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«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

Post. address:
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation
Location address:
of. 307, 4/2, Slavyanskaya sq., Moscow 109074, Russian Federation

Tel./fax: 7 (495) 772-95-90, ext. 12631

E-mail: vgmu@hse.ru 

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 for 2017 (more than 5500 journals)

Russian Science Citation Index
two-year  impact factor for 2016: 1,505
(the citation  of all sources)

Russian Science Citation Index
five-year  impact factor for 2017: 1,368

Ten-year h-index 2017: 21

 

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Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

Gyuzel Yusupova 1, Evgeniy Nesterenko 2
  • 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation
  • 2 Мaster of Economic Sciences at the Department of Economics, HSE, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation

Should "What is Done by Night Appear by Day"? An Optimal Design of the Leniency Program to Investigate Collusion

2016. No. 3. P. 91–120 [issue contents]
Recent trends in the regulation of antitrust legislation have shown that it is necessary to review the policy on the method of cartel deterrence. First of all, it is connected with the strengthening of the world tendency to collusion at different markets, so new mechanisms are periodically introduced to keep up antitrust law in Russia.
The article presents a game-theoretic model of strategic interaction of market participants in the conditions of information asymmetry, firms of collusion and an antimonopoly authority including. In various parameters of the leniency program, market conditions, actions of the antimonopoly authority participants of collusion make a decision about their strategy (to collude, to collude but to cooperate, or not to collude). This model shows that the methods of the antimonopoly authority can be justified if, it uses the factor of uncertainty and riskaverse by collusion participants to increase the incentives of participants not to collude.
The model results made it possible to formulate recommendations on improving the design of leniency program in Russia. The following tasks, among others, are singled out as the tasks of first priority: the raise of the maximum penalty, progressive discount decrease to the second and every next collusion participant who confesses, as it is FAS of Russia that has had these powers since the beginning of 2016.

Citation: Yusupova, G.F. & Nesterenko, E.E. (2016). Dolzhno li taynoe stanovit'sya yavnym? Optimalnyi dizayn rassledovaniya karteley v usloviyakh programmy oslableniya nakazaniya [Should "what is done by Night Appear by Day"? An Optimal Design of the Leniency Program to Investigate Collusion]. Public Administration Issue, n. 3, pp. 91–120 (in Russian).
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ISSN 1999-5431
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