«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

Post. address:
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
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Major Indexing

Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

V. Leksin1
  • 1 Doctor of Economics, professor, chief scientific researcher at Federal State Budgetary Scientific Institute, Institute for Systems Analysis RAS, 9 60-Letiya Octyabrya Av., Moscow 117312, Russian Federation

“Centre” and “periphery” in state management: channels of inter-influence

2013. No. 4. P. 59–74 [issue contents]

The subject-matter of the article is an analysis of the causes and consequences of the attitude of the central bodies of government to the bodies of power in the periphery [to the subfederal and municipal ones, and of the sub-federal government bodies to the municipal bodies], which is not typical of the majority of federations. For many years this kind of attitude has been enhancing centralization of power which originally stemmed from our legislation and the ideas of a hierarchical organization of state and municipal management being useful and quite admissible.

The method of analysis used was a case study of the native legislation and the practice of relationships between the central and periphery bodies of government over the years of 2000–2013, as well as analytical materials especially prepared as expertise for government bodies of different levels.

The study showed an absolute domination of the federal "centre" in the field of periphery legislation, judicial and executive power. According to the taxation scheme, produced by the federal "centre", two thirds of the general volume of periphery taxes should be transferred to the revenue part of the federal "centre" budget. Thus, practically all "periphery" have found themselves being unable to carry out their constitutional responsibilities to the people independently, and have been in direct fiscal and budget dependence from the federal "centre"; the same has been the case with the fiscal and budget relations between the municipal "periphery" and the sub-federal "centre", with the possibility for the "periphery" to influence decision making by the federal "centre" being most limited. Only 7% of the bills, prepared in the subjects of the RF and presented to the State Duma, become acts of parliament The same percent of their powers has been laid down independently by the periphery regional and municipal government bodies, and the rest is fixed and enforced to be executed by the federal "centre".

The domineering of the federal "centre" in regard to the "periphery" is gradually losing its positive potential, so restricting independence of the periphery at the time when a general crisis is spreading, is hardly expedient.

Citation: (2013) «Tsentr» i «periferiYa» v gosudarstvennom upravlenii: kanaly vzaimovliYaniYa [“Centre” and “periphery” in state management: channels of inter-influence] Public Administration Issues, no 4, pp. 59-74 (in Russian)
ISSN 1999-5431
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