Issue 2010 no1 contents:

Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate the need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops the initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.

The idea of the article “Rules in the public sector in the light of Nobel Prize: contribution of Elinor Ostrom in the investigation of the collective action problem” appeared as an adequate response to the recent important event in the scientific world – The Nobel Prize awards in the economic sciences area. Elinor Ostrom is the first woman to win the Nobel Prize for Economics, which was established in 1968. Her award recognizes her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons, to the investigation of which she has devoted more than 40 years. The main aim of this article is to track the development of the theory of rules, promoting the effective management of collective action problem in Ostrom’s works and to show her contribution to the development of the modern economic science. The last, but not the least goal is to show the importance of her conclusions for the analysis of the public sector in modern Russia. The article begins with the description of the main events of Ostrom’s professional experience, research interests and investigation methods. Further, the detailed analysis is held of the main representative publications on the topics of common-pool resource problem, influence of different public institutions on it, game theory. Some parts of this article are devoted to the specific examples of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes and groundwater basins in such countries as Switzerland, Spain, Nepal, Turkey, etc. Methods of analysis and conclusions of common resource problem play an important role for the scientific research of any economy, including economies in the position of sharp institutions’ development such as Russian economy, for one. That is why scientific research held by Elinor Ostrom is so important for the creation of the right view about all the advantages and disadvantages of different variants of common-pool resource management problem. The article concludes with the description of the main publications of Russian economists on this specific topic, including A. Aleskerov, A. Auzan, G, Egorov, K. Sonin, R. Enikolopov and E. Guravskaya.

The article argues the undesirability of introducing recently proposed changes in the regime of vertical restrictions regulation in Russia. They are similar to the changes, which were introduced in the United States by Robinson – Patman (1936) and Miller – Tydings (1937) Acts. But at the same time these new rules stand in sharp contrast to modern practice of antimonopoly regulation in the USA and the EC countries. At the moment even the most extreme types of vertical restrictions – the exclusive contracts that prohibit selling goods or acquiring them from any but the contracted side – are not automatically condemned as per se illegal. The softening of the regime of regulation was due to the recognition that vertical agreements should not be considered along the horizontal interactions only. The underlying motivation for their introduction can be much wider and may have nothing common with the foreclosure reasons. The article provides an overview of modern institutional theoretical approaches that could potentially be used in the analysis of exclusive agreements (and vertical restraints in general). It is not just the traditional analysis of the exclusive dealing through the lens of investment fostering, but also the considerations based on the multitask moral hazard theory, the «reference point» approach [Hart and Moor 2008] and vertical integration theory of Baker, Gibbons and Murthy.

The article is dedicated to fiscal incentives for business angels. Business angel, a comparatively new phenomenon in Russia, is defined in the first part of the article. The second part is a research of fiscal incentives intended for private investors in order to encourage them to support small innovative enterprises. The research is based on European and North American experience. Finally, the third part suggests the ways of creating a system of fiscal incentives for business angels in Russia.

The article deals with the organization of Russia’s territory and its development from the historical point of view: the space potential of the country; factors of settlement and separation; mechanisms promoting development of Russia’s territory. The article focuses on the importance to distinguish between political-administrative and socio-economic bases of federative relations while forming administrative and territorial division. The article considers dynamics of settlement, indicates the mechanisms which help establish balanced territorial development of the country.

The article is based on the results of the research of community funds. Community funds are non-profitable organizations. Community funds accumulate and distribute the recourses donated to them by the commercial sector, authorities and private philanthropists. The recourses are directed to the community to solve its urgent problems. The article discusses the organizational features of the community funds as well as their specificity as grant-giving organizations. The article characterizes some particularities of the community funds and public authorities’ communications, and it also shows the influence that the economic crisis of 2009 has on their performance. The community fund technology is an alternative mechanism to increase efficiency of the state and municipal social sphere management. The community funds develop forms of social activity and civil participation due to the engagement of groups of philanthropists and citizens. Processes of philanthropy institutionalizing take place. The role of the community funds as support instruments to provide life quality, its social and economic elements on a certain territory, increases in situation of economic crisis.

The article explores possibilities of the management techniques, aimed at creating work force for public organizations, their capacities and benefits. The main attention is devoted to the task to make systematic and hierarchical relationships between different techniques and instruments visible. Effects of synergy and mutual supplementation are examined in most details.

This article is devoted to the transformation of the regional programs of socioeconomic development application in present Russia. This work presents the results of the research of the programs of socio-economic development approval dynamics, programs’ legal framework and means of short-term support, coordination of programs and strategies application. It shows that programs of socio-economic development are turning to be a tool of great demand among Russian regions. The tendency of increasing the number of complex systems of middle-term and strategic planning in recent years is pointed out. The article gives proof of the presence of program and indicative components in most of the programs used in 1999 – 2008.