«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

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National Research University
Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation
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Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

Daniil Esaulov 1, Andrey Tkachenko 1
  • 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Russian Governors and Public Procurement Contract Allocation

2017. No. 4. P. 103–138 [issue contents]
This paper analyses the impact of governor’s tenure and his/her local ties on restriction of competition in the allocation of public procurement contracts. Basing on existing literature, we proposed that (1) tenure impact on competition in public procurement is nonlinear and (2) it depends on the governor’s pre-existing work experience in the region before he/she was elected/appointed. To test these hypotheses we employ contract-level data for the whole population of public contracts on road constructions in Russian regions during 2011–2014, and governor’s biographical information. The analysis showed that during the first two terms of a new governor in office, the procurement competition increases and then
starts to decrease. Such a non-linear effect is especially prominent for governors-outsiders – the ones without pre-existing local ties. At the same time, this effect is not observable for the governors who came from the regional elite. Moreover, previous work experience in the region leads to a higher procurement competition on average. We also showed that restriction of competition for governors-outsiders could not be explained by the increase of contract execution quality: execution delays the increase linearly and the probability of execution terminating is not decreasing with the increase of the governor’s tenure.

Esaulov, D. & Tkachenko, A. (2017). Vliyanie rossiyskikh gubernatorov na raspredelenie gosudarstvennykh kontraktov [Russian Governors and Public Procurement Contract Allocation]. Public Administration Issues, no 4, pp. 103–138 (in Russian).
ISSN 1999-5431
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