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«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

Post. address:
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation
Location address:
of. 307, 4/2, Slavyanskaya sq., Moscow 109074, Russian Federation

Tel./fax: 7 (495) 772-95-90, ext. 12631

E-mail: vgmu@hse.ru 

Science Index rating

56th place in the SCIENCE INDEX
 for 2017 (more than 5500 journals)

Russian Science Citation Index
two-year  impact factor for 2016: 1,505
(the citation  of all sources)

Russian Science Citation Index
five-year  impact factor for 2017: 1,368

Ten-year h-index 2017: 21

 

Journal's Indexing

Scopus




Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

Varvara Vasileva 1,2
  • 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation
  • 2 Senior Lecturer of the Policy Analysis Department, School of Public Administration, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University; Associate Professorof the Political Science Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, HSE, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation

Conflict of Interest Regulation in the Public Service: Brazilian Experience. (Part two)

2015. No. 3. P. 165–190 [issue contents]

The paper argues that the existing model of civil service anticorruption reform by importing “best practice” of conflict of interests regulation in the public service does not help to tackle or minimize corruption, but creates a vicious circle both in theory and practice. Corruption studies artificially segment corruption into independent macro- and micro-levels, and research contributing to one of the levels does not improve our understanding of corruption. Failed, long-lasting or, having unexpected results, recent administrative reforms clearly demonstrate insufficiency of “importing the model” as an anti-corruption measure. The model of corruption markets, presented in the article, explains the insufficiency of importing best practice, and demonstrates that the “good enough governance” tactic is able to minimize the national corruption market. The “good enough governance” has a good implication for unsolved problems of the Russian public service: one could never become Singapore by importing Singapore’s “best practice” regulations. Russian “good enough governance” of conflict of interests regulation in the public service might be adapting the experience of Brazil’s anti-corruption reform in the civil service (as the one that solved the same problems with the similar lack of resources). The paper presents a thorough analysis of the anti-corruption reform in Brazil, based on the study of regulations that were introduced by Cardoso and his successors (mid. 1990s-2015) and is structured according to the aims of the reform. Three mutually reinforcing groups of measures were introduced: decreasing politicization of the Brazil civil service, regulating conflict of interests in the most “sensitive” areas (such as public procurement) and ethic regulations. The research conducted has practical implications for the Russian public service – incremental mechanism for reforming the national public service and, consequently, minimizing the national corruption market.

Citation:

Vasileva V.M. (2015). Regulirovanie konflikta interesov na gosudarstvennoy sluzhbe: brazilskiy opyt (Vtoraya chast). [Conflict of interest regulation in the public service: Brazilian experience (Part two)]. Public Administration Issues, n. 3, pp. 165–190 (in Russian).

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ISSN 1999-5431
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