27 from 82, 1 – the best), Democracy Index (20 from 167, 1 – most democratic), Global Food Security Index (18 from 107, 1 – the most secure) (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 35).

However, as the analyses show, wealth, ample resources, business environment and living conditions in the city are no guarantee of urban safety. But as a whole these factors form necessary conditions for targeted and active policy aimed at reducing crime and raising the safety level of life in a city.

In our article we compare the security models in two cities – New York and St. Petersburg – although in the Safe City Index there is no mention of St. Petersburg. We can however find Moscow there. So we can presuppose that the diffe-
rence from the point of safety between the two largest Russian cities is not crucial – which gives us an opportunity to extrapolate the Moscow situation to a certain extent to St. Petersburg. Furthermore, we should bear in mind the fact that both cities are not independent actors in regards to the policy-making process in the sphere of security – they have no right to determine strategy and make final decisions on methodology and choice of instruments.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
<th>Moscow</th>
<th>New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population of the agglomeration (mil. people)*</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Cities Index</td>
<td>43 (61.6)</td>
<td>10 (78.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital Security</td>
<td>46 (51.54)</td>
<td>3 (79.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Security</td>
<td>24 (68.93)</td>
<td>2 (78.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Security</td>
<td>41 (70.65)</td>
<td>16 (84.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Security</td>
<td>49 (45.27)</td>
<td>28 (69.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rankings by Income Classification</td>
<td>Low-middle income / US$ 10000 to 30000 – 13 (61.6)</td>
<td>High income / above US$ 55000 – 3 (78.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livability Index</td>
<td>73 (from 140, 1 – the best)</td>
<td>56 (from 140, 1 – the best)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide Cost of Living</td>
<td>84 (from 103, 1 – the cheapest)</td>
<td>104 (from 103, 1 – the cheapest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Environment Index</td>
<td>60 (from 82, 1 – the best)</td>
<td>7 (from 82, 1 – the best)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Index</td>
<td>125 (from 167, 1 – the best)</td>
<td>19 (from 167, 1 – the best)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Food Security Index</td>
<td>40 (from 107, 1 – the best)</td>
<td>1 (from 107, 1 – the best)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015.


The comparison of the largest US agglomeration around New York City and the largest Russian agglomeration forming around Moscow give us an idea of the differences in safety arrangements in these two highly urbanized regions. These differences, as we have already suggested, can be extrapolated to St. Petersburg whose agglomeration of more than 6 mil inhabitants is forming largely in the same way as Moscow’s.

Main reasons and basic factors determining the decline of safety in large cities in the 20th and 21st centuries. In search of a way out

The urban growth most typical of our time is characterized by “urban sprawl”. The intergrowth of large agglomerations into megalopolises with dozens of millions of inhabitants, the concentration of power in these megasystems,
and the formation of fragmented and weakly interlinked “cities–regions” creates the foundations for the spread of criminal practices and the emergence of new forms of urban crime. In the beginning of the 21st century we can see the evident growth of social tension in the cities due to real estate and land scams together with the money laundering, which produce a serious economic and social crisis. No less important for urban systems is the rise of contradiction and conflicts based on inequality of distribution of public wealth on the territory, and differences in the possibility of accessing infrastructure and services for different social groups living in the same city.

The intensity of centrifugal forces initiated by various interests and needs correlates with the degree of differences between city districts, categories of its inhabitants and social groups. The most vulnerable and therefore the most aggressive of these are groups such as young people who very often can't find their place in a modern city and migrants who are considered by other inhabitants as intruders in their world of values and whose behavior and lifestyle seem inconsistent with the model of socialization typical of a defined city. These centrifugal forces are of an objective nature and the negative synergy formed as a result of their existence snowballs quickly and intensively. In order to lessen tension and raise the safety level it is necessary to form positive synergy by implementing a policy aimed at the creation of “safer cities”, “inclusive cities”, “just cities”.

