Issue 2016 no3 contents:

The article analyses the evolution of regulatory policy mechanisms in Russia based on an overview of theoretical aspects and OECD recommendations about best practices of government regulation. It offers alternative definitions of government regulation as an independent branch of economic policy that has been attracting ever more attention in recent years. The article analyses approaches to the optimization of government regulation taking into account market failures and market improvement opportunities, and makes a point that contradistinguishing government regulation from market regulation is unjustified. An observation is made that since regulation implies a certain degree of enforcement, the effectiveness of regulation largely depends on the amount of trust that society places in the government.
It is common knowledge that government regulation is examined, in both theory and practice, through the prism of not only public but also private interests. To secure advantages and benefi ts, certain interest groups attempt to influence the formation of government regulators, oft en to the detriment of public interests. This raises the question about the aspects of reasonable deregulation.
When it comes to choosing the practical course for improvement of government regulation, the recommendations of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), based on many years of analysis of regulatory performance in many countries, are invaluable.
Analysis of the evolution of Russian regulatory practices demonstrates that they are generally consistent with OECD recommendations. Superfluous regulatory functions of the government (unrelated to market failures) are scaled back, resulting in a reduction of administrative barriers and translating into business climate improvements. Market entry formalities are simplified along with control and oversight procedures applicable to business entities. Information transparency increases as regulatory requirements become more readily available and self-regulation improves. And yet further steps aimed at improvement of government regulation call for a deeper and more profound analysis and fundamental preparations in terms of creating information databases for a risk-oriented approach and making regulators really independent and more accountable.

The article describes peculiarities of state regulation in the industrial sphere in the Russian Federation within the period of 1991–1999. It gives an analysis of Russian industry condition in 1990s, general economic and legal factors that affected the choice of regulation tools of industrial policy during this period, including the effects of the industrial complex privatization. Here you will find an evaluation of the federal programs in the industrial sphere and other policy papers, adopted with the aim of bringing the industry out of the crisis, including State Industrial Policy Framework of Russia for 1994–1995 and Russian Federation Industrial Policy Guidelines for 1995–1997.
The article also analyses an industrial policy tool implemented in 1990s called Financial-Industrial Group (FIG). The state considered the latter instrumental in a competition promotion and, at the same time, insuring stability in the industrial realm. But, lack of the elaboration of the legislation on financial and industrial groups caused many problems with its implementation, in particular: lack of mechanisms for an effective cooperation of financial and industrial capital; the inclusion of insolvent companies in FIG; lack of FIG support tools. In conclusion the author states the absence of complex industrial policy in 1990s. Lack of funding of the adopted industrial legislation implementation was aggravated by practically complete lack of adequate legal regulation. The general fragmentation and inconsistency of the normative regulation of social relations in the 90s, wrought by the inability to regulate new economic relations with the old normative – legal acts, fully manifested itself in the regulation of industrial activities. The proposed instruments of state regulation did not have a clear legal basis and remained without implementation.
This article is the first in a series devoted to the analysis of industrial development management over the past 25 years. The overall purpose of this series is the evaluation of the industrial regulation in the Russian Federation and setting the conditions for making a new industrial development strategy of the Russian Federation.

The article is devoted to the reporting as a tool of state regulation and enforcement. The article examines the reporting of Russian business organizations with reference to the state bodies.
The article includes the following topics: the notion of reporting, types and features of reporting, problems of reporting, the procedure for the establishing of new types of reporting for business organizations.
The article examines the reporting regardless of the scope of regulation. Other articles usually consider reporting of enterprises only in relation to the financial sector (tax reporting) or to the statistical reporting, but this article studies reporting at the universal level. The author distinguishes the following types of reporting: the state statistical reporting, financial reporting (accounting and tax reporting), reporting of sectors. There is a description of each type of reporting and its legal regulation, of signs and features of each type of reporting systems in the article.
The article presents a classification of the business reporting on various grounds.
It is proved that the reporting is a tool of state regulation and enforcement on a par with such tools as: various state permissions (licensing, accreditation, certification, etc.), control functions of state bodies (testing and inspection business). Reporting creates costs for business as it needs completing reporting forms. Therefore, this article proposes to introduce regulatory mechanisms that exclude the establishment of redundant reporting forms.
The authors’ conclusions were verified in eight areas of public administration. The authors revealed an exhaustive list of reporting forms in all these areas. Such forms were reviewed with regard to the content and purposes of their collection.
The article formulates proposals to improve the procedure for the establishing of new types of reporting for business organizations.

