«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

Post. address:
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation
Location address:
of. 307, 4/2, Slavyanskaya sq., Moscow 109074, Russian Federation

Tel./fax: 7 (495) 772-95-90, ext. 12631

E-mail: vgmu@hse.ru 


Major Indexing

Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

Svetlana Pivovarova1
  • 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

2010. No. 2. P. 125–135 [issue contents]
The Russian public procurement system places serious restrictions on the choice of competitive procedure, form of the contract and enforcement strategy applied by the procurer. In this paper we present a theoretical model of a sealed bid fi rst price auction that refl ects these restrictions. Our model implies that the procurer oft en may reach an effi cient result of the competitive procedure only by breaking the restrictions forced to it by law, either by eliminating the suppliers with the low bids or using additional information about the supplier’s type in the bid assessment process.
Citation: Pivovarova S. G. (2010) Stimuly k ispol'zovaniyu neformal'nykh kontraktnykh mekhanizmov v rossiyskoy sisteme gosudarstvennykh zakupok (GU–VShE, 7–8 aprelya, 2010 g.) [] Public Administration Issues, 2, pp. 125-135 (in Russian)
ISSN 1999-5431
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