The history of world cities provides us with a number of examples of a sharp rise in crime and thus a fall in the security level, leading not only to a fall in quality of life concerning safety but also to the lower rate of economic development, and to the formation of a negative city image in terms of public opinion throughout the world. The rise of crime from 1960 to the 1990s, in contradiction to the general opinion that crime is determined by poverty, was characteristic of cities in economically developed countries. One such example was New York City. It once more can serve as proof that there is no direct correlation between level of economic development, inhabitants’ income and level of crime in the city. Urban crime itself is a multi-aspect phenomenon depending on various variables of city life. At the same time, different forms of crime may have totally different causes.

Security is a central element of city administration responsibilities. As past experience shows, policy based on repressions and violence as a rule brings mainly negative results. Bearing in mind the fact that the city and the state are the main actors in the process of formulation and implementation of the security policy as a whole and the fight against crime in particular, we want to stress that the city authorities should concentrate on crime prevention with the help of measures that could stimulate city development and ensure social harmonization and situational impact determined by specific characteristic of the city itself.

In his article “The Evolution and Challenges of Security within Cities” Franz Vanderschueren argues that the decisive role in the level of danger to the peo-

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1 Vanderschueren Franz – Director of the Center for Citizen’s Security, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile, and Coordinator of the team of technical advisers of UN-HABITAT.
ple is played not by the size of the city and the direct risks of organized crime, but by the efficiency of the system and the process of city management. Only a few city management systems have a clear and elaborate policy in this sphere. At the same time, Vanderschueren is sure that in matters of prevention, city authorities have unique possibilities because they can benefit from their proximity to the population and therefore know better regarding the needs and the characteristics of city inhabitants.

A prevention policy demands decentralization as it requires proximity actors in order to be implemented. A central government, by definition, is distant from the reality of cities, not to mention their various neighborhoods, does not know its people and territory, and therefore cannot guide an alliance with local actors necessary for effective prevention policies. It is unable to work actively to prevent the exclusion of certain social groups and layers from social life (Vanderschueren, 2016).

Prevention policy as a holistic strategy requires the use of a clear and rigorous methodology. In order to understand the reality and the causes of criminality it should start with a participative diagnosis (including city inhabitants, interest groups, NGOs, diasporas, religious communities, etc.). A strategic approach to crime prevention and high level security provision needs some sort of consensus among local actors. First of all, it is necessary to work out a model of strategic priorities that will define specific projects that will help to prevent crime.

The implementation of crime prevention strategies includes the monitoring and regular evaluation of these projects and, finally, some supporting policies such as the training of technical teams and communications. Though the focus on technical approaches is important, methodological accuracy is also relevant. Without it, enacting preventive measures is dispersive, dislocated and with little or no impact in the mid and long term.

Vanderschueren identifies three main phases in strategy formulation and implementation processes. The first is the collective learning of tools and the strengthening of alliances between the main actors. It lasts for approximately three to four years. In this phase, continuity, a rigorous approach, leadership and technical teams are the key issues. The second phase requires consolidation of the urban community expressed in terms of social cohesion, a culture of crime prevention, the quality of life and the reduction in crime levels. The third phase is characterized by the adaptation of a successful experience of other cities and in many cases urban strategies which allow for the creation a national urban security policy (Vanderschueren, 2016).

To a large extent the root causes of crime lie in the social environment, this is why the fundamental problem is to ensure coherence and consistency between the crime prevention and the social policy in the city. Efficient prevention demands focusing efforts on vulnerable groups and, at the same time, eliminating (or at least – reducing) the structural factors that generate vulnerabilities. Crime prevention should strive to achieve a “just city” (Fainstein, 2014a) that offers opportunities for the most vulnerable social groups and has clearly formulated, effective prevention approaches articulated by social and urban policies.
The transformation of a modern city into a “just” one is touched upon in a number of research works analyzing this problem from different political and ideological angles, starting with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx & Engels, 1972, p. 482) and including such outstanding contemporary scholars as Manuel Castells, Michael Harloe, David Harvey, Peter Marcuse, Enzo Mingione, John Rowls (Castells, 1977, 1978; Harloe, 1996; Harvey, 1993; Marcuse, 2012; Mingione, 1981; Rowls, 1999) and many others. The main bulk of these researches is analyzed by Susan Fainstein in her book “The Just City” (Fainstein, 2014b).