The principle “one-in, one-out” means that the regulator should abolish the existing regulation in the amount of the costs imposed by a new regulation on business. This article contains an overview of experience in applying the “one-in, one-out” principle in Great Britain, Canada, and Australia. This research provides an analysis of the existing models of its application their features and quantitative results of the application of the principle, with the most interesting part being statistical data on the magnitude of costs, aimed at fulfilling the requirements of legislation which could reduce the overall burden of legislation on business during the application of the ne-in, one-out” principle. B Basing on the study of international experience, an analysis of risks relating to the use of this principle, is carried out. The implementation of the principle «one-for-one" is shown in lawmaking activities in Russia: the regulatory framework governing its use, as well as the results of the first enforcement. An analysis of the practice of application of the principle in Russia is based on statistics provided on regulation.gov.ru. portal. The research results in drawing conclusions about opportunities and consequences of the principle "one-for-one" implementation that can be claimed when applied in Russia. At present, the principle does not embrace all draft regulations that may increase the administrative burden. The formulating of the principle in legislation brings about some ambiguity that creates uncertainty in using it, as well as in methods (limitations on using the standard cost model). The practice of canceling the existing regulation, based on the «one-in, one-out» principle, is rare. However, the application of the principle in certain areas may have a positive impact on the reduction of administrative costs, such as the revision of the sectoral regulatory and legal framework of state control, the formation of a unified register of reporting forms and review of business reporting to public authorities.

Recent trends in the regulation of antitrust legislation have shown that it is necessary to review the policy on the method of cartel deterrence. First of all, it is connected with the strengthening of the world tendency to collusion at different markets, so new mechanisms are periodically introduced to keep up antitrust law in Russia.
The article presents a game-theoretic model of strategic interaction of market participants in the conditions of information asymmetry, firms of collusion and an antimonopoly authority including. In various parameters of the leniency program, market conditions, actions of the antimonopoly authority participants of collusion make a decision about their strategy (to collude, to collude but to cooperate, or not to collude). This model shows that the methods of the antimonopoly authority can be justified if, it uses the factor of uncertainty and riskaverse by collusion participants to increase the incentives of participants not to collude.
The model results made it possible to formulate recommendations on improving the design of leniency program in Russia. The following tasks, among others, are singled out as the tasks of first priority: the raise of the maximum penalty, progressive discount decrease to the second and every next collusion participant who confesses, as it is FAS of Russia that has had these powers since the beginning of 2016.

The study examined the problems of poor quality (the predominance of a formal nature) of financial and economic justification (feasibility study) of bills. At first we consider the regulatory requirements for the justifications. Then on the analysis of 200 bills of economic and fiscal topics introduced in the State Duma in 2015–2016, we find the prevalence of poor-quality justifications, and no association with the approval of bills. It is noted that pre-parliamentary discussion procedures (required for the Government of Russia), with all their shortcomings, have a positive effect on the quality of justifications. The solution to the problem of weakness of the financial and economic justification is thus seen in the formation of common requirements and extension of the procedures for pre-parliamentary discussions to cover all subjects of legislative initiative.

Instead of predicted globalization of state governance, that is described as appearance of a “global cosmopolitan state” one can see the divergence, caused by non-uniformity of innovative development; strengthening of situational competition in different states and the ways of life that experience the stress of innovative development.
Uncertainty of innovative development is a real reason for the contemporary crisis of public governance. The article introduces the notion of administrative crisis as an aspect of public governance crisis: inadequacy of existing administrative mechanisms of governance to new challenges.
Current state governance administrative paradigms that describe the state as a system of administrative bodies and a system of public service are transformed under the pressure of administrative crisis. The main theories and models inside the administrative paradigms that appear due to the administrative crisis are explored.

The European Union and the euro played a major role, and even a decisive one, in the political transformations of public management in the French society. This transformation is characterized by a set of regulatory and legislative texts reorganizing the procedures and functioning of public administration. The adoption of a structure based on «agencies», some of which may be called «independent» is of course the most spectacular appearance of this transformation.
Gradually we see developing a «government of rules» that reduces ever more the scope of political action. It represents, for some, an immanent tendency in parliamentary democracy; this is the argument of Carl Schmitt. Furthermore, the 2007-2008 financial crises led to a latent crisis of the Economic and Monetary Union. It led to an important pivot in the forms of governance and the establishment, within the Euro zone, a disciplinary structure that infl uences economic policies.
This raises an important issue about democracy.

The transition to the project principles in public administration, which was announced by the Russian President, needs a new ordering of the structural relationships within the public authority. The growth in the volume of employees of public authorities was accompanied by the blurred responsibility and the universally accepted linear – functional structure of management did not allow the authorities to react quickly to changes in the external environment and improve productivity by achieving concrete indicators.
The purpose of the article is to offer a new type of the state authority management structure, which could combine the project principles and at the same time not lose the unity of command and hierarchy that is typical of governmental agencies.
Th e article uses a structural approach to the design of public authority, which ensures the coordination of the activities of its parts, as well as the interaction between them, and for the first time it is suggested combining in one type of the management structure peculiarities of the project (matrix) and functional type for public authority.
Basing on the organization management structures typing methodology the article proposes a new type of governance structure – a project-functional one, which can be useful during a new stage of the administrative reform in the transition to project management principles, and shows positive features of the new type of governance structure for the organization of public authority, with the RF Ministry of the Far East Development (Minvostokrazvitiya) being an example as a possible experimental site for perfecting the new type of governance structure.