The article deals with the problem of state regulation as a reason of costs for the recipients of legal norms – both for state actors and commercial ones. Orientation to the strategy of "smart regulation" was proclaimed against the background of overcoming the financial and economic crisis in the countries-members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEС). According to the memorandum of the European Commission (October 2010) the "smart regulation" consists of three components: a complex ERI system (the evaluation of the regulatory impact) at all stages of the public management cycle - from acts designing and decision making to the retrospective clearance and simplification of the current legislation; 2) cooperation institutes of the legislative, executive and controlling bodies of power in the member-countries of the EU; 3) participation systems of interest groups and citizens.  The research hypothesis is in the supposition that there is the fourth component of the system. It is the transition from the ministerial organizational model of the assessment of the regulatory impact to the model of tips on optimizing regulation in the central bodies of power.

The institutional design in the countries, which the article analyzes, is identical in having established independent bodies to control the norm-setting; they are meant to supervise the quality of regulation. One of the inseparable characteristics of the "smart regulation" is delegating some powers in the field of ERI to the higher level of public management: this is necessary to take into account when making institutional designs for countries with transitional economy. Successful practice of such independent expert councils of high level has become the ground for preparing the concept of the National Council for improving the legal regulation of entrepreneurial and investment activities in the RF.