The author’s position regarding various actors in the process of enhancing the level of justice in a city that makes it possible to prevent the emergence of depressive districts and residential quarters, and the formation of favorable conditions for inhabitants’ criminalization is as follows: firstly, the enhancement of justice is possible in modern developed liberal democracies – a statement rejected by neo-Marxist researchers; secondly, it can be done with the help of various municipal programs and projects with the active mass participation of inhabitants though in some cases urban movement participants’ interests can have a negative connotation, for example, they can reflect distrust and hostility towards migrants; thirdly, the capabilities of municipalities in achieving high levels of justice are limited as they have no power to initiate system changes.

This is why Fainstein stresses the necessity to only support urban development that will be free from discrimination and will offer chances for self-realization and provision of optimal quality of urban life, with national social programs. This statement doesn’t contradict the idea about the special role of cities in crime prevention and fight against its manifestations. The main obstacle for the implementation of such policy is the lack of necessary institutional arrangements, adequate resources and an efficient system of result evaluation. The Global Network on Safer Cities, launched in 2012 by UN-HABITAT (Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC), 2012) promotes ideas of joint work aimed at the formation of safe urban systems through collaboration of local actors’ coalitions with police and national governments.

British researcher Robin Hambelton in his book “Leading the Inclusive City. Place Based Innovation for a Bounded World” (Hambelton, 2015, ix-x) presents a whole list of numerous protests by urban residents in different countries that were accompanied with violence and brought considerable damage to their own cities: 1980 – riots in Bristol when people protested against tough police actions and M. Thatcher’s governmental policies; 2001 – massive protests in a number of British cities; 2011 – new street riots in Bristol (this time against the opening of “Tesco Express”) becoming a sort of a prelude to the same kind of protests in many other cities in the country; 2013 – powerful demonstrations in Stockholm suburbs, protests in Brazilian cities, in Istanbul, and Paris districts; summer 2014 – massive riots in Saint Louis (Missouri) caused by the death of an Afro-American teenager killed by a policeman – a situation that made President Obama interfere, urging calm and promising fair investigation of the case and its roots. Hambelton argues that the main reason for such
events is the “exclusion” of large groups of people from social life and the absence of possibilities to influence the decision-making process that has a direct impact on their lives.

A day without crime. The history of New York City’s success

In modern urban history there are some unique moments when as a result of efficient crime prevention and the high quality of the fight against criminal bands, the number of violent crimes show a steady decline and at certain point reaches zero – even if just for one day (Hughes, 2012). This very occurrence happened in 8 Million New York City – one of the most important political and financial centers of both the USA and the world (according to GWA classification) – in 2012. It is necessary to stress the fact that this was a logical result of the efficient crime prevention policy that had been formulated in the early 1990s when New York, a “Fear City”, was considered to be one of the most dangerous urban areas in the USA.

The 2017 statistics on violent crimes in the city also shows a steady decline in their number. The results of the New York police and city residents’ fight against crime is best illustrated by a special information bulletin (fact sheet) issued under the auspices of Mayor Bill de Blasio and NYPD Police Commissioner James P. O’Neill in April, 2017 (Police Department of the NY City, 2017). There we can find New York crime statistics for the previous week, the previous four weeks in absolute figures and as a percentage of the same period in 2016 as well as 2 years, 7 years and 24 years previously. Most interesting is the historical retrospective, starting with 1990, when there was a significant rise in crime in the city. The formulation and implementation of a city prevention crime strategy and the reduction of crime started at the end of 1993 after Rudolph Giuliani, the former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York State, had been elected Mayor.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>2262</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>3126</td>
<td>3225</td>
<td>2476</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>100 280</td>
<td>85892</td>
<td>39003</td>
<td>27873</td>
<td>15195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felonious Assault</td>
<td>44122</td>
<td>41121</td>
<td>28848</td>
<td>23020</td>
<td>20457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>122 055</td>
<td>100 936</td>
<td>47181</td>
<td>32694</td>
<td>12743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Larceny</td>
<td>108 487</td>
<td>85737</td>
<td>51461</td>
<td>46291</td>
<td>43421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.L.A.</td>
<td>146 925</td>
<td>11622</td>
<td>43315</td>
<td>29607</td>
<td>6626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>527 257</strong></td>
<td><strong>430 460</strong></td>
<td><strong>212 913</strong></td>
<td><strong>162 064</strong></td>
<td><strong>99823</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Police Department of New York City, 2017.
Table 3

