Issue 2008 no4 contents:

The article analyzes the fundamental theoretical models of public management (Veber and Wilson’s model and the model of “a new public management”) in the context of creation a new public management system in Russia. The article shows advantages of the models and makes the conclusion that the modern public management system in Russia cannot be formed solely on the basis of the models analyzed. When we compare these two models we see that either has difficulty in stimulating economic agencies to the effective use of the resources. The model of Veber-Wilson means that the state machinery should certainly aim at political leadership and, as it lacks analysis of the economic constituent in the functioning of bureaucracy, it ignores the aspects connected with the effective selection of the resources to achieve the goals set to the State machinery. It (the State machinery) is expected to carry out commissions of the political leaders without asking for substantial means (budget money) for its performance, that is why its due expenditures ought not to be mentioned. The theory of “a new public management” focuses on responding to the interests of the public and meeting its needs through increasing transparence of the state machinery. This model, considering the state machinery as an institution to which the management laws of the private sector must be applied, analyzes results and efficiency of its performance in connection with intensive usage of the resources in order to reduce the fiscal expenditures of the state. Efficiency of the state machinery’s performance is  egarded here as meeting interests of the public or a customer and saving some money of the budget, allocated for the state functions, by optimizing the organizational structure and by making changes to transfer some functions to the outsourcing. It should be taken into account that this approach used by the state machinery as a strategy to optimize fiscal expenditures and to decrease transaction losses is not always reasonable. Budget saving tends to affect negatively the processes of improving management technology. We can ascertain that methods of developing reasonable goals and ways to achieve these goals with the help of the economic instruments to evaluate resource provision of the public management remain still  ndiscovered fully within the framework of the given models of bureaucracy structure. Hence these models cannot be widely used to realize reforms and development of the state machinery performance to-day. To counterbalance the disadvantages of the theories mentioned above, a “program and goal” conception, which was widely spread in many countries in the middle of the 20th century, can well be considered. Practical implementation of the “program and goal” approach needs a program as the main management instrument to be introduced which, in its turn, allows the public management to function without clear orientation to the existing models of the bureaucratic structure. Thus, this approach cannot be a model of the bureaucratic structure as it considers the organization of the management process from a conceptually different angle. The article concludes that realization of all the efforts to set up a federal state institution of public management must take place within a single unified program. The program will integrate all measures which the public management bodies (institution) as well as the staff offices of the federal state and public management institutions of the Russian Federation subjects are to realize.

The article is meant for both scholars, specialists in state and municipal administration and for a wide readership. The article shows how over a fairly long historical period of time the Swedish people began and have been developing their participation in the national and local decision-making  processes. The article reveals some specific features of interaction between the local self-government and local state administration; peculiarities of the Swedish system of self-government that has a high degree of independence which distinguishes it from many other countries, where we can see integration of the local self- government bodies into the state administration structure. The Constitution of Sweden provides foundations for self-government in the system of local bodies, their selfsupport, independence from the bodies of the state executive power, which have no rights to pass acts necessary for the communal bodies of self – government to abide by, which only submit to the laws and other acts of the legislative power. The author is trying to show how the Swedish people have managed to combine the tasks solution of local and national importance within the system of local bodies. The purpose of the article is to describe the way Sweden solves the problem of double submission of the local special bodies to the local bodies of general competence and to the central administration bodies. Under the existing system of double submission of the local state bodies, they are selfsupporting and independent from the centre, as well as the self-government is independent from the executive power, which has its own system of administration bodies and its own financial system. The article describes activity of the social bodies which represent interests of the self- government in the centre.

This research undertakes a theoretical and empirical examination of “high  performance bonus” systems in government, that is, incentive payments awarded by the federal government to state organizations or statewide programs to motivate and recognize high performance achievements. The  paper draws from a multidisciplinary literature on incentives in organizations to first derive implications for the design and implementation of high  performance bonus systems. An empirical analysis of the Workforce Investment Act performance bonus system and its effectiveness in recognizing and rewarding performance follows. The results of the theoretical and empirical investigation suggest that high performance bonus systems are more likely to encourage misrepresentation of performance and other strategic behaviors than to recognize and motivate exceptional performance or performance improvements.

