«Public Administration Issues» Journal,

Post. address:
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow 101000, Russian Federation
Location address:
of. 307, 4/2, Slavyanskaya sq., Moscow 109074, Russian Federation

Tel./fax: 7 (495) 772-95-90, ext. 12631

E-mail: vgmu@hse.ru 

Science Index rating

23nd place in the SCIENCE INDEX
for 2021 (more than 4000 journals)
Russian Science Citation Index

two-year impact factor for 2021: 2,314
(the citation of all sources)

Russian Science Citation Index
five-year impact factor for 2021: 1,898

Ten-year h-index 2021: 34


Journal's Indexing


Research and educational journal
Published quarterly since 2007
ISSN 1999-5431
E-ISSN 2409-5095

Andrey Shastitko 1, Natalia Pavlova2
  • 1 Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Head of the Chair of Competition Policy and Industrial Policy, Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University; Director of the Centre for Competition and Economic Regulation Studies, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy, 82 Vernadsky av., Moscow 117571, Russian Federation.
  • 2 Ph.D. (in Economics), Assistant Professor, Chair of Competition Policy and Industrial Policy, Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University; Senior research fellow at the Centre for Competition and Economic Regulation Studies, RANEPA. , 82 Vernadskogo Av., 119571Moscow, Russian Federation.


2021. No. 2. P. 7–33 [issue contents]

The article aims to show how decisions taken by a government body can directly contradict the goals for which it is endowed with appropriate powers. The effect is demonstrated by a recent antitrust case against the mobile operator Tele2. The hypothesis of the study is that the regulator's decision finding an antitrust violation, based on an incorrect interpretation of the behavior of an oligopolist, may have negative consequences for competition in the market. The theoretical part of the work is based on the concept of a maverick firm. The empirical base of the work is formed by data on the mobile communication market in Russia from 2017 to 2020. The paper shows that the observed results of the mobile communication market performance in Russia do not indicate the reduction incompetition. We prove that the behavior of "Tele2" in the mobile communication market meets the criteria of a maverick firm, a concept known in the research literature and in the foreign law enforcement practice. We explain why the interpretation of the behavior of a maverick firm as abuse of dominance (reflected in the antitrust case) contradicts the economic essence of such behavior. Possible anticompetitive consequences of such an interpretation are determined. The analysis underscores the role of meso-institutions in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the field of competition protection and reveals the sources of side effects of antitrust policy, which, among other things, can manifest in the incentives for less active competition. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.


Shastitko, A.E. & Pavlova, N.S. (2021). Antikonkurentnyje posledstviya antimonopol'noy politiki: keys mobil'nykh operatorov [Anticompetitive Consequences of Antitrust Policy: The Case of Mobile Operators]. Public Administration Issues, no 2, pp. 7-33 (in Russian).

ISSN 1999-5431
© 2009 Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления
Rambler's Top100 rss