The article aims to show how decisions taken by a government body can directly contradict the goals for which it is endowed with appropriate powers. The effect is demonstrated by a recent antitrust case against the mobile operator Tele2. The hypothesis of the study is that the regulator's decision finding an antitrust violation, based on an incorrect interpretation of the behavior of an oligopolist, may have negative consequences for competition in the market. The theoretical part of the work is based on the concept of a maverick firm. The empirical base of the work is formed by data on the mobile communication market in Russia from 2017 to 2020. The paper shows that the observed results of the mobile communication market performance in Russia do not indicate the reduction incompetition. We prove that the behavior of "Tele2" in the mobile communication market meets the criteria of a maverick firm, a concept known in the research literature and in the foreign law enforcement practice. We explain why the interpretation of the behavior of a maverick firm as abuse of dominance (reflected in the antitrust case) contradicts the economic essence of such behavior. Possible anticompetitive consequences of such an interpretation are determined. The analysis underscores the role of meso-institutions in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the field of competition protection and reveals the sources of side effects of antitrust policy, which, among other things, can manifest in the incentives for less active competition. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.