Changes in number of violent crimes in New York City (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crime</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2016 to 2001</th>
<th>2016 to 1998</th>
<th>2016 to 1993</th>
<th>2016 to 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td></td>
<td>-49,2</td>
<td>-47,5</td>
<td>-82,9</td>
<td>-85,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td></td>
<td>-26,7</td>
<td>-42,9</td>
<td>-56,1</td>
<td>-54,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td>-45,5</td>
<td>-61,0</td>
<td>-82,3</td>
<td>-84,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felonious Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td>-11,1</td>
<td>-29,1</td>
<td>-50,3</td>
<td>-53,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td>-61,0</td>
<td>-73,0</td>
<td>-87,4</td>
<td>-89,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Larceny</td>
<td></td>
<td>-6,2</td>
<td>-15,6</td>
<td>-49,4</td>
<td>-60,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.L.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>-78,8</td>
<td>-85,5</td>
<td>-94,4</td>
<td>-95,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-38,4</td>
<td>-53,1</td>
<td>-76,8</td>
<td>-81,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Police Department of New York City, 2017.

As we have already mentioned, one of the most important conditions for crime prevention and combating is the availability of a clear, distinctive strategy based on the situational analysis and consideration of specific characteristics of the city and its consistent implementation according to all of the basic principles of its concept. In New York there is a long tradition of strategic planning and management – not only for the city itself but also for a large urbanized region of which it is the center. Equalization of material and social conditions on the whole territory of the tri-state New York metropolitan area and the enhancement of justice for all its inhabitants were and still are strategic priorities of all three implemented regional development plans (Regional Plan Association, 2012).

When crime overwhelmed the city, a combat crime strategy as part of the city strategic planning had been worked out under the leadership of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD Police Commissioner William Bratton2 (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). In 1993 when Bratton was appointed, the situation was so bad that articles in newspapers were headlined “Rotten Big Apple” (Baker, 2015). It seemed to the residents that the city was under siege. In the early 1990s the 25 per cent increase in the size of the police department and the “Safe Streets, Safe Cities” programme of the then Mayor David Dinkins did not bring the desired results. By 1994 there was the impression that the police couldn’t control anything. Bretton was sure that the police’s mission was not only to react to the committed crimes but also to control and prevent them. To his mind, the main method of such control and prevention was to control street conduct. To do this a concept of “zero tolerance” was formulated and implemented in the city. The crime rates began to drop and continue to do the same nowadays.

The “zero tolerance” model was thoroughly analyzed by both American and foreign specialists (Walklate & Evans, 1999; Wacquant, 1999). It was highly ap-

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precipitated though not all of its components were considered undisputable. Thus, the more aggressive style of police work in some cases led to abuse of authority, for example, the use of weapons against a man who had refused to show a standard ID with a photo. Analytics point out the following main elements of the New York model:

1. Specific targets for reducing crime were set for the Police Department and its officers: to remove weapons from the streets, to curb youth crime in schools and on the street, to force drug dealers out of the city, and to stop domestic violence.

2. Information systems have been significantly improved to ensure accurate and up-to-date data on the state of crime, especially in “hot spots”, as well as trends in the situation during the week on the ground. Prior to this, such information was only available on a quarterly basis and at a higher level of aggregation.

3. The chiefs of the police precincts assumed responsibility for the state of crime in their territory, and more specifically for the development and implementation of the strategy for reducing crime in their territory.

4. Weekly meetings of senior leaders were introduced together with the chiefs of the precincts. During these meetings, special criminality maps were used to identify the most dangerous areas and points, active monitoring of police stations and their leaders was conducted, and resource allocation was planned.

5. The police were encouraged to severely curtail minor offenses in order to prevent the formation of patterns of deviant behavior and to suppress the use of weapons. Other strategies were also used: observation of the situation in the territories by policemen in uniforms or plain clothes, the establishment of observation posts to search for stolen vehicles, the organization of “vertical patrols in buildings”, the use of rules for the suppression of illegal business, and the operation of identifying drug sellers using “control purchases”.

6. Local police chiefs were given the right to use detectives and specialized units to solve crime problems in the areas indicated by them, and not only within their own remit as before.

The concept became the basis of police actions and provided for punishment and detention for minor violations (hooliganism, being in a state of alcoholic intoxication, vandalism, etc.) as preventive measures against more serious crimes (theft, rape, murder), committed by the same persons who had been involved in previous violations of public order.

The special role of the mayor of the city and the chief of police in the development and implementation of the described model is connected, primarily with the fact that the issues of combating crime by all available means are to a decisive degree administered by the city authorities. The head of the New York City Police Department – the Police Commissioner – is appointed by the Mayor. He has more than 40,000 professional policemen in his subordination. The Department reports directly to the head of the city administration and acts exclusively in accordance with the municipal legal acts passed by the City Council. After the election of B. de Blasio, on January 1, 2014, William Bratton, author and main inspirer of the success story, was again appointed the Police Commissioner.
In 2014 the problem of combating urban crime exacerbated anew due to the murder of a black teenager by a white police officer and provoked intense controversy between Giuliani and the current mayor of New York City Bill de Blasio, as well as a rather harsh reaction from the New York Police. As a sign of disrespect to Mayor de Blasio, thousands of policemen turned their backs on him. A blatant challenge was demonstrated during the funeral of officer Wenjian Liu killed in retaliation for the death of several black people at the hands of the police.

On NBC’s “Meet the Press” (Fisher, 2014) program Giuliani insisted that Darren Wilson, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, who fatally shot 18-year-old Michael Brown, should be acquitted. He argued that 93 percent of black people are killed by other black people and the tragedy in Ferguson was an exception used by racist incendiaries. New York policy in Giuliani’s time as Mayor saved more Afro-American lives than in any other period of the city’s history. Giuliani explained that he and other New York City mayors had worked hard to make New York Police Department “as proportionate” as possible to reflect the racial makeup of the city.

Many black children are alive thanks to this policy. White police officers would not appear in areas where black people live if they did not kill each other. The danger for a black child in America, according to Giuliani, was not a white policeman, but another black person, and the responsibility was on the black community to reduce the reason why the police officers were assigned in such large numbers to the black community. Black people commit murders eight times more often than any other category in American society.

The current mayor of the city, Bill de Blasio (Mcduffee, 2014) who positions himself as a fighter against racism (married to an Afro-American and has two children) expressed his disagreement with Giuliani’s opinion, accusing him of a fundamental misunderstanding of the reality where a white child is in a different position than the black one: any action in the presence of a policeman – sudden movements, the desire to take out a mobile phone – may be misunderstood if it is a young man of color. We should begin a frank dialogue about the problems wherein parents fear that their children are at risk of interacting with the police, while the latter should protect them.

The words of de Blasio prompted city policemen to say that they protect all the children of the city from violence, regardless of skin color (Altman, 2014). The conflict arising in this context demonstrates a high level of complexity and sharpness of contradictions in the heterogeneous – multinational, multiracial and multi-confessional city. Nevertheless, the New York example gives hope.

To understand what strategies to combat crime can be effective in municipalities and how this affects the composition of residents, their property status, employment and other factors, an analysis of specific municipalities is needed. The situation in each individual case is influenced, among other factors, by an understanding of what the local community is and how it is defined as a whole. In understanding the municipality and the local community, which is important for addressing the problems of crime roots in certain parts of the city (often in the central part, in the “old city”), the following circumstances are most significant:
– the location in a certain place (in a geographical and topographical sense), a sense of attachment to the territory and its way of life;
– the presence or absence of social contacts and connections;
– the existence of a symbolic image of the territory and the local community;
– the presence of some common characteristics for a significant part of the residents (occupations, age, social and property status, ethnicity, etc.);
– awareness of the role of the municipality as an engine of collective action.

Often these characteristics are closely related to the perceptions of residents about the state of crime in their part of the city. In the last decades of the 20th century many municipalities in the US and Europe formulated and implemented their own security strategies as a reaction to the growth in crime. The notional shift from “fighting crime” to “ensuring security” meant a growing understanding of the need for inter-level and interagency cooperation within the framework of this activity.

Quite indicative is the example of security in the southern Bronx (in the context of the New York City reforms). In 1993–1994 the situation in this neighborhood was one of the most difficult in the whole city: many newly arrived migrants (mostly of Hispanic origin), unemployed and in need of social benefits, health insurance, etc. The level of reading and math skills (standard criteria for assessing the level of education) was significantly lower than the average for the city (less than 30% of students in both subjects showed knowledge at the standard level).

A group of researchers (Delgado et al, 2015) analyzed the matter of the reduction in residents' reporting various offenses and crimes to the police. As a result, the following conclusions were drawn:
1. The more active and constructive position of the police precincts contributed to the reduction of offenses and, accordingly, to the number of reports.
2. The best information support – the allocation of the most sensitive points – made it possible to concentrate police actions, for example, to send special patrols to certain parts of the district.
3. Simultaneously, the decrease in the number of reports was connected with the overall decline in crime in the city and in the United States as a whole.

In general, the experience of New York City shows that the political will of the inhabitants of the city and its authorities can bring exceptional results in the struggle for a higher level of justice and security, but this is impossible without the appropriate institutional conditions (powers, resources, understanding the severity level of the problem). In addition, this struggle can never be completed and constantly requires new efforts, ideas, concepts and consensus building in the urban community on the choice of methods for this struggle and the means of their provision.

From “gangsters Petersburg” to “safe city”

On April 3, 2017 in St. Petersburg, the first large-scale terrorist act occurred in 90 years of the city’s history: on the platform between the “Technological Institute” and “Sennaya Ploshchad” stations of the St. Petersburg Metro, a suicide
bomber launched an improvised explosive device. A second explosive device was discovered at “Ploshchad Vosstaniya” station and was rendered harmless by sappers. Immediately after the explosion, all train movement in the metro was completely stopped and all passengers were evacuated.

Such incidents happen quite often in large cities, however, it is not they, as a rule, which make the development of the entire system more difficult, destabilize the situation, and negatively affect the quality of life. Every day in cities with multi-million populations a large number of crimes are committed, including violent ones, that destroy the integrity of the system and form entropy “black holes” that absorb resources and create fear among residents, uncertainty about the future, fears for one’s own life and the lives of their children, and hatred of “others”, whoever they may be: members of another race, ethnic or linguistic group, culture, social stratum, etc.

The choice of St. Petersburg as an object of analysis is not accidental. According to one of the investigators of the criminal situation in the city, journalist Andrei Konstantinov (Konstantinov, 2016), the wave of organized crime that swept the city in the early 1990s was not only related to changes in Russia – democratization, the introduction of private property, a decline in the level of authoritarian pressure on society, etc., but also rooted in the history of the country and the city itself. In his book, A. Konstantinov included chapters on the first years of the history of the city, the imperial period of its existence, the first years of Soviet power and its further struggle against crime throughout the seventy years of the existence of the socialist system. The depth of analysis and the multidimensional nature of the perception of the problem of crime in a large city are particularly visible in the chapters describing the “dashing nineties” when the number of murders in St. Petersburg reached 1,000 per year (Akhmetzhanova, 2015).

Without delving into the past, especially since the modern system of criminal statistics has developed relatively recently and does not allow open access to existing data from the 1990s, we will analyze the state of crime in St. Petersburg in last few years. They quite sufficiently testify the significant achievements of law enforcement authorities, however, they provide additional data for further consideration of what conditions and factors of influence are insufficient for the final stabilization of the situation and prevent further improvement of the security level in the city as a whole and in its separate districts and quarters.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crime</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016 to 2015 (%)</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2016 to 2010 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularly serious</td>
<td>7566</td>
<td>7966</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>5196</td>
<td>+31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>14052</td>
<td>14540</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>20461</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders and attempted murders</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>52351</td>
<td>56480</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>64370</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of crime</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016 to 2015 (%)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2016 to 2010 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsolved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularly serious</td>
<td>5968</td>
<td>5844</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>+52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>8712</td>
<td>8848</td>
<td>‒3.4</td>
<td>11362</td>
<td>‒23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murders and attempted murders</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>‒8.7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>‒63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>26506</td>
<td>25845</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
<td>30138</td>
<td>‒12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Prosecutor General Office of RF, 2017.

Based on the general definition of the “safe city” parameters as “just” and “inclusive”, as well as the role in the formation of a system with such parameters of various parts of its management contour and the development of the principles of its functioning, we must determine those basic elements that play a decisive role in this process. In the first place, in any case, it is the city leader and the head of that part of the law enforcement system that directly performs activities to maintain law and order round the clock. In the case of St. Petersburg, as well as in the New York City variant, this is the responsibility of the police force, which is headed by the Central Administration for Internal Affairs of the City of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region (The Central Administration of Internal Matters for St. Petersburg …, 2017).

St. Petersburg is not a municipality. Being a subject of the Russian Federation, in fact, it can be characterized as a city-state. We fully agree with S. Feinstein’s idea of the special role of municipalities in the formation of a “fair city” that is necessary to prevent crime and reduce the crime rate in it. But in the situation of a city-state, we are sure that the greater part of its responsibility as an administrative body of the constituent unit of the Russian Federation should be an active involvement in ensuring the effectiveness of integration and consolidation of the urban community and local government. In the federal cities of Russia – Moscow and St. Petersburg – the role of local self-government is reduced mainly to issues of gardening and landscaping, as well as the execution of certain state powers transferred to them, for example, in guardianship and trusteeship. However, the list of issues of local importance of the 111 municipalities in St. Petersburg includes participation in the prevention of law in the city. At the same time this participation is strictly regulated by federal legislation and the legislation of the subject of the Russian Federation. Similarly, activities are regulated in the field of the prevention of terrorism and extremism, participation in the creation of conditions for the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening interethnic and inter-religious harmony, the preservation and development of the languages and culture of the peoples of the Russian Federation residing on the territory of the municipality, social and cultural adaptation of migrants, and prevention of interethnic conflicts (On the self-government organization in St. Petersburg, 2017).

The statements above are to a large extent formal, and municipalities do not have sufficient authority or the necessary resource base to follow an active and coherent strategy in this sphere. In addition, if we agree that it is necessary to form
coalitions at the local level in order to actively confront hostility, hatred and crime, then one of the main questions about the interaction of municipal authorities (that have almost no real power) with business, NGOs and, primarily, the police remains unanswered. In addition, the Main Administration for Internal Affairs is a part of the of the federal ministry structure, subordinated to the Minister of Internal Affairs, and practically is not able to pursue its own policy in accordance with the peculiarities of the city. Moreover, such a structure can’t take into account the specific characteristics of city districts and individual municipalities.

The difference between the parts of St. Petersburg is as striking as the differences between the areas of New York City. This can be judged by various statistical indicators, starting with the characteristics of the housing stock, including the age and ethnic composition of the population, and right up to the criminal situation. On May 4, 2016, a map of the most dangerous districts of St. Petersburg was published on the website of the RBC television channel. It was developed on the basis of the data of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, the St. Petersburg Information and Analytical Center, the Committee for Informatization and Communication of the Government of St. Petersburg, and the Committee on Legality, Law and Order and Security. In accordance with the data presented on this resource, the greatest number of crimes per thousand inhabitants is committed in the Admiralteysky, Kronshtadtsky and Central districts of the city. The clearance rate is the highest in the Kronshtadtsky district because it is a fairly closed system. However, the inevitability of punishment does not stop criminals.

The main features of the Admiralteysky and Central districts include the preservation of a fairly large number of communal apartments in poor condition that attract low-rent migrants and other marginal categories, and at the same time, the presence of a large number of places of mass congestion of tourists and people visiting theaters and concert halls in the evening.

Most frequently, serious crimes are committed in the Admiralteysky, Moscovsky, Frunzensky and Kirovsky districts, and least frequently in the Petrodvortsy, Pushkinsky and Kurortny districts that are considered to be of elite character and are located in the suburbs. Most murders and attempted murders are committed in the Central, Nevsky and Moscovsky districts.

Conclusion

Further movement of St. Petersburg towards being a safe and just city depends to a large degree on external factors that the Northern capital can’t control to the necessary degree. Therefore its ability to achieve success equivalent to the success of New York is greatly limited.

First of all it is necessary to point out the fact that one administrative body is responsible for police operations in the City of St. Petersburg and in the Leningrad Region – two subjects of the Russian Federation with totally different conditions of life and work. Consequently, types of crime in a highly urbanized city and in rural areas are, mildly speaking, far from alike. So it is necessary to have specialists with two different kinds of experience and mentality. At the same time the leadership of the Central Administration for Internal Affairs has
to establish and preserve good contacts with two different Governors and regional governments.

The second problem is that the Head of the Central Administration is appointed by the federal center and the choice of that particular person can be determined not by the interests of the city but by some other considerations. Thus, on June 11, 2011 under the decree signed by President Dmitry Medvedev, General-Colonel Mikhail Sukhodolsky was relieved from his post as first deputy interior minister and given the post of head of the Central Administration of the Interior Ministry for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, replacing the discharged General-Lieutenant Vladislav Piotrovsky. From the very beginning this led to opposition from St. Petersburg police officers (Vyshenkov, 2012). The main reason for this was that this man who had never worked in the city before immediately started to misuse his power by introducing “innovations” which did not coincide with the unique characteristics of the Northern capital of Russia. At the same time his style of leadership, full of arrogance and self-confidence, contradicted the tradition of comradeship that dominated the St. Petersburg police administration. The result was a public conflict that led to Sukhodolsky’s dismissal in February 2012. Sergey Umnov, the current police chief, was then appointed. His entire service in law-enforcement bodies since 1986 have been connected with St. Petersburg (Leningrad) – starting as a policeman in the patrol and guard service and moving step by step to a position of the head of the police.

One of the main principles of civil service functioning in today’s Russia is that of rotation. The heads of the regional departments of federal bodies and their deputies responsible for control and supervisory functions are subject to job rotation which is considered to be an efficient mechanism for fighting corruption. Under current legislation, top police officials are transferred to similar posts once every five years. In the opinion of the Russian ex-Minister of Internal Affairs, Rashid Nurgaliyev, such a reshuffle helps newly-appointed leaders to “get a fresh look at the situation, see the problems and define ways to settle them” (Internal Ministry, 2011).

A change of leadership is certainly necessary. However, in the case of such complex systems as St. Petersburg, there is a real danger that the process of the new police leader’s adaptation will be prolonged and lead to a decrease in the overall level of security in the city. In such cases, in our opinion, a person who has no experience of life and work in the city should not be considered a possible candidate for replacement. It is the responsibility of the city authorities to control this kind of decision-making process in Moscow bearing in mind the interests of St. Petersburg and its inhabitants, using all the lobbying resources they have. In the current situation, without efficient collaboration with the federal center, a qualitative leap toward a safe city is impossible. But in the future, decentralization in this sphere is highly desirable.
REFERENCES