In the article the author compares civic engagement policies of the two international  financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank (WB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – in Russia and investigates its interrelation with the civic engagement policy of the Russian federal executive authorities. The author understands civic engagement policy of IFIs and Russian authorities as support, dialogue and consultations,  development of partner relations with civil society organizations (CSOs) and groups of population at local, national and global levels. Based on the research results reviewed, as well as concrete cases studied, the author came to a conclusion that the most efficient civic engagement policy is implemented through a variety of civic engagement forms, which are linked with corresponding decision-making stages of the political institutions – forecasting (scoping), planning, programming and evaluation, including some intermediary stages, immanent to each political institution. Based on historical analysis of the creation and development of civic engagement policies of the WB and EBRD, the author concluded that from 1991 to 2006 the World Bank, especially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which had worked in close cooperation with the  international Monetary Fund (IMF), did not formulate or implement efficient civic engagement programs in Russia. This fact contributed to complications and failures of reforms, carried out with the WB’s support in the mentioned time span, as well as, in certain cases, inappropriate use of loans by the Russian Government. EBRD, on the contrary, from the very start of its operations in Russia, consecutively used civic engagement forms, adopted at the institutional level, including public consultations and independent expert assessments, which provided for a successful implementation of most of the Bank’s projects throughout Russia. International institutions and Russian authorities need a well-thought and result-oriented civic engagement policy in order to raise the efficiency of social and economic reforms’ components, due to consideration of various social groups’ and interest groups’ interests and obtaining feedback from society for timely correction of certain policies and political decisions. Part of political institutions’ civic engagement functions may be decentralized. The fact that EBRD, unlike the WB, did not decentralize its civic engagement functions, have not had a major negative influence on EBRD’s projects. However, in the case of decentralization, EBRD could have developed even further its advantages of institutional presence in Russia’s regions. There are nine main civic engagement forms used by IFIs and their Russian Government counterparts,  rimarily at the federal level. All of these forms could be tentatively divided into real mechanisms increasing the efficacy of the WB and EBRD  investments and their support to reforms in general, and imitation forms (quasi-mechanisms) of civic engagement. It should be noted that imitation forms of civic engagement not only substitute, take the space of the real forms, but also contribute to inappropriate use of state resources, deflect the civil society sector as a whole. Both the WB and EBRD have been reviewing their civic engagement policies in order to enlarge their civic engagement forms and models, as well as to assure greater disclosure of information. Civil society consultative bodies at federal, regional and municipal executive authorities appear in Russia: Public Chamber, Council on Support to Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights; civil society, expert and consultative bodies by ministries and state agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Anti-monopoly Service) and other. Based on analysis of history and forms of civic engagement policies of the WB, EBRD and Russian executive authorities, the following key principles were marked out by the author: formal policy should be documented by an institution at the highest possible level; it should become obligatory for execution for all officials; special capacity building programs for institution’s staff should be previewed; all levels of an institution should take part in development and implementation of the policy; openness should be observed in the course of civic engagement policy development and policy review; these policy measures should be integrated into other key policy documents of an institution; interaction with a variety of stakeholders should be assured (with consideration of age, gender, social and geographic diversity/balance); special budget and other resources should be previewed.

Recent trends in technology progress have brought significant changes not only in everyday life, but also in the sphere of regulation. The broadcasting sector is not exception. Here we can witness a wide range of technological novelties – mobile television, electronic program guide, teletext services, “video-on-demand” and others. And beyond obvious benefits of new products and services, we shall give a thought to the other side of the coin: the  bulk of new products and services is not included into current regulatory framework, though it is still broadcasting with all its possible effects and  influences. Thus in the era of new technologies arising, we shall review current models of broadcasting regulations and draw up a more appropriate regulatory framework. In the article author considers four scenarios of new technologies development in the sphere of broadcasting in the future in appliance to situation in Russian Federation. They were suggested by Robin Foster, independent consultant on economic, political and strategic issues in the sector of telecommunications of Ofcom. At first, author analyses current problems of regulation in the sector of broadcasting: the problems with statutory on authorization and licensing procedures, the problems with practice of receiving necessary authorizations and licenses, and the problems with the strategy in the sector. Statutory base was drawn up in the early 1990-th and is focused on traditional, now obsolescent, technologies. As a result, to become a broadcaster, a candidate should overcome sometimes insurmountable administrative and financial obstacles. And overall government strategy of developing industry is not turned on resolving these difficulties. Author suggests that the new regulative model should be flexible and should be designed according to changes in subject and object of regulation and regulator itself. For each of them, recommendations on the future regulation frames